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Content analysis sample periods  
Sample period Events taking place at the time 
 
12 - 18 
September 2002 
 
Prime Minister, John Howard addresses National Press Club and sets out Federal 
Government’s reasons for supporting war in Iraq.   
US President Bush, on anniversary of 9/11, delivers a speech on Ellis Island 
VP Cheney addresses the US Centre for Strategic and International Studies.   
UK Prime Minister Blair visits the US. 
5 - 11 February 
2003  
 
Howard outlines his Government’s reasons for supporting the US, including in 
decision to return to the UN Security Council for a ‘second resolution’ on Iraq. 
US Secretary of State, Colin Powell, addresses the United Nations General 
Assembly and outlines the case against Iraq, producing ‘evidence’ of Iraq’s 
possession of WMD that was later discredited.  
13 - 19 March 
2003  
 
US recognises it would not get the support of the UN Security Council for a second 
resolution sanctioning an invasion of Iraq.   
US, UK and Australian troops are prepared for war. 
Iraqi people contemplate their fate. 
20 – 26 March 
2003 
US, UK, Australian and Polish troops invade Iraq. 
Australian journalist killed in a suicide bombing. 
Reports of coalition forces killed in ‘friendly fire’ incidents.   
Media carry accounts of Iraqi citizens struggling to cope with early days of war, with 
mixed feelings about the American invasion.  
Early accounts of looting, but few accounts of the warm welcome some troops 
expected. 
1 – 7 May 2003 
 
Bush announces the end of major combat operations - ‘in the battle of Iraq we have 
prevailed’ - on the USS Abraham Lincoln. 
Howard visits US President at his Crawford ranch.  
Discovery of mass graves in Iraq, believed victims of Saddam Hussein. 
2 – 8 October 
2003 
David Kay reports no WMDs. 
Concern that the ‘body count’ in Iraq just keeps rising. 
Furor in the US over failure to find WMD. 
US Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) launches criminal investigation into 
allegations of ‘dirty tricks’ at the White House into what became known as the 
Valerie Plame affair.   
1 – 7 March 2004 
 
First anniversary of the war. 
Jull reports exaggeration of intelligence reports in Parliamentary Joint Committee on 
ASIO, ASIS and DSD report on Inquiry into Intelligence on Iraq's Weapons of Mass 
Destruction (WMD).  
Ex-diplomat Philip Flood to head up a further inquiry  
Commentators argue that Howard won the political battle over Iraq. 
Attacks in Karbala and Baghdad raise fears of a civil war in Iraq.   
20 – 26 July 2004 Philip Flood’s Report of the Inquiry into Australian Intelligence Agencies (handed 
down a week after the Butler report, Review of Intelligence on Weapons of Mass 
Destruction, was tabled in the UK House of Commons; and two weeks after the US 
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence tabled its Report of the Select Committee 
on Intelligence on the U.S. Intelligence Community's Prewar Intelligence 
Assessments on Iraq) finds shortcomings in pre-war intelligence, but no evidence of 
political interference.   
AC Nielsen poll finds most Australians believed war not justified.   
20 – 26 March 
2008  
 
5th anniversary of the invasion of Iraq by the ‘coalition of the willing’.   
US military deaths in Iraq reach 4,000. 
Rudd vows to pull Australian combat troops out of Iraq by year’s end. 
Bush leaves decision about troop draw-down to new President.   
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Synopsis 
 
The 2003 Iraq war provided a case study through which to investigate the influences on 
media agenda formation at two quality Australian newspapers, the Sydney Morning Herald 
(SMH) and the Australian, and to explore what gave rise to commonalities and differences 
in reporting and analysis.  This research compared the Australian’s and the SMH’s 
coverage of the war using a content analysis of 1,204 articles drawn from both papers 
during nine critical periods before, during and after the invasion.  Interviews with Fairfax 
and News Ltd journalists, politicians, experts and public servants explored the politics of 
what happened as well as possible reasons for differences in the ways both papers 
reported on the war.   
The analytical aim of the project was to determine which of three US media models - W. 
Lance Bennett’s indexing model, Thomas Christie’s agenda-public opinion congruence 
model and Robert Entman’s cascading network activation model - might best describe 
what occurred in the Australian print media’s coverage of the war.  The research findings 
confirmed some hypotheses, challenged some, and enabled a more nuanced 
understanding of others.  For example, the data did not paint a picture of the Australian 
media as being ‘lap-dogs’, but nor did they impress as being active watch-dogs.  The 
picture also varies at different stages of the war.  The study found that, for example, while 
the Government dictated the terms of the debate on Iraq (WMD and terrorism before the 
war and flawed intelligence advice afterward), they did not always succeed in dominating 
the media agenda.   
This research found that, in broad terms, the Australian was consistently more pro-war 
than the SMH.  While this was always so on editorial policy and the front page of the 
paper, the extent to which it carried into feature articles and news stories was much more 
mixed, and varied with themes and time periods.  While journalists at both papers saw Iraq 
as a policy failure, in the absence of concerted Opposition sponsorship of a counter-
narrative, there was not sufficient momentum or critical mass for the issue to build into a 
political crisis for the Government.  
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Introduction 
On 19 March 2003, US troops in coalition with British, Australian and Polish forces invaded 
Iraq.  The invasion took place after a long political and military build-up focussing on 
Saddam Hussein’s alleged possession of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and 
support for terrorist groups.  The war was quick and decisive, with the end of the battle for 
Baghdad marked by the 9 April toppling of Saddam’s statue in Firdos Square, in front of 
the Palestine Hotel and the world’s media.  Just six weeks after the invasion, on 1 May 
2003, US President, George W Bush, was on the deck of the aircraft carrier USS Abraham 
Lincoln announcing the end of major combat operations in Iraq.  “In the Battle of Iraq, the 
United States and our allies have prevailed” (Bush, 2003), he said – but soon things 
started to go wrong.   
Instead of the warm welcome some troops expected, there were many cases of open 
hostility and armed resistance.  Widespread looting in the wake of major combat 
operations and limited troop numbers undermined US efforts to take control of and restore 
the country’s infrastructure.  Civil disorder and chaos made life unsafe for Iraqis who 
struggled to survive in the midst of sectarian violence, al Qaeda opportunism and a 
breakdown in law and order.  The decisions by the administrator of the Coalition 
Provisional Authority, L Paul Bremmer III, to embark on a program of de-Ba’athification 
and his disbanding of the Iraqi army greatly complicated US rebuilding efforts and swelled 
the ranks of disgruntled Iraqis (Bremer, 2006, Packer, 2005, Ricks, 2006).  Later 
revelations about US abuses at the Abu Ghraib prison contributed to an undermining of 
US authority in the country.  Some commentators referred to the war as a ‘quagmire’ – a 
word reminiscent for Americans of the Vietnam conflict (Ricks, 2006, Woodward, 2008).   
The costs of the war in terms of US and coalition blood and treasure were considerable.  
Close to 4,500 US service men and women died before troops were withdrawn in 
December 2011, with a further 300 other coalition deaths, including 179 from UK, 33 from 
Italy and 23 from Poland (iCasualties.org, 2012).  More than 33,000 were wounded 
(iCasualties.org, 2012, Iraq Body Count, 2012(1)).  This does not include the estimated 
“one hundred thousand US soldiers [who] have returned from the war suffering serious 
mental health disorders, a significant fraction of which will be chronic afflictions” (Stiglitz 
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and Bilmes, 2008, p. ix).  The estimated cost of the Iraq war for US taxpayers has ranged 
from $806 billion (Belasco, 2011) - which included Department of Defense, State 
Department/USAID and Department of Veterans Administration budget submissions, and 
medical care for Iraq war veterans - to an estimated three trillion dollars if the ongoing cost 
of support for veterans, including social and economic costs are included (Stiglitz and 
Bilmes, 2008).  The costs of the Iraq war are “more than double the cost of the Korean 
war…[and] are projected to be almost ten times the cost of the first Gulf War, almost a 
third more than the cost of the Vietnam War and twice that of World War 1” (Stiglitz and 
Bilmes, 2008, p6).  According to Stiglitz and Bilmes, only World War II cost more in real 
terms. 
The Iraqis too paid dearly.  Estimates of Iraqi deaths between 2003 and 2011 range 
between 158,000 (of which around 79% were civilians (Iraq Body Count, 2012)) and close 
to 1.5 million (Opinion Research Business report cited in Reuters, 2008).  Iraq Body Count 
estimates that only around 13% of all documented civilian deaths were directly caused by 
US-led coalition forces and over half of these occurred during the invasion in 2003 and the 
sieges of Fallujah in 2004 (2012).  The rest were caused by Iraqis and insurgents.  The 
UNHCR estimated in September 2007 that there were then around 4 million displaced 
Iraqis, 2.2 million within Iraq and a similar number abroad, with around 1 million displaced 
prior to the war (UNHCR, 2007).   
Weapons of mass destruction were never found.  Many of the arguments advanced by the 
US, British and Australian governments for going to war in Iraq were subsequently 
discredited.  Yet in November 2003, just eight months after the invasion, in an interview 
with David Frost on Breakfast with Frost on BBC television, Howard said about the Iraq 
conflict that “by and large, Australia has moved on” (Howard, 2003(b)). Even though both 
were subsequently re-elected, the US President and the Blair Government were deeply 
damaged by the exercise.  In the 2004 Australian election, the Howard Government was 
returned with the first majority in both houses since 1977.  In the 2007 election the war in 
Iraq ranked 9th as an issue of importance amongst voters: 6th for Greens voters, 8th for 
Labor voters and 13th for Liberal-National party voters (Bean and McAllister 2009). 
Some commentators have suggested that the media failed Australia by failing to challenge 
the Government narrative in the lead-up to the Iraq invasion (Manne, 2005, McKnight and 
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McNair, 2012).  News Limited (now News Corporation Australia)’s proprietor, Rupert 
Murdoch, made no secret of his support for intervention in Iraq, but this was also at a time 
when public opinion was against the war.  Australian Prime Minister, John Howard, was 
widely viewed as a persuasive and skilled politician (Kelly, 2006, Shergold, pers. com., 19 
Feb 2013), but many commentators argued that “globalised spin [had] shaped the US, 
British and Australian government cases for war against Iraq” (Barker, 2003, p104, Price, 
2004).  The Opposition at the time was divided, in the throes of a leadership change and in 
fear of looking weak on security (Latham, 2005).  According to Macquarie University’s 
Professor Murray Goot, “the polls suggested not only that Australians did not want to be 
part of an American-led force, but that American efforts to stitch up a ‘coalition of the 
willing’ and Australia’s apparent willingness to go along with it had damaged the image of 
the Australian government vis-a-vis America and the American government vis-à-vis 
Australia” (2003, p4).  This research seeks to shed light on the pre-war period; to examine 
media coverage; and to understand how the Government was able to mobilise public 
opinion, initially opposed, to support the war during the invasion. 
The post-invasion collapse of the reasons for going to war, and the failure of this issue to 
develop into a political crisis for the Australian Government (as it had for the US and UK 
governments) raises questions about democracy in Australia: about the adequacy of 
Australia’s institutions and processes, including its press.  Two inquiries investigated the 
possible failure in intelligence advice: the inquiry of the Parliamentary Joint Committee on 
ASIO, ASIS and DSD into ‘Intelligence on Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction’ (chaired by 
David Jull, MP and known as the Jull inquiry) and the Government Inquiry into Australian 
Intelligence Agencies conducted by retired diplomat, Philip Flood.  Neither inquiry 
examined the policy or decision-making process that took Australia to war on the basis of 
a false premise. It was unclear if it was a failure in the policy process or a failure in 
judgement on the part of political leaders.  News Ltd journalist Paul Kelly suggested that 
Australia’s official advisers ‘acquiesced’ and provided only the advice asked for (2006).  
While many in the media focused on the failure of the intelligence agencies, unexpectedly 
it was the Australian which focused attention on the PM as decision-maker, with its 2 
March 2004 front page headline “PM’s spin sexed-up Iraq threat” (Walters, 2004).  
Inexplicably, the Opposition failed to hold the Government to account.  Apart from some 
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speeches in Parliament, which received limited media coverage, they appeared to have 
“rolled over” on the issue of Iraq (Kelly, 2004). 
A great deal has been written about the failure of the US media (and to a lesser extent the 
media in the UK) to challenge the narratives coming from the White House and Downing 
Street around the reasons for going to war in Iraq (Bennett, 2007, Bennett, Lawrence and 
Livingston,  2007, Cunningham, 2003, Dimaggio, 2009).  Both the New York Times and 
the Washington Post issued apologies for their pre-war coverage (Kurtz, 2004, New York 
Times editors, 2004).  In Australia, on the other hand, there was very little soul searching 
on the part of the media.  While some academics have been highly critical of our media’s 
performance, particularly the Murdoch press, (Hobbs, 2010, Jakobowicz and Jacka, 2005, 
Manne, 2011(a), McKnight and McNair, 2012, Tiffen, 2014), the response on the part of 
the media has been largely defensive.  Any public anger at perceived deception was not 
reflected in the subsequent elections and this resulted in what Murray Goot called a “moral 
panic induced by polling that suggested that Australians were prepared to support a 
government that had misled them – deliberately or otherwise” (Goot, 2007, p42).  While 
Goot goes on to challenge this view in his paper, this research will consider the influences 
on the Australian media’s agenda in covering the Iraq war.  This research explores the 
means and extent to which the Government was able to control or ‘manage’ the Australian 
media agenda and other sources stimulating debate or challenging Government narratives 
on Iraq.  Finally, the research examines the degree to which the media held the 
Government to account and the role played by other elites and public opinion in that 
process.   
Media and political agendas 
In the long-running debate about media influence on public opinion, an influential view has 
been that the “news media may not be successful in telling people what to think, but they 
are stunningly successful in telling their audiences what to think about” (Cohen 1963, cited 
in McCombs and Shaw, 1972, p 2-3).  The media do this by influencing the perceived 
salience of an issue (a view of an issue’s relative importance) through placement of 
articles, the choice of headlines and the framing of issues in their discussion.  Framing 
refers to “the process of selecting and highlighting some aspects of a perceived reality, 
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and enhancing the salience of an interpretation and evaluation of that reality” (Entman, 
2004).  The media use frames and framing to engage readers, to give context to a story 
and to give weight (in terms of relative importance) to particular news sources, themes and 
a certain interpretation of a story.  Looking behind this process, if the media help to frame 
the public’s agenda, it is equally pertinent to ask how the media’s agenda is shaped.  
Journalists and editors no doubt influence each other, but are also influenced by what their 
readers think or want to read.  This research project, rather than look at the impact of the 
media on public opinion, sought instead to look at the varied influences on members of the 
media themselves and to further an understanding of the formation of the media agenda, 
including the power and influence of political elites, journalistic practices and journalists’ 
commitment to news values, the impact of media ownership and ultimately the impact of 
public opinion – using the Iraq war as a case study.   
There are different views about the influence of public and elite opinion.  This thesis 
considered three models: one which describes the impact of public opinion on the media 
agenda (Thomas Christie’s agenda-public opinion congruence model (2006)); one which 
describes the impact of political and other elites on the media agenda (W. Lance Bennett’s 
indexing model (2007)) and one which combines the two in a feedback model (Robert 
Entman’s cascading network activation model (2004)).  Christie, Bennett and Entman are 
all eminent American scholars who have written on the US media and coverage of the 
2003 Iraq war.  This project sought to examine the degree to which their models could be 
transposed and might adequately describe what happened in Australia.  Where the models 
did not appear to explain what happened, this project sought to identify the degree to 
which that might have been the product of shortcomings in the models themselves or 
different influences at work in the context of Australian politics. This research found that 
the Entman model went a considerable way toward capturing the complex interplay of 
factors influencing journalists and contributing to media agenda formation.  
Research aims and design 
Media agenda formation is at the centre of this research.  Specifically, the project sought 
to identify the influences on media agenda formation at two quality Australian newspapers 
- the Australian and the Sydney Morning Herald (SMH) - to explore what differences 
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emerged in their reporting and analysis, and why.  Sometimes the two papers covered the 
war in similar terms, but at other times differently.  The study sought to identify what 
influences might explain differences in coverage; who was most influential in shaping 
media coverage, when and why; and what might have influenced the media’s 
understanding of the issue. 
These questions raised methodological problems about the best way to a) study media 
content systematically, and b) uncover contextual and other influences that shaped and 
formed that agenda.  These dual needs - for an objective analysis of content and an 
investigation of the forces that shaped content (agenda formation) - were addressed 
through a mixed method research design which included a quantitative content analysis 
and qualitative in-depth interviews. 
Content analysis 
Content analysis was used to identify and analyse patterns in media coverage. Analysis 
explored questions like - ‘What were the patterns of media coverage at different times?’  
‘What were the differences between papers?’  ‘What was the media agenda?’ Given the 
sheer volume of coverage of the Iraq war, nine sample periods were selected at times of 
critical events before, during and after the Iraq invasion.  The content analysis - of 1,204 
articles published about the 2003 Iraq conflict by the SMH and the Australian – involved 
the systematic study of themes, sources and direction of coverage, enabling comparisons 
between the two media organisations.   
Content analysis is a method commonly used in media research (Frey, Botan and Kreps, 
2000, p.236).  Firstly, it can “identify, enumerate and analyse occurrences of specific 
messages and message characteristics embedded in texts” (Frey et al, 2000, p 236) 
providing an examination of “qualitative data in a quantitative manner” (Stacks, 2002).  The 
coding of key article attributes enabled a systematic, objective and quantitative 
comparison between the two newspapers across nine sampling periods.  Secondly, the 
content analysis produced data which could be compared to a similar study of the British 
media conducted by Howard Tumber and Jerry Palmer from City University, London 
(2006).  
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Key article attributes – such as type and size of article, themes covered, sources quoted, 
placement (page number) and tone or direction of sentiment – are an indication of a 
newspaper’s agenda, that is their editorial view on a particular issue or range of issues, 
including salience (relative importance) (McCombs, 2004)).  Through the systematic 
coding of these attributes, content analysis enables the identification of different patterns 
or changes in pattern over time.  A front page article on a topic suggests importance, as 
does the size of the article (number of words) or its placement on a dominant page of the 
paper.  The views of particular parties to the debate – whose relative influence is 
suggested by the number of times and the order in which they are quoted – are frequently 
indicative of editorial position on an issue.  Another indicator of a paper’s agenda is the 
number of articles that take a position on an issue compared with the number of articles 
that include a plurality of views, or take an opposing position.  Editorials, too, reflect the 
paper’s agenda, but this is explicit rather than inferred.   
The value of content analysis lies in its systematic application of uniform coding rules to a 
body of selected media content to enable a reliable comparison, which might reveal 
patterns not readily seen when material is viewed casually and subjectively, or when items 
are considered in isolation.  The quantitative results offer no basis for inferring the reasons 
behind an issue being framed in a particular way or a particular editorial line being taken at 
the time.  These questions needed to be explored through qualitative investigation. Having 
a view of the changing agendas led, then, to larger questions about the influences that 
shaped them.   
Interviews 
Influences on the media agenda were explored through semi-structured, in-depth 
interviews with journalists, editors, former politicians, current and former public servants 
and former defence personnel.  Interviews provided an opportunity to explore questions 
qualitatively.  ‘Why was the war framed in the way it was?’  ‘Why did newspapers take a 
similar approach at some times, but different approaches at other times?’  In areas like 
foreign affairs and intelligence, the Government of the day has a high level of control over 
information and hence influence over the shape of the debate.  In interview, journalists 
were asked to describe the influences that had shaped their views at different stages of 
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the Iraq war, including their efforts to hold the Government to account in a policy area 
where, by its nature, there is little transparency and few alternative sources of information.  
Editors explained how they decided on an editorial line when information was scarce and 
the subject matter complex.  Former public servants, including intelligence analysts, 
provided context for their advice to government – insofar as it had been put on the public 
record by two official inquiries (Jull, 2003, Flood, 2004) – as a means of comparing what 
happened with the way it was reported.     
Journalists were asked about the availability of alternative voices in the debate, including 
the impact of the Australian Opposition’s position on the war; public opinion and its impact 
on the way they covered the conflict; leaks and ‘unofficial’ voices (including questions 
around intimidation of the bureaucracy); the impact of tight deadlines; and the impact of 
the editor’s/proprietor’s views.  They were also asked whether the media (in their opinion) 
lived up to their ‘watchdog’ role in coverage of Iraq and whether there were obstacles that 
prevented them from putting their ideals into practice.  For example was there pressure to 
report the war with a particular slant, given the paper’s editorial position on the war?   
This project also explored the agendas and influence of the politicians and decision-
makers at the time, including former Prime Minister Howard, and some of the senior public 
servants who were advising the Government at the time.  Interviews sought to clarify the 
communication objectives of key influential figures and their perceptions of the degree to 
which media coverage had accurately reflected their actual priorities in the lead-up to, 
execution of, and aftermath of the invasion.  There is a particular focus on the 
Government’s management of media coverage of the two intelligence inquiries held in 
2003-2004. 
Structure of the thesis 
This thesis seeks to advance understanding of the theory around agenda-setting, agenda-
formation (or building) and framing.  It begins with a review of the literature in chapter one, 
‘Media and political agendas - Untangling the debates’, and looks at three models being 
tested by this research which describe the relationship between the media (and the media 
agenda) and elites, opinion leaders, other media and public opinion: 1) W. Lance Bennett’s 
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indexing model (2007), 2) Thomas Christie’s agenda-public opinion congruence model 
(2006) and 3) Robert Entman’s cascading network activation model (2004).  The chapter 
also reviews US, UK and Australian critiques of the media’s coverage of the Iraq war, and 
raises questions about the role played by the Australian media in convincing a reluctant 
public to support the war and then to return a Howard Government with an increased 
majority in 2004, at a time when President Bush and Prime Minister Blair suffered huge 
losses in popular support as a result of Iraq.   
Chapter two outlines the research design, research questions and hypotheses being 
tested by the study.  It details the content analysis coding process, including source and 
theme categories, along with an explanation of the criteria for deciding whether an article 
was ‘pro-war’, ‘anti-war’ or ‘balanced’.  Summary statistics provide an overview of the 
project, and there is a detailed explanation of the reasons behind the selection of people 
for interview and the selection of the nine sample periods for the content analysis.   
The next four chapters present the data from the content analysis and interviews.  Chapter 
three seeks to identify the direction of changing patterns of pro-war and anti-war coverage 
across journalistic genres, including editorials, opinion and analysis, and news items 
across all three periods of the war (pre-war, invasion and post-invasion) for each 
publication (SMH, Australian).  This chapter also considers the influence of article 
placement on a reader’s perception of the editorial position of a publication and of the 
salience of an issue.  Chapters four, five and six are structured around the three stages of 
the war.  Chapter four looks at the influences that shaped the media’s pre-war agenda, 
including portrayal of the Government’s primary stated reasons for going to war: Saddam 
Hussein’s possession of WMD and his links with terrorist groups.  Chapter five looks at 
patterns of press attention and the dynamics of agenda setting during the first week of the 
invasion, while chapter six looks at press attention and the influences that affected the 
media agenda during the post-invasion stage of the conflict, when the failure to locate 
WMD in Iraq resulted in the collapse of the Government’s rationale for war.  The post-
invasion chapter draws on both content analysis and interview data to explore the way in 
which Australian Prime Minister John Howard sought to manage the consequences of war, 
in particular through the two inquiries into pre-war intelligence: the Parliamentary Joint 
Committee on ASIO, ASIS and DSD Inquiry into Intelligence on Iraq’s Weapons of Mass 
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Destruction (the Jull Committee inquiry) and the Government Inquiry into Australian 
Intelligence Agencies conducted by Philip Flood.  This chapter also considers the role of 
the Opposition and the impact and awareness of public opinion in shaping the media’s 
narrative in the post-invasion environment.   
Chapter seven explores the Government’s communication objectives around the Iraq 
conflict; the Prime Minister’s relationship with the media; and the way in which Australian 
party political dynamics influenced the debate over Iraq.  Interview data provides insight 
into the ways in which both the Government and the Opposition sought to influence the 
Iraq debate, and explores the impact of the debate on Australian politics.  
Conclusion 
In the lead-up to the war, given the intelligence-related nature of the reasons for Australian 
involvement, the public were highly dependent on the media for the information they 
needed to make a judgement about the nation’s going to war.  Yet the media were in turn 
dependent on the Government for evidence to substantiate claims about Saddam’s WMD 
capability, his claimed links with al Qaeda and his hostile intent.  While the Australian 
media had access to US and UK sources, those sources too were often highly dependent 
on their own governments for information.  This meant that there were few experts, other 
than a handful of US, UK and Australian academics, retired generals and former 
diplomats, available to provide an alternative reading of the situation.  Only insiders within 
the bureaucracy and intelligence communities were in possession of sufficient information 
to make an independent judgement of the intelligence information, and they were bound to 
silence as a condition of their employment.  Even whistle-blower Andrew Wilkie, while his 
access to information enabled him to mount a credible challenge to the Government’s 
case, was unable to release information publicly because, as a public servant, he was 
bound by the Crimes Act 1914 (Wilkie, 2004).  For the public, then, the issue of Iraq largely 
came down to one of trust in the Government and trust in the media’s ability and 
determination to hold the Government to account. 
In a liberal democracy like Australia, with representative government, regular elections are 
the means by which the people hold elected representatives to account.  “To make 
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informed choice, voters must have access to both sufficient and relevant information so 
they can decide whom to elect” (Finkelstein 2012, p24).  The media play an important role 
in this process as “a mature democracy depends on having an educated electorate, 
informed and connected through parliament” (Sampson, 1996, p47).  Michael Schudson 
puts it succinctly: “The job of the press is to help produce a more informed electorate.  A 
more informed citizenry will create a better and fuller democracy” (2002, p.204).  This view 
holds for both the political left and right. 
That the actions of government and the state, and the efforts of competing parties and interests 
to exercise political power, should be underpinned and legitimised by critical scrutiny and 
informed debate facilitated by the institutions of the media is a normative assumption uniting the 
political spectrum from left to right (McNair, 2000, p1). 
The public depends on the media, directly or indirectly, for news of the world, including 
political information.  The journalist and writer, Walter Lippman (1922), wrote about the 
media creating the ‘pictures in our heads’ through which we understand the world outside, 
but expressed concern that the media was unable to report on everything that 
governments did and nor could citizens have the time or access to information to be ‘omni-
competent’, as the ideal model of democracy implied.  “At its best the press is a servant 
and guardian of institutions; at its worst it is a means by which a few exploit social 
disorganization to their own ends…It [the press] is like the beam of a searchlight that 
moves restlessly about, bringing one episode and then another out of darkness into vision” 
(Lippmann, 1922, p 113).   
There are few more important decisions a government can make than to take the nation to 
war.  Prime Minister John Howard described his decision to commit Australian troops to 
“join the Americans and British in the military operation against Saddam Hussein in March 
2003 [as] the most controversial foreign affairs action of [his] government” (Howard, 2010).   
War raises both moral and pragmatic questions and often gives rise to strong community 
responses. Michael Waltzer has observed that “justice has become, in all Western 
countries, one of the tests that any proposed military strategy or tactic has to meet” (2002, 
p935).  Just War adherents would expect military action to be a proportional response to a 
direct threat, and conducted in accord with international law (Walzer, 2006).  They would 
expect such a decision to be made by government after a thorough process of 
bureaucratic review and only as a last resort, when all other diplomatic efforts had failed.  
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It goes without saying, that governments in democratic societies are expected to be honest 
about their reasons for going to war.  Foreign policy realists would expect that the 
proposed military action was going to work: that the effort was worth the sacrifice of blood 
and treasure.  If there were to be a failure in policy, process, governance or leadership, it 
is the role of the media to shine Walter Lippman’s proverbial light (1922) on those failures, 
exposing them to the full glare of public attention and, in doing so, holding the Government 
to account.  The media are also a channel for community feedback to government, through 
letters to the editor and public opinion polling.  In effect, when failures of policy or process 
occur, the media have both the capacity and the responsibility to act as the institution of 
last resort.  If the media fails, democracy is the poorer. 
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Chapter 1 – Media and political agendas: untangling 
the debates 
Media coverage of the Iraq war generated controversy in the three Anglophone countries 
that participated in the coalition of the willing, more so in the US and UK than in Australia.  
There is a body of literature devoted to its critique and which informs the design of this 
research.  The literature raises questions about the influences and process of media 
agenda formation (agenda building); the media’s role in shaping the wider community 
agenda (agenda setting); and in influencing the way readers understand and feel about an 
issue (framing)(McCombs, 2004, McCombs and Shaw, 1972).  This research draws on 
three models which look at agenda-building: 1) Christie’s congruence model (Christie, 
2006); 2) Bennett’s indexing model (Bennett, 2007), and 3) Entman’s cascading network 
activation model (Entman, 2004).  Each provides insight into the nature of the relationships 
between the makers of news and media agenda formation, and the media agenda and 
public opinion.  These theories informed the structure of the content analysis, as well as 
the issues explored in qualitative interviews with journalists, editors, experts, politicians 
and public servants who were involved in framing the news.  This research tests, 
evaluates and critiques each of the theories with a view to identifying which theory best 
describes what happened in Australia.   
This chapter reviews the literature on agenda setting, agenda formation and framing and 
examines and explains the three influential models considered in this thesis.  It also 
examines various critiques of media performance in the United States, the United Kingdom 
and Australia and provides an overview of the many Congressional and Parliamentary 
inquiries held in the three countries in the wake of the Iraq war.   
Agenda setting, agenda formation and framing 
Any analysis of the media, in this case in the context of the 2003 Iraq war, is undertaken 
because what the media say has significant implications, not just for citizens’ access to 
information, but for the way we think about issues and our ability to engage in informed 
political debate.  “In choosing and displaying news, editors, newsroom staff and 
broadcasters play an important role in shaping our political reality.  Readers learn not only 
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about a given issue, but also how much importance to attach to that issue, from the 
amount of information in a news story and its position” (McCombs and Shaw, 1972, p176). 
The oldest and most enduring concern with mass media is with their effects.  There is a 
long research tradition which has considered the impact of mass media on individuals’ 
beliefs, attitudes and behaviour.  Over time, opinion about media influence has swung 
from one of immense power or powerful effects (before and during the 1930s); to a 
perception of powerlessness or limited effects (during the 1940s -1960s); to, ultimately, a 
more differentiated perception today: one of moderate-to-powerful effects (Smith, 2008, 
p44).  During the 1930’s, concepts like the bullet or hypodermic theory of communication 
attributed great power to the media.  Propaganda was used widely during the first and 
second world wars.  Mass media were believed to have the ability to “shape opinion and 
belief, change habits of life, actively mould behaviour and impose political systems even 
against resistance” (McQuail, 1979, p9).   After WWII, however, mass communications 
research in the US prompted a change in perception from one of mass media power to 
one of relative powerlessness.  Research found that public communication was an 
influence, among many others, rather than a necessary and sufficient cause of behavioural 
change (Klapper, 1960).  The mass media, namely radio, film and/or print, were found 
“unlikely to be major contributors to direct change of individual opinions, attitudes or 
behaviours or to be a direct cause of crime, aggression or other disapproved social 
phenomena” (McQuail, 1979, p10).    
In the early 1970s, communication scholars broadened their focus from the study of the 
short-term impact of message content on individual behaviour (a feature of limited effects 
research), to the longer-term impacts of mass media on institutions, on perceptions and 
priorities.  They looked particularly at the impact of television and newspapers in five key 
areas: political campaigns, the definition of social reality and social norms, immediate 
responses or reactions to media content, institutional change, and changes in culture and 
society (McQuail, 1979, p11).  They also explored other dimensions of messaging 
including timing, frequency and intensity which might influence perceptions of salience, or 
which might reinforce, facilitate, inhibit, trigger or act as a catalyst.  When it came to 
politics, media effects appeared to be much more powerful in shaping the way the political 
game was played than in changing an individual’s vote.  Media scholars, Jay Blumler and 
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Denis McQuail, started to study audiences to examine motivations for watching particular 
television programs.  They were joined by others including Elihu Katz and Michael 
Gurevitch and over time their research culminated in uses and gratifications theory. 
According to the theory, “people make active choices in selecting media for particular 
purposes…[including] information, entertainment, value reassurance, social interaction 
and emotional release” (Smith, 2008, p43).   They found that people tended to watch and 
read media sources that reinforced rather than challenged their values. 
The issue of media effects remains “a disputed one” (McQuail, 1979, p8) – indeed Annie 
Lang (2013) recently suggested the discipline was in a state of crisis – but agenda setting 
is a phenomenon that has been identified in numerous research projects over time and 
across geographies.  Walter Lippmann, in his 1922 classic Public Opinion, put the view 
that the news media are our “windows to the vast world beyond our direct experience, (that 
they) determine our cognitive maps of the world”(McCombs 2004).  While agenda-setting 
is now widely associated with McCombs and Shaw’s 1972 paper “The Agenda-Setting 
Function of Mass Media” (when the term ‘agenda-setting’ was first coined), the most 
famous quote on the phenomenon dates back to 1963 and a book by Bernard C. Cohen 
called The Press and Foreign Policy.  Cohen (cited in McCombs and Shaw, 1972) noted 
that the press “may not be successful much of the time in telling people what to think, but it 
is stunningly successful in telling its readers what to think about.”  McCombs and Shaw 
studied the 1968 US presidential campaign and surveyed Chapel Hill voters concurrently 
with analysis of the locally available newspapers (Durham Morning Herald, Durham Sun, 
Raleigh News and Observer Raleigh Times, New York Times), television (NBC and CBS) 
and news magazines (Time and Newsweek) and found “a very strong relationship 
between the emphasis placed on different campaign issues by the media (reflecting to a 
considerable degree the emphasis by candidates) and the judgements of voters as to the 
salience and importance of various campaign topics” (McCombs and Shaw, 1972, p181).  
Over 400 empirical studies have subsequently investigated agenda-setting effects in many 
countries, including Japan, Spain, Argentina and Germany (McCombs, 2004, p36). 
More recently agenda-setting research has identified, not just first level effects (traditional 
agenda-setting which builds the salience of objects or ‘what to think about’) but second 
level effects which influence the salience of object ‘attributes’ (the range of properties and 
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traits an object can have) (McCombs, 2004, p87).  First level agenda-setting (traditional 
agenda-setting) is about gaining attention, while second level agenda-setting is focused on 
comprehension (Lippmann’s “pictures in our heads” (McCombs, 2004, p68)).  Research 
conducted around the 1976 presidential campaigns suggests a “striking degree of 
correspondence” between the Chicago Tribune’s election coverage and the attributes used 
in Illinois voters’ descriptions of Jimmy Carter and Gerald Ford (McCombs 2004, p73).  
These attributes included traits like “competency, compassion and political beliefs”, and 
because of the lag involved, the “direction of influence was clearly from the media to the 
public agenda” (McCombs, 2004, p73).  Similar results were obtained in research into the 
1996 Spanish elections, where correlations were found between voters’ pictures of the 
candidates, Jose Maria Aznar, the conservative Popular Party candidate and the 
incumbent Socialist Prime Minister, Felipe Gonzalez, and the content of press and TV 
news coverage and political advertising (McCombs, 2004, p73). 
The concept of agenda–setting has continued to evolve as social scientists have put 
together a more nuanced understanding of the processes of mass communication 
influence.  Concepts like stereotyping, modelling, Elizabeth Noelle-Neumann’s spiral of 
silence theory, George Gerbner’s cultivation theory and Nancy Signorielli’s mean world 
syndrome have added to the media effects tradition, and the concept of framing links with 
second-level or attribute agenda-setting (McCombs, 2004).  According to media and 
political science scholar, Robert Entman, 
To frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a 
communication text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal 
interpretation, moral evaluation and/or treatment recommendation for the item described 
(Entman 1993, cited in McCombs, 2004, p87).  
Journalists use frames and framing to make sense of a story and to engage the reader.  
Cultural theorist, Stuart Hall, suggested that frames were organising principles that “call 
our attention to the dominant perspectives...(to) suggest what is relevant and irrelevant” 
(McCombs, 2004, p.89).  We rely on journalists to explain not just what is happening, but 
its significance in context.  Framing has the “power to structure thought, to shape how we 
think about public issues, political candidates or other objects in the news.  Frames have 
been described as ‘schemata of interpretation’” (McCombs, 2004, p89).  Journalism 
professor, Kirk Hallahan, explained that “framing operates by biasing the cognitive 
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processing of information by individuals” in at least two ways: through priming and “by 
providing contextual cues that guide decision-making and inferences” (1999, p208).  For 
example, presenting an occurrence as negative is more likely to attract attention because 
our fear of loss or risk means that “negative information is weighted more heavily than 
positive information” (p208).  Priming uses our cognitive structures or schemas by 
“association and expectation to make inferences about events and to impute meaning not 
manifested in the message itself” (Hallahan, 1999, p208). 
Hallahan identified seven models for framing: situations, attributes, choices, actions, 
issues, responsibility and news.  Framing of situations involves putting an event in its 
context.  This could be done in such a way as to heighten or allay fear.  For example, a 
government bail-out of a financial institution might be presented as “main street bailing out 
Wall St” (with overtones of the poor bailing out the already rich and powerful) or 
“government guarantees financial system” (with overtones of reassurance during uncertain 
economic times).  Framing of attributes is about accentuating certain characteristics of 
objects and people, while ignoring others (Hallahan, 1999, p210).  A politician for example 
might be simultaneously represented as “weak and indecisive” or “thoughtful and 
consultative.”  Actions and choices can be framed in such a way as to heighten uncertainty 
and fear, or risks can be downplayed to encourage risk-taking behaviour.  When it comes 
to issues, “social problems and disputes can be explained in alternative terms by different 
parties who vie for their preferred definition (of) a problem or situation to prevail” (Hallahan, 
1999, p210).  When it comes to responsibility, framing happens when “people portray their 
role in events consistent with their self-image in ways that maximize benefits and minimize 
culpability” (Hallahan, 1999, p210).  News frames are used by the media, when they 
portray events using ‘familiar, culturally resonating themes to relay information about 
events” (Hallahan, 1999. p210).  For example, sporting analogies are commonplace in the 
Australian media, with references to a politician “dead batting” a question during question 
time, or a party going on the “front foot” with the announcement of an initiative.   
More recently the concept of framing has been used, not just to describe the ways in which 
journalists and the media influence the public agenda, but how other parties (politicians, 
public officials, activist groups, experts and public opinion) influence and shape the media 
agenda, sometimes referred to as agenda-building or agenda formation.  For example, the 
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Bush White House’s framing of the reasons for invading Iraq has been studied (Christie, 
2006), as has the use of Cold War rhetoric, for their impact on the media agenda and 
through the media on the public agenda (usually measured by public opinion polls).   
Journalists and their sources 
News “mediates the wider socio-political environment to its audience, but in turn its 
content”, according to Tiffen, “has been mediated by its reliance on how other institutions 
make information available” (1989, p32).  Decisions about what to cover are made on the 
basis of judgements about the relative newsworthiness of events.  “Newsworthiness is a 
negotiated phenomenon rather than the application of independently derived objective 
criteria to news events” (Tuchman, 1978, p45). 
News is, then, a parasitic institution: its product is the deeds and words of others, and its quality 
depends at least partly on the quality of the information environment in which it is operating.  
News content, therefore, always needs to be understood not only in the context of what 
information is considered newsworthy, but of what information becomes available to the news 
media, and how (Tiffen et al., 2013). 
Journalists organise their news-gathering around formal news events (such as a press 
conference), the formal release of information (via media release), and through direct 
contact with sources.  Sources help journalists do their jobs quickly and efficiently by 
providing reliable information (on or off the record); confirming or denying rumours; 
providing an expert or counter-opinion; and perhaps providing a ‘scoop’ by leaking or 
providing news before other news outlets hear about it.   
Their news-gathering routines should offer the best news in the greatest volume in the least 
time-consuming way, with some protection against the competitive danger of being ‘scooped’, 
and against the risks of unreliability and uncertainty in controversial areas.  This all contrives 
towards reliance on the routine channels of official institutions (Tiffen, 1989, p32). 
When it comes to official institutions, the Federal Parliament is the most significant, not 
least because it is where democracy is enacted in full view of the media, and therefore of 
the electorate.  The Parliamentary Press Gallery represents the largest permanent 
concentration of journalists in the country, with over 250 accredited media, mostly 
journalists but also cameramen, editors, photographers, technicians, administration and 
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specialist support staff (Federal Parliamentary Press Gallery website, 2015).  With the 
“executive (Cabinet Ministers), legislators, political staff and the press gallery all in the one 
building” there is no shortage of news: “it is easy to get ‘a story’ but very difficult to get the 
‘real story’” (Tiffen, 1989, pp33-34).  In Parliament House, one need never leave the 
building to get a story: journalists from different news agencies attend the same events, 
read the same media releases and quote the same people (Simons, 1999).  In such an 
information-rich environment, there is always the risk of ‘churnalism’, “where pressures on 
journalists to accelerate and increase their production of news leads to less balancing and 
cross-checking of different views” (Tiffen et. al., 2013, p3). 
The study of journalists and their sources “draws its roots from questions about bias, 
power and influence” (Berkowitz, 2009, p102).  Cultivating a range of sources is the key to 
a journalist or news agency avoiding ‘churnalism’, balancing views and standing out from 
competitors.  Good sources also help journalists understand complex issues (like the Iraq 
war) more deeply, and avoid ‘capture’ by the official government ‘line’.  The ability to get a 
reputable specialist’s insight, a senior bureaucrat’s backgrounding, an insider’s counter 
view, or a ‘leak’ is what differentiates.  The old adage about ‘a reporter being only as good 
as her sources’ holds true in Canberra, where the intimacy of living in a public service town 
enables access to ‘insiders’ in all parts of the bureaucracy.  Sources are jealously 
guarded, but are not always reliable, as Malcolm Turnbull can attest (reference Godwin 
Grech and the Ozcar affair, Grattan and Schubert, 2009).  Quality journalism, then, is 
differentiated by “the number, diversity and range of sources” (Tiffen et. al, 2013, p 3), 
which is why this study aims to measure empirically the sources used in coverage of the 
Iraq war. 
Reporting on war 
War reporting challenges many of the central principles of journalism.  While the role of the 
war correspondent had long been romanticised, “it is beset by an array of problems 
associated with allegiance, responsibility, truth and balance” (Allan and Zelizer, 2004, p3).  
News values, at the heart of journalism, “do not necessarily serve the individual journalist 
well in the midst of his/her own country’s war” (Tumber, 2004, p193).  Reporting in an 
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impartial and objective way, on a war in which one’s country is involved, can sit 
uncomfortably with readers, editors and political leaders. 
The principles of reporting are put to a severe test when your nation goes to war. To whom are 
you true? To the principles of abstract truth, or to those running the war machine; to a frightened 
or perhaps belligerent population, to the decisions of the elected representatives in a 
democracy, to the exclusion of the dissenting minorities, to the young men and women who 
have agreed to put their lives at risk on the front-line? Or are you true to a wider principle of 
reasoning and questioning, asking why they must face this risk. Let me put the question with 
stark simplicity: when does a reporter sacrifice the principle of the whole truth to the need to win 
the war? (Adie, 1998) 
While some might argue that the Federal Parliamentary Press Gallery is to a large extent 
already captive to official sources, this relationship of information dependence is 
exacerbated in the lead-up to and during times of war.   
In times of conflict, a free media ensures that the public are not dependent on the military or 
political view of the campaign, but receive an independent description of events in order to 
make an informed choice as to whether or not to support the conflict.   
The problem is that the media’s claim to right of access to information on the basis of the 
public’s right to know conflicts with the military’s desire to win the war and to do so with 
minimum casualties…The consequences of losing public support for any war can be severe and 
long-term for both the government and the military.  Thus, in wartime, a new battle emerges on 
the home front – that for public opinion (Miskin, Rayner and Lalic, 2003). 
Ask anyone in the US military today and you are more than likely to hear the media 
blamed [incorrectly] for the US defeat in Vietnam.  Some in the US media also blamed 
their colleagues for the loss.  Phillip Knightley in his book, The First Casualty, quotes 
Robert Elegant, an Asia expert and former Vietnam correspondent as saying: 
For the first time in modern history the outcome of war was determined not on the battlefield but 
on the printed page and, above all, on the television screen…never before Vietnam had the 
collective policy of the media – no less stringent a term will serve – sought by graphic and 
unremitting distortion, the victory of the enemies of the correspondents’ own side (Knightley, 
1989, p428). 
Vietnam represented the first time in war-reporting history that journalists were not tightly 
controlled and censored (Knightley, 1989) and it would seem that the military and 
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politicians in anglo-phone countries learned from that experience.  According to Phillip 
Knightley,  
Vietnam was an aberration…the Falklands provided a model of how to make certain that 
government policy is not undermined by the way a war is reported.  The rules turned out to be 
fairly simple: control access to the fighting; exclude neutral correspondents, censor your own; 
and muster support, both on the field and at home, in the name of patriotism, labelling any 
dissidents as traitors…objectivity could come back into fashion when the shooting was over 
(Knightley, 1989, p438). 
From the British experience in the Falklands, the US military learned a valuable lesson in 
managing the media, and “how a controlled media could become part of a successful war 
effort” (Miskin et. al, 3002, p8).  Given the remoteness of the location, journalists were 
completely dependent on the Royal Navy “not only for access to the battle zone but for 
food, shelter, protection and transmission of their reports” (Miskin et. al, p8).  As Morrison 
and Tumber described: 
The journalists not only merely observed their subjects, but lived their lives and shared their 
experiences, and those experiences were of such emotional intensity that the form of prose 
which journalists use to take the reader into that experience – the “I was there” form – provided 
not only a window for the reader, but also a door for partiality irrespective of any desire to 
remain the detached professional outsider (Morrison and Tumber, 1988, pp 95-6).  
The US military favoured ‘embedding’ journalists because it “created an esprit de corps 
between journalists and the military;…it allowed the military complete dominance of the 
media coverage;…and it led to an emphasis on the minutiae of the conflict at the expense 
of the big picture” (Miskin et.al., 2003, pp 8-9).  Embedding was used in both the Gulf and 
Iraq wars, with over 500 journalists ‘embedded’ with US fighting units when they invaded in 
March 2003 (Miskin et.al., 2003, pp i).  However, embedding was rejected by the 
Australian Defence Force on the grounds that it would be ‘impractical’ (Miskin et. al., 2003, 
piii).  A significant proportion of Australian troops deployed to Iraq were Special Air Service 
(SAS) personnel, whose operations remained top secret (see chapter 5).  The restrictions 
on coverage of Australia’s engagement in the Iraq war led to an overwhelming reliance by 
the media on American and British sources, both embedded and independent, but mostly 
embedded.  That left Australians largely in the dark about what Australian troops were 
doing in Iraq, where they were operating and the success or otherwise of their mission.  
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Many Australians were not aware, for example, that Howard had withdrawn the SAS after 
the active phase of the invasion in May 2003 (see chapter 7). 
The Australian Government never lost sight of the importance of the media in ‘selling’ the 
Iraq war.   Clearly, as Howard Tumber has pointed out “the motives for going to war and 
the willingness of public opinion to accept military operations, with their normal infliction of 
death and suffering, are integral parts of the politics of war” (2006, p4).  If the war is one of 
‘national survival’, then public opinion and more likely the media will lend support.  If the 
war is ‘optional’, then Tumber argues that “the role of opposition to the war should be 
differently evaluated according to the distinction” (2006, p4).   The Iraq war clearly falls into 
the latter category.  Given the long lead-times involved; the strength of opposition to the 
war, both domestically and abroad (Goot, 2007, Rampton and Stauber, 2006, p16); and 
the government inquiries held in its wake, this study is as interested in the media’s 
coverage of the lead-up to and aftermath of the war, as it is in their coverage of the 
conduct of the war. 
Three theories 
The relationship between political actors, elites, public opinion, media ownership and the 
media agenda is a complex one: in a constant state of flux and made more complex in 
time of war.   It is also contested between scholars.  Three of the leading theories have 
shaped the design and execution of this research: Thomas Christie’s agenda-public 
opinion congruence model (2006)); W. Lance Bennett’s indexing model (2007)) and 
Robert Entman’s cascading network activation model (2004). 
Christie’s agenda-public opinion congruence model, outlined in his 2006 article, used 
agenda-setting (the impact of the media agenda on the public agenda) and agenda-
building (the formation of the media agenda) approaches to conduct a framing analysis of 
the rationale for the Iraq War.  Looking at the interaction between public support, mass 
media and public policy agendas, he analysed public policy statements made during White 
House briefings (that drew on the President’s rationale for Iraq war outlined in his radio 
address of 22 March 2003) and mass media coverage in the New York Times, the 
Washington Post and ABC World News Tonight.  He compared a two month period of high 
  
23 
 
public support (from 1 April 2003, when 69% of Americans approved of the President’s 
conduct of the war) with a period of low public support a year later (from 1 April 2004, 
when only 44% approved).  Christie found a high correlation between the incidence of 
themes/terms in White House briefings with those covered in the NY Times and the 
Washington Post during the period of high public support, but no correlation at all during 
the period of low public support.  Christie proposed a model of agenda-public opinion 
congruence that suggests that during periods of high public support, there is a period of 
high unanimity or congruence in media coverage, while during periods of low public 
support the media are likely to reflect a greater diversity of views.  This agenda-formation 
model suggests that public opinion influences the degree to which the media are 
susceptible to the White House framing of an issue. 
Bennett identified a practice known as indexing which he described as the “journalistic 
practice of opening or closing the news gates to citizen-activists (and more generally a 
broader range of views) according to level of conflict among public officials and 
established interests involved in making decisions about an issue” (2007, p6).  This model 
focuses not on the impact of public opinion, but on the power of already influential voices 
in influencing the media agenda.  Indexing points to a tendency in the media to give voice 
to the already powerful.  The result is that when there is open disagreement amongst 
political elites in a democracy and public officials are debating issues openly, the news is 
information-rich, diverse and broadly-based.  However when there is consensus, there are 
no strong counter-voices among political elites, for example in the US in the lead-up to the 
invasion of Iraq, or when issues are complex, for example in discussion of economics and 
foreign policy, media coverage often tends to reflect the official line (Bennett, 2007).   
Building on Bennett’s work, Entman, proposed a cascading network activation model, 
which shows how the “thoughts and feelings that support a frame” (2004, p9) extend from 
the White House downward to other elites (Congress members, officials and staffers), to 
journalists and news organisations to ultimately be reflected in the news frames used in 
the media (framing words and images), which then flow on to the public.  The model 
includes feedback loops, so that the downward cascade is matched by feedback which 
cascades back upward via public opinion polls, letters to the editor and calls to talkback 
radio to journalists, who in turn may moderate their framing of issues in the media, which 
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feeds back up to other elites and ultimately back to the White House.  In this complicated 
model, journalists’ frames are influenced through their social and professional contact with 
the elites and are moderated in their contact with networks which include editors, 
colleagues and competitors.  “The more often journalists hear similar thoughts expressed 
by their sources and by other news outlets, the more likely their own thoughts will run 
along those lines, with the results that the news they produce will feature words and 
visuals that confirm the same framing” (Entman 2007, p9).  In the absence of opposing 
official voices, it takes a lot of public feedback to challenge those frames (Bennett 
2007(1)). 
In Scandal and Silence: Media Responses to Presidential Misconduct, Entman expanded 
his cascading network activation model to analyse a series of presidential scandals - and 
non-scandals - and found a “weak correlation between the magnitude of media attention 
and the social costs imposed by scandalous misdeeds” (2012, p24).  Entman’s model 
includes cultural congruence, elites’ strategic skills, media decision-making heuristics or 
biases and perceived public opinion (2012, p37-38).  At all levels, motivations play a role.  
Contrary to the popular view of the media as ‘scandal mongers’, Entman found that the 
“intensity of scandal news is not propelled by the substantive seriousness of the politician’s 
offense…nor do mainstream media exhibit continuous vigilance to unearth and publicize 
any potential scandal they find…Motivations to pursue potential scandals were often weak 
or absent” (2012, p37-38).   Entman identified a series of heuristics which he called 
decision-making biases which he believes govern journalistic decision-making.  They 
include preferences for: 
1. process over substance; 
2. simplicity over complexity;  
3. visually illustrated over non-visual information;  
4. popularity and power over unpopularity and weakness;  
5. party unity over party discord;  
6. likeable politicians over unlikeable;  
7. stereotype-confirming novelty over incongruous novelty;  
8. diffusing elite pressure over publicizing core truths (Entman, 2012, p39). 
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Entman also found that, even when the media were disposed to probe and scandalise, 
they could not create a scandal on their own.  “Even if it were true that news organizations 
are eager to seize on scandals and push them as far as they can, their fervency would not 
be all that relevant politically.  As willing as they might be, journalists don’t have the power 
to create and maintain scandals” (2012, p207).  A scandal requires an influential sponsor: 
either a politician, political party, a court or a committee. 
Critiques of the media and the Iraq War 
While the leaders of the US, UK and Australia used similar arguments to take their nations 
to war, there were differences in the way each country’s media covered the conflict.  Much 
of the literature critiquing media performance emanates from the United States, where 
journalists and scholars were disturbed by the US media’s almost universal acceptance, 
before the war, of the White House narrative about Saddam Hussein’s WMD and 
purported links to terrorists.  In the UK, however, greater media diversity and political 
divisions generated media coverage which was more critical of the Government and, 
perhaps as a result, there were fewer critiques of UK media performance.  In Australia, 
despite strong public opposition to a war in Iraq, the Murdoch press strongly supported the 
war, while the Sydney Morning Herald opposed.  This thesis aims to build on the literature 
which examines the performance of the Australian media at that time. 
US media  
Journalists themselves have written extensively on the Bush White House campaign for 
war and have critiqued the performance of their colleagues in failing to challenge the White 
House’s narrative on the war.  Journalists like The New Yorker’s Seymour Hersh (2004), 
the Washington Post’s Thomas E. Ricks (2006), the New York Times’s George Packer 
(2005) and Frank Rich (2006), Newsweek’s Michael Isikoff (2007) and The Nation’s David 
Corn (Isikoff and Corn, 2007), are among those who have written about a tightly scripted, 
highly disciplined White House information campaign in the lead-up to the war, and a 
largely compliant media.  They pointed to the narratives and images used by the President 
and the White House that “ drowned out” reports to the contrary (Bennett, 2007) and were 
reported in the media with little challenge, despite the availability of credible contrary 
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evidence.  Dominant narratives included “Iraq's weapons of mass destruction are 
controlled by a murderous tyrant, who has already used chemical weapons to kill 
thousands of people” (Bush, 2002(b)); “Iraq has given shelter and support to terrorism and 
practises terror against its own people” (Bush, 2002(b)); 9/11 hijacker Mohammed Atta 
met with an Iraqi intelligence official in Prague five months before the attack (Cheney, 
2001); “Iraq has sought to buy thousands of specially designed aluminum tubes, which 
American officials believe were intended as components of centrifuges to enrich uranium” 
(Gordon and Miller, 2002);  “Saddam Hussein recently sought significant quantities of 
uranium from Africa”(Bush, 2002(a)); “We cannot wait for the final proof - the smoking gun 
- in the form of a mushroom cloud”( Bush, 2002(b)).   
Memoirs by many of the key figures in the US Administration have provided some insights 
into the decision to go to war in Iraq, including the process of selling the war.  These 
include President George W Bush (2010), Vice-President Dick Cheney (2011), Former 
Defense Minister Ronald Rumsfeld (2011), Former National Security Adviser Condoleezza 
Rice (2011) and former Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) George Tenet 
(2007) – as well as public servants and others within the Administration including National 
Coordinator for Counterterrorism, Richard Clarke (2004), Former Chief of CIA Clandestine 
Operations, Europe, Tyler Drumheller (2006), former Administrator of the Coalition 
Provisional Authority of Iraq, Ambassador L. Paul Bremmer III (2006) and US Under 
Secretary of Defense for Policy, Douglas Feith (2008).  Two former White House Press 
Secretaries, Ari Fleischer (2005) and Scott McClellan (2008), published their memoirs, 
with McClellan’s a good deal more critical of the Administration and what he called 
Washington’s “culture of deception”, perhaps because he had been forced to resign for 
misleading the press over the Valerie Plame case.  McLellan provided an insight into the 
White House’s marketing efforts to “convince Americans that war with Iraq was inevitable 
and necessary” and pointed to Andy Card’s (White House Chief of Staff) comment to the 
New York Times that, “From a marketing point of view, you don’t introduce new products in 
August” (2008, p121). 
The Administration’s narratives and themes dominated US media coverage in the lead-up 
to the war and were reflected in the views of the public.  On the eve of the invasion “sixty-
nine percent of the (US) public felt that an Iraq connection to 9/11 was at least somewhat 
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likely” (Bennett, 2007(1), p3).  This was in large part because of a concerted White House 
campaign that associated Iraq with al Qaeda long after the CIA’s contrary analysis was 
available (Bennett, 2007).  Some news sources reported official statements without 
challenge.  Bennett pointed out that “factual misperceptions reflect the news sources that 
people rely on for their information” and that “80 percent of the viewers of FOX news 
shared one or more factual inaccuracies about the war, while only 23 percent of Public 
Broadcasting Service (PBS) and National Public Radio (NPR) audiences were similarly 
mistaken” (Bennett, 2007(1) p4).   
Some in the US media questioned the White House narrative, but were the exception 
rather than the rule.  In the New Yorker, in an article titled “Who lied to whom?”, Seymour 
Hersh questioned Secretary of State Colin Powell’s evidence to the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee (about Iraq seeking to obtain uranium from Niger) and President 
Bush’s State of the Union reference to the British government having “learned that 
Saddam Hussein recently sought significant quantities of uranium from Africa”(Hersh 2003 
(1)).  Hersh reported that, after months of trying to obtain copies of documents related to 
these claims, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was finally passed copies of 
the relevant documents in the early days of March 2003, just weeks before the war started.  
It took “only hours” for the IAEA to determine that the documents were a forgery.  “One 
letter, dated October 10, 2000, was signed with the name of Allel Habibou, a Niger 
Minister of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation, who had been out of office since 1989” (Hersh 
2003 (1))  Another letter had an obviously faked signature which an IAEA official 
suggested “could be spotted by someone using Google on the Internet” (Hersh 2003 (1)).  
Hersh observed that the forgery, which later became the source of “widespread and bitter 
questions in Europe about the credibility of the United States…initially only provoked a few 
news stories in America and little sustained questioning about how the White House could 
endorse such an obvious fake” (Hersh 2003 (1)).  
There are examples where White House “evidence” of Saddam Hussein’s chemical 
weapons capability was either contradicted or brought into question by publicly available 
accounts, but where the mainstream media did not follow this up to investigate in greater 
detail.  Sheldon Rampton and John Stauber (2003), in their book, Weapons of Mass 
Deception documented highly ambiguous intelligence quoted again and again by White 
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House officials as if it were established fact.  In the case of the claim that Iraq had 
purchased thousands of high-strength aluminium tubes “used to enrich uranium for nuclear 
weapons”, Rampton and Stauber pointed to the inclusion of this claim in Colin Powell’s 
speech to the UN on 5 February 2003, despite the IAEA’s view that the dimensions of the 
tubes in question made them “ill-suited to uranium enrichment” (p87).  Scott Ritter, a 
former UNSCOM weapons inspector, published in the Boston Globe in July 2002 that he 
believed that “the majority of weapons and agents produced by Iraq” had been destroyed 
(Rampton and Stauber 2003).  This was backed up by Newsweek (3 March 2003) reports 
of the 1995 testimony of an Iraqi defector, Hussein Kamel, Saddam Hussein’s son-in-law, 
who told IAEA inspectors that “after the Gulf War, Iraq destroyed all its chemical and 
biological weapons stocks and the missiles to deliver them” (Rampton and Stauber, 2003, 
p83). 
After the war, with the failure to find WMD, some journalists reflected on how they had got 
it all so wrong.  In the lead-up to the war, Judith Miller of the New York Times, had enjoyed 
a close relationship with the administration, and with Iraqi defectors and exiles, including 
Ahmad Chalabi, who were associated with the Iraqi National Congress and the Committee 
for the Liberation of Iraq (New York Times, 26 May 2004).   Her 8 September 2002 article, 
co-authored with Michael Gordon, claimed that: 
Iraq has stepped up its quest for nuclear weapons and has embarked on a worldwide hunt for 
materials to make an atomic bomb…In the last 14 months, Iraq has sought to buy thousands of 
specially designed aluminum tubes, which American officials believe were intended as 
components of centrifuges to enrich uranium…Iraqi defectors who once worked for the nuclear 
weapons establishment have told American officials that acquiring nuclear arms is again a top 
Iraqi priority. American intelligence agencies are also monitoring construction at nuclear 
sites…Hard-liners are alarmed that American intelligence underestimated the pace and scale of 
Iraq's nuclear program…they argue that Washington dare not wait until analysts have found 
hard evidence that Mr. Hussein has acquired a nuclear weapon. The first sign of a "smoking 
gun," they argue, may be a mushroom cloud (Miller 2002). 
The analogy linking a ‘smoking gun’ with a ‘mushroom cloud’ was used subsequently by 
many in the administration, including Bush, (2002(b)) and Rice (2002).  Vice President, 
Dick Cheney, cited the New York Times article as an authoritative source supporting his 
claim that Iraq had a nuclear weapons program (Isikoff 2006, Cheney, 2002).  The paper 
had been used by the White House to make public unverified intelligence material in their 
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efforts to justify war.  After the war, on 26 May 2004, the editors of the New York Times 
made an unprecedented apology to their readers, saying: 
Over the last year this newspaper has shone the bright light of hindsight on decisions that led 
the United States into Iraq…It is past time we turned the same light on ourselves…Looking 
back, we wish we had been more aggressive in re-examining the claims as new evidence 
emerged - or failed to emerge. The problematic articles varied in authorship and subject matter, 
but many shared a common feature. They depended at least in part on information from a circle 
of Iraqi informants, defectors and exiles bent on "regime change" in Iraq, people whose 
credibility has come under increasing public debate in recent weeks…Complicating matters for 
journalists, the accounts of these exiles were often eagerly confirmed by United States officials 
convinced of the need to intervene in Iraq. Administration officials now acknowledge that they 
sometimes fell for misinformation from these exile sources. So did many news organizations — 
in particular, this one (New York Times, 26 May 2004).   
The Washington Post made a similar admission to its readers in an article by staff writer 
Howard Kurtz on 12 August 2004.  In “The Post on WMDs: An Inside Story”, Kurtz referred 
to a story that veteran reporter Walter Pincus had written, days before the start of the war, 
in which he questioned the Bush administration’s evidence on Saddam’s WMD.  Without 
the intervention of the assistant managing editor, Bob Woodward, the story would not have 
run at all.  In the end it was relegated to page A17 (Kurtz 2004).  This was an example of a 
trend found after an examination of the paper’s coverage and interviews with editors and 
reporters: that the paper had carried a number of articles critical of the White House in the 
lead-up to Iraq, but that they did not make it to the front page.  Pentagon correspondent 
Thomas Ricks was quoted as saying that "Administration assertions were on the front 
page. Things that challenged the administration were on A18 on Sunday or A24 on 
Monday. There was an attitude among editors: Look, we're going to war, why do we even 
worry about all this contrary stuff?" (Kurtz 2004). 
In the post-war soul-searching, the Columbia Journalism Review carried a number of 
articles on the subject.  Chris Mooney, in an article titled “The Editorial Pages and the 
Case for War” wrote about a study of the editorial pages of the six leading US newspapers 
– The Wall Street Journal, Chicago Tribune, the Washington Post, USA Today, the New 
York Times and the Los Angeles Times – in the six weeks between Powell’s speech to the 
UN and the beginnings of hostilities on 19 March 2003 (Mooney 2004).  Four of these 
papers – The Wall Street Journal, Chicago Tribune, the Washington Post and USA Today 
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– were consistently pro-war and “accepted Bush’s justification for it” (Mooney 2004 p3).  
The New York Times referred to Powell’s UN speech as “the most powerful case to date”, 
but that the US “cannot afford to confront Iraq without broad international support” 
(Mooney 2004 p4).  The Los Angeles Times “argued that the Bush administration should 
act in concert with the United Nations or not at all” (Mooney 2004 p4).  While two papers 
called for international support, Mooney concluded that “none of the papers…held the 
Bush administration to an adequate standard of proof when it came to launching not just a 
war, but a preemptive war opposed by most of the world” (Mooney 2004 p5). 
One scholar blamed the media’s timidity and failure to challenge the official Iraq narrative 
on the absence of a clear understanding of what it means to be ‘objective’.  Managing 
editor of the Columbia Journalism Review, Brent Cunningham (2003), cited examples of 
press failure to challenge the Bush Administration on their frequent linking of al Qaeda to 
Iraq in the lead-up to the war, and on Bush’s reference, in his speech to the American 
Enterprise Institute on 26 February 2003, to Iraq serving “as a dramatic and inspiring 
example of freedom for other nations in the region” (Bush, 2003(a)).  He ascribed this 
reluctance to the long-held notion of journalistic objectivity, which he argued “makes 
reporters hesitant to inject issues into the news that aren’t already out there” (Cunningham 
2003).  He argued that there was a lack of consensus amongst journalists about what it 
means to be ‘objective’, ‘fair’ or ‘balanced’, yet “in recent years a cottage industry of bias 
police” had sprung up, particularly on radio talk shows, to batter journalists into line 
(Cunningham 2003).  Instead of the individual political bias that journalists are often 
accused of, Cunningham says:  
Reporters are biased toward conflict because it is more interesting than stories without conflict; 
we are biased toward sticking with the pack because it is safe; we are biased toward event-
driven coverage because it is easier; we are biased toward existing narratives because they are 
safe and easy  (Cunningham 2003, p10).  
A number of scholars (Norris 2000; Entman 2004; Bennett 2007) have argued that there is 
very little evidence to support an argument in favour of systematic political media bias, 
despite the liberal leanings of most in the profession.  Bennett observed that there were 
organisational routines, professional norms and editors to keep political bias in check.  
Instead, he saw a different kind of media bias; one that results from the structural and 
organisational pressures on journalists to favour the “dramatic and personalized aspects of 
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events over more complex underlying political realities” (Bennett 2007 p38).  Bennett 
identified four characteristics of journalistic practice that work against deeper more 
analytical coverage and “the cause of democracy”: personalization, dramatization, 
fragmentation and the authority-disorder bias (2007, p40).  Personalised news is the 
“journalistic bias that gives preference to the individual actors and human interest angles in 
events while downplaying institutional and political considerations that establish their social 
contexts” (Bennett, 1996, p48).  Dramatised news is the result when “reporters and editors 
search for events with dramatic properties and then emphasize those properties in their 
reporting” (Bennett, 1996, p52).  Fragmentation describes what happens when “news 
fragments exist in self-contained dramatic capsules, isolated from each other in time and 
space” (Bennett, 1996, p58), making it hard for an audience to understand the wider 
context.  It was the result when journalists lifted “actors out of political context and 
surrounding their actions with titillating but irrelevant fantasy themes mak(ing) it very hard 
to put together a coherent picture of the world” (Bennett, 1996, p58).  The authority-
disorder bias described journalists’ pre-occupation with order “along with other related 
questions of whether authorities are capable of establishing or restoring it” (Bennett, 2007 
p43), with the effect that the complexities of the situation are glossed over and attention is 
focused on the personal performance of the official in question. 
In the context of Iraq, Bennett pointed to the media’s role in disseminating White House 
mis-information.  After the war “41 percent (of Americans) continued to believe that 
Saddam had something to do with al Qaeda, apparently on the basis of continuing 
suggestions from prominent members of the administration” which he suggested raised 
questions about what journalists should do when confronted with officials saying things 
“inconsistent with established facts” (2007, p3).  Bennett described American journalism as 
“trapped within an unworkable set of professional standards, with the result that the more 
objective and fair reporters try to be, the more official bias they introduce into the news.” 
(2007, p157)  He cited a five-nation study by Thomas Patterson and colleagues that found, 
ironically, that despite the freedom and political independence of the American press, “US 
journalists display the least diversity in their decisions about whom to interview for different 
hypothetical stories and in what visuals they chose for those stories” (Bennett 2007, p157).  
Patterson concluded that “the strong norms of political neutrality or independence among 
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American journalists actually homogenized the political content of their reporting” (Bennett, 
2007, P158). 
British media  
In contrast to the US, the UK media presented a more diverse range of opinions and were 
more critical of their government, of US policy, the reasons for going to war and the 
potential consequences of war.  A study of UK media coverage by Tumber and Palmer 
(2004) found that pre-war coverage in the Guardian was 55% negative and 45% positive, 
in the Daily Mirror was 70% negative and 30% positive, in the Daily Telegraph was 43% 
negative and 57% positive and in the Daily Mail was 41% negative and 59% positive 
(Tumber and Palmer, 2004).  Tumber and Palmer concluded that “support for/criticism of 
the US position on Iraq (was) clearly related to (the) political alignment and editorial policy” 
of the publications themselves (2004, p78). When the results were added according to the 
left/right positions of the papers, the results mirrored each other: the two left-leaning 
papers, the Guardian and the Daily Mirror were 62.5% negative and 37.5% positive, while 
the Daily Telegraph and Daily Mail, were 42% negative and 58% positive in their coverage 
(Tumber and Palmer, 2004, p78).   There was much more coverage of Iraq in the left-
leaning broadsheets and “support and criticism can also be seen in relation to the spread 
of thematic material that constituted the ‘story’ of the Iraq crisis in general” (Tumber and 
Palmer 2004, p78).  The broadsheets tended to balance discussion of policy options and 
US motives (which focus on principles) with discussion of the US/UK relationship and the 
outcomes of US policy (which focus on pragmatism), while the tabloids focused very 
heavily on US policy and motives (p81).  Tumber and Palmer conclude that this reflected 
two different news agendas; with the tabloid agenda driven by “hard news values, dictating 
a focus on the major facts of any set of events, with a low degree of analysis of related 
material, but with a relatively strong focus on the main principles that drive policy, whereas 
the broadsheet agenda [was] also driven by a desire to present maximum possible 
background and analytic material” (Tumber and Palmer, 2004, p81). 
In Scotland, many media were also critical of the UK Government and US policy.  Media 
Politics scholar, John Robertson (2004) conducted research which looked at Iraq war 
coverage of Scottish newspapers between January and November 2003.  His survey 
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found that the Herald/Sunday Herald generated a fairly strong anti-war climate, while there 
was “an overall tendency, especially in The Scotsman/Scotland on Sunday for anti-war 
writing to be balanced by material which either directly supported the war agenda or which, 
by uncritically reporting military achievements and developments, contributed to the 
creation of a climate in which the war seemed normal” (p475). The differences between 
the two papers were evident when ‘damaging’ coverage was graphed against ‘supportive 
and non-judgemental’ coverage, with the result that the Herald’s ‘damaging’ reporting was 
double that of its ‘supportive/non-judgemental’ reporting, while the Scotsman’s coverage 
tended to be balanced (Robertson 2004).  In response to the question: “Did they fulfil their 
role as ‘watchdog’ on behalf of the citizenry?”, Robertson concludes that both papers 
came out of the research looking like quality newspapers, having given generous space to 
a wide range of high quality comment from readers and contributors.  However, while the 
results demonstrate a preparedness on the part of the papers to criticise the government, 
Robertson found both papers to have fallen down on their ‘watchdog’ role in that they did 
not give adequate coverage to the “massive ‘collateral’ damage to the Iraqi environment 
and its people”(Robertson, 2004, p475).  
Perhaps because there was such a lively media debate over Iraq, there were fewer 
critiques of UK media performance, but there were some notable books by journalists 
critical of the Government.  John Kampfner, former chief political correspondent at the 
Financial Times, traced Blair’s personal journey from a man who came to office with no 
interest in or experience in foreign affairs to a man on a mission, determined that “Britain 
still had a global role…[based on] the two traditional pillars of the armed forces and the 
‘special relationship’ with the US” (2003, p17).  In six years, Blair committed British forces 
to action five times, but it was Iraq that deeply damaged him.  Kampfner argued that Blair 
was driven by “a combination of self-confidence and fear, of Atlanticism, evangelism, 
Gladstonian idealism, pursued when necessary through murky means.  His was a 
combination of naivety and hubris” (2003, p351).  The Accidental American is another 
journalist’s account of the closeness of the Blair/Bush relationship (Naughtie, 2004).  In it 
James Naughtie, former chief political correspondent of the Guardian, described a 
relationship so strong that Blair’s loyalty to Bush and commitment to war in Iraq 
undermined his long-held ambitions for Britain’s integration into Europe and ultimately lost 
him the support of the British public (2004). 
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Memoirs of some of the key political figures provide more personal accounts of the political 
tensions caused by Blair’s commitment to Iraq.   Robin Cook, Leader of the House of 
Commons and former Foreign Secretary, and Clare Short, Secretary of State for 
International Development, both resigned over the Iraq war and testified to the UK House 
of Commons Foreign Affairs Select Committee that they had been briefed by MI6 - before 
the conflict in Iraq  - that Saddam’s WMD did not pose any immediate threat.  In her 
memoir, Short pointed to weaknesses in the UK decision-making processes around Iraq, 
where key decisions were made without proper consultation with Cabinet (2005, p147).  In 
his diaries, Cook too was concerned about poor policy process and about honesty.  He 
recounted how he had left conversations with Blair convinced that “the timetable to war 
was plainly not driven by the progress of the UN weapons inspections…[that] the solution 
was not going to be disarmament through the UN, but regime change through war” (2004, 
p311).   Cook suggested that he had “no reason to doubt that Tony Blair believed in 
September [2002] that Saddam really had weapons of mass destruction ready for firing 
within forty-five minutes.  What was clear…was that he did not believe it himself in March 
[2003]” (2004, p312).  Short suggested that the roots of Blair’s ”misjudged policy toward 
Iraq” lay in the shortcomings of New Labour itself (2005, p1).   “It became clear during 
Blair’s second term that neither Blair nor New Labour had any significant guiding 
principles, philosophy or values” (2005, p2).  She suggested that “from the start it was 
obsessed with presentation rather than content and [was] willing to be economical with the 
truth” (2005, p1).  Short suggested that “New Labour was and is a ruthless, power-winning 
project.  It has little idea what it wants power for and because it is focused on winning 
media approval, tends to drift steadily in a direction approved by the Murdoch press” 
(2005, p2).   
Alastair Campbell’s diaries The Blair Years (2007) and Blair’s memoir, A Journey, (2010) 
provide an appreciation of the anguish involved when a Prime Minister commits troops to 
war.  Blair’s very emotional and personal account tends to describe his feelings rather than 
what transpired and when.  As personal as it is, it provided an insight into his 
defensiveness about the war and his desire to avoid expressing regret lest it be interpreted 
as “’Blair apologises for war’ or “At last he says sorry’” (2010, p371).  A Journey lent 
weight to Short’s view (expressed the day she resigned) that Blair had “achieved great 
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things since 1997 but paradoxically he is in danger of destroying his legacy as he 
becomes increasingly obsessed by his place in history” (Kampfner, 2003, p333). 
Australian media  
By comparison with the UK and US, there is not the same tradition in Australia of retired 
members of the Government and/or officials releasing their memoirs.  John Howard 
released his memoir, Lazarus Rising the same year (2010) as both Bush and Blair, but 
there have been few memoirs from his former senior Government colleagues or members 
of the Australian Public Service.  The former Leader of the Opposition, Mark Latham 
released The Latham Diaries (2005) and the former Office of National Assessments 
whistle-blower Andrew Wilkie released Axis of Deceit (2004)) and there have been 
memoirs from the military, Major General Jim Molan (Running the Iraq War (2008)), and 
the former UN Weapons Inspector Rod Barton (The Weapons Detective: The Inside Story 
of Australia’s Top Weapons Inspector, (2006)), but they are the exception rather than the 
rule.  Australian public servants, even in retirement, tend to keep up a tradition of keeping 
policy processes behind closed doors. 
In Australia, there were critiques of both the Government (see Geoffrey Barker’s Sexing it 
up: Iraqi Intelligence and Australia, 2003, and Alison Broinowski’s Howard’s War, 2003) 
and the media, but much of the media focus tended to be on the Murdoch press.  Rupert 
Murdoch’s papers supported the war, with the exception of the Hobart Mercury on one 
occasion in September 2002 (Manne, 2005, Greenslade, 2003, McKnight, 2012).  
[Murdoch owns seven of Australia’s twelve major national and daily newspapers, along 
with many regional papers.]  According to Robert Manne, the Mercury “had been 
instructed in writing by head office to alter its position on Iraq” after an editorial suggesting 
“it would be wrong for the US pre-emptively to attack Iraq…[A] blazing ember in the 
powder keg would be a dream scenario for the future rise of Islamic fascist 
fundamentalism” (Manne, 2005, pp 75-76).  Like other Murdoch papers around the world, 
the Australian “heaped scorn on critics of the war” and called them ‘appeasers’ (McKnight, 
2012, p203).  Attacks on Labor leader, Simon Crean, were withering, while the foreign 
editor, Greg Sheridan, suggested that “Saddam Hussein would possess nuclear weapons 
‘within two or three years’” and that “George W. Bush was ‘really a modern Winston 
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Churchill’” (McKnight, 2012, p203).  Mitchell Hobbs, in his PhD thesis (2010, unpublished) 
suggested that Murdoch’s views were not just reflected in opinion and editorial content, but 
influenced the paper’s news reporting: 
“…in the days leading up to Australia joining the ‘coalition of the willing’ in their war against Iraq, 
the Australian was conforming to the outspoken views held by Rupert Murdoch, producing many 
articles with a pro-war/neo-conservative bias.  Although this bias was not totally pervasive, it 
was not confined to the opinion and editorial pages, but seemingly seeped through to the 
regular news pages…While it cannot be determined whether these findings are a reflection of 
the corporate culture of News Corporation (unwitting bias) or the direct results of editorial 
policies (deliberate bias) they suggest nonetheless that the quality of this publication’s 
journalism can be undermined when the proprietor takes a keen interest in a particular story” 
(pp.239-240) 
Manne has argued that the Australian “delivered public opinion for the Howard 
Government” on the Iraq war (Manne, Quarterly Essay, 2011), although it is arguable that 
the Australian public never fully accepted the Government narrative (Goot, 2007(2)).  
Despite Murdoch’s dominance of the Australian print media, Jakubowicz and Jacka 
pointed to the emergence of an alternative discourse, mainly in the Sydney Morning 
Herald (SMH) and the Australian Broadcasting Corporation (ABC) which “(unlike the 
constant support from the Murdoch press) undermined government capacity to dominate 
totally the public agenda and set the terms for debate” (p118).   The SMH opposed the 
war, unlike its Fairfax stablemate the Age, making it one of the few capital dailies to do so.  
Journalists like Paul McGeough “were able to sustain some continuing interrogation of the 
government agenda” as he stayed in Baghdad to report on the impact of US bombing on 
civilians and the insurgency that followed “the declaration of victory” (Jakubowicz and 
Jacka, 2005, p118).  The ABC, true to its charter of independence, provided the Australian 
public with fresh insights into the war “despite sustained public and behind-the-scenes 
pressures to conform with government opinion as the only legitimate version of the 
national interest” (Jakubowicz and Jacka, 2005, p118).  The Four Corners program, for 
example, presented perspectives of the war that were not readily available through other 
Australian mass media.  Two programs stand out: “The American Dreamers”, about the 
influence of the neocons in US politics (2003(a)), and “Spinning the tubes” which explained 
the story behind the aluminium tubes mistakenly believed to have been for Saddam’s 
nuclear program (2003(b)). 
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Public opinion, a combination of events, and isolated independent media players meant 
that, while the government’s narrative was hugely influential, it never totally dominated the 
media agenda or the public debate.  Howard and his ministers echoed the narratives and 
themes used by George Bush and Tony Blair and the same problematic evidence was 
advanced in support of the proposition that Saddam had weapons of mass destruction.  In 
the lead-up to the war, the majority of the Australian population, according to opinion polls, 
was opposed to the war (Goot, 2003; Goot, 2007)).  In capital cities around the country 
there were large demonstrations against the war and the Opposition was opposed to going 
to war without specific United Nations endorsement.  Andrew Jakubowicz and Liz Jacka 
(2005) pointed to ways the Howard Government sought to use the Bali bombings in 
October 2002 to heighten terrorism fears, launching the government’s “Let’s look out for 
Australia” anti-terrorism campaign in February 2003, at a time when the majority of 
Australians were concerned about terrorism at home, and opposed to committing to a war 
thousands of miles away (Jakubowicz and Jacka, 2005).  At the same time the Howard 
Government sought to highlight the importance of the alliance with the US, while 
portraying the United Nations as a “’toothless tiger’ controlled by authoritarian and corrupt 
Third World regimes” (Jakubowicz and Jacka, 2005).   
The Howard Government’s ability to totally control the Iraq news agenda before the 
invasion was further limited by the resignation on 11 March 2003 of Office of National 
Assessments official, Andrew Wilkie.  Formerly an army lieutenant-colonel, Wilkie was the 
only serving intelligence officer in any of the coalition countries to become a whistleblower 
over the war and his resignation came a week before Howard’s announcement that 
Australian troops would take part (Barker, 2003).  Wilkie had set up a meeting with 
Canberra Press Gallery journalist Laurie Oakes so that his resignation would be covered 
by both broadcast and print media (Barker, 2003; Wilkie, 2004).  He argued that Iraq did 
not pose a security threat; that “the war had little to do with weapons of mass destruction 
and almost nothing to do with al-Qaeda…(He argued that) we were on the cusp of waging 
an unjustified war on the basis of a preposterous lie” (Wilkie, 2004, p8).  The resignation 
captured headlines, disrupted the government’s efforts to sell their message - that Iraq 
was a threat to global security - and fed into an alternative discourse about the war.   
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The alternative discourse, however, failed to translate into a compelling and sustainable 
counter-narrative.  There was never the drumbeat of a media campaign that might have 
prompted a deeper debate or crisis, despite opinion polls suggesting public unhappiness 
with the war (Goot, 2007).  While the SMH continued to oppose the war, once the invasion 
had started, public opinion came around to support it (Goot, 2003).  After the war, there 
seemed to be a sense that as Australia had created the problem, Australia needed to be 
part of the solution, and Latham’s “troops home by Christmas” statement coincided with a 
drop in his personal popularity (Newspoll, 2004). 
Contested agendas  
The failure to find WMD in Iraq, and the subsequent collapse of the rationale for war, 
resulted in congressional and parliamentary inquiries in the US, UK and Australia.  The 
inquiries in each of the three countries tended to coincide in terms of timing and had 
similar terms of reference which, while examining the quality of the intelligence advice on 
Iraqi WMD, moved the focus away from the quality of decisions made by governments to 
the judgements and processes of the intelligence agencies.   
In the US, questions were being asked in the media about why weapons of mass 
destruction had not been found, and journalists such as Seymour Hersh (2003) pointed to 
mounting evidence which raised doubts about the reasons for going to war.  On 20 June 
2003, the Chairman of the US Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Senator Pat 
Roberts (R-KS) and the Vice-Chairman John D. Rockefeller IV (D-WV) announced that the 
committee would conduct a detailed review of the Iraqi WMD intelligence process.  The 
first part of the Committee’s review was released in July 2004.  It identified numerous 
failings in the US intelligence-gathering and analysis process and found that, as a result, 
inaccurate materials misled both government policy makers and the American public.  
Subsequent and perhaps more damaging parts of the review were not finalised until 2005, 
2006 and 2007, with the most damaging part - which details inappropriate, sensitive 
intelligence activities conducted by the US Department of Defense’s Office of the 
Undersecretary of Defense for Policy (Douglas Feith), without the knowledge of the 
Intelligence Community or the State Department – was not released until 2008. 
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In June 2003, testimony to a UK parliamentary committee about Iraq intelligence prompted 
the Australian Senate to call for its own inquiry.  On 17 June 2003, Cook and Short 
testified to a House of Commons Committee that they had each been “briefed by MI6 in 
the period before the military conflict in Iraq to the effect that Saddam Hussein’s weapons 
of mass destruction did not pose any immediate threat” (Senator Chris Evans, Hansard, 18 
June 2003).  The following day, on 18 June 2003, Australian Senator Chris Evans referred 
to Cook and Short’s testimonies in a question to the Minister representing the Foreign 
Minister in the Senate (Hansard 2003).  That same day the Australian Senate asked the 
Joint Parliamentary Committee on ASIO, ASIS and DSD to “consider the nature, accuracy 
and independence of the intelligence used by the Australian government and the accuracy 
and completeness of the presentation of that intelligence by the Australian government to 
the Parliament and people of Australia” (Senate Hansard 18 June 2003, Jull 2003).  This 
inquiry found that “statements by the Prime Minister and Ministers were more strongly 
worded than most of the Australian intelligence community judgements” (Jull 2003, p94), 
leading to our own reports that the Prime Minister had “sexed up” intelligence to alarm 
people (Barker 2003).  Of interest in the Jull Committee report is the testimony from the 
Office of National Assessments (ONA) to the effect that they had been unable to comment 
on Prime Ministerial references to UK and US intelligence reports in his speeches because 
they were “made on the basis of material ONA had not seen.” (Jull, 2003, p94)  Andrew 
Wilkie, in evidence to the Jull Committee, said that he did not believe that Iraq posed a 
sufficiently serious security threat to justify a war; that he thought that too many things 
could go wrong; and that war was totally unnecessary at that time because options short of 
war were yet to be exhausted (Wilkie, Hansard 2003(2), Transcipt).  The inquiry called for 
a further “independent assessment of the intelligence agencies” (pxiii), which resulted in 
Philip Flood, a former Australian diplomat, being appointed to conduct a further inquiry. 
In the UK in August 2003, the Hutton inquiry was commissioned to investigate the death of 
British biological weapons expert, Dr David Kelly.  In May 2003, journalist Andrew 
Gilligan’s BBC report that the Blair Government had “sexed up” British intelligence reports 
about Saddam Hussein’s WMD – namely that Iraq could launch WMD within 45 minutes – 
led to a crisis for the Blair government and the subsequent suicide (on 17 July 2003) of 
Gilligan’s source, Dr David Kelly.  The Hutton inquiry was subsequently commissioned 
"…urgently to conduct an investigation into the circumstances surrounding the death of Dr 
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Kelly" (Hutton 2004) and resulted in both Gilligan and Alistair Campbell (Blair’s senior 
media adviser) losing their jobs.  A year later, on 19 March 2004, Gilligan made the 
following observations in an article for the Evening Standard:   
Right war, wrong reasons….More than anything else, what discredited the war was the rush to conflict, 
the need to claim Iraq as a pressing danger. From this need stemmed all the Government’s most 
famous tabloid half-truths and non-truths. No one I know ever doubted that Saddam had WMD, or 
could rebuild them quickly. It was a perfectly fair inference to draw from his behaviour, even, if it now 
seems to have been wrong. But no expert, spook, or politician I ever met, apart from a few New 
Labour androids, believed Iraq’s WMD were a threat “current and serious” enough to require military 
action in March 2003 (Gilligan, 2004). 
Both the Hutton inquiry report and the subsequent Butler ‘Review of Intelligence on 
Weapons of Mass Destruction’ cleared the Blair Government of any blame, but Butler 
recommended better evaluation and assessment of intelligence information in the future 
before invoking action.   Despite the reviews already conducted, the UK public’s desire for 
truth about Iraq prompted the former Prime Minister, Gordon Brown to announce a further 
inquiry on 15 June 2009.  That inquiry, chaired by Sir John Chilcot, was to identify lessons 
that could be learned from the Iraq conflict.  It has yet to report its findings.  
Conclusion 
These two bodies of literature – agenda setting, agenda formation and framing, and 
critiques of media performance over Iraq war coverage – drove construction of the thesis 
research design and set up the research challenge, which was to address a gap in the 
literature critiquing Australia’s media performance.  This thesis seeks to address questions 
related to the role that the Australian media played in holding the Government to account 
over the Iraq war.  It seeks to get some measure of the diversity of views that were 
represented in the quality print media at the time and identify the dominant themes and 
sources represented in coverage.  The project identified various influences operating on 
journalists and editors in their formation of the media agenda, including the role of the 
proprietor.  The research tested each of the three theories - Christie’s congruence model 
(Christie, 2006); Bennett’s indexing model (Bennett, 2007), and Entman’s cascading 
network activation model (Entman, 2004) – to determine which best describes the 
relationship between the news makers, the media and the public in Australia in the context 
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of the Iraq war.  The next chapter outlines the research design and explains its rationale, 
including key research questions. 
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Chapter 2 – Research design 
This research used the Australian print media’s coverage of the 2003 Iraq war as a case 
study to examine the influence of political elites and public opinion on the media agenda.  
Specifically, its aim was to identify and describe broad differences in coverage of the war 
by two of Australia’s leading newspapers, Sydney Morning Herald (SMH) and the 
Australian, and to identify the influences that shaped these papers’ agendas over time.  
The research had both quantitative and qualitative components: a content analysis of nine 
key periods in the lead-up to, during and after the US-led invasion of Iraq, and interviews 
with key journalists, editors, politicians, opinion leaders and bureaucrats directly involved 
in the Iraq debate.  The content analysis design had two built-in comparisons: differences 
and similarities between papers and periods.  Interviews with direct participants provided 
insights into the context and reasons for the differences (and similarities) between the 
papers. 
Research questions and hypotheses 
This research was designed to address five research questions and seven hypotheses: 
Research Question 1: Which themes dominated?  The content analysis sought to 
identify the themes which dominated coverage of the conflict and to find and explain 
differences between the two papers at the different stages of the war.  The analysis 
explored the way in which the media understood and portrayed the war and the role the 
SMH and the Australian played in terms of their preparedness to challenge the 
Government narrative.    
Hypothesis one: That the Australian media were neither ‘lap-dogs’ nor active ‘watch-dogs’ 
in their coverage of the war. 
Research Question 2: Which sources dominated the news?  The analysis identified up 
to four sources for each article, with a view to determining whose voices, if any, dominated 
the debate on Iraq and whether these varied over time or between papers. Of particular 
interest was the degree and means by which the Government dominated the debate, and 
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whether other political elites or critics of the war were given space in the media to counter 
the Government’s narrative.  
Hypothesis two: That the Government dictated the terms of the debate on Iraq, influencing 
the media agenda despite public opposition to the war. 
Hypothesis three: That Labor went silent on the issue of Iraq, leaving the Government 
dominating the post-war debate and controlling the media agenda in the latter stages of 
the conflict. 
Research Question 3: Which direction or position dominated?  The analysis sought to 
explore and explain any systematic directional differences in coverage over time between 
the two papers (the Australian and SMH).  Of interest were the views of the editor and/or 
proprietor and whether journalists felt under pressure to take a particular position in their 
coverage of the Iraq debate.   
  Hypothesis four: That the Australian was consistently more pro-war than the SMH. 
Research Question 4: What were the influences on the formation of the media 
agenda?  The analysis sought to gain a deeper understanding of the degree to which the 
media were successful in holding the Government to account in a policy area where there 
was little transparency and few alternative sources of information.  The study examined 
how political interests and media coverage interacted with the policy process and how the 
media decided on an editorial line, when information was scarce and the subject matter 
complex.  Interviews with journalists and editors explored the influence of public opinion. 
Hypothesis five: That during times of uncertainty and complexity, the media are especially 
mindful of public sentiment, and make sure they are not too far out of step with what they 
believe to be their readers’ views. 
Hypothesis six: That while many journalists did not accept the Government narrative 
around the war, they did not have the power, alone, to create a compelling counter-
narrative or bring about a political crisis. 
Research Question 5: Which theory is most suited?  This project examined the nature 
of the relationships between elites, public opinion and the media through three models – 
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Bennett’s indexing model, Christie’s agenda-public opinion congruence model and 
Entman’s cascading network activation model – with a view to deciding which best 
describes media agenda formation in Australia during the Iraq war.   
Hypothesis seven: That Entman’s cascading network activation model is a more accurate 
descriptor of the complex nature of the relationships between the elites, public opinion and 
the media agenda, but that the role of an activist proprietor can over-ride other influences. 
Design rationale  
The research project’s aims were two-fold: to identify and describe broad differences in 
coverage of the war by two of Australia’s leading newspapers, Sydney Morning Herald 
(SMH) and the Australian; and to identify the influences that shaped these papers’ 
agendas over time.  The first aim required a research design that would enable a detailed 
and systematic examination of each paper’s news content and the second required insight 
which could only come from qualitative interviews with those seeking to influence the 
news, as well as those reporting it.  Content analysis involves a largely quantitative 
examination of content without consideration of headlines, layout and other clues 
predisposing a reader to take a particular frame when reading an article.   
While a more qualitative semiotic analysis has the potential to identify the many ways in 
which a paper engages and influences its readers, there were two reasons why this was 
not the preferred method.  A semiotic analysis would have necessitated a narrowing of the 
sample size.  As a method, semiotic analysis requires considerable time and careful 
judgement, as well as access to print versions of the newspapers.  To examine 1,204 
articles in their print context would have taken more resources than those available.  
Secondly, the Australian was well-known for the strength of its headlines, while claiming 
that its content was balanced.  This research was designed in part to test those claims with 
objective and replicable data.     
  
45 
 
Content analysis design  
The Sydney Morning Herald (SMH) and the Australian were chosen for the content 
analysis because they were both broadsheets; they speak to comparable audiences 
(educated and politically aware) (Tiffen,1989, Young, 2011, Mitchell cited in Seccombe, 
2015); and as quality media, they tend to be opinion leaders with considerable influence 
on the frames that other media use to analyse issues of public importance (Tiffen,1989, 
Young 2011).  The two papers also lend themselves to comparison and analysis because 
of their different proprietors.   
Fairfax, publisher of the SMH, owns four of the major capital city and national dailies in 
Australia.  With a board that in recent times has tended to be dominated more by business 
advisers, Fairfax tends to fit the traditional model of editorial independence: independence 
which is both proclaimed in their masthead and central to their positioning in the 
newspaper market.  News Corp Australia (formerly News Ltd)’s proprietor, Rupert 
Murdoch owns “around 65 per cent of daily metropolitan newspaper circulation” (Tiffen, 
2002) and critics have argued that Murdoch directed all his papers around the world to 
take a pro-war stand (Greenslade, 2003).   Murdoch does not conceal his use of the 
Australian to further his own agenda for Australia (Kelly, 2014(b)), and has admitted he 
sought to use his influence in support of the Iraq war (Murdoch, 2007), but his editors and 
journalists have denied any specific direction (see chapter 3).  While there is a widespread 
perception of the power of the proprietor, Tiffen argues that this power is often over-
emphasized with “insufficient attention [given] to the structures which constrain and direct 
actions” (2002, p 36).  According to Tiffen “politicians’ belief about media proprietors’ 
power – all too evident in media policy-making – rests on two key assumptions…the power 
of media content to impact on public opinion…[and] the extent of control over media 
content by media owners” (2002, pp 40-41).  Media effects research raises questions 
about the first assumption (see chapter 1).  In relation to the second, whatever a 
proprietor’s desires, they are inevitably circumscribed to some extent by the chaos and 
pressure of daily decision-making around “the deadline and the news hole” (Tiffen, 2002, 
p43); by the unpredictability of news itself; by the commercial nature of the media 
business; and by the morale and professionalism of journalists themselves (Tiffen, 2002). 
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This research examines the relationship between proprietor and content, as well as that 
between journalists and their sources.  The methodology was, in part, based on that used 
by Tumber and Palmer in their study of the British media in Media at War: The Iraq Crisis 
(2004).  The content analysis identified the sources and themes woven into these two 
Australian papers’ news coverage, analysis and editorials about the war, including their 
explanation of the reasons for going to war.  The analysis identified and traced the themes 
and sources dominating the Iraq debate at the distinct stages of the conflict and their 
placement (page number) within each paper. 
Different editorial policies, and the Australian’s more extensive international coverage, 
meant that overall the SMH had fewer articles, but with a higher average word count.  
Figure 2.1 is a graph of the monthly frequency of all articles on Iraq (1,204 of which were 
included in the content analysis) published by the SMH and the Australian between 
January 2002 and March 2008.  [These numbers were compiled using Factiva and a 
search for all articles which included the word ‘Iraq’.]  Coverage in the Australian peaked at 
1,107 articles in March 2003 (in the period immediately before and during the invasion) 
and peaked in the SMH at 571 articles in the same month.  SMH articles had a mean word 
count of 705 words compared with 600 for the Australian: an average 105 words or 17% 
longer.   
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Fig 2.1    Monthly frequency of articles mentioning Iraq, 2002-2008 
All articles mentioning Iraq published in the SMH and the Australian between January 2002 and March 2008 
 
To factor out the impact of the papers’ different formats, and enable a comparison of like 
with like, figure 2.2 graphs the relative importance of Iraq news events for each paper in 
each month.  Frequency is expressed as a percentage of total Iraq coverage by each 
paper each month between January 2002 and March 2008.  Figure 2.2 shows that, despite 
the differences in word count and the number of articles published, the patterns of 
coverage, reflected in the percentages published in each month, were surprisingly 
consistent across both papers.  This suggests that, putting aside differences in proprietors’ 
views, editorial policies and formats, the SMH and the Australian shared similar news 
values: that is there was consistency between the two papers in their views of what 
constituted news when it came to the Iraq conflict. 
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Fig.2.2   Percentage of Iraq articles each month in SMH and Australian, 2002-2008  
 
 
Sample and press attention 
The content analysis involved the coding of 1,204 articles published on Iraq by the SMH 
and the Australian during nine one-week sample periods before, during and after the 2003 
invasion of Iraq.  The periods selected included peaks of media attention at moments that 
were pivotal in the politics of the war.  All articles with the term ‘Iraq’ published in both 
newspapers during the selected periods, were downloaded using Factiva and out of an 
original sample of 1,896 articles, 692 articles were excluded because they were either not 
primarily about the Iraq war or were duplicates of articles already coded.  Articles were 
excluded, for example, if they were travel articles with a passing reference to the impact of 
the Iraq war on travel routes; business analyses not primarily about the impact of the war 
on the economy or opinion pieces where reference to Iraq was just in passing.  The results 
of the coding were entered into SPSS (Statistical Package for the Social Sciences).  Table 
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2.1 shows the break-down between the two papers of the numbers and proportion of 
articles coded.  Around 35% (419) were published by the SMH and 65% (785) were 
published by the Australian.   
 
Table 2.1                 Sample 
         Sample size by media outlet 
 
 
 
 
Nine sample periods, each a week long, were selected around critical times and events in 
the lead-up to, during and after the Iraq invasion (see content analysis sample periods and 
Iraq-related events occurring at the time).  As neither the SMH nor the Australian 
published a Sunday edition, this meant that there were six days of coverage in each 
sample period (see table 2.2).     
 
Table 2.2     Sample periods 
Nine sample periods and reasons for their selection 
 
 
 Frequency Percentage 
SMH 419 34.8 
Australian 785 65.2 
Total 1,204 100.0 
Date of sample period Reason for selection 
 
12 - 18 September 2002 
 
Bush’s address to the UN, Blair visits US  
5 - 11 Feb 2003  
 
Powell addresses Security Council 
13 - 19 March 2003  
 
Howard outlines reasons for war to 
National Press Club and House of 
Representatives  
20 – 26 March 2003 Invasion of Iraq  
 
1 – 7 May 2003 
 
Bush declares ‘In the battle of Iraq we 
have prevailed’ 
2 – 8 October 2003 David Kay reports no WMDs 
 
1 – 7 March 2004 
 
Jull reports exaggeration of intelligence 
reports 
20 – 26 July 2004 Philip Flood hands down his report 
20 – 26 March 2008  
 
5th anniversary and fighting continues 
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Fig 2.3.            Total number of articles in each of the sample periods 
                            
 
Figure 2.3 illustrates the number of articles coded in each of the nine sample periods.  The 
fourth sample period, with the greatest number of coded articles, was the first week of the 
invasion of Iraq. 
Nine sample periods n = 1,204 
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Table 2.3     Nine sample periods 
Number and percentage of articles in each sample period by media outlet 
 
Sample period  SMH Australian 
12 - 18 September 2002 Number 35 52 
% within Media outlet 8% 7% 
5 - 11 February 2003 Number 59 105 
% within Media outlet 14% 13% 
13 - 19 March 2003 Number 87 150 
% within Media outlet 21% 19% 
20 - 26 March 2003 Count 147 265 
% within Media outlet 35% 34% 
1 - 7 May 2003 Count 28 55 
% within Media outlet 7% 7% 
20 - 8 October 2003 Count 7 42 
% within Media outlet 2% 5% 
1 - 7 March 2004 Count 24 44 
% within Media outlet 6% 6% 
20 - 26 July 2004 Count 27 60 
% within Media outlet 6% 8% 
20 - 26 March 2008 Count 5 12 
% within Media outlet 1% 2% 
 Count 419 785 
% within Media outlet 100% 101% 
            n = 1,204 
Table 2.3 shows the number and percentage of articles in each of the nine sample periods 
for each of the media outlets.  Around 54% of all 1,204 articles coded were published in 
two weeks in March 2003: the week prior to the invasion and the week of the invasion.  
Coverage dropped away considerably after the invasion when it appeared that coalition 
troops had been successful and Australian troops had come home, but media interest 
increased again as the violence in Iraq worsened, the US body count rose and the two 
inquiries into pre-war intelligence reported to the Australian Parliament. 
Coding frame 
The coding frame was designed to move beyond impressions into a systematic charting of 
the differences over time and between the two papers, including sources (whose voices 
were heard/who was quoted), the different themes covered over time and the sentiment or 
tone of articles.   
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Coding captured the following information: 
1. article ID number – to enable ready document location, 
2. media outlet – SMH or the Australian, 
3. date of publication, 
4. number of words in the article, 
5. by-line, name of journalist or author, 
6. type of article: news item, opinion or analysis, editorial or ‘other’, 
7. number of persons quoted in the article – no-one, one, two, three or four or more, 
8. first, second, third and fourth person quoted, 
9. percentage of the material quoted in the article attributed to the first person quoted 
(possible results were 100%, 75%, 50% and 25%), 
10.  first, second, third and fourth themes identified in the article, 
11.  direction of the headline – positive, negative or balanced, and 
12.  direction of the article – positive, negative or balanced. 
Type of article 
Each article was categorised as being a news item, an opinion or analysis piece, or an 
editorial.  Occasionally there were other items, for example a film review that might also 
take a position on the war and was therefore coded.  Letters to the editor were excluded 
from the study.  While an argument might be made that letters published reflect not just the 
views of the reader but also the views of the pages editor, their inclusion would have 
added to the volume of articles to be coded and clouded the discussion about formation of 
the media agenda as reflected in news and editorial content.  Table 2.4 provides a 
breakdown of article types or genres - ‘news’, ‘opinion/analysis’, ‘editorials’ and ‘other’ - in 
both publications.   
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Table 2.4    Balance of news and opinion 
Percentage of different types of articles by media outlet  
 
Type of article SMH Australian 
News 55 66 
Opinion/analysis 39 30 
Editorial 5 4 
Other 1 0 
              n = 1,204, Columns add to 100% 
While the proportions of editorials on the war were comparable, there was a significant 
difference between them when it came to the balance between ‘news’ and 
‘opinion/analysis’.  The Australian was more likely to publish news articles on Iraq (65%) 
than was the SMH (56%), while a greater proportion of SMH articles were likely to be 
opinion and/or analysis of the Iraq situation (39%) than was the case with the Australian 
(29%, see table 2.4). 
 
Table 2.5     By-lined articles 
               Articles with and without by-lines by media outlet 
 
By-line present SMH Australian 
No by-line 7 28 
By-line 93 72 
              n = 1,204, Columns add to 100% 
There were marked differences between the two publishers when it came to the proportion 
of articles without a by-line.  Often articles without a by-line were straight news items 
written by staff reporters and the author was not named.  Likewise, editorials, traditionally, 
did not have a by-line as they purported to represent the views of the newspaper.  The 
differences were only partly explained by the Australian’s greater focus on news coverage.  
Table 2.5 shows that 28% of articles published by the Australian during the periods 
sampled did not have a by-line, while only 7% of SMH articles did not have a by-line.   As 
expected all editorial pieces in both papers were without by-lines and almost every opinion 
or analysis piece had a by-line.  The big difference between the two publications was in 
the straight news coverage, where 34% of Australian news articles did not have a by-line, 
while only 3% of SMH news items did not have a by-line.  This difference may perhaps be 
explained by the Australian’s access to world-wide in-house news coverage through its 
parent company, News Corporation.   
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Table 2.6     Article placement 
Percentage of Iraq articles by page number by media outlet 
 
Page number SMH Australian 
1 11 10 
2 5 7 
3 5 6 
4 4 7 
5 3 6 
6 8 7 
7 6 9 
8 5 5 
9 4 3 
10 5 2 
11 6 7 
12 4 4 
13 3 5 
14 2 2 
15 3 1 
Other 26 19 
       n = 1,204, Columns add to 100% 
Table 2.6 indicates the placement of articles – or page of publication - of articles 
mentioning Iraq in the two publications during the sample periods.  Both papers placed 
more Iraq articles on page one, around 10 – 11% of all Iraq articles, than on any single 
other page of their publication.  Around half of all Iraq articles in the Australian during the 
sample periods were on pages 1 to 7 (with page 7 in the international news section, the 
second most popular after page 1), while half of all Iraq articles in the SMH during the 
same periods were placed on pages 1 to 9 (with page 6, in the international news section, 
the second most popular after page 1). 
Sources/Voices  
For each article, the number and identity of the persons quoted were recorded.  For coding 
purposes, high profile participants like the President of the United States, the British Prime 
Minister, the Prime Minister of Australia and Saddam Hussein had their own individual 
code, which fitted into a table categorising respondents according to the country or 
international organisation they represent (Australia, US, UK, Iraq, European Union, Middle 
East, International Organisations and ‘other’) and type (Government, Opposition, ‘other 
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political’, ‘academics and experts’, ‘community groups and NGOs’, journalists, family of 
military, Iraqi exiles and ‘other’).   
 
Table 2.7   Coding sheet for sources/types/who quoted 
 
 
Given the importance in the Iraq debate of representatives of the UN, a separate category 
was created for ‘international organisations’ to include people like Kofi Annan, UN 
Secretary General, and Dr Hans Blix, Executive Chairman of the UN Monitoring, 
Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC).  Source/type code categories are set 
out in table 2.7.   
 
Table 2.8    Number of sources/voices per article 
  Mean number of persons quoted per news article and for all articles in each publication 
 
 
Table 2.8 shows the mean number of people quoted by the two publications in articles 
about Iraq.  These results suggest that longer articles enabled the SMH to cover the views 
of a wider array of people.  More sources were quoted (voices heard) on average in each 
SMH article on the war.  The average number of people quoted in SMH articles was 2.5: 
higher than the 2.0 quoted in articles published in the Australian.  When only news items 
were included, the mean number of persons quoted in SMH articles increased to 2.9, while 
in the Australian the mean increased to 2.3. 
Who quoted? Australian  United 
States  
United 
Kingdom 
Iraq  International 
organisations  
European 
Union 
Middle 
East  
Other 
Government         
Opposition         
Other political         
Academic & 
experts 
        
Community 
Groups & 
NGOs  
        
Other 
Journalists  
        
Family of 
military  
        
Iraqi exiles         
Other-specify         
Media outlet Mean (News) Mean (Total) 
SMH 2.9 2.5 
Australian 2.3 2.0 
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Table 2.9            Sources/voices  
Number of people quoted in articles (percentage of total) by media outlet  
 
Number of people 
quoted in each article SMH Australian 
0 13 18 
1 23 26 
2 23 20 
3 13 15 
4 20 14 
5 4 3 
6 2 2 
7 0 1 
8 1 1 
11 1 0 
12 0 0 
13 0 0 
                               (Columns add to 100%) 
 
To keep the coding task within manageable limits, only the identities of the first four people 
quoted in each article were coded - by nationality and type.  Ninety-three percent of SMH 
articles and 94% of articles in the Australian (see table 2.9) quoted four people or fewer 
and a majority of articles quoted two or fewer people.  Given this trend, I do not believe 
that coding only to four voices had a significant distorting effect on the results.   
Themes 
Coded themes were grouped into three time periods – before, during and after the 
invasion – to reflect the difference issues that were pertinent at the different times.  In the 
first time period, there are seven theme categories: ‘WMD and terrorism’, ‘policy options’, 
‘US/Australia Alliance/relations with other countries’, ‘discussion of US motives’, 
‘anticipated outcomes’, ‘Australian domestic sentiment/pro and anti-war groups’ and 
‘overseas domestic sentiment/pro and anti-war groups’.  Each article was analysed and up 
to a maximum of four themes were identified, with each theme allocated a unique number 
and a theme category.  Given the nature of the themes covered and the tone of the article, 
each article was judged to be ‘pro-war or supportive of the US/Australian position’; ‘even-
handed/balanced’ or ‘anti-war or critical of the US/Australian position’.  The research used 
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similar categories to those used by Tumber and Palmer in their research in Media at War: 
The Iraq Crisis (2004) which enabled comparison with the British papers they studied.   
The second time period, during the war, had two theme categories: ‘conduct of the war’ 
and ‘long-term political purposes or outcomes’.  Each article was judged to be 
‘heroic/supportive of the war’, objective/even-handed’ or ‘sceptical/opposed to the war’.  In 
the third time period, post-invasion, there were ten theme categories: ‘situation in Iraq’, 
‘other nations’ policies’, ‘war on terror’, ‘domestic Australian political fall-out’, relations with 
other nations’, ‘economic impact of the war’, ‘what really happened’, ‘UK political fall-out’, 
‘US political fall-out’, ‘US motives’.  Each article was judged to be ‘supportive of the war’, 
‘even-handed/balanced’ or ‘critical of the war’.   Table 2.10 sets out the classification 
system.  The list of sub-themes grew as the coding progressed, each categorised 
according to the following framework.   
 
Table 2.10:    Themes/subthemes quoted 
 
Pre-war Pro-war/Supportive of 
US position 
Even-
handed/balanced 
Anti-war/Critical of 
US/Australian position 
WMD & Terrorism WMD evidence accepted 
as reason for war. 
Argument in favour 
balanced by criticism. 
WMD evidence 
questioned and threat 
disputed. 
Policy Options Policy uncritically 
supportive of US position.  
Legality not questioned.   
Policies balanced by 
alternatives. 
Policy options criticised.  
Alternative options put 
forward. 
US/Australia 
Alliance and 
relations with other 
countries 
US Alliance seen as 
positive and a reason for 
Australian involvement in 
Iraq. 
 
Arguments for and 
against military action 
on the basis of the 
Alliance. 
Support for US Alliance 
and Iraq involvement 
seen as having potential 
to damage relationships, 
with our neighbours. 
Discussion of US 
motives 
US motives accepted at 
face value. 
Both positive and 
negative views on US 
motives. 
US motives questioned. 
Anticipated 
Outcomes 
Outcomes predicted to be 
positive for Iraq, the 
region and the US. 
Discussion includes 
positive and negative 
outcomes. 
Outcomes predicted to 
be negative for Iraq, with 
increased threat of terror. 
Aus Domestic 
sentiment/pro & 
anti-war groups 
Positive focus on the 
domestic political 
implications of the war. 
Discussion includes 
views from both sides 
of domestic politics. 
Political implications of 
the strength of anti-war 
sentiment. 
o/s Domestic 
sentiment/pro & 
anti-war groups 
Positive focus on 
domestic political 
implications of the war in 
other countries. 
Discussion picks up 
on both pro-war and 
anti-war activities o/s. 
Strength of anti-war 
sentiment and political 
implications for other 
countries. 
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During the war Heroic Even-
handed/balanced 
Sceptical 
Conduct of the war US, UK and Australian 
troops reported as being 
highly trained, highly 
motivated and brave. 
War described in 
factual, balanced 
terms. 
Conduct of the war 
criticized.  Concerns 
expressed over likely 
outcomes. 
Long-term political 
purposes or 
outcomes 
Long-term outcomes 
seen as positive for Iraq, 
the region and US. 
Discussion includes 
both optimistic and 
pessimistic views on 
possible outcomes. 
Long-term outcomes 
seen as devastating for 
the Iraqis, damaging to 
the US and give rise to 
increased terrorism.  
  
Post invasion Support the war Even-
handed/balanced 
Critical of the war 
Situation in Iraq  Positive portrayal of 
situation in Iraq. 
Balanced with both 
positive and negative 
outlook for future. 
Situation in Iraq reported 
in negative terms.  
Other nations’ 
policies  
Other nation’s policies 
support the US position. 
Factual account of 
other countries’ 
policies on Iraq. 
Other nation’s policies 
critical of US policy in 
Iraq. 
War on terror  Iraq war seen as 
important part of wider 
war on terror. 
Even-handed 
approach. 
Iraq intervention seen as 
heightening terror threat. 
Domestic 
Australian political 
fall-out  
Positive portrayal of 
political implications of 
Australian Government’s 
handling of the war. 
Balanced account of 
political implications of 
Government’s handling 
of the war. 
Criticism of Australian 
Government’s handling 
of the war. 
Relations with 
other nations  
Support for war 
portrayed as positive for 
relations with other 
nations. 
Support for war 
portrayed as having no 
impact on relations 
with other nations. 
Support for war 
portrayed as negative for 
relations with other 
nations. 
Economic impact 
of war  
War seen as having a 
positive economic 
impact.  
Even-handed 
discussion of both 
positive and negative 
positions. 
War seen as having a 
negative economic 
impact. 
What really 
happened 
Pro-US interpretation of 
what happened. 
Balanced account of 
both sides of the 
discussion 
Anti-US interpretation of 
what happened. 
UK political fallout Positive portrayal of Blair 
and his support for war.  
Balanced account. Criticism of Blair and his 
support for war. 
US political fallout Positive portrayal of 
political impact of Bush’s 
decision to go to war. 
Even-handed account 
of the political impact. 
Criticism of Bush in post-
invasion period. 
US motives US motives portrayed as 
positive. 
Balanced account. US motives portrayed as 
negative. 
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Direction of headlines and articles 
In making a judgment about the balance of opinion or direction of an article, consideration 
was given to whether an argument was quoted first (giving it greater weight), the relative 
number of persons quoted and number of lines devoted to each side of the argument, and 
the tone of coverage.  Direction is not a measure of bias.  For example, neutral coverage 
of an anti-war protest would be coded as ‘anti-war’ because of the anti-war theme.  
However if anti-war protestors were depicted in a negative light as riotous, unruly, stupid or 
wrong, then the direction of the article might be ‘pro-war’.  Whenever there was any doubt 
about the balance of sentiment, the article was coded as ‘neutral’ or ‘balanced’. 
Articles were coded as anti-war if the direction of an article was critical of the case for war 
or opposed to the position taken by the US or Australian political leaders.  Before the war 
such articles argued that the evidence that Iraq possessed WMD was inconclusive or that 
despite residual depleted WMD, Iraq did not constitute a threat.  Other anti-war articles 
argued that it was not in Australia’s national interest to engage in a pre-emptive strike 
without international support and that going to Iraq would increase the terrorist threat to 
Australia.  During the war, anti-war sentiment was reflected in arguments that the war was 
not going well or that there was a risk of dire humanitarian consequences.  After the 
invasion anti-war articles might have been critical of the way the US was running the war 
or highlighted the dangers of ongoing inter-group civil strife in Iraq.   
Validity, reliability and replicability 
According to Krippendorf “content analysis is a research technique for making replicable 
and valid inferences from texts (or other meaningful matter) to the contexts of their use” 
(2004, P18).  For data to be reliable, it must be capable of being replicated by other 
researchers working at a different time, but applying the same technique to the same data.  
This is straightforward when analysis is a simple matter of counting: many of the data 
categories in this content analysis are very clear.  There would be little dispute, for 
example, in identifying the media outlet, the date of publication, the number of words, the 
by-line, the number of people quoted and the order in which they are quoted.  There were, 
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however, some categories that to a greater or lesser degree involved some level of 
judgement, for example, deciding whether an article was news or analysis, but these 
judgments were based on long-held journalistic categories or traditional ‘genres’ which 
associate a particular way of writing a news story as opposed to an opinion piece.  
Identifying sub-themes also required that a judgement be made and, as the process 
evolved, the list of sub-themes grew to almost one thousand.  However, while another 
researcher might not have come up with identical sub-themes, the way in which these 
were categorised and analysed into the larger framework should have rendered the 
method replicable.  For example, the sub-theme ‘Iraq has tried to import yellowcake from 
Niger’ would be counted in the theme category of ‘WMD and terrorism’.  While another 
researcher might have used different words to describe sub-themes, categorisation of 
such an article under the theme ‘WMD and terrorism’ would be clear and unambiguous to 
another researcher.   
Judgement was also required in deciding whether an article was ‘supportive of war/the US 
position’, ‘opposed to war/the US position’ or ‘even-handed or balanced’, although having 
identified certain themes as pro or anti-war made judgement easier and more reliable.  For 
example, if the balance of themes in an article were anti-war (eg. coverage of anti-war 
demonstrations) then the article was coded as anti-war.  On the other hand, if an article 
were about an anti-war demonstration but used hostile language portraying participants as 
stupid, unruly or aggressive then, depending on the share of copy, the balance of the 
article might have been coded as pro-war.  Much of the straight news coverage of the build 
up to war was coded as pro-war, unless a critic was also quoted.  This in part might 
explain some of both papers’ pro-war coverage just before and during the invasion.  
Likewise, in the wake of the failure to find WMD in Iraq, the content of news items by their 
very nature was anti-war, since WMD had been the justification for war.  Pro or anti-war, 
therefore, does not of itself mean bias or the use of editorial discretion: rather, it reflects 
the way a story treated a particular theme or issue. 
Decisions where a subjective judgement was required are outlined in table 2.11.  The 
position or tone of an article was influenced by the positioning of arguments (for example, 
which argument was covered in the first and dominant paragraph), which argument 
dominated in terms of space and the number of proponents quoted, and whether emotive 
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language was used in support of or in opposition to the argument.  There were no issues 
related to inter-coder reliability, as the researcher coded the entire sample.  Any article 
published during the sample periods which mentioned Iraq (except in passing), expressed 
an opinion about the case for war or sought to explain Australia’s involvement in the war 
was coded, even if the primary purpose of the article was something else entirely.  With 
the exception of letters to the editor, if there was sufficient discussion of the war, whether 
or not an opinion was expressed, the article was coded.  
 
 
Table 2.11:    Themes/subthemes quoted 
 
Variable Judgement Required, Yes/No 
Article ID number – to enable ready document 
location 
No 
Media outlet – SMH or the Australian No 
Date of publication No 
Number of words in the article No 
By-line, name of journalist or author No 
Type of article: news item, opinion or analysis, 
editorial or ‘other’ 
Some judgement required.  Categories identified 
according to standard journalistic genres. 
Number of persons quoted in the article –  
no-one, one, two, three or four or more 
No 
First, second, third and fourth person quoted No 
How much of the material quoted in the article was 
attributed to the first person quoted (possible results 
were 100%, 75%, 50% and 25%) 
No 
First, second, third and fourth themes identified in 
the article 
Some judgement required for identification of sub-
theme, but minimal for overall theme category. 
Direction of the headline – positive, negative or 
neutral 
Yes – based on language used. 
Direction of the article – positive, negative or 
neutral. 
Yes – based on positioning of arguments (eg 
argument included in dominant paragraph), which 
argument dominated in terms of space or number of 
proponents quoted, and language used in support of 
or in opposition to the argument. 
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Qualitative analysis rationale 
While content analysis can provide systematic data on news coverage, it cannot gauge the 
external context for what is written and cannot explain why certain narratives took hold of 
the media’s imagination, while others quickly faded from view.  Nor can it explain the 
influence of the views of colleagues, overseas media coverage or the proprietor.  In-depth 
interviews can enrich understanding by providing context and possible answers to the 
‘why’ questions, such as, ‘why didn’t the media challenge the Government more over its 
WMD evidence before the invasion?’  
Forty semi-structured in-depth interviews (see appendix A for list of interviewees) were 
conducted with journalists, editors, senior politicians, experts, current and former senior 
public servants, including former intelligence officers, and opinion leaders to gain an 
understanding of the different perspectives on the war according to an interviewee’s role at 
the time, whether it be advising government, seeking to influence government, making and 
communicating decisions on behalf of the Government, or writing about, reporting on or 
editing media coverage of the war in Iraq.  Journalists were asked about the different 
influences on them in the process of developing a narrative around the war.  Politicians 
were asked about decision-making processes and the messages they sought to convey to 
the public in ‘selling’ or opposing the war.  Public servants were asked about the behind 
the scenes processes and on-the-record advice they gave to government.  All were asked 
for their views on the media coverage at the time in terms of accuracy and fairness in 
covering the issues and the media’s effectiveness in holding the government to account.   
In accordance with the requirements of the University of Sydney Human Ethics 
Committee’s approval, all interviewees were issued a formal letter of invitation, a 
participant information leaflet and gave written or verbal approval to being recorded.  Each 
interviewee was provided with a full transcript of the interview, and later, details of the 
quotes which would be attributed to them, and offered the opportunity to amend either if 
they wished.  Transcripts and quotes were amended in accordance with interviewees’ 
wishes. 
Interviews were analysed by first grouping them according to the interviewee’s occupation 
(journalist, editor, politician, current or former public servant, subject expert including 
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weapons inspector) and analysed according to themes to identify patterns, contradictions 
and insights into the complex interplay of roles, responsibilities and objectives involved in 
the media’s coverage of the Government’s reasons for taking the country to war.  Interview 
data were then compared and contrasted with the results of the content analysis in order 
to present a more nuanced and multi-layered appreciation of the process involved when 
journalists seek to develop and present a narrative around the reasons and efficacy of 
going to war. 
Conclusion 
This thesis draws on the results of a mixed method, grounded research approach – 
including a content analysis of 1,204 articles that appeared in two of Australia’s leading 
newspapers, Sydney Morning Herald (SMH) and The Australian, and interviews with 40 
journalists, editors, senior politicians, experts, current and former senior public servants 
and opinion leaders - to identify and describe patterns in the media’s coverage of the 2003 
Iraq war.  The thesis seeks to identify the influences that shaped the different media 
agendas at the time and to identify which of three theories propounded by US scholars - 
describing the nature of the relationships between political elites, public opinion, news 
values, news organisations and media agendas - best describes Australian media agenda 
formation around the 2003 Iraq war.  In advancing understanding of the agenda formation 
process in Australia, this thesis will shed light on the degree to which US models of 
agenda formation can be directly applied to the press in Australia or whether there are 
other influences operating in the Australian context which need to be taken into account.   
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Chapter 3 – The Iraq war and the media agenda 
We have become accustomed to a truncated cycle in which revelation of wrongdoing is followed 
by…nothing; or rather, nothing beyond the public knowledge of that wrongdoing.  Official 
investigation, when it comes, tends to be severely circumscribed, either implicitly – as with the 
various military-led inquiries into the torture revelations, which have largely excluded the 
question of civilian policymakers’ responsibility – or explicitly – as with the [US] Senate 
Intelligence Committee’s abbreviated inquiry into intelligence and the Iraq war, in which the 
central question of policymakers’ use of that intelligence was placed outside the compass of 
inquiry and postposed to an indefinite future  (Danner, 2006, xvii-xviii). 
Australia’s newspapers, unlike some of their European counterparts, publish a mix of 
views within each publication - either in a collection of articles from authors of varying 
viewpoints or sometimes with the presentation of opposing views within a single article.  
This tradition reflects the mass distribution nature of papers today and grew out of the 
need to attract the widest possible audiences and build a sense of professional journalistic 
responsibility (Siebert et al., 1978, Schudson, 1978, Schudson 2008).  At the same time, 
newspapers seek to establish a personality or persona by taking a position on particular 
issues, using editorials, placement within the paper, page one treatment and headlines to 
convey their views to readers (Fuller, 1997, p94).   
Iraq was an issue on which every Australian paper took a view.  All Murdoch papers 
supported, and continue to support, the invasion (Greenslade, 2003) – with the one 
exception of the Hobart Mercury on one occasion when a maverick editorial writer’s copy 
slipped past an acting editor (Tuffin, pers. comm. 30 May 2013).  However, there was 
division within the Fairfax stable: the Age supported Australia’s involvement in the coalition 
of the willing, while the SMH opposed it.   Each paper had its own style and ways of 
signalling its views, sometimes obvious, but sometimes in ways not always obvious to the 
reader.    
This chapter explores the way in which editors at each of the two papers in this study 
decided on their paper’s editorial position on the war and then compares patterns of pro 
and anti-war coverage in the Australian and the SMH across the different genres - 
editorials, headlines, analysis and opinion, and news articles – and different time periods.   
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Editors and the war  
For any newspaper, war generates volumes of news, increased demand for information 
and considerable political debate.  There is a lot of straight news reporting, human interest 
reporting, and increased demand for expert opinion and analysis.  War can be good for 
business, but there are risks involved as the editorial team decides on the paper’s position 
in the midst of unpredictable events and fluctuating public opinion. 
As with any story, the first priority of an editor is to ensure that the resources are in place 
to cover the story.  With the Iraq war, news was being generated across four different time 
zones, in Washington, London, Canberra and Baghdad, with news from the Middle East 
and England coming in late at night and very close to printing deadlines.   Michael 
Stutchbury, editor of the Australian at the time, explained that the logistics of covering the 
war and keeping track of rapidly unfolding events presented a challenge. 
If Australia's going to be involved in a war then that's a big story.  So that's quite a big effort to 
cover that properly so you've got to get all your resources in line and work out how you're going 
to cover this thing and you don't go through too many wars so that's a big thing.  So just the 
logistics and the exercise of covering it and it's happening on the other side of the world in a 
different time zone… Just what's happening and how you're going to cover it is a big thing   
(Stutchbury, pers. comm. 29 Jan 2013). 
Both the SMH and the Australian had correspondents based in each capital and in the 
middle-east, nonetheless both papers were also highly dependent on news agencies, or 
other papers for syndicated news content, like the New York Times in the case of the 
SMH.  Despite its reputation for fact checking, in this instance the New York Times proved 
to be an unreliable source.  One of their journalists, Judith Miller, was being used by the 
Pentagon and the White House to advance the case for war by making public untested 
information from Iraqi exiles: information that was later discredited (Bennett, Lawrence and 
Livingston, 2007, Rampton and Stauber, 2007, Rich, 2006,) and for which the New York 
Times later issued a public apology (New York Times Editors, 2004).  Whitehead, SMH 
editor at the time, spoke about the way in which Judith Miller had been manipulated. 
Looking back on it…we relied very heavily on material from the New York Times which has 
subsequently [been] shown to be thoroughly discredited. That was around the leaks out of the 
Pentagon…that went through to one particular reporter at the New York Times - Judith Miller - 
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and was presented in a way that was designed to form public opinion in the United States in 
favour of the eventual military intervention. We ran all of that...if it comes from the New York 
Times and it's been verified by their fleet of editors, it should be right (Whitehead, pers. comm. 
19 Dec 2012). 
While Judith Miller’s material was problematic, Whitehead suggested that the SMH’s 
commitment to putting two different sides of the story helped the paper and, perhaps, 
saved it from damage to its own credibility and reputation. 
Miller had access to material continuously. In hindsight she was fed stuff that was wrong. We 
ran all of that material, most of that material. At the same time, what helped us was, we had 
various reporters - Paul McGeough first and foremost among them - who had a different view to 
what was unfolding. So being able to present two different sides of the story is incredibly 
important to the DNA of a masthead like the Sydney Morning Herald, and The Age, which 
carried the same thing (Whitehead, pers. comm. 19 Dec 2012). 
While the New York Times apologised for having failed to subject Judith Miller’s material to 
the same rigorous checking that other authors were subjected to (NY Times editors, 2004), 
the SMH, it appears, did not consider it appropriate to issue a similar apology to their 
readers.  For Whitehead, his obligations to readers would appear to have been met having 
balanced Miller’s false pro-war stories with McGeough’s critical stories. 
SMH’s editorial position on Iraq 
Since its inception in 1831, the SMH, according to Whitehead, had been committed to 
being “balanced [such that] every Tory would think that we were a Whig, and every Whig 
would think we were a Tory; such would be the balance of our argument” (pers. comm. 19 
Dec 2012).  Whitehead argued that it was this commitment to balance which defined the 
company to this day: it was “not up for negotiation” (pers. comm. 19 Dec 2012).  
Whitehead contrasted the Australian journalistic tradition – with its code of conduct 
requiring journalists to be balanced, fair and transparent – with the various journalistic 
traditions that have grown up in Western Europe, the US, and on Fleet Street.   
In our culture, which is dominated by the early Fleet Street culture, you cover both sides of the 
story. That's what you are there to do. A slightly different journalistic tradition grew up in the 
United States, but very much wedded to the notion that a free press was as important to a 
democracy as a robust opposition, and to be a free press you need to not blindly pursue dogma, 
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not blindly pursue people or issues outside a moral framework (Whitehead, pers. comm. 19 Dec 
2012). 
Being balanced, fair and transparent was fundamentally about presenting both sides of the 
story, Whitehead maintained, balancing a Judith Miller story with a Paul McGeough article.  
Whitehead spoke of balancing the number of columnists of opposing views and matching 
the same “centimetre commitment”. 
As meticulous as you can be on the opinion page, for every voice that you present arguing in 
favour of something, you find another voice that will argue a different line or a different 
perspective and, certainly, from a different political viewpoint.  We reflect that both in the 
columnists - and at that time, I think, we had Miranda Devine very close to a Howard view of the 
world, Gerard Henderson not far removed, Paul Sheehan - commentators that helped balance 
the commentators from the left like Alan Ramsey and others - who, unsurprisingly, had very 
different views on this. So you literally tried to line up the same number of columnists and, 
roughly, the same column centimetre commitment, so that you have opposing views 
(Whitehead, pers. comm. 19 Dec 2012). 
The same ethos, according to Whitehead, applied to the selection and placing of news 
stories in the SMH, when “you want to be able to run both sides of a story as often as you 
possibly can” (pers. comm. 19 Dec 2012). 
That does not mean on any one day it's 50/50. It means that in the course of a particular 
discussion [or] development - it might be an anthrax attack or something - it will run for a certain 
number of days with a dominant line. Then you've got to work really hard to make certain it's all 
questioned.  The next particular unit of news might flip the other way and might be a pro-military 
story or a different view; but over the course of the coverage you want to make certain that you 
are presenting every single opportunity to question what's going on (Whitehead, pers. comm. 19 
Dec 2012). 
While the SMH was committed to presenting both sides of the Iraq story, the importance of 
the issue required the paper to take an editorial position.  Whitehead argued, however, 
that the paper’s editorial position had no impact on the paper’s news coverage. 
The editorial position of the Sydney Morning Herald, fundamentally, over 182 years, has been 
conservative, but the editorial position of the newspaper has never, to my knowledge, dictated 
news coverage.  In US publications they are actually separate. The news department doesn't 
talk to the opinion and editorial team. They regard that as church and state in the United States. 
Here and in the Anglo community, church and state is commercial versus editorial; so editors 
are across both (Whitehead, pers. comm. 19 Dec 2012). 
  
68 
 
After much deliberation on the part of the editorial team, the SMH decided to oppose the 
war, while its Fairfax stable mate, the Melbourne Age, decided to support the war.   
Whitehead spoke about a rigorous process within Fairfax when the editorial team had to 
present their arguments. 
We're sister newspapers. The editors report to the same people, but it is a thoroughly rigorous 
process to mount your arguments, present them internally and, ultimately, decide on a position. 
…Iraq was a long time coming from 11 September [2001] through to 20 March [2003]...[when] 
the main invasion happened. The critical piece is, you know you are going to have to make a 
call one way or the other: is the war legitimate and should Australia be involved (Whitehead, 
pers. comm. 19 Dec 2012)? 
The decision about Iraq was taken against the backdrop of another robust debate involving 
Fairfax media: coverage of Middle Eastern affairs.  Whitehead said that for a number of 
years there had been a critique by the Jewish community in Australia that Fairfax was not 
pro-Israel enough, alongside another critique that Fairfax was not supportive enough of 
Palestine.  While Iraq was a separate issue altogether, there were some who saw the 
SMH’s opposition to an invasion of Iraq as anti-Israel. 
The fact that we did not support Australia's war in Iraq was seen by some members of the pro-
Israeli group as being a sign that we were anti-Israel, which is just not the case, and has…never 
been the case in any way, shape or form.  My counterpart at The Age at the time, Michael 
Gawenda - a prominent member of the Jewish community in Melbourne - felt the pressures to 
ensure that Australia was doing the right thing (Whitehead, pers. comm. 19 Dec 2012). 
The SMH editorial team decided that, whatever the merits of the US and UK arguments, 
the Iraq war was not something Australia should involve itself in.   
We said whatever the merits - which we were seriously questioning - what are the merits of 
military intervention and what is the body of evidence? We weren’t able to resolve that, but we 
knew there was enough doubt. Whatever the merits of the Anglo-American argument, this is not 
a war that should involve us. We [Australia] continuously answer[s] the call up without 
questioning all of the details... 
The arguments that came forward in that final very lengthy editorial were the arguments that we 
thought best supported that view: the Australian capability, the need for us to be suitably 
sceptical about this particular theatre of war. No matter what had happened before and no 
matter what public opinion was around appropriate or otherwise, reactions to 11 September and 
other terrorism activity that followed in 2002 in particular - Bali in our case - in Australia's case - 
  
69 
 
you just need to leave the emotion at the door and say why are we involved in this war 
(Whitehead, pers. comm. 19 Dec 2012). 
Whitehead argued that, despite the same argument being pushed by the Labour 
Government in the UK, a conservative government in the US and a Liberal government in 
Australia, “they were all pushing the same argument that we did not find, fundamentally, 
convincing” (pers. comm. 19 Dec 2013).  
Knowing what we now know about that war, none of us should have been involved in that war. It 
was a relief in many ways that bureaucracies in London and Washington can still do a detailed 
independent review of such big political decisions in a contemporary time frame and come out 
and, fundamentally, decide, one way or the other, these pieces of evidence did not stack up; 
these pieces of intelligence did not stand the test of time and, in some cases, a very short test of 
time (Whitehead, pers. comm. 19 Dec 2013). 
Both the SMH and the Age informed the Fairfax CEO, Fred Hilmer, of their editorial 
positions and their different views were published on the same day.  According to 
Whitehead, neither Hilmer, nor the Fairfax Board, were involved at any stage in the 
formulation of either papers’ editorial position and the fact that they reached different 
conclusions was evidence of the papers’ independence. 
The fact that [the Age and the SMH] reached different conclusions to the broader argument 
about the war was seen to be a really good sign, internally at Fairfax.  We can have newspapers 
that take different positions - because many publishers don't work like that when there is a 
major issue at stake. If you're a network of newspaper titles or websites they are, often, taking 
the same line.  
Fred Hilmer…as our first Jewish chief executive officer - I'm not so certain he was the first - he 
was acutely aware of Middle East politics, let me say. He did not come down one way or the 
other to say you must cover this. Fred was not involved in any way, shape or form. He was 
informed. He wanted to ensure that there was intellectual rigour around the arguments. On the 
same day the two newspapers came out with different views (Whitehead, pers. comm. 19 Dec 
2013).  
On the issue of editorial independence, Whitehead said that in five years as editor he had 
never had any pressure from either the chief executive or the Board to write anything or 
take a particular position.  “That's an independent media company that champions quality 
journalism. It won't put up with reckless journalism. It's not a free for all, but absolutely no 
position” (Whitehead, pers. comm. 19 Dec 2012). 
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…it's quite different when you aren't run by a publisher mogul who says this is what we'll do. We 
don't work that way, and have never worked that way in any way…The diversity of views within 
Fairfax titles, on any number of topics in modern history, demonstrates that (Whitehead, pers. 
comm. 19 Dec 2012). 
Australian’s editorial position on Iraq 
At the Australian, the editorial team played a similar role in bringing all of the parts of the 
equation together, but with a publisher whose support for the Iraq war was well known and 
a corporate culture much more committed to campaign journalism than to independence. 
Stutchbury explained that the paper’s position on Iraq fitted with the paper’s centre right 
pro-US alliance position, its support for the first Gulf War and in the post 9/11 context. 
Yeah, well, I think the Australian is a centre right newspaper, pro the US alliance 
and…especially in the context of 9/11 and things that have gone on, and the first Gulf War 
…would be by and large more inclined to back the Iraq war than some others.  It's a centre right 
newspaper that's by and large quite supportive of the US alliance (Stutchbury, pers. comm. 29 
Jan 2013). 
Asked about the Guardian’s (Greenslade, 2003) observation that all of Murdoch’s 175 
titles across three continents had taken the same position on Iraq (with the single 
exception of the Hobart Mercury on only one occasion), Stutchbury denied that Murdoch 
had directed the Australian to take a particular editorial position. 
You don't get much or very little direct direction about ‘you should do this’, but it's pretty clear 
from the history of the paper and of the overall organisation what its natural inclination would be.  
So it's more of - if you want to put it like that - it would be more of an osmosis thing and more of 
a sense of what sort of publication it is (Stutchbury, pers. comm. 29 Jan 2013). 
Stutchbury argued that it was good for a publication to know what it was and to have a 
world view through which things might be filtered. Within the context of a particular world 
view there was still room for debate. 
I think it's good for publications, by and large, to know what they are and to have a world view 
…so things can be filtered through a general world view…The main thing is following the 
news…and then if it all turns bad it all turns bad…Even within that world view, there's still quite 
a bit of debate (Stutchbury, pers. comm. 29 Jan 2013). 
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Asked if the Australian went out of its way to ruffle feathers, Stutchbury replied “Yes, 
definitely, and the Aus still does a very good job of it - a very good job of it” (pers. comm. 
29 Jan 2013).  He argued that it was the role of the media, and traditionally broadsheet 
newspapers, to take a stand on issues, to set the agenda and to follow an angle 
consistently. 
Well, a newspaper doing its job - there's a mass of nonsense out there and the political process 
throws up a lot of cant and it's the role of the media and traditionally of broadsheet newspapers 
- to cut through all that and take a stand on a few things…you set an agenda and you follow an 
angle and you're doing it very publicly day in and day out (Stutchbury, pers. comm. 29 Jan 
2013). 
Stutchbury argued the virtues of campaign journalism for which the Australian is 
renowned. “That's definitely part of what the role is and you've got to be vigorous and 
you've got to take a view on certain things and prosecute your campaign” (Stutchbury, 
pers. comm. 29 Jan 2013).  Taking an angle has its risks, however, and Stutchbury 
recognised that sometimes it can rebound on the paper. 
If you get it horribly wrong, you're very exposed if you go out on a limb and say something - this 
is all wrong - and you turn out to be wrong.  So there's a discipline of…doing it in the public 
glare every day and if you take it up to say the government of the day they'll come back at you, 
so you've got to be able to be prepared to defend yourself (Stutchbury, pers. comm. 29 Jan 
2013). 
Despite the paper’s pro-war position on Iraq, the Australian was the only paper in the 
country to respond to the release of the Jull report with a page one headline “PM’s spin 
sexed-up Iraq threat” (Walters, 2004).  Here was a pro-war paper carrying the most 
provocative headlines, with a clear reference to the UK case involving BBC journalist 
Andrew Gilligan who accused the British Government of having “sexed up” its September 
dossier, Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Assessment of the British Government, 
to boost its case for war. [Gilligan sparked a “cataclysmic row between the government 
and the BBC” and the release of the identity of UK weapons inspector Dr David Kelly as 
Gilligan’s source led to Kelly’s suicide and the Hutton inquiry into his death (Cozens and 
Jeffery, 2004).]  Stutchbury could not remember the details of Walters’ article, but 
suggested that it was probably a good story and that its lack of fit with the paper’s line 
would not have been a problem as it was “not a bad thing to mix things up from time to 
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time” (pers. comm. 29 Jan 2013).  “You don't want to get too into a line…that you become 
very predictable.  You want to be open to challenges…You want to have a lively debate 
about stuff” (Stutchbury, pers. comm. 29 Jan 2013).  Stutchbury suggested that it was 
common for an editor to include in the paper articles and views and opinions that ran 
contrary to the editorial line, in part to give voice to employees who might have something 
interesting to say. 
I think that's part of the art and craft of editing, that you want to mix it up from time to time … 
Your line, so to speak, has got to be able to adjust…within any organisation there's competing 
voices and you want to give them a bit of an outlet, as well because they might have something 
interesting to say (Stutchbury, pers. comm. 29 Jan 2013). 
When it came to public opinion, Stutchbury maintained that journalists were writing with 
their audience in mind, thinking both about how the reader might receive information while 
at the same time seeking to shape their views, but that the paper’s position on a particular 
issue had to be consistent with the paper’s traditional position in the marketplace of ideas. 
You've got to make an independent assessment of your position on the merits of the case, but 
you've cultivated over a long period of time, over decades, a position in the marketplace for 
ideas and so you've got to be aware of how all that fits together (Stutchbury, pers. comm. 29 
Jan 2013). 
While aware of the paper’s diverse readership, Stutchbury argued that the paper sought to 
project a position consistent with the paper’s world view: which seeks to shape a nation 
that is vibrant, energetic and outward looking, pro-market, in favour of smaller government 
and a strong enterprise culture, and strongly in favour of the US Alliance (Stutchbury, pers. 
comm. 29 Jan 2013).  Asked if that also meant that the paper was pro-Government, 
Stutchbury replied that: 
The story is the main thing…by and large [the Australian would be] in favour of the [Howard] 
Government when it's doing things that we [the paper] think are the right things to do…at the 
time.  But then we played a very big role in some very big issues such as children overboard.  
That was my story and you would not have that as a phrase in the Australian political lexicon if 
the Australian hadn't broken the story a few days before that election campaign (Stutchbury, 
pers. comm. 29 Jan 2013). 
In addition to children overboard, there were other stories, like the Australian Wheat Board 
scandal and the Mohammed Haneef affair that the Australian had broken at the expense 
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of the Howard Government.  Stutchbury argued that, while the paper might be broadly 
supportive of the Government’s direction, “you should be vigorous in how you cover all 
sides of politics” (Stutchbury, pers. comm. 29 Jan 2013). 
Influence of the proprietor 
Eleven of Australia’s twelve major capital city and national dailies are owned by News Ltd 
or Fairfax media.  The SMH is Australia’s oldest newspaper, founded in 1831, with a 
longstanding commitment to editorial independence (Lagan, 2012).  Started as a family 
company, the Fairfax family lost control of the company in the wake of a failed takeover bid 
by 26 year-old Warwick Fairfax in the late 80s and early 90s.  At various times in its 
history, the Fairfax board has included such media figures as Conrad Black and Kerry 
Packer when they were part-owners of the company.  With the exception of CEO Greg 
Hywood, in recent years the board has tended to be dominated by business advisers 
rather than people with experience in print media.  Whoever has been on the board, 
Fairfax media has had a reputation for editorial independence and claims to still live by its 
first motto: 'Sworn to no master, of no sect am I' (Lagan, 2012).  A recent attempt by Gina 
Rinehart to gain three seats on the board, to reflect her increased stake in the company, 
was thwarted in part because of her refusal to sign the Fairfax Media Charter of Editorial 
Independence (Lagan, 2012).  Lagan described “the collegiate way [Fairfax Media] editors 
operate, where hard argument and dissent are tolerated daily in deciding the next edition's 
news priorities” (2012).  Not everyone has valued the Fairfax culture, however.  During his 
time at Fairfax, Black launched an assault on what he saw as “a journalists' culture…too 
far Left, too powerful and too entitled” (Lagan, 2012).   
The Fairfax model, then, tends to be the traditional model of relative editorial 
independence.  No-one currently working for Fairfax – including former editor Whitehead 
and several journalists – claimed that they had ever been influenced by the Fairfax board 
or a particular share-holder to take a particular editorial line on any issue or on the Iraq 
conflict in particular.  The different position taken by the Age on Iraq would suggest that 
this is the case.  Nor did any journalist claim to have been influenced by an editor to take a 
particular line in an Iraq news story.  Whitehead argued that editorial positions were taken 
only after careful examination of the merits of an argument, without consideration of 
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politics or public opinion – or the views of shareholders and the board.  Once decided, an 
editorial position was totally independent of news content.  However, Whitehead was of 
the view that the same could not be said of his counterparts at the Australian. 
The Sydney Morning Herald did not form a view of Australia's involvement with the war because 
of politics, in any way, shape or form. I'm not certain that my counterparts at the time at The 
Australian could have said that.   Our decision about Australia's involvement in the war had 
nothing to do with whether we support one Government or the other.  Our thinking is not within 
that framework. This was a big decision by the Australian Government. Our thinking was not 
clouded by our support or otherwise for the political parties that make up that Government, and 
nor should it be….You could not use the popularity of the decision to go to war as a reason for 
supporting [either]... (Whitehead, pers. comm. 19 Dec 2012). 
For Whitehead the editorial position was always one decided as a matter of principle.  It 
was the paper’s rigour and robustness that attracted readers, rather than a desire for 
readers to hear their own views echoed back at them. 
It's always about the principles…Sometimes people don't know what they want to read and 
sometimes they don't know all the information…Readers come to us because they expect rigour 
in our debates and robustness in what we present. They don't come to us because we always 
think the same way as them (Whitehead, pers. comm. 19 Dec 2012). 
In the case of the Australian, the proprietor is an activist who has never hidden his use of 
the paper as a vehicle for furthering his own agenda for Australia (Kelly, 2014(b)).  Rupert 
Murdoch launched the Australian in Canberra on 15 July 1964 seeking to enact his father 
Sir Keith Murdoch’s dream of establishing a national newspaper.  Rupert’s desire grew out 
of frustration with the “dead hand of early 1960s conservatism pervading the media, 
politics and the national vision” and a desire to “shake up a sleepy Australia, finally 
beginning to stir, and dismantle the tottering Menzian political and cultural establishment” 
(Kelly, 2014(a), p19).  Murdoch has a deep and abiding commitment to the paper, which 
he has supported through many years of financial losses.  According to Kelly, Murdoch 
wants to improve the country.  “His vision for Australia the country and his vision for the 
Australian as a paper are one and the same thing” (Kelly, 2014(b)). 
From the start The Australian was a contentious paper.  It exists to challenge not to reassure.  It 
was born to promote a vision and the task of each editor-in-chief, in association with Murdoch, is 
to offer that vision to the nation.  Its hallmarks have been aggression and intelligence.  Three 
enduring theme emerge from the Murdoch interview – Australia as a Big Country committed to 
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an expanded immigration program as a national project; Australia as a globally engaged and 
Asian-oriented power seeking deeper ties with neighbours and allies; and Australia as a 
successful economy whose political leaders need the courage to back pro-market, competitive 
policies reinforced by a commitment to hard-headed educational outcomes and technological 
progress (Kelly, 2014(a), p19).   
No-one interviewed from News Ltd agreed that the Australian’s pro-war position on Iraq 
had been dictated by Murdoch, despite the observation that the Guardian’s Roy 
Greenslade had found that all 175 News Corporation editors around the world had 
supported the war (Greenslade, 2003).  Robert Manne found that there had been one 
exception, the Hobart Mercury which on one occasion had carried an anti-war editorial  
prompting an instruction “in writing from head office to alter its position on Iraq” (Manne, 
2005, p 76).  Lindsay Tuffin, the author of the offending editorial and now founder, 
publisher and editor of the Tasmanian Times, said that he had not been aware at the time 
of any instructions having been received in writing, but that after the editorial he got the 
sense that his services were no longer valued and left the Mercury not long afterwards 
(pers. comm., 30 May 2013). 
If anyone working on the Australian had been unsure of Murdoch’s position on the Iraq 
war, his long-standing support for the neo-cons (through his ownership of the Weekly 
Standard - for whom Iraq “became its defining theme”) (McKnight, 2012, p194); his strong 
support for the US alliance; and his support for Bush, Blair and Howard might have been 
an indication.  Murdoch has stated publicly that his newspapers supported the invasion.  
According to Manne, Murdoch told a News Corporation shareholders’ meeting in Adelaide 
in October 2004 “With our newspapers we have indeed supported Bush’s foreign policy.  
And we remain committed that way” (Manne 2005, p77).  At the Davos World Economic 
Forum in 2007, Murdoch said that he did not think that his company had succeeded in 
shaping the media agenda over Iraq, but that “we tried”. 
We don’t have the power to change [the agenda].  Obviously if you are in the media and 
concerned about what is going on in the world, you’d like to make a difference.  But you are not 
going to change the world completely like that.  We can’t change elections.  Good strong news 
organisations, by disclosing things, can help shape the agenda, but only in a limited way. 
We basically supported – our papers and publishing – supported the Bush policy in the Middle 
East.  We’ve been critical of its execution, but our support hasn’t meant very much because 
clearly public opinion now has grown very, very tired of the whole enterprise (Murdoch, 2007). 
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The Australian’s editorial support for the Iraq invasion did not necessarily mean the 
absence of opposing views: that would have resulted in a very dull paper.  As Stutchbury 
suggested, “you have to mix it up from time to time” (pers. comm. 2013).  It did, however, 
translate into editorials and page one articles and headlines that left the reader with no 
doubt as to the paper’s position.  Playwright David Williamson, author of the play Rupert, 
said recently “the clarity of Rupert’s ideological line is evident...it just whacks you in the 
face every time you open the Australian in the morning” (Taylor, 2014).  On the issue of 
Iraq, 46% of front page articles were pro-war, 36% were balanced and just 18% were anti-
war (see table 3.10).  Ninety-four per cent of editorials were pro-war and the paper’s 
support for the war remained unchanged over time, despite the failure to find WMD and 
the collapse of the reasons for going to war; the release of damaging findings from 
inquiries in the US, UK and Australia; and the unfolding civil war in Iraq, with massive 
military and civilian casualties (see table 3.1).  The opinion pages, however, were more 
balanced, with a mix of opinion in large part because of the personal views of the opinions 
editor at the time: 40% of articles were pro-war, 36% were anti-war and 24% were 
balanced (see table 3.7).  Tom Switzer, while conservative in his politics, was a realist and 
personally opposed to the war (pers. comm., 19 March 2012).  He was also committed to 
balancing the pro-war views of some of the Australian’s regular columnists with the anti-
war views of scholars, politicians and opinion leaders. 
What distinguished me from my colleagues in the Australian was that I actually opposed the 
war. But I did it for conservative, realist reasons, which was a bit different from many of the 
arguments you'll get at Fairfax which tended to be more cynical than my explanations (Switzer, 
pers. comm. 19 March 2012). 
According to Switzer, journalists “tend to subscribe to a progressive view of the world, a 
small ‘l’ liberal view of the world…Whether they were sub-editors or news reporters or 
graphic artists, most journalists at both Fairfax and News would have come out against the 
[Iraq] war” (Switzer, pers. comm. 19 March 2012).  When it came to the Australian’s 
editors, however, it was a different story. 
Now, I think the difference between say the Australian and the Age and the Herald, although 
most journalists working at News Corp or at least working at the Australian newspaper were 
probably opposed to the war, I think it's fair to say that the prominent editors and the people 
who wrote the editorials were very supportive of the war. They ultimately make the decisions 
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about what position the newspaper takes with its editorials and what opinion pieces we publish. 
I was part of that editorial team (Switzer, pers. comm. 19 March 2012). 
At times Switzer found the situation uncomfortable as he found himself sharing his anti-war 
side of the argument with people with whom he was ideologically opposed.  In particular 
he was greatly critical of those who argued that the war was about oil. 
Now my argument had nothing to do with oil. My argument was that the threat that Saddam 
Hussein posed could have been contained, the way it had been since the previous Gulf War in 
1991, you know the naval blockade, the sanctions, the no-fly zone. [Containment] didn't have 
the sort of political sex appeal of liberation. But it avoided the unintended consequences that a 
liberated Iraq delivered.  So that was my realist argument against the war. Whereas I felt that 
many of the people opposing it in the newsrooms at News Limited and at Fairfax, but even the 
official editors and the editorial lines, were far to the left on this question than my own realist 
position (Switzer, pers. comm. 19 March 2012).` 
In 2001, Switzer came to the Australian from the Australian Financial Review, a Fairfax 
paper.  Asked if he had been aware of cultural differences between the two organisations, 
Switzer said that he had not felt a huge cultural contrast when he had moved between the 
two organisations.  
I never really thought there was much of a cultural clash. I think journalists are journalists. I think 
that most reporters and some editors in both Fairfax and News Limited were highly professional, 
very smart, sharp observers of national and international politics for the most part.   I think, 
ideologically speaking, there might have been a left slant on the news room in both Fairfax and 
News Limited. But generally speaking, I felt that there wasn't a huge cultural contrast (Switzer, 
pers. comm. 19 March 2012). 
In 1985, when Paul Kelly decided to leave Fairfax to return to the Australian as national 
affairs editor, he had to make what he described as an “agonising decision” (pers. comm. 
18 June 2012).  Kelly described Fairfax and News Ltd as quite different organisations that 
have evolved over time.  Kelly had been working at Fairfax as chief political correspondent 
and deputy editor for the National Times, then chief political correspondent for the SMH 
from 1981 to 1984.  The “quality of the Fairfax papers was very high” and the company 
was seen as “the triumph of the concept of editorial independence”, but over time, 
according to Kelly, the Fairfax company “became more and more what in simplified and 
generalised terms you would call a paper committed to progressive causes in both the 
SMH and the Age” (pers. comm. 18 June 2012).  In 1991 Kelly was appointed editor-in-
  
78 
 
chief of the Australian until 1996 when David Armstrong took over as editor-in chief and 
Kelly became editor-at-large, a position he still holds.  Chris Mitchell took over as editor-in-
chief in 2003. 
While Switzer did not find huge cultural differences between Fairfax’s AFR and News Ltd’s 
Australian, there remains a persistent view among some academics and commentators of 
Murdoch as an interventionist proprietor - and that the personality of the proprietor 
(described by Margaret Simons as “narcissistic and bullying”) has had a huge impact on 
the corporate culture of the organisation (also seen as “narcissistic and bullying”)(Simons 
2014).  However in a recent article, Kelly described as myth the “spectre of Rupert 
Murdoch on the phone rapping out orders to hapless editors about his targets for the next 
day’s front page”, suggesting that “within a conspiracy-heavy culture there is no greater 
cult beloved of media polemicists and populist politicians” than that image of the proprietor 
(2014(c)).  However, the image of Murdoch as an activist does not have to imply he is on 
the phone every day.  In interview Kelly described how the process worked: 
You are put in to run the paper.  So this company expects a lot of its editors.  It expects them to 
take responsibility for their paper and deliver.   If they don’t then they’re got rid of – and if they 
do, they tend to have a long tenure (Kelly pers. comm. 18 June 2012).   
When it came to establishing an editorial line or position, Kelly described a process where 
he and Ken Cowley, a News Corporation executive, went to Los Angeles for a few days for 
an extended conference with Murdoch prior to his appointment as editor-in-chief.  It was at 
this conference that Murdoch and Kelly agreed on the position that the Australian would 
take under Kelly’s direction.  
The purpose of this conference was to really go through systematically and methodically area 
after area and talk through what the paper would stand for under my editorship and the line we 
would take.  Essentially I relied on this meeting and the agreements we reached at this meeting 
for the entire five years I was editor in chief (Kelly pers. comm. 18 June 2012).   
The agreement with Murdoch was that the Australian, under Kelly as editor-in-chief would 
support market based economic reform and a small, tight and effective government sector; 
a big Australia when it came to immigration policy; justice and land rights for Aboriginal 
people; a strong US Alliance and deepening integration with Asia when it came to foreign 
policy; personal responsibility and the need for welfare reform; and commitment to 
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investment in education among other things (Kelly, pers. comm 18 June 2012).  Media 
academic, Margaret Simons, has acknowledged the Australian’s contribution to the 
improvement of journalism in Australia and recently noted that “there have been times in 
the Australian’s history, particularly Paul Kelly’s five-year tenure as editor-in-chief during 
the Hawke and Keating governments, when observers on all sides of politics willingly 
conceded it was the best newspaper in Australia” (2014).   
The priorities Murdoch agreed with Kelly are the same today under Chris Mitchell as 
editor-in-chief, but many critics have observed that in recent years the style of the paper 
has become more aggressive and more self-congratulatory.  These days, according to 
Simons, the paper is seen as increasingly self-obsessed and sensitive to criticism.  “The 
Australian is increasingly partisan, its campaigns more belligerent, its attacks on its critics 
more persistent and nasty” (Simons, 2014, p10).  Ricketson and Dodd pointed to a 
problem “that in recent years the Australian has proved itself extraordinarily thin-skinned in 
dealing with criticism. The newspaper devoted close to twice as many words excoriating 
Robert Manne as he had written in his 2011 Quarterly Essay “Bad News: Murdoch’s 
Australian and the shaping of the nation”” (Ricketson and Dodd, 2014).  Manne had been 
critical of the Australian’s coverage of the Iraq war, suggesting that the Australian’s 
coverage had played a role in moving public opinion on the war (Manne, Quarterly Essay, 
2011).  
According to Kelly, few people are neutral about the Australian. He suggested that the 
paper inspires strong feelings.  It is an “assertive paper that has a sense of mission” (Kelly, 
2014(b)).  Under Chris Mitchell that “assertiveness” has manifested as a tendency to 
attack the critic rather than the argument.  Simons quoted Elisabeth Wynhausen, a 
journalist sacked by Chris Mitchell in 2009, describing Mitchell as a “tireless strategist 
whose best and worst instincts [are] filtered through the same tendency to turn almost any 
subject into an excuse for an argument with a bunch of imagined enemies.  He treated the 
paper like the spoils of war” (2014, p12).  “Critics have their numerous differences and 
disagreements, but in the pages of the Australian they become one tribe: the enemy.  Left-
wingers” (Simons, 2014, p12).    
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Comparing patterns of press attention 
This section compares patterns of pro and anti-war coverage in the Australian and the 
SMH across the different genres - editorials, headlines, analysis and opinion, and news 
articles – and across the broad pre-war, invasion and post-invasion periods, as well as 
more precisely during each of the nine sample periods.  Articles were coded as pro or anti-
war on the basis of the balance of themes covered.  For example, articles presenting 
evidence of WMD were coded as pro-war, while those questioning the nature of the threat 
were coded as anti-war.  This section also examines the ways in which papers sought to 
send a message through the placement of articles, particularly on page one, and the way 
in which page one articles were used to both attract attention and to frame debate in a 
particular way.   
Editorials 
Leader writers at the Australian took a strong pro-war position throughout the conflict, but 
tended also to see the war through the prism of party political politics.  Those at the SMH 
took a (less strong) anti-war position and tended to argue the issue more as a matter of 
principle, while also considering party political implications.  Tables 3.1 and 3.2 list the 
number of editorials in the SMH and the Australian that were rated pro-war, anti-war or 
balanced, during the three stages of the war (3.1) and during the nine sample periods 
(3.2).   
 
Table 3.1 Editorials: changes in direction before, during and after the invasion 
   Number of editorials that were pro-war, anti-war or balanced at each stage of the war by media outlet 
                                    n = 52 
 
Media outlet Pre-war Invasion Post 
Invasion 
Total 
SMH  Pro-war 1 0 1 2 (11%) 
Anti-war 6 1 5 12 (63%) 
Balanced 0 1 4 5 (26%) 
Australian Pro-war 11 8 12 31 (94%) 
Anti-war 0 0 0 0 (0%) 
Balanced 0 0 2 2 (6%) 
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Table 3.2    Editorials: changes in direction over time  
Direction of editorials - pro-war, anti-war or balanced – over the nine sample periods (number of articles) 
                  n = 52 
 
The Australian used their editorials to argue in favour of the use of force in Iraq and to 
discredit critics, including Labor with its policy of opposing Australian involvement without 
UN support.  Of the thirty-three editorials on Iraq included in this study, only two were 
judged to be balanced and the rest supported the war.  On 14 September 2002, under the 
headline “Along the right path, we head into the unknown”, the Australian’s editorial raised 
a number of doubts about Hussein’s links with September 11, his nuclear capacity and the 
dangers of pre-emptive strikes as a basis for global peace, but ultimately concluded that 
“we know we cannot do nothing…we must protect the innocent – and we are heading 
along the right path to do that” (2002, p16).  On 5 February 2003, the Australian’s editorial 
declared Howard the winner in the parliamentary debate over the pre-deployment of 
Australian troops to the Middle East; described Crean’s contribution as “fumbling, 
repetitive and unconvincing”; and argued that the “threat of force was needed to deal with 
Saddam” because “twelve years of defiance by Hussein show that the old policies of 
containment no longer work” (2003(a), p12).  Two days later, in an editorial describing US 
Secretary of State Powell’s address to the UN as “compelling”, the paper argued that “if 
Hussein cannot be neutralised through the threat of force, the use of force becomes the 
only option” (2003(b), p12).  The Australian suggested that “if Hussein has been caught 
with his pants down, so has the Australian Labor Party.  Simon Crean’s attempt to cash in 
on the public opposition to military action against Iraq without the endorsement of the UN 
has been undermined by his unimpressive showing in Tuesday’s debate and the 
shenanigans within his own party” (2003(b), p12).  The editorial on 8 February, titled 
“Saddam can’t save Simon” suggested that “to see a leader in mortal peril, look beyond 
Media outlet 12-18 
Sept 
2002 
5-11 
Feb 
2003 
13-19 
March 
2003 
20–26 
March 
2003 
Invasion 
1-7 
May 
2003 
2-8 Oct 
2003 
1-7 
March 
2004 
20–26 
July 
2004 
20–26 
March 
2008 
SMH Pro-war 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 
Anti-war 3 2 1 1 1 0 1 2 1 
Balanced 0 0 0 1 2 0 1 1 0 
Australian Pro-war 3 5 3 8 4 1 3 3 1 
Anti-war 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Balanced 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 
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Baghdad, and consider the circumstances of Simon Crean” (2003(c), p18).  The day 
before, fifteen rebel Labor MPs had “declared unqualified opposition to any attack against 
Iraq, making a mockery of Mr Crean’s authority” (2003(c), p18).  The paper again 
suggested that Crean was “seeking a cheap fix of easy popularity over Iraq” (2003(c), 
p18). 
The Australian argued that dealing with Saddam would send a message to other dictators, 
like North Korea’s Kim Jong-il.  Their editorial of 11 February 2003 was headed “Kim will 
learn from Saddam” (2003(d), p10).  The paper argued that “if Hussein survives with his 
regime and weapons programs intact, it will be the clearest of signals that the United 
Nations hasn’t the stomach to stand up to dictators – not just in the Middle East but around 
the world” (2003(d), p10).   The French plea for weapons inspectors to be given more time 
was portrayed as “less weak than feeble” (2003(e), p10).  The paper’s 13 March 2003 
editorial, titled “French toast irrelevant UN” argued that “Chirac’s arguments [were] born of 
an impossible dream that he [could] restore France’s faded glory as a great power by 
denying the US and its allies UN sanction for any attack on Iraq” (2003(e), p10). 
As the war drew closer, the paper commended the Prime Minister on having “delivered a 
compelling restatement of the Government’s position on Iraq” (2003(f), p10).  The paper’s 
14 March editorial, “Mr Howard’s clear case for a just cause”, suggested that “the result of 
doing nothing now will be to incur a far greater cost in the future…the combination of rogue 
states, weapons of mass destruction, and the new face of Islamist terrorism creates a mix 
that could lead to ‘the ultimate nightmare which the world must take decisive and effective 
steps to prevent’” (2003(f), p10).  On 19 March 2003, after Howard’s commitment of 
Australian troops to a US-led coalition, the paper’s editorial said that “the Howard 
Government has made the right decision, both in terms of morality and in terms of 
Australia’s national interest” (2003(g), p12).  Crean again was criticised for having “married 
his political future to the outcome of the approaching military campaign” (2003(g), p12).  
Contrary to Crean’s suggestion that it would be “seen historically as a ‘black day’ for 
Australia”, the editorial suggested instead that it was a “solemn day, on which this country 
reaffirmed a long tradition in which it has not been prepared to stand by while others make 
the sacrifices required to rid the world of the threat posed by tyranny” (2003(g), p12). 
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The two balanced editorials were about Tony Blair’s struggles with his own party during 
the UK Labour Party’s conference in Bournemouth in October 2003.  Blair admitted that he 
had hit a “rough patch”, but referring to his decision to commit troops to Iraq, he said that 
“the one thing the British public wouldn’t tolerate in a politician was cowardice” (Australian, 
4 October 2003, p1).   The editorial on the fifth anniversary of the war, 22 March 2008, 
once again supported the decision to go to war despite continuing unrest in Iraq, despite 
the milestone of the death of the 4,000th US soldier in Iraq, and despite failing public 
support in Australia, the US and the UK.  The editorial argued that “at least Iraq has the 
chance to create a better future for itself and the region…the justification for war is as 
strong as ever…We know today that Iraq has no WMD and is not cooperating with terrorist 
groups such as al Qaeda [but] the way the Bush administration has handled the liberation 
and reconstruction of Iraq deserves harsh criticism” (the Australian, p14).  Perhaps mindful 
of public opinion, the leader writer acknowledged the critics and criticism of the war. 
Of nineteen editorials on Iraq that the SMH carried during the sample periods, only two 
were judged to have supported the war, five were neutral and the rest were opposed to the 
war.  One of the editorials in support of the war was published in the week immediately 
prior to the invasion.  It would appear that the leader writer was mindful of the impending 
war and the likely bandwagon effect that Australia’s commitment might have on public 
opinion.  The other was published in the week of the US President’s declaration on board 
the aircraft carrier the USS Abraham Lincoln that “in the battle of Iraq the United States 
and our allies have prevailed” (SMH editorial, 5 May 2003).  While the editorial on balance 
was judged to be in favour of the war, it contained arguments both in favour and against 
the war.  The editorial suggested that “it was a quick and decisive war, important as a 
demonstration of American power and determination….All that does not make the war 
right or just.  Its effective execution has helped ease the doubts of many who had been 
opposed to it” (SMH editorial, 5 May 2003, p12).   
On 2 March 2004, after release of the Jull Committee report (the report of the 
Parliamentary Joint Committee on ASIO, ASIS and DSD, “Intelligence on Iraq’s weapons 
of mass destruction”) and almost a year after the invasion, a SMH editorial called for a 
judicial inquiry into Australia’s intelligence agencies.  Two days later, an editorial drew 
attention to the worsening security situation after bomb attacks in Baghdad and Karbala 
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killed 77 Shi-ite Muslims observing the festival of Ashura (the holiest day of the Shia 
religious year).  The article pointed to the ‘slide to civil war in Iraq’; welcomed the re-
engagement of the UN (after the August 2003 bombing of the UN Headquarters in 
Baghdad and death of UN Special Representative, Sergio Viera de Mello); and observed 
that “much good work ha[d] been done towards getting Iraq back on its feet.  It must not be 
allowed to be destroyed by terrorism, from any quarter” (SMH, 4 March 2004, p12).   
During the July 2004 sample period, there were three SMH editorials: two anti-war and 
one balanced.  ‘Spy errors come home to roost’ (written in anticipation of Philip Flood’s 
report to the Australian Government on Australia’s intelligence services) put the view that 
the Howard Government had “avoided much of the pain inflicted on leaders in the United 
States and Britain…had not lost a military life in war…and had relied overwhelmingly on 
US and British intelligence” (SMH, 20 July 2004, p10).  This reliance on the “remarkably 
similarly flawed” US and British assessments raised questions about the rigour with which 
the bona fides of intelligence sources and information had been tested.  The article 
suggested that Australia had “simply parroted the war justifications used by George Bush 
and Tony Blair” (SMH 20 July 2004, p10).  It argued that “John Howard [had] relied on 
false information to justify sending Australians to war” and had justified the Iraq invasion 
“by its removal of a tyrant [when] at the start [he had] insisted regime change was not 
sufficient justification, an attitude which shifted as the case for war fractured” (SMH 20 July 
2004, p10).  The second editorial, “When spies get it wrong”, was published on 23 July 
2004 in response to the Flood report.  Flood had acknowledged “a failure of intelligence on 
Iraq”, but argued that this did not necessarily mean the failure “was mainly the fault of local 
intelligence services”, given their reliance on overseas intelligence counterparts (p12).  
The editorial noted that, while Flood could find no evidence that the intelligence agencies’ 
political masters had sought to influence the content of their reporting, agencies were 
“influenced by their [the politicians’] views about Iraq.  They failed to challenge rigorously 
their preconceptions and assumptions about Iraq…and were not rigorous enough in 
challenging the intelligence they received…[which] was variously thin, equivocal and 
uncertain” (SMH 23 July 2004, p12).   
Marking the fifth anniversary of the invasion, on 22 March 2008, the SMH’s editorial said 
“UN inspectors were right, and that intelligence reports were doctored or ‘sexed up’ to 
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produce an alarming scenario from negative or inconclusive material” to build the case for 
war (SMH, p30).  The suggested link between Saddam Hussein and Osama Bin Laden’s 
al-Qaeda had been ruled out by an official Washington report and, as former chief UN 
weapons inspector Hans Blix had pointed out “Saddam was no threat to anyone but his 
own people” (SMH, p30).  The editorial said that “Iraq ha[d] become a self-inflicted 
strategic quagmire” at a cost to the US of around 4,000 soldiers’ lives and 30,000 
wounded, with estimates of the cost of the war between $US550 billion (official) and $US3 
trillion (Stiglitz and Bilmes, 2008).  For the Iraqis that cost had been up to 655,000 deaths 
and some 4 million refugees (SMH, 22 March 2008, p30). 
Analysis and opinion articles 
A newspaper’s agenda is also evident in the balance of views expressed in analytical and 
opinion pieces.  In both papers there was a more pluralist approach to the presentation of 
views in analysis and opinion articles than in editorials.  The SMH’s strong anti-war 
position remained evident, but the Australian’s analysis and opinion articles, with Switzer 
as editor, were more balanced than expected while slightly pro-war. Tables 3.3 and 3.4 
provide the percentage of analysis and opinion pieces judged to be pro-war, anti-war or 
balanced in the SMH and the Australian across the three stages of the war and in all nine 
sample periods.   
 
Table 3.3  Analysis and opinion articles: changes in direction over time 
Percentage of analysis/opinion articles that were pro-war, anti-war or balanced at each stage of the war (by 
media outlet) 
Media outlet Pre-war Invasion Post 
Invasion 
SMH  Pro-war 15 17 3 
Anti-war 68 60 70 
Balanced 17 23 28 
The Australian Pro-war 44 43 31 
Anti-war 38 30 36 
Balanced 18 27 33 
                n = 392 
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Table 3.4  Analysis and opinion articles: changes in direction over time 
Percentage of analysis/opinion articles pro-war, anti-war or balanced over nine sample periods (by media 
outlet) 
 
                 n = 392 
Pro and anti-war analysis and opinion articles in the Australian were more balanced than 
expected, with anti-war articles outnumbering pro-war articles in three of the nine sample 
periods.  The ratio of pro-war to anti-war to balanced articles was around 40:36:24.  The 
exception was on the fifth anniversary of the war, when all of the opinion pieces were pro-
war.  It was strange that the Australian published only pro-war analyses at a time when the 
war was going badly and when public opinion in the US, UK and Australia had come 
around to the view that the war had been a terrible mistake.  Perhaps the difference lay in 
the fact that by that stage, Tom Switzer, the self-confessed anti-war opinions editor 
(committed to diversity on his opinions page) had left the paper. 
It was of interest to note the softening of each paper’s agenda in the week immediately 
prior to the invasion (13-19 March 2003) – whether it was anti-war (as was the case with 
SMH) or pro-war (in the case of the Australian).  Only on two occasions did SMH pro-war 
opinion pieces exceed 20%: in the week immediately preceding the invasion and in 
October 2003, when Blair was under considerable political pressure in the UK.  Curiously, 
during this period (October 2003) there were very few articles on Iraq in the SMH.  Neutral 
articles in the SMH peaked in May 2003 (despite the triumphalist tone of news coming 
from the US at the time) and in March 2008, on the fifth anniversary of the invasion.   
Media outlet 12-18 
Sept 
2002 
5-11 
Feb 
2003 
13-19 
March 
2003 
20–26 
March 
2003 
Invasion 
1-7 
May 
2003 
2-8 Oct 
2003 
1-7 
March 
2004 
20–26 
July 
2004 
20–26 
March 
2008 
SMH Pro-war 13 7 22 17 0 25 0 0 0 
Anti-war 60 72 69 60 63 75 81 64 0 
Balanced 27 21 9 23 38 0 19 36 100 
Number (15) (29) (32) (48) (8) (4) (16) (11) (1) 
 
Australian Pro-war 48 49 38 43 36 27 17 36 100 
Anti-war 39 31 44 30 21 53 56 9 0 
Balanced 13 21 18 27 43 20 28 55 0 
Number (23) (39) (45) (60) (14) (15) (18) (11) (3) 
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News coverage  
When it came to straight news coverage, both papers were more likely to publish articles 
which embraced a plurality of views, than articles which signalled a position on the war.  
The coding system meant that the direction taken by a news story was a reflection of the 
balance of themes and/or sources quoted.  When a story covered pro-war themes or 
quoted pro-war sources, in both papers it was often balanced on the same page by a story 
covering anti-war themes or quoting an anti-war source.  Surprisingly, in most sample 
periods, both papers were more likely to publish straight news stories with anti-war themes 
and sources than pro-war themes and sources.  (The exception to this was the Australian 
during the invasion (see table 3.5) and both papers after Bush’s “mission accomplished” 
speech in May 2003 at the end of the invasion (see table 3.6.)  In the post-invasion period 
this trend was due in part to ongoing coverage of the failure to locate WMD (coded as anti-
war).  Table 3.5 provides data for three periods, while table 3.6 provides the data for each 
of the nine sample periods.   
 
Table 3.5   News stories: changes in direction over time 
Percentage of news articles pro-war, anti-war or balanced at each stage of the war (by media outlet) 
 
Media outlet Pre-war Invasion Post 
Invasion 
SMH  Pro-war 20 20 23 
Anti-war 38 32 26 
Balanced 42 48 51 
The Australian Pro-war 29 33 18 
Anti-war 33 22 29 
Balanced 38 45 53 
              n = 741, Columns add to 100% for each paper 
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Table 3.6    News stories: changes in direction over time 
Percentage of news items pro-war, anti-war or balanced over all sample periods (by media outlet)  
 
        n = 741, Columns add to 100% for each paper 
In seven of the nine time periods, SMH news stories were more likely to be balanced – 
that is reflect a balance of view-points - than to signal a position.  Anti-war news items also 
equalled or outnumbered pro-war news items in eight of the nine time periods.  The spike 
in the proportion of anti-war SMH news articles in October 2003 is a slight aberration, as 
there were not many SMH articles during this period (just three news items about Iraq) and 
most dealt with the adverse consequences of the war for Tony Blair in London.  The anti-
war position of the SMH was evident in every time period except May 2003, when the 
news was dominated by reports of war successes, including the fall of Baghdad, the 
pulling down of Saddam’s statue in Firdus Square and the US President’s ‘mission 
accomplished’ speech.   
Surprisingly, given the Australian’s pro-war editorial position, in eight of the nine sample 
periods, the paper was more likely to carry a balanced news item (one which included a 
diversity of views) on Iraq than one which signalled a position.  Perhaps more surprising 
was the finding that the paper featured equal or greater proportions of anti-war news items 
than pro-war in seven of the nine time periods (see table 3.6).  (Here it needs to be 
remembered that articles were coded as pro-war or anti-war according to the balance of 
themes and people quoted: it was not a judgement about media bias.)  As might be 
expected, the Australian published more pro-war news articles during the invasion than at 
any other time, but its highest proportion of pro-war news articles were in the first sample 
period (39% in 12 – 18 September 2002).  While those published in September 2002 
appear to have been carefully balanced with the same number of anti-war articles, this 
Media outlet 12-18 
Sept 
2002 
5-11 
Feb 
2003 
13-19 
March 
2003 
20–26 
March 
2003 
1-7 
May 
2003 
2-8 Oct 
2003 
1-7 
March 
2004 
20–26 
July 
2004 
20–26 
March 
2008 
SMH Pro-war 29 29 12 20 44 0 20 8 0 
Anti-war 29 43 39 32 13 100 20 33 0 
Balanced 41 29 50 48 44 0 60 58 100 
(Number) (17) (28) (52) (95) (16) (3) (5) (12) (3) 
 
Australian Pro-war 39 28 27 33 29 13 5 21 0 
Anti-war 39 36 29 22 9 42 43 32 33 
Balanced 22 36 43 45 63 46 52 48 67 
(Number) (23) (61) (99) (197) (35) (24) (21) (44) (6) 
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was not the case during the invasion.   The proportion of pro-war news items dropped off 
steadily after the invasion, when coverage focused on the search for WMD and 
government inquiries examining pre-war intelligence.   
The changes in direction in news coverage in both papers appeared to have varied 
according to two factors: 1) what was happening (commencement of a war in March 2003 
or announcement of failure to find WMD from late in 2003) and 2) public opinion at the 
time.  Newsworthy events reported by both papers may explain much of the commonality 
of coverage, but the Australian’s access to the international News Ltd resources enabled 
that paper to cover events in the US, Iraq and UK more extensively.   
Genre and article direction  
While the two papers had opposing editorial positions on the issue of Iraq, in both papers 
the balance of opinion varied according to the genre – editorial, opinion/analysis or news.  
Editorial positions were more likely to be reflected in the analysis and opinion pages than 
in coverage of news.  Table 3.7 compares the percentage of editorials, opinion/analysis 
and news items of both papers that were judged to be pro-war, anti-war or balanced. 
 
Table 3.7  Article direction for news, opinion/analysis and editorials 
Percentage of editorials, opinion/analysis and news articles pro-war, anti-war or balanced (by media outlet) 
  
Media outlet Genres 
Editorials Opinion/
Analysis 
News 
SMH Pro-war 11 12 20 
Anti-war 63 67 33 
Balanced 26 21 46 
Australian Pro-war 94 40 28 
Anti-war 0 36 28 
Balanced 6 24 45 
                 n = 1402, Columns add to 100% 
 
In the Australian, the genre differences were more marked, with 94% of all editorials pro-
war, while less than half that, 40%, of opinion/analysis articles and 28% of news articles 
were pro-war.  In the SMH there was consistency between the editorial position (63% of 
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editorials were anti-war) and the opinion/analysis articles (67% were anti-war), while less 
than half that proportion of news items (33%) were anti-war.   When it came to straight 
news coverage, both papers were more likely to balance pro and anti-war themes and 
sources within balanced individual articles, than to balance viewpoints by publishing a pro-
war article alongside an anti-war article – although both papers did this as well.  Signalling 
a position on the war was less likely in straight news coverage than for any other genre.  
The Australian’s news items were predominantly neutral or balanced (45%), with pro-war 
and anti-war items evenly represented (28%, see table 3.7).  The SMH’s news coverage 
also tended to be predominantly neutral or balanced (46%), but its anti-war news coverage 
was greater (33%) than its pro-war news coverage (20%).   When it came to news 
coverage, being anti-war or pro-war was a reflection of the themes covered in an article, 
rather than any suggestion of imposed media bias.  The data suggest a degree of 
journalistic independence and are backed up by the accounts of journalists themselves, 
who frequently maintained that they were professionally committed to the notion of 
balanced and fair reporting and had never been briefed to take a particular position in their 
news reporting.      
Pro and anti-war coverage: articles and headlines 
Regardless of news content, a paper’s editorial agenda is also reflected in the choice of 
headlines and decisions about the placement of articles within the paper.   
 
Table 3.8      Article direction (headline direction): pro-war, anti-war or balanced 
     Percentage of articles (headlines) pro-war, anti-war or balanced at each stage of the war by media outlet 
 
                         n = 1204, Columns add to 100% for each paper 
 
Media outlet Pre-war Invasion Post Invasion 
SMH  Pro-war 17 (17) 19 (17) 12 (13) 
Anti-war 53 (48) 41 (37) 50 (43) 
Balanced 30 (35) 40 (46) 39 (44) 
Australian  Pro-war 36 (36) 38 (37) 26 (24) 
Anti-war 34 (28) 23 (18) 30 (26) 
Balanced 30 (36) 39 (45) 44 (49) 
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Table 3.9  Difference between article and headline direction 
Difference in percentage of articles and headlines that are pro-war, anti-war or balanced at each stage of the 
war by media outlet 
 
                         n = 1204, Columns add to 100% for each paper 
 
Not every anti-war article had an anti-war headline.  Each newspaper published a mix of 
articles that supported or opposed the war and a significant proportion of all articles in both 
papers (between 30% and 44%, see table 3.8) were judged to have included a balance of 
themes and sources.  For both papers there was a greater likelihood of an anti-war article 
being given a headline that did not accurately reflect the direction of the article (see table 
3.9).  As expected, SMH headlines and articles were more anti-war than the Australian at 
each stage of the war, though the proportion of anti-war articles in both papers dropped 
during the invasion.  This perhaps was part of a “rally round the flag” effect evident when 
nations go to war (Baume, 2003, p213), and in response to a perception (based on opinion 
polling) that public opposition to the war was softening (Goot, 2003).  SMH anti-war 
headlines dropped from 48% before the war to 37% during the invasion (see table 3.8), 
while anti-war articles dropped from 53% to 41% during the invasion, when headlines and 
articles tended to be more ‘balanced’ (see table 3.8).   The Australian’s pro-war content 
dropped from 38% to 26% after the invasion.  During the invasion, both papers’ headlines 
were more likely to be balanced.  Forty-six per cent of SMH headlines during the invasion 
period and 40% of articles were neutral or balanced, while 45% of the Australian’s 
headlines and 39% of their articles were neutral or balanced.  Both papers published more 
anti-war articles after the invasion (SMH 50%, Australian 30%, see table 3.8) than during 
the invasion - to be expected, perhaps, given the failure to find WMD and the worsening 
civil unrest.  Despite mounting costs and casualties, the Australian’s largest category after 
the invasion was ‘balanced’ (44%), with anti-war articles (30%) for the first time accounting 
for a higher proportion of coverage than pro-war articles (26%, see table 3.8). 
Media outlet Pre-war Invasion Post Invasion 
SMH  Pro-war 0 -2 -1 
Anti-war -5 -4 -7 
Balanced +5 +6 +5 
Australian  Pro-war 0 -1 -2 
Anti-war -6 -5 -4 
Balanced +6 +6 +5 
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The significance of article placement 
The placement of articles within a newspaper conveys the editors’ views on the relative 
importance of particular items.  For example, page 1 is reserved for the most important 
items of the day, followed by page 3, page 2, page 5 and then page 4.  Readers tend to 
read the right hand pages (the odd numbered pages) before the left-hand or even 
numbered pages (Holsanova, Rahm et al. 2006).  The layout of a page, including an 
article’s location, accompanying graphics and headline treatment, influence the way in 
which readers’ eyes will explore a page’s content (Holsanova, Rahm et al. 2006).  Both 
page number (location) and page design, therefore, can be indicators of the paper’s 
agenda.  Other editorial policies, for example the placement of international news items in 
an international section of the paper, also influence placement decisions, but the right-
hand page is seen as the one that would be read first and therefore the dominant page.  
Table 3.10 looks at the direction of articles on Iraq placed on the front page, the dominant 
pages (the odd-numbered right-hand pages) or the left-hand pages of each newspaper.   
 
Table 3.10    Article direction and placement 
Percentage of articles pro-war, anti-war or balanced on page 1, dominant or left-hand page by media outlet 
 
                        n = 126, Rows add to 100% 
 
               n = 556, Rows add to 100% 
 
                                   n = 522, Rows add to 100% 
Consistent with the Australian’s editorial position on the war, page one coverage of Iraq 
was most likely to be a pro-war article (45%) or a balanced article (36%): less likely was an 
anti-war article (18%, see table 3.10).  Page one of the SMH was most likely to carry 
Page one Pro-war Anti-war Balanced (Number) 
SMH 20 28 52 (46) 
Australian 45 18 36 (80) 
Dominant right-hand page  Pro-war Anti-war Balanced (Number) 
SMH 15 54 31 (194) 
Australian 32 32 36 (362) 
Left-hand page  Pro-war Anti-war Balanced (Number) 
SMH 18 47 36 (177) 
Australian 33 30 38 (345) 
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balanced articles on Iraq (52%); around half as likely to run anti-war articles (28%); and 
less likely to run pro-war articles (20%, see table 3.10).  Both dominant and left-hand 
pages in the body of the SMH were more likely to run anti-war articles than pro-war 
articles.  In the body of the Australian, both dominant and left-handed pages of the 
Australian were pretty balanced in their placement of pro-war, anti-war, and balanced or 
neutral articles.  
Front page articles 
Each day’s page one headlines are designed to attract attention: they catch the eye and 
prompt a potential reader to reach into their pocket to buy a copy of the paper, perhaps at 
the local railway newsstand or newsagent.  Page one articles reflect the editors’ views of 
the day’s most newsworthy items: those expected to be of most interest to readers.  In just 
a few words, a headline captures the essence of an issue, framing it in terms that (an 
editor believes) a reader will understand and will resonate with readers’ values (Golding 
and Elliott, 2009).  Front page articles are also an indicator of the media agenda: those 
items the media believe should (will) occupy the thoughts and attention of citizens.  Page 
one articles on Iraq peaked in the Australian in the week immediately prior to the invasion 
and in the SMH in the week of the invasion (See table 3.12).  
 
Table 3.11 Page 1 articles: changes in direction before, during and after invasion 
            Number of page 1 articles pro-war, anti-war or balanced at each stage of the war by media outlet 
 
                                    n = 126 
 
Media outlet Pre-war Invasion Post 
Invasion 
Total 
SMH  Pro-war 5 3 1 9 (20%) 
Anti-war 6 3 4 13(28%) 
Balanced 11 7 6 24(52%) 
Australian Pro-war 21 7 8 36(45%) 
Anti-war 6 3 4 13(16%) 
Balanced 16 5 10 31(39%) 
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Table 3.12   Page one articles on Iraq: changes in direction over time 
Balance of page one articles - pro-war, anti-war or neutral – over nine sample periods (number of articles) 
 
                 n = 126 
 
In September 2002, six months out from the war, SMH front page articles tended to be 
balanced in tone, but by February 2003, at a time of considerable debate in the 
Parliament, anti-war front page articles outnumbered pro-war articles 6:2.  In the week 
immediately prior to the war, SMH front page articles tended to be balanced rather than 
anti-war, with balanced articles outnumbering pro-war articles 6:3 – suggesting a softening 
of their anti-war position as they sensed the inevitability of war.  During the invasion 
sample period (20 – 26 March 2003), there were at least two front page articles on the war 
each day.  Pro-war and anti-war articles were balanced at three each, with balanced 
articles outnumbering the sum of those that took a position.   
By the cessation of major military operations in May 2003, SMH front page articles had 
dropped to three in the week.  There were no front page articles on Iraq during the October 
sample period, when the focus of SMH reporting had been on the political fall-out for Blair 
in the UK.  In March 2004, the release of the Jull report (the report of the Parliamentary 
Joint Committee on ASIO, ASIS and DSD, “Intelligence on Iraq’s weapons of mass 
destruction”) prompted two front page articles on the same day, 2 March 2004: a news 
item by Tom Allard “Foreign reports used to sell war” and an opinion piece by Peter 
Hartcher the political editor, “The sound of three hands clapping”.  The third front page 
article in the March 2004 sample period was a Marian Wilkinson piece “Kerry vows to 
transform America” in which John Kerry, the 2004 Democrat presidential candidate, was 
quoted as saying “The President had misled the country over the war in Iraq” and drew a 
Media outlet 12-18 
Sept 
2002 
5-11 
Feb 
2003 
13-19 
March 
2003 
20–26 
March 
2003 
 
1-7 
May 
2003 
2-8 
Oct 
2003 
1-7 
March 
2004 
20–26 
July 
2004 
20–26 
March 
2008 
Total 
SMH Pro-war 0 2 3 3 1 0 0 0 0 9(20%) 
Anti-war 0 6 0 3 0 0 3 1 0 13(28%) 
Balanced 5 0 6 7 2 0 0 4 0 24(52%) 
Australian Pro-war 6 5 10 7 3 0 0 5 0 36(45%) 
Anti-war 1 1 4 3 0 2 2 0 0 13(16%) 
Balanced 3 4 9 5 2 2 2 2 2 31(39%) 
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comparison between the Bush administration and that of Richard Nixon during the 
Vietnam war (SMH, 4 March 2004, p1).   
In the sample period July 2004 there were five page one articles covering Iraq.  These 
tended to focus on the domestic political ramifications of the war, with information about 
the war itself coming mostly from Paul McGeogh, SMH correspondent posted in the 
region. On 20 July 2004, political correspondent Mark Metherell wrote a piece -“PM Claws 
back Latham’s lead” – about a ‘softening in public antagonism to the war in Iraq’ and a 
slump in Mark Latham’s, Leader of the Opposition, approval rating from 62% in February 
to 50% in July 2004 (SMH, p1).  The same article reported that an AC Neilsen poll had 
found that 53% of respondents suggested the Coalition would best manage Australia’s 
alliance with the US while 30% replied that Labor would.  On 22 July 2004, McGeogh 
wrote of the complexity of tribal politics in post-Saddam Iraq, quoting Bedouin leader 
Mudher Al-Kharbit as suggesting that “we’ll make Vietnam look like a picnic”.  The 
following day, the SMH ran two page one articles on Iraq: a McGeough article carrying 
allegations of “widespread abuse of power and ill-treatment of prisoners by the Iraqi 
authorities” (McGeough, SMH, 23 July 2004) and an article by Tom Allard and Cynthia 
Banham, reporting on the findings of the Flood “Report of the Inquiry into Australian 
Intelligence Agencies”.  Flood found that the “Federal Government did not put pressure on 
spy services to provide sympathetic assessments before the Iraq war but joined the 
conflict on the basis of ‘thin, ambiguous and incomplete’ intelligence” (Allard and Banham, 
SMH, 23 July 2004, p1).  The following day’s paper carried an article by Marian Wilkinson 
in Washington reporting on the findings of the 9/11 Commission, which found that 
“Saddam Hussein and Iraq played no role in the September 11 attacks” (Wilkinson, SMH, 
24 July 2004, p1).  In contrast to the Australian, the SMH carried no page one articles 
marking the fifth anniversary of the Iraq invasion (20 March 2008): only an editorial. 
During each of the three pre-war sample periods, the Australian gave page one 
prominence to pro-war articles, which outnumbered anti-war articles by 6:1, 5:1 and 10:4 
(see table 3.14).  Pro-war articles tended to appear on the front page with articles 
reflecting a plurality of views, although occasionally by an anti-war article.  With the 
invasion the focus moved away from the rights and wrongs of war to logistics and the 
human face.  The Australian’s front page of 20 March 2003 ran three Iraq-related stories.  
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Roy Eccleston wrote about Saddam Hussein’s defiance of George Bush’s noon deadline 
for him to flee Iraq in “Just hours from blitzkrieg”, while Ian McPhedron interviewed Iraqis 
out shopping in a Baghdad market for “War-weary leave their fate to Allah” and Cameron 
Stewart considered the impact of Australia’s joining the coalition of the willing on 
Australia’s vulnerability to terrorist attack for “Coast exposed to terrorists”.  The Australian 
published front page articles on Iraq almost daily during the sample periods of May 2003 
(at the declared end of formal military operations in Iraq) and July 2004 (with the release of 
Philip Flood’s “Report of the Inquiry into Australian Intelligence Agencies”), and four times 
each in the sample periods of October 2003 and March 2004.  In the final sample period, 
on the fifth anniversary of the war, the Australian carried two front page articles on the 
same day, 22 March 2008, about the death of Australian aid worker, Stuart Cameron in 
northern Iraq in 1993.  “Saddam has Aussie killed – Secret papers expose Iraqi regime’s 
global terrorism mission” reported on documents released by the US on the fifth 
anniversary of the invasion which quoted a letter to the then Iraqi Defence Minister saying 
that Cameron’s murder was “executed by our directorate in fulfilment of your excellent 
direction”.  [The same article also implicated the Iraqis in supporting a plot to ‘eliminate’ 
Martin Indyk, an Australian-educated former US ambassador to Israel.]  The other page 
one article that day, “I never believed it was a random attack”, quoted Cameron’s widow as 
having had a long-standing belief that her husband had been the target of Iraqi 
government agents for his work with the Kurds in the north of Iraq. 
In both papers the number of page one articles dropped off considerably after May 2003, 
when the approximately 2,000 Australian combat troops, deployed along with US, UK and 
Polish troops as part of the coalition of the willing, had been withdrawn from Iraq after the 
cessation of major combat operations.  A further contingent of Australian troops was later 
deployed to Iraq in 2005 in response to a Japanese request for security assistance in  Al 
Muthanna province, but, apart from the final sample period (March 2008, the fifth 
anniversary of the invasion) that phase of the conflict was out of the scope of this 
research.   A comparison of the direction of page one headlines with the direction of page 
one articles (see table 3.8) suggests that with both papers there was a tendency to choose 
headlines that were less anti-war than the sentiment of the accompanying article.  In the 
case of the SMH, this meant more pro-war headlines than pro-war articles and in the 
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Australian, this meant more balanced headlines than balanced articles – however the 
differences were not great. 
Front page sources 
Both papers were more likely to quote government sources on their front page before and 
during the invasion, while the SMH was more likely to quote opposition sources after.   
 
Table 3.13 Page 1 sources before, during and after the invasion 
             Percentage of sources quoted at each stage of the war by media outlet 
 
                            n = 126 articles, Columns add to 100% 
 
Government sources accounted for 67% of front page sources quoted in SMH before the 
invasion.  In the Australian they accounted for 52% (see table 3.13).  Both papers were 
equally likely to quote opposition sources during this period (13%, see table 3.13).   In the 
post-invasion period, however, the Australian was more than twice as likely as the SMH to 
Media outlet Pre-war Invasion Post 
Invasion 
Total 
SMH  Government  67 49 21 52 
Officials 14 39 21 23 
Opposition 13 2 28 13 
Expert 0 0 3 1 
Community groups 
& NGOs 
0 2 17 
4 
Journalists 0 0 0 0 
Iraqis 6 7 7 6 
Other 0 0 0 0 
Opinion polls 0 0 3 1 
      
Australian Government  52 35 48 48 
Officials 20 30 16 21 
Opposition 13 8 14 12 
Expert 2 0 7 3 
Community groups 
& NGOs 
4 0 14 
6 
Journalists 1 11 0 3 
Iraqis 5 8 2 5 
Other 3 8 0 3 
Opinion polls 0 0 0 0 
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quote government sources in front-page articles (48% versus 21%), while the SMH was 
twice as likely as the Australian to quote opposition sources (28% versus 14%, see table 
3.13).  In the post-invasion period when the US, UK and Australian governments were 
seeking to explain the collapse of their arguments for going to war in Iraq, the Australian 
provided a much greater share of voice to government sources than it did the opposition 
(48% versus 14%, see table 3.13). 
Conclusion 
This chapter traced a number of dimensions of the anti-war and pro-war direction of 
coverage in the SMH and the Australian - across three periods and across all nine sample 
periods - in an effort to understand better the two papers’ agendas in their coverage of the 
Iraq war.  The analysis found that each paper, while giving voice to opposing views, took 
an editorial position on the Iraq conflict: the SMH against Australian involvement and the 
Australian in favour (see table 3.1).  These positions were slightly moderated just before 
and during the invasion, suggesting that editorial teams at both papers were sensitive to 
public opinion and moderated content through article placement or a more moderate 
headline, when there was a sense that public opinion might be changing direction.  In the 
SMH, their editorial position was strongly reflected in their opinion and analysis articles 
(67% were coded as anti-war, see tables 3.7), while in the Australian, their pro-war opinion 
and analysis articles tended to a large extent to be balanced by anti-war articles 
(40%:36%, see table 3.7).  Straight news coverage in both publications was more likely to 
reflect a plurality of views than to signal a position on the war (see table 3.7).   With the 
exception of the front page, articles dealing with pro-war themes tended to be balanced on 
the same page by articles dealing with anti-war themes (see table 3.10). 
The Australian’s campaigning approach to the Iraq war translated into strong pro-war front 
page articles (46% pro-war, see table 3.10), and overwhelming support in its editorials 
(94% pro-war, see table 3.7), but news reporting tended to be more balanced and, while 
opinion pages were slightly pro-war (40% pro-war, 36% anti-war and 24% balanced, see 
table 3.7), they reflected both sides of the debate.  With balanced or anti-war articles, 
headlines sometimes made the content appear to be more pro-war than it was.  While a 
semiotic analysis was not part of this study, the data suggest that the Australian sought to 
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actively reflect its editorial line in headlines and the placement of articles, so readers were 
left in no doubt what the paper stood for, even though the actual content took a more 
pluralist approach.   
While the SMH took a strong anti-war position in its editorials (63% anti-war) and opinion 
and analysis pieces (67% anti-war, see table 3.1), it tended to take a more moderate 
position on its front page (28% anti-war compared with 46% pro-war in the Australian, see 
table 3.9).  The SMH softened its anti-war content with more balanced headlines, reflecting 
perhaps its more conservative image of itself.   
A page one headline will leave a more lasting impression of the paper’s sentiments on an 
issue than will the detailed content of an article, say, on the left-hand page of the 
international section in the body of the paper.  Readers impressions of the paper’s position 
will be influenced more by headlines and particularly by page one placement than by 
articles in the body of the paper.  Tables 3.11 – 3.12 present the pro-war or anti-war 
direction of both papers’ page one articles – and they suggest a more moderate, balanced 
agenda on the part of the SMH and a more aggressive pro-war position on the part of the 
Australian.  It would seem that the Australian’s pro-war front-page bias reflected its 
editorial view, while the SMH’s editors sought to convey a more neutral or balanced 
position on Iraq on its front pages.   
In response to criticism of the Australian’s coverage of Iraq, Tom Switzer has argued that 
his coverage of Iraq was pretty balanced, with marginally more pro-war than anti-war 
opinion pieces (pers. comm., 19 March 2012) – and this research would appear to confirm 
this.  But his response does not effectively counter the concerns of the Australian’s critics, 
given that this research also finds a consistent pro-war bias in the Australian’s editorial 
position and front page coverage, although a more balanced approach to straight news 
coverage. 
The pro-war positions taken by the Australian’s regular columnists added to a widespread 
perception of bias.  Greg Sheridan and Dennis Shanahan consistently put the US and 
Howard Government’s argument for war, while the argument against the war was often put 
by Simon Crean, Bob Hawke, Peter Botsman, Richard Butler, Scott Burchill or Carl 
Ungerer – opinion leaders who wrote one-off opinion pieces and were not on the 
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Australian’s payroll.  It is true that journalist Matt Price tended to put an anti-war position 
and editor-at-large, Paul Kelly tended to be more mixed and sometimes unclear in his 
position – but most of the well-known regular columnists were pro-war, while their 
counterparts at the SMH tended to be anti-war. 
The Australian’s perhaps disingenuous response to critics – using the numbers of their 
own content analysis (Switzer’s numbers) as proof that accusations of bias were not true – 
suggests that the paper may have a business model that seeks to “have their cake and eat 
it too”.  The often inflammatory front page headlines and the strongly pro-US views of 
some commentators appear to have been a tactic designed to attract conservative readers 
and, in the case of Iraq, to either express the views of the US, UK and Australian 
governments or strengthen the Australian Government’s resolve.  But the variety of views 
put by external commentators and opinion leaders, suggests that the Australian’s editors 
wanted to appeal to a wider and more educated readership, including those who may have 
been opposed to the war, and those in the bureaucracy with an interest in international 
affairs.   
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Chapter 4 – WMD and the shaping of the media’s pre-
war agenda 
             The truthful, well-weighed answer that tells the blacker lie…           
                                            - Rudyard Kipling, “Gehazi”, 1915 
In the long lead-up to the Iraq conflict, journalists covering the debate faced the challenge 
of reporting accurately and interpreting the competing narratives around the war.  For 
some, the context of the pre-war rumblings aroused suspicion.  After 9/11 there had been 
a global wave of sympathy for the Americans and there had been widespread support for 
the invasion of Afghanistan, but the US Administration’s language around the ‘war on 
terror’, with its ‘either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists’ message (Bush, 2001), 
followed by President George Bush’s ‘axis of evil’ State of the Nation address on  
29 January 2002, left some journalists wondering about what was to come.  The 
subsequent campaigns by President Bush, UK Prime Minister Tony Blair and Australia’s 
Prime Minister John Howard to justify an invasion of Iraq were received by some critics 
with a deep cynicism.  There were doubts about the claimed links between Saddam and al 
Qaeda and the degree to which Saddam represented a threat to the US.   
In interview, a number of journalists voiced their suspicions that Saddam represented a 
case of unfinished business – a reference to the 1991 Gulf War, when George H W Bush 
decided to comply with UN direction and not push on to Baghdad after US troops had 
driven Iraqi troops out of Kuwait.  Others suggested it was a desire for revenge for an 
alleged foiled Iraqi plot to assassinate George H. W. Bush and other family members 
(Isikoff, 2008).  Still others have argued it was a show of force on the part of the US 
(Friedman, 2004) or part of a neo-conservative plan to remake the Middle East, while 
ANU’s Hugh White suggested that Americans’ desire for revenge in the wake of 9/11 had 
not been sated by the invasion of Afghanistan and the failure to capture Bin Laden (White, 
pers. comm. 23 August 2012). Journalists, however, have to deal in ‘realities’ and ‘truths’ - 
which mean sources and evidence - with journalistic values requiring a commitment to 
accurate and fair reporting (MEAA, 1996), where personal views are not relevant.   
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Patterns of press attention 
This chapter draws on the content analysis and interviews to examine press coverage 
during the pre-war period when weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and Saddam 
Hussein’s links with terrorist groups were the cornerstone of the Government’s efforts to 
sell Australian involvement in the Iraq war to an increasingly sceptical public (Goot, 
2007(2)).   
Themes in pre-war coverage 
Not surprisingly, the analysis of pre-war articles on Iraq in the SMH and the Australian 
found that ‘WMD and terrorism’ was the single most dominant theme in media coverage, 
accounting for 26% of all Iraq-related themes in the SMH and 30% in the Australian, ahead 
of discussion of policy options, Australian public opinion, anticipated outcomes of the war, 
the US Alliance, overseas public opinion and US motives (see Table 4.1).  
  
Table 4.1    Pre-war themes in the lead-up to war 
   Changes in the coverage of themes (as a percentage) over the three pre-war periods 
 
Media outlet 12-18 
Sept 
2002 
5-11 
Feb 
2003 
13-19 
March 
2003 
Total 
pre-
war* 
SMH WMD & Terrorism 24 27 26 26 
Policy options 17 20 21 20 
US/Australia Alliance & 
relations with other nations 
20 19 11 15 
Discussion of US motives 6 6 5 5 
Anticipated outcomes 12 8 15 12 
Aus domestic sentiment/pro & 
antiwar groups 
19 19 15 17 
O/S sentiment/pro & antiwar 
groups 
2 2 8 5 
Australian WMD & Terrorism 28 32 29 30 
Policy options 21 19 23 21 
US/Australia Alliance & 
relations with other nations 
17 11 13 13 
Discussion of US motives 11 3 6 6 
Anticipated outcomes 4 9 13 10 
Aus domestic sentiment/pro & 
antiwar groups 
14 24 11 16 
O/S sentiment/pro & antiwar 
groups 
4 2 4 4 
       n=488 articles, Columns add to 100% for each publication  
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The pattern of themes covered by both newspapers was quite consistent, with percentage 
differences at the margins, suggesting shared news values despite divergent editorial 
positions on the Iraq war (the Australian supported the invasion, while the SMH opposed 
it).  Some themes were covered more frequently as war approached, while other themes 
appeared to fade in their importance.  Once again there were similarities between the two 
papers.  Table 4.1 shows, for example, that WMD and terrorism remained the most 
important theme for each of the three stages in the pre-war period.  In both papers, 
discussion of policy options grew in frequency in the week before the invasion, while 
discussion of the US Alliance dropped in both papers between September 2002 and 
March 2003.    
Discussion of anticipated outcomes of the war increased in both papers as war 
approached, while discussion of Australian domestic anti-war sentiment dropped as war 
approached.  Coverage of overseas anti-war groups increased in the SMH in the week 
before the invasion.  Overall, both papers, had the same top four themes - WMD and 
terrorism, policy options, Australian domestic attitudes toward the war, and the US Alliance 
– in the same order of importance. 
Pro-war, anti-war (or balanced) context of themes 
In the SMH, every theme was more likely to be discussed in an article which (on balance) 
opposed the war, while in the Australian, WMD and terrorism, and policy options, tended 
to be raised in the context of articles in support of the war.  In both papers, discussion of 
the US Alliance and relations with other countries, US motives, anticipated outcomes of 
the war, and overseas community sentiment tended to be mentioned in articles which were 
(on balance) anti-war (see table 4.2).   
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Table 4.2   Themes and direction in all pre-war coverage 
The percentage of individual pre-war media themes in articles which were positive/pro-war, neutral/balanced 
or negative/anti-war - by media outlet. 
 
 n=488 articles (181 SMH, 307 Australian), 1,431 themes (553 SMH, 878 Australian), Rows add to 100%. 
 
Discussion of domestic sentiment on the war tended to be balanced.  For both papers, 
discussion of the anticipated outcomes of the war was more often in the context of a 
negative anti-war or balanced article, than a positive one.  Table 4.2 shows whether an 
argument was advanced in the context of an article which, on balance, supported the war, 
was against the war or was balanced in tone.   Table 4.3 is the same table, but for news 
items only. 
Media outlet - Theme Theme quoted in pro-war, anti-war or balanced context 
Positive/pro-war/ 
Pro-US 
Negative/anti-
war/anti-US 
Balanced/ 
Neutral 
SMH WMD & Terrorism 27 44 29 
Policy options 16 54 30 
US/Australia Alliance & relations 
with other nations 
25 61 14 
Discussion of US motives 17 52 31 
Anticipated outcomes 15 52 34 
Aus domestic sentiment/pro & 
antiwar groups 
10 69 22 
O/S sentiment/pro & antiwar 
groups 
4 68 28 
Australian WMD & Terrorism 52 24 24 
Policy options 49 32 20 
US/Australia Alliance & relations 
with other nations 
35 41 24 
Discussion of US motives 28 55 18 
Anticipated outcomes 21 44 35 
Aus domestic sentiment/pro & 
antiwar groups 
37 37 25 
O/S sentiment/pro & antiwar 
groups 
13 50 38 
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Table 4.3   Themes and direction in pre-war news coverage only 
The percentage of individual pre-war media themes in pre-war news articles which were positive/pro-war, 
neutral/balanced or negative/anti-war - by media outlet. 
 
   n=280 articles (97 SMH, 183 Australian), 751 themes (277 SMH, 474 Australian), Rows add to 100%. 
 
When it came to straight news, coverage of almost all themes in both papers was more 
likely to be balanced or neutral than across both papers as a whole (see tables 4.3 
compared with 4.2).   The editorial positions of both papers were still evident in straight 
news coverage, but to a lesser extent, suggesting perhaps, a commitment to fair and 
balanced reporting (see table 4.3) in the context of an awareness of editorial policy. 
WMD, terrorism and pre-war coverage 
Differences between the SMH and the Australian were evident over time when WMD and 
terrorism themes were considered.  Table 4.4 shows the proportion of times that WMD and 
terrorism themes were mentioned in the context of pro-war, anti-war or balanced articles.   
 
Media outlet - Theme Theme quoted in pro-war, anti-war or balanced context 
Positive/pro-war/ 
Pro-US 
Negative/anti-
war/anti-US 
Balanced/ 
Neutral 
SMH WMD & Terrorism 29 25 45 
Policy options 13 35 52 
US/Australia Alliance & relations 
with other nations 
31 50 19 
Discussion of US motives 0 46 55 
Anticipated outcomes 18 41 41 
Aus domestic sentiment/pro & 
antiwar groups 
20 53 27 
O/S sentiment/pro & antiwar 
groups 
7 79 14 
Australian WMD & Terrorism 39 22 39 
Policy options 38 30 32 
US/Australia Alliance & relations 
with other nations 
28 41 31 
Discussion of US motives 28 44 28 
Anticipated outcomes 25 40 35 
Aus domestic sentiment/pro & 
antiwar groups 
22 44 33 
O/S sentiment/pro & antiwar 
groups 
4 52 44 
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Table 4.4      WMD and terrorism: article direction in the lead-up to war 
                  Percentage of WMD Themes where tone was Pro-war, Anti-war or Balanced 
 
Media outlet 12-18 
Sept 
2002 
5-11 
Feb 
2003 
13-19 
March 
2003 
Total 
pre-
war** 
SMH Pro-war 28 29 26 27 
Anti-war 32 63 36 44 
Balanced 40 8 39 29 
 
Australian Pro-war 69 58 40 52 
Anti-war 27 22 25 24 
Balanced 4 20 35 24 
            n=405 articles, Columns add to 100% for each publication 
 
It is interesting the way in which each paper’s position moderated as the war grew closer.  
The SMH was reasonably balanced in its earlier coverage of WMD and terrorism in 
September 2002, but by February 2003 had settled into an anti-war position, which 
moderated as the war got closer.  The Australian maintained its pro-war position in its 
coverage of WMD and terrorism, but moderated its strong pro-war position as war grew 
closer and, perhaps, as doubts emerged about the nature of the evidence surrounding 
WMD and Saddam.  While the proportion of anti-war articles in the Australian remained 
relatively constant in the pre-war periods, ranging between 22% and 27%, its balanced 
reporting increased as the invasion came closer. 
Sources  
Central to the concept of the media as the ‘fourth estate’ is a free press keeping 
governments honest and accountable on behalf of the citizenry (Siebert et al, 1978).  This 
suggests that, rather than dominate media coverage, government sources should be 
balanced by other sources that are critical of it and reflect a diversity of views and 
viewpoints.  Newspapers cannot include all sources in their stories.  Editorial decisions 
have to be made about the relative importance, accuracy and legitimacy of sources in their 
decisions about how a story will be told.  The process by which decisions are made about 
sources and which messages get into the news is called gatekeeping (Bennett 2007, p5).   
This section looks at the representation of sources quoted in the SMH and the Australian’s 
coverage of the period leading to the Iraq war and seeks to answer the question: ‘Which 
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sources dominated before the Iraq war and what was the context?  Who tended to be 
overlooked?  Were there systematic differences between the two papers and to what 
might those differences be attributed?’  The data have been analysed according to the 
type of source quoted eg. government, and the nationality or location of persons quoted 
(for example ‘Australia’ would be indicated in the case of an Iraqi refugee who may not 
have citizenship or residency, but was interviewed in Australia).  The frequency with which 
particular people are quoted in the media can be an indicator of influence.  It will often 
demonstrate the regard in which a particular individual’s views are held and suggests that 
journalists and editors believe their opinions are of interest to readers.   
 
Table 4.5    Sources  
Type of source as a percentage of all persons quoted in each of the three sample periods 
 
Media outlet 12-18 
Sept 
2002 
5-11 
Feb 
2003 
13-19 
March 
2003 
Total 
pre-
war** 
SMH Government  52 48 42 46 
Officials 12 8 17 14 
Opposition 12 18 7 11 
Expert 16 14 15 15 
Community 
groups & NGOs 
0 4 4 3 
Journalists 1 2 7 5 
Iraqis 0 0 4 2 
Other 7 5 5 5 
Opinion polls 0 0 0 0 
 
Australian Government  53 47 39 44 
Officials 11 11 20 16 
Opposition 13 22 9 14 
Expert 11 4 13 10 
Community 
groups & NGOs 
6 5 6 6 
Journalists 0 5 2 3 
Iraqis 4 1 4 3 
Other 3 4 6 5 
Opinion polls 0 0 0 0 
                                                     n = 421, Columns add to 100% 
 
For both papers, governments were by far the most important sources on Iraq – quoted 
almost five times as often as the next most quoted groups (the opposition, experts), 
closely followed by other media, community groups, non-government organisations and 
Iraqis.  The pattern was strikingly similar for both papers.  It would appear that both papers 
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saw government sources, both the Australian and other governments, including the US 
and UK, as newsworthy and legitimate sources of information about Iraq.   
Australian sources – who dominated? 
There were remarkable similarities between the two papers when overseas sources were 
excluded from the data (see table 4.6).   
 
Table 4.6  Australians quoted in the lead-up to war 
Type of Australian source as a percentage of all Australians quoted by each outlet for each pre-war period 
 
Media outlet 12-18 
Sept 
2002 
5-11 
Feb 
2003 
13-19 
March 
2003 
Total 
pre-
war 
SMH Government  45 33 29 35 
Officials 6 0 9 5 
Opposition 19 38 16 23 
Expert 19 21 26 23 
Community 
groups & NGOs 
0 5 3 3 
Journalists 11 3 14 10 
Iraqis in Australia 0 0 0 0 
Other 0 0 2 1 
 
Australian Government  44 36 30 34 
Officials 0 5 10 7 
Opposition 26 42 19 29 
Expert 8 5 17 11 
Community 
groups & NGOs 
5 6 10 8 
Journalists 3 6 9 7 
Iraqis in Australia 10 0 1 2 
Other 5 1 4 3 
n = 499 (206 in SMH and 293 in Australian), Columns add to 100% 
 
For the whole pre-war period, Government sources dominated.  Forty percent of 
Australians quoted in the SMH were government sources – 35% elected and 5% 
unelected officials.  This was comparable with 41% in the Australian – 34% elected and 
7% unelected officials (see table 4.6).  As the war drew closer, Government sources still 
dominated, but the number of elected Government representatives went down, while the 
number of officials, experts and journalists quoted went up.  In both papers the proportion 
of elected Government representatives was highest at 45% (SMH) and 44% (the 
Australian) in September 2002 when Iraq was first debated in Parliament.  Government 
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sources, while still important in coverage, were quoted proportionately less often as war 
approached.  In articles in both papers, government sources tended to be balanced 
against opposition voices or experts, which together represented 46% of sources in the 
SMH and 40% in the Australian.  The data (see table 4.6) suggested that the Australian 
was almost three times as likely to balance Government sources with a quote from an 
Opposition source as from an expert, while the SMH appeared to be equally likely to 
balance Government sources with either an Opposition source or an expert opinion.  The 
Opposition’s (Labor) exposure peaked in both papers in February 2003, though not 
necessarily for good reasons.  During this period, John Howard made a statement to the 
Parliament about Iraq; Colin Powell made his presentation to the UN Security Council; and 
Simon Crean, having welcomed Powell’s ‘new evidence’ was accused in the media of 
changing his position on Iraq (Ramsay, SMH, 2003(a)).  Across the pre-war period in the 
Australian the representation of community groups and non-government organisations 
(NGOs) doubled from 5% to 10%, while in the SMH representation went from zero to 5% 
to 3%.  Iraqis in Australia represented 10% of sources quoted in the Australian in 
September 2002, but dropped off to just 1% in the week before the invasion. 
Nationality of sources 
The nationality of sources can also indicate whose views are considered newsworthy and 
hence who is accorded greater attention.  Table 4.7 has a breakdown of the 
nationality/location of those quoted in articles on Iraq in each newspaper across each of 
the three pre-war sample periods.   
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Table 4.7   Nationality of sources  
Nationality of sources as a percentage of those quoted by each outlet during each pre-war sample period 
 
Media outlet 12-18 
Sept 
2002 
5-11 
Feb 
2003 
13-19 
March 
2003 
Total 
pre-
war 
SMH Australia 62 48 43 48 
US 12 29 25 23 
UK 2 2 10 6 
Iraq 5 2 8 5 
International Orgs 5 5 5 5 
European Union 5 8 6 6 
Other Middle East  8 0 4 4 
Other, incl Asia & Africa 1 6 0 2 
 
Australian Australia 41 51 44 46 
US 34 21 24 25 
UK 3 5 7 6 
Iraq 3 5 7 6 
International Orgs 8 6 5 6 
European Union 10 7 8 8 
Other Middle East  0 3 6 4 
Other, incl Asia & Africa 1 3 0 1 
               n = 422, Columns add to 100% 
In both papers, Australian and US sources together accounted for more than 70% of all 
sources, with a ratio of around 2:1 Australian versus US sources (see table 4.7).   Over the 
three time periods, the trends appeared to reflect the relative importance that each paper 
placed on events that were happening at the time and related sources.  In some periods 
the SMH had a stronger Australian focus while the Australian had a stronger US focus 
(September 2002, see table 4.7), while in other periods the reverse was the case.  The 
September sample period included coverage of John Howard’s address to the National 
Press Club on the anniversary of 11 September, and a debate in the House of 
Representatives on Iraq, during which Howard called on the UN to “get serious about 
Iraq”, signalling that he saw a role for the UN where previously he had suggested that “any 
invasion was a matter for the US to decide” (Allard, 2002).  At the same time a lot was 
happening in the US.  On the anniversary of 9/11, President Bush delivered his Ellis Island 
speech in which he said “the US would never allow any terrorist or tyrant to threaten 
civilization with weapons of mass destruction” (Eccleston, 13 Sept 2002).  The US was 
also urging the UN Security Council to take a strong stand on Iraq.      
In February and March 2003, the Australian focused more on the Australian political 
debate, with 51% and 44% of its sources from Australia.  The SMH, however, increased its 
  
111 
 
US coverage from its low of 12% in September 2002 to 29% and 25% immediately before 
the invasion.   
There are some other interesting trends in the data. Interest in UK sources at the 
Australian increased steadily from 3% in September 2002, to 5% in February 2003 and 7% 
immediately prior to the war.  For the SMH, however, interest in UK sources was at 2% in 
September 2002 and February 2003, until it jumped to 10% in March 2003 immediately 
prior to the invasion.  The increased coverage in both papers was largely due to British 
Labour Prime Minister Tony Blair’s difficulties as divisions over the war deepened within 
his party and he faced the prospect of a leadership challenge.  British Leader of the House 
of Commons, Robin Cook resigned; International Development Secretary, Clare Short was 
threatening to resign; and up to ten Parliamentary Secretaries were ‘ready to follow her 
lead’ (SMH editorial, 2003(a)).  On 13 March 2003, the Australian carried a front page 
article headlined ‘Get off the fence, orders Bush - Embattled Blair seeks extended deadline 
for Saddam’, (Lusetich, 2003), and a page 8 article suggesting that ‘the jackals were 
circling’ (Jenkins, 2003).    That same week, the SMH carried articles headlined ‘Loyal 
Bush ally in the wars – Blair’s MPs turn on him’ and an excerpt from Robin Cook’s 17 
March resignation speech (Fray, 2003).   
In both papers there was a steady increase in the proportion of Iraqi sources quoted as the 
invasion drew nearer.  The Australian quoted the same number of Iraqi sources as 
sources from the UK (3% in September 2002, 5% in February 2003, and 7% in March 
2003), while the SMH quoted more Iraqi sources (5%) than UK sources (2%) in September 
2002; the same number of Iraqi and UK sources in February 2003 (2%); and in March 
2003 sourced 8% of quotes from Iraqis and 10% from the UK, where Blair’s troubles were 
judged to be more newsworthy than those of Iraqis. 
Observations on press coverage 
The British and Australian papers’ common heritage provides an interesting point of 
comparison for the Australian data through a similar study of British papers’ coverage of 
the Iraq war, conducted by communication scholars, Tumber and Palmer (2006).   
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Comparing Australian and British coverage  
Tumber and Palmer (2004) looked at the direction of pre-war coverage in British papers.  
To enable comparison with their findings, the data were stripped of the ‘neutral or 
balanced’ category, which was not included in their study (see table 4.8).   
 
Table 4.8   Comparison with British papers: pre-invasion 
Proportion of positive and negative articles in SMH, the Australian and British papers  
 
Title Positive Negative 
SMH  25% 75% 
Daily Mirror (UK)* (L,T) 30% 70% 
Guardian (UK)* (L,B) 45% 55% 
Australian 51% 49% 
Daily Telegraph (UK)* (R,B) 57% 43% 
Daily Mail (UK)* (R,T) 59% 41% 
Rows add to 100, * Tumber and Palmer 2004, p.101 
           R = right-leaning, L = left-leaning, T = tabloid, B = broadsheet 
 
The balance of SMH coverage in the pre-invasion period more closely resembled the UK 
Daily Mirror, a left-wing tabloid which, under editor Piers Morgan, was staunchly opposed 
to the Iraq war.  The Australian’s coverage in the same period fell mid-way between the 
left-leaning Guardian and the conservative Daily Telegraph, both broadsheets, suggesting 
perhaps that the broadsheet format may have had an influence on content.  The two 
British tabloids took stronger positions on the war (the Daily Mirror against the war and the 
Daily Mail in favour of the war) than did the two British broadsheets.  During this period in 
the UK, Iraq was a controversial political issue, with Blair under pressure from within his 
own party and Cabinet ministers threatening to resign over the matter.   
Comparing themes in Australian and British press 
The theme categories used in the content analysis enabled a comparison with Tumber and 
Palmer’s (2004) data on British newspapers, with some minor adjustments.  The themes 
‘WMD and terrorism’, ‘Australian domestic sentiment’ and ‘overseas public sentiment’ were 
excluded from the Australian data.  Table 4.9 compares the results.  
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Table 4.9   Themes in pre-war coverage in Australia and UK 
Themes in pre-war coverage as a percentage of all themes by outlet in Australia and UK* 
                                                             Rows add to 100%, * Tumber and Palmer, 2004, P78.                                                                                           
For both the SMH and the Australian the relative weightings given to each theme more 
closely resembled each other than they resembled the British papers. The US/Australia 
relationship, for example, was more important to the SMH and the Australian, than was the 
US/UK relationship for any of the British papers.  The Guardian and the UK Daily 
Telegraph were more focused on the implications of the US/UK relationship and the 
possible outcomes of US policy than were either the UK Daily Mail or the Daily Mirror. For 
both the UK Daily Mail and the Daily Mirror, discussion of policy options far outweighed 
discussion of the US motives for going to war, the US/UK relationship or the outcomes of 
US policy.  Of the British papers, the balance of themes in the Guardian (left wing 
broadsheet) and the Daily Telegraph (right-wing broadsheet) more closely resembled the 
Australian broadsheets than did those in the Daily Mail (right wing tabloid) or the Daily 
Mirror (left-wing tabloid), suggesting the themes that dominated the media agenda during 
that period related more to the format of each paper than to editorial position on the war.  
 
Title Policy 
Options 
US motives US/Australia 
(US/UK) 
relationship 
Outcomes of 
US policy 
SMH 38 10 29 23 
Australian 42 12 26 20 
Daily Telegraph (UK)* (R,B) 26 19 19 36 
Guardian (UK)* (L,B) 33 11 19 36 
Daily Mail (UK)* (R,T) 75 7 13 6 
Daily Mirror (UK)* (L,T) 75 13 5 6 
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Table 4.10   Themes in pre-war coverage in Australia and UK 
Themes in pre-war coverage as a percentage of all themes by outlet in Australia compared with the pattern 
for UK broadsheets (Guardian and Daily Telegraph) and tabloids (Daily Mirror and Daily Mail).* 
 
     Rows add to 100%, * Tumber and Palmer, 2004, P80, table 6.5A 
                                                                                            
The differences and similarities between the two Australian papers and the British papers’ 
coverage of themes appeared to have had more to do with both papers’ broadsheet format 
than their political leanings or editorial policies.  Table 4.10 compared the SMH and the 
Australian coverage of themes, with the same information for the British papers, but this 
time the British papers were grouped according to format.  The pattern of coverage for the 
Australian papers, both broadsheets, was more similar to the British broadsheet profile 
than to that of the British tabloids. 
 
Table 4.11  Themes in pre-war coverage in Australia and UK 
Percentage of ‘principle’ and ‘pragmatism’ themes in pre-war coverage by outlet in Australia and UK* 
Rows add to 100%, * Tumber and Palmer, 2004, p81, table 6.6 
 
When Tumber and Palmer grouped the four themes such that matters of ‘principle’ 
(discussion of policy options and US motives) were compared with matters of ‘pragmatism’ 
(the nature of the US relationship and possible outcomes of US policy) the difference in 
pattern between the British tabloids and broadsheets was more pronounced (Tumber and 
Palmer, 2004, p81, table 6.6).  When the two Australian papers’ themes were grouped in 
Format (Title) Policy 
Options 
US 
motives 
US/Australia 
relationship 
(US/UK relationship) 
Outcomes of 
US policy 
Australian broadsheets 
(SMH and Australian) 
40 11 27 22 
UK Broadsheets* 
(Guardian and Daily Telegraph) 
31 14 19 36 
UK tabloids* 
(Daily Mirror and Daily Mail) 
75 11 8 6 
Format (Title) Macro-theme ‘principle’ – 
themes looking at policy 
options and US motives 
Macro-theme ‘pragmatism’ – 
themes dealing with US 
relationship and outcomes of 
US policy 
Australian broadsheets 
(SMH and Australian) 
51 49 
UK Broadsheets* 
(Guardian and Daily Telegraph) 
44.5 55.5 
UK tabloids* 
(Daily Mirror and Daily Mail) 
85 15 
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the same way and compared with the British data, the balance between themes of 
‘principle’ and themes of ‘pragmatism’ was closer to the balanced approach of the British 
broadsheets than that of the British tabloids, which was strongly skewed in favour of 
matters of ‘principle’ over ‘pragmatism’ (see table 4.11).  This suggests that broadsheet 
editors in both countries believed their readers – who tend to be better educated (Young, 
2011) - sought to balance questions of principle with pragmatism, while tabloid editors 
believed their readers to be focused more on matters of principle, including questions such 
as ‘What other options were available to the US?’ ‘Why did the US want to go into Iraq?’  
Some of the ‘principle’ questions tend to be normative and might lend themselves to the 
more negative, sensationalist approach of tabloid journalism. 
 
Table 4.12  Discussion of policy options in Australian and British media 
Coverage of discussion of Policy Options – percentage positive/pro-war or negative/anti-war - by media 
outlets in Australia and UK* 
 
Title Policy options quoted in pro-war or anti-war 
context 
Positive/pro-war/ 
Pro-US 
Negative/anti-
war/anti-US** 
SMH 23 77 
Daily Mirror (UK) (L,T)* 34 66 
Guardian (UK)* (L,B) 39 60 
Australian 60 40 
Daily Telegraph (UK)* (R,B) 66 34 
Daily Mail (UK)* (R,T) 67 33 
     n = 227 articles, Rows add to 100%, *Tumber and Palmer, 2004, P 82 
 
Table 4.12 compared the SMH and the Australian’s coverage of policy options with 
Tumber and Palmer’s results for selected British papers.  The trend in the Australian 
papers was the same as that in the British papers: the ‘distribution of positive and negative 
mentions…follow[ed] the political allegiance of the media titles’ (Tumber & Palmer, 2004, 
p82).  As with the British papers, the Australian results were almost a mirror image of each 
other, reflecting the pro-war editorial position of the Australian and the anti-war editorial 
position of the SMH.   
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Table 4.13   Coverage of US Motives in Australian and British media 
Discussion of US Motives – percentage positive/pro-war or negative/anti-war - by media outlets in Australia 
and UK* 
 
Title Discussion of US motives in pro-war or 
anti-war context 
Positive/pro-war/ 
Pro-US 
Negative/anti-
war/anti-US 
SMH 25 75 
Daily Mirror (UK)* (L,T) 29 71 
Australian 33 67 
Guardian (UK)* (L,B) 50 50 
Daily Mail (UK)* (R,T) 59 41 
Daily Telegraph (UK)* (R,B) 62 38 
          n = 62 articles, Rows add to 100%, *Tumber and Palmer, 2004, P 83 
 
Differences between the Australian and UK media agendas emerged in their coverage of 
the US motives for war.  Table 4.13 showed that discussion of US motives tended to be in 
an anti-war context for both the SMH and the Australian. In the UK however, discussion of 
US motives for going to war tended to reflect the political orientation of the papers, with 
pro-war sentiment dominant in coverage by the two right-wing papers Daily Telegraph and 
Daily Mail; balanced coverage in the Guardian; and anti-war coverage of US motives 
strongly evident in the Daily Mirror’s coverage, which most closely resembled that of both 
Australian papers. 
 
Table 4.14   Coverage of US relationship in Australian and British media 
Comparing Australian coverage of US/Australia relationship with UK coverage of the US/UK relationship – 
percentage positive/pro-war or negative/anti-war*. 
 
Title US/Australia (US/UK) relationship quoted 
in pro-war or anti-war context 
Positive/pro-war/ 
Pro-US 
Negative/anti-
war/anti-US** 
Daily Mirror (UK)* (L,T) 6 94 
Guardian (UK)* (L,B) 27 73 
SMH 29 71 
Daily Mail (UK)* (R,T) 34 66 
Daily Telegraph (UK)* (R,B) 43 57 
Australian 46 54 
            n = 161 articles, *Tumber and Palmer 2004, P 84, **Rows add to 100%. 
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Another difference evident between the Australian and UK coverage of Iraq lay in their 
relative concerns over the US relationship: the Australian media were much more pre-
occupied with the US relationship than were their UK counter-parts (see table 4.10).  What 
was also interesting was that across the board in both countries, discussion of US/UK and 
US/Australia relationships tended to be in a negative or anti-war context, although this was 
less so for the UK Daily Telegraph (57%) and the Australian (54% negative).  In the British 
papers, the vehemence of the negative position tended to reflect political leanings, with the 
left-wing Daily Mirror the most negative about the US/UK relationship (94% negative), 
followed by the Guardian (73%) and then by the Daily Mail (66%) and the Daily Telegraph 
(57%) (see table 4.14).  In Australia the relationship was also viewed in negative terms, 
with the SMH (71%) slightly less negative than the Guardian (73%).   
It is clear that the media in both countries considered that the US decision to go to war 
raised negative questions about the nature of the US relationship – although it needs to be 
remembered that the British tabloids did not devote much coverage to the issue (8% - see 
table 4.10).  The British broadsheets, while giving the US relationship greater 
consideration than the tabloids (19%, table 4.9), gave less space to the issue than did the 
Australian (25%, table 4.10) and SMH (26%, table 4.10).   
 
Table 4.15  Coverage of Outcomes of US Iraq Policy in Australian and British media 
Comparing coverage of outcomes of US Iraq policy in Australian and UK media  
– positive/pro-war or negative/anti-war.* 
 
Title Discussion of outcomes of US Iraq policy 
quoted in pro-war or anti-war context 
Positive/pro-war/ 
Pro-US 
Negative/anti-
war/anti-US** 
Daily Mail (UK)* (R,T) 5 95 
Daily Mirror (UK)* (L,T) 8 92 
SMH 22 78 
Australian 33 67 
Daily Telegraph (UK)* (R,B) 56 44 
Guardian (UK)* (L,B) 57 43 
        n = 103 articles, Rows add to 100%, *Tumber and Palmer 2004, P 85 
 
Discussion of potential outcomes of US policy in Iraq represented only 6% of UK tabloid 
themes (see Table 4.10), but what coverage there was overwhelmingly negative (Daily 
Mail - 95% and Daily Mirror - 92%, see table 4.15), while coverage not so negative in the 
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Australian broadsheets (SMH – 78% and the Australian – 67%) and on balance more 
positive in the UK broadsheets (Daily Telegraph – 44% and Guardian – 43% negative, see 
table 4.15).  The pattern appeared to split the papers along the lines of format, tabloid-
broadsheet, rather than left-right leanings.  Tumber and Palmer (2004) suggested that “the 
[UK] broadsheets gave far more attention to the likely future events in Iraq than did the 
tabloids, and that both broadsheet titles saw the ousting of Saddam Hussein as a positive 
outcome of US policy, despite differences of editorial line with respect to most of the other 
aspects of US policy” (2004, p85).   
It may be that negative tabloid coverage can be explained in terms of the pulling power of 
negative news, however, it is not clear why both British broadsheets (one right and the 
other left-leaning) would tend to be more positive in their coverage of the outcomes of US 
policy in Iraq, while both Australian broadsheets tended to be more negative.  A possible 
explanation may lie in a closer look at the data.  Around 60% of pre-war articles 
considering the possible impact of a US invasion of Iraq appeared in the Australian media 
the week before the invasion – which might have been expected.  (We do not have similar 
period distinctions for the Tumber and Palmer study.)  What was different about the 
Australian political landscape, however, was the appearance of the high profile whistle-
blower, Andrew Wilkie, who had resigned from the Office of National Assessments on 11 
March 2003 (Wilkie, 2004).   For a time, Wilkie’s resignation dominated the media and 
caught the Government off-guard.  Wilkie’s concerns were not just about the absence of 
evidence that Saddam Hussein possessed weapons of mass destruction and the lack of 
evidence that Saddam had any intent to use them against the US, but about the likely 
impact of a war on the civilian Iraqi population and the potential displacement of up to 
three million Iraqi refugees.  (Refugees had been a sensitive political issue in the previous 
general election in Australia.)  In the UK, the absence of a similar figure predicting such 
dire consequences may have led the broadsheets to see the future differently.   
Dynamics of agenda setting 
The dominance of WMD as a pre-war theme in media coverage did not necessarily mean 
that journalists themselves were convinced by the Government’s narrative around the war.  
While it has to be acknowledged that those interviewed for this research project had the 
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benefit of hindsight, many of the journalists said that they had felt reservations at the time 
(between September 2002 and March 2003) about both the US and Australian official 
reasons for going to war.  It was not that they had access to any evidence to the contrary.  
They didn’t.  It was that many felt that the official narrative was not convincing.   
Journalistic scepticism about WMD 
While the Government’s key messages focussed on Saddam’s possession of WMD and 
his links with terrorist groups, many journalists were unconvinced that Saddam had WMD 
or, if he did, that he necessarily represented a threat to the region or the world.  However 
in the absence of independent intelligence, most journalists saw themselves as 
necessarily reliant on the Government for information and, as media professionals, they 
felt that there was no room in their reporting for their personal opinions. 
We were trying to be even-handed…in my reporting, [I] gave a lot of space to critics of the war.  
We were the ones writing about that it was going to inflame terrorism.  I don't think we were 
questioning the WMD stuff.  We were questioning it, but without your own intelligence 
information before the war, it's a bit hard to say, other than, well, this seems a bit flimsy (pers. 
comm. 24 Jan. 2013). 
While scepticism, perhaps, goes with the territory of being a journalist, for some there was 
a deeply ingrained cynical view that Governments are especially inclined to lie when it 
comes to the reasons for going to war.  A former News Ltd editor said “I can only speak for 
myself. I never thought that there were weapons of mass destruction.  Never did.  I'm 
cynical.”  He referred to the Vietnam War and said “I just think I've never seen a war where 
people told the truth, so…my starting point is that I need proof to do anything.  I'm not 
going to believe anyone” (Franklin, pers. comm, 4 Dec. 2013) 
While some journalists were sceptical about the existence of WMD, senior News Ltd 
journalist, Paul Kelly, challenged the notion that the Australian media could have been 
expected to know in advance that no WMD would be found.   
Are people saying the Australian media should have realised that Iraq had no WMD capability?  
Well I can't accept that.  I've listened to the arguments and I don't think they're realistic.  It's one 
thing to be sceptical or raising questions about it - that's fine, a lot of people did that.  But to 
actually think the Australian media should have based its coverage on recognition that Iraq 
didn't have WMD and on that basis therefore be attacking the Australian and American 
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Governments, well I think that is intellectually unsustainable, that particular position.  I don't 
think any major media outlet in Australia took that position (Kelly, pers.comm, 18 June 2012). 
Adding to scepticism was the observation that the Government’s narrative changed subtly 
over time with a shifting of emphasis from WMD to the Alliance as the war got closer and 
doubts were raised about some of the intelligence reports. One journalist said: 
Well, he [Howard] said that they were…as I recall it, it was really purely WMD. Then towards 
when the people were sort of saying, well, this is a pretence…But towards the end, particularly 
at that last debate, that's when Howard started to talk a lot more about the US alliance as the 
reason for it (pers. comm, 24 Jan. 2013). 
In interview, some journalists observed that the Government’s framing of the public debate 
about going to war on the basis of the existence (or non-existence) of WMD had the effect 
of deflecting attention away from a public examination of Saddam’s capability and intent – 
factors which would normally be considered in the process of a country deciding to go to 
war.  The Government’s contribution to public debate tended to fudge questions related to 
the level of risk Saddam represented and the precise way in which he was a threat either 
to his neighbours in the Middle East or to the US or US allies.   
Well I mean if it just came down to a question of does he have WMD or not?...I would have 
thought that the other questions would have been, well ‘what's his intentions?’ and ‘what's his 
capability?’  I mean does he have any links with any of these groups?  I don't think they ever 
found anything.  Was he actually continuing to make these weapons and to what end?...A lot of 
the logic goes out the window doesn't it?...So this is what I mean between the fear element and 
the build-up and then, well, Saddam's got them, what could happen next?  It's all about ‘coulds’ 
rather than the ‘what’ or the ‘woulds’….maybe that debate got framed at the end there in too 
narrow a format (Eccleston, pers. comm, 21 Jan. 2013). 
The parallels between political developments in Australia and those in the US and the UK 
were of intense interest to the media.  Peter Fray, a senior Fairfax journalist based in 
London during the Iraq war, described “massive demand” for what he was writing.   
There was a real sense that the story was in Washington and in London and Brussels …So I 
was working like a dog on that. I remember when that report came out, the 45 minutes to 
destruction report [September Dossier]…there was a little voice in my head [saying] ‘you're 
getting taken for a ride’…you're taking things on trust here…but you know the report did say it 
was compiled by using the best intelligence available….So you're allegedly seeing information 
from MI5 and CIA…I mean there was a clever piece of media manipulation in that respect of 
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course.  But I mean the Brits and the Americans and the Australians had a terrific media 
campaign.  They had a massive media win really when you look back on that, there weren't that 
many dissenting voices at that time….The British papers are partisan so there was roughly, I 
think, 80:20 in favour of going to war…There was a level of debate in Britain that was clearly not 
happening in Australia, I think (Fray, pers. comm, 31 Oct 2012). 
Roy Eccleston, a senior News Ltd journalist based in Washington before and during the 
Iraq war, described the atmosphere of fear in the US post 9/11: an environment in which 
the US public acquiesced in going to war. 
I suspected, having lived through 9/11, you [couldn’t] actually be in Washington or New York 
and not feel the fear and understand the logic of the American position.  If you're attacked and 
there are other bad guys out there saying we're going to get you too and you feel like…they only 
have to get one thing through and we'll lose…it's a seductive argument that you're in danger 
and that you've got to do something about it…that's what they played on.  In terms of whether 
they were convincing, I think the argument [was] a real one, that terrorists want[ed] to get these 
missiles or weapons or anthrax…The other thing is you've got to remember anthrax 
happened…actually amid all this thing after 9/11 we actually had an anthrax attack in 
Washington….Now it was a home grown thing of course, but that played into the whole fear 
thing too, because when you're getting your mail through your front door as we used to do, and 
the stuff was going through the mail centre and people were dying, again it's another little thing 
that you suddenly become a little bit more concerned [about] (Eccleston, pers. comm. 21 Jan. 
2013). 
Building on post 9/11 fears, the narrative - about Saddam having WMD and links with 
terrorist groups - resonated with public and media perceptions of Saddam as the 
personification of evil.  He was known to have treated his political enemies in the most 
brutal ways and had used chemical weapons on his own people. 
I suppose to the extent that I believe that [Saddam] was a bad person and kept that stuff, it 
wouldn't have surprised me had he kept it, but that he'd build something else or was continuing I 
think that was where they didn't really have the proof (Eccleston, pers. comm. 21 Jan. 2013). 
From the first war rumblings, Paul McGeough, a senior Fairfax journalist in the Middle 
East, queried the alleged links between Saddam Hussein and al Qaeda, which morphed 
over time into more general allegations of links with terrorists. 
We were going to find a justification or a reason to go [to war] no matter what.  If it wasn't WMD, 
it was going to be the human rights of the Iraqis, it was going to be something else, it was going 
to be al-Qaeda.  I was always suspicious and I always had this sense that America wanted a 
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bigger target and no matter what justification - if they couldn't stand up justification A, they 
would go to justification B, they'd go to justification C (McGeough, pers. comm. 29 Nov. 2012). 
US Secretary of State Powell’s presentation to the United Nations in February 2003 was 
positively received by some, but many journalists described hearing his speech and asking 
themselves if that was all there was in terms of evidence.  Eccleston described how 
difficult it was as a journalist to listen to Powell’s evidence, a lot of it very technical and 
detailed, to have doubts about it, but to have limited access to alternative sources of 
information or expertise with which to examine or counter the evidence. 
[As a journalist] you don't know that they're wrong for a start.  You can't say there [aren’t] any 
weapons in Iraq, you couldn't say that, but you can certainly say what your own analysis of it is 
and I did…I think you've got to sort of say well what's actually happening?  But then at the end 
of the day you also have to try and say well since you do know all this stuff and since you're 
following it a heck of a lot more closely than anyone else, even if you don't know any answers, 
at least you can sort of give it a go at saying well on the basis of what we were told and the 
basis of what we know, this is as much as I can see…the headlines were ‘No KO, just more 
blows to the body’….everyone wanted to know ‘have they got the proof?’  Every time you had to 
say, well no, they haven't actually got the proof, but it's all you can do really (Eccleston, pers. 
comm. 21 Jan. 2013). 
The perceived lack of a credible narrative around the reasons for going to war, resulted in 
a lot of speculation about the real reasons for the US going to war, and to a lesser degree, 
the real reasons for Australia’s involvement.  One journalist spoke about his own 
speculation. 
We reported saying, look, well actually, the real reason why they're doing it is to get rid of 
Saddam and…to realign the Middle East in its favour by putting in a pro American regime in the 
area and oil was part of that, a part of that thinking.  But we did a lot of stuff saying - you know, 
Hugh White and guys like that were saying, that WMD is just a convenient pretext (pers. comm. 
24 Jan. 2013). 
Mike Seccombe, another Fairfax journalist pointed to a deliberate campaign to obfuscate 
the distinction between those who had been responsible for the 9/11 terrorist attack and 
the Iraqi regime. 
I think that in America in particular that the mass of the public were not aware of the distinction 
between the people that they were going to war with and the people who launched the attack on 
them.  I think that was pretty much the same here and I think that the Government very 
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deliberately encouraged the mixing of the two things…There was a little song that I remember 
we all laughed about.  It was to the tune of If You're Happy and You Know It Clap Your Hands 
and it was ‘If you cannot find Osama bomb Iraq’. I remember people going around humming 
that…and that pretty much summed up what I thought about it (Seccombe, pers. comm. 6 Dec. 
2012). 
Despite this widespread cynicism, the pressured life of a political journalist, along with the 
increasingly accepted ‘horse-race’ nature of political coverage, does not necessarily lend 
itself to the investigative journalism that might have uncovered UN weapons inspectors’ 
reports or other evidence to challenge Government assertions about Iraq’s WMD.  Steve 
Lewis, who was in the Canberra press gallery for the Australian at the time, made the 
observation that as a political journalist working for a daily newspaper, there was a 
tendency to get caught up in the ‘story du jour’ with little opportunity to ‘take a step back’.  
Other News Ltd specialist writers, like Greg Sheridan, Foreign Affairs Editor, and Patrick 
Walters, National Security Editor, were covering the debate over the intelligence presented 
as justification for war and the broader foreign policy implications.  Lewis saw his role as 
reporting the political debate, rather than a close examination of the evidence.  
You're looking for chinks in the armour…on such a volatile and sensitive issue as sending 
Australian soldiers into war where there's not bipartisanship.  It's probably the only time that I've 
been involved in reporting something like this. You're looking to speak to as many people as 
you can to try and get a sense as to whether Simon Crean's position is solid within the caucus - 
Labor Caucus - and vice versa with Howard. So you're looking to just talk to as many people as 
you can to try and get a sense as to how the politics plays out; whether there are concerns 
within their ranks. I guess you treat it like any other story albeit it's such a sensitive issue (Lewis, 
pers. comm, 4 Feb 2013). 
Lewis did not consider that his personal feelings as a journalist had any impact on his 
reporting.  He saw it as his responsibility to be dispassionate: a view shared with many 
other journalists interviewed for the project. 
Whatever my personal feelings were and my recollection - this is only recollection - is I was 
pretty sceptical about the case to go to war because I thought Bush was pretty flaky but that's 
my only recollection. I don't remember writing anything to that extent. When you're reporting 
something you have to try and be as dispassionate as you can. So you might totally disagree 
with a policy but it doesn't mean that you shouldn't report - you've got to try and be 
dispassionate when you're reporting.  So I don't remember that my views on the war would have 
necessarily coloured the way that I wrote the story.  I wasn't a screaming anti-war zealot.  I 
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wasn't a screaming neocon and my views may have changed…clearly we were misled/lied to 
about WMD (Lewis, pers. comm, 4 Feb 2013). 
The Government’s presentation of intelligence in support of an invasion evolved over time, 
with early speeches referring to US and UK intelligence which was not supported by the 
Australian intelligence agencies at the time and which was later discredited (Jull, 2003(2)).  
This evidence included reference to aluminium tubes, yellow cake from Niger and links 
with al Qaeda.  Of the twelve journalists interviewed, only one, the Australian’s political 
editor Dennis Shanahan, observed that Howard did not use any of the (later discredited) 
intelligence in his final speech to Parliament, when he committed Australian troops to the 
invasion in March 2003.  
His [Howard’s] Parliamentary presentation was extremely thorough, and…very nuanced. He did 
not support a lot of the accusations that Blair and Bush had picked up on. He didn't go 
anywhere near there deliberately….What it did was illustrate that John Howard's basic decision 
to go into Iraq was about the US Alliance.  These arguments about moderating the US position, 
being there at the table, supporting the UK, working closely with Tony Blair - very closely with 
Tony Blair - and not the aluminium tubes and links with terrorism - he didn't make that claim 
either, with al-Qaeda.  He didn't even make the claim about weapons of mass destruction in the 
same way that Colin Powell or Bush had, because he was being cautioned by our defence 
people and our intelligence people…we had higher standards. John Howard was not going to 
stand up - and that was the significance of standing up in Parliament - because he stood up in 
Parliament and he was not going to say something that he could not defend. I know that they 
decided to take an extremely conservative view of the intelligence, which turned out to be 
correct (Shanahan, pers. comm., 4 Dec. 2012). 
Shanahan pointed to the fact that Australian intelligence agencies had access to the same 
intelligence that US and UK agencies had, but that Australian standards of proof were 
higher.   
It's not that he [Howard] knew it was shaky, it's that he did not want to commit on something he 
wasn't sure about. Now, it doesn't mean that, in the end, the aluminium tubes may have been 
true or that weapons of mass destruction - there are still people who maintain they went off to 
Syria - but the point is that, at no stage did he make a claim about al-Qaeda, about the 
aluminium tubes or weapons of mass destruction.  Kevin Rudd absolutely assumed there were, 
and publicly claimed there were weapons of mass destruction. So, that was the atmosphere we 
were in, where everyone was saying there are weapons of mass destruction. The Labor party 
spokesman was saying, there are weapons of mass destruction. Yet, the Prime Minister went 
into Parliament and didn't use that argument (Shanahan, pers. comm., 4 Dec. 2012). 
  
125 
 
John Howard’s 18 March 2003 speech to the House of Representatives, in which he 
announced the Government’s decision to go to war, did not draw on any of the evidence 
presented by Colin Powell, US Secretary of State, in his 5 February presentation to the 
United Nations.  Nor did the Prime Minister repeat any of the evidence that both he and 
Alexander Downer had used in previous speeches.  There were no references to mobile 
biological weapons labs, aluminium tubes for uranium enrichment or direct links between 
Iraq and al Qaeda.  Instead there were references to “weapons programs” and “intentions 
to pursue weapons programs” rather than to actual possession of “weapons”.  He used 
only UN reports.  However, the Prime Minister did speak of the dangers posed by Iraq as a 
‘rogue state’ - and al Qaeda’s desire to acquire WMD - as a reason for invading Iraq, 
leaving listeners to make the connection.  
It is inherently dangerous to allow a country such as Iraq to retain weapons of mass destruction, 
particularly in the light of its past aggressive behaviour.  If the world community fails to disarm 
Iraq, we fear that other rogue states will be encouraged to believe that they too can have these 
most deadly of weapons and that the world will do nothing to stop them.  As the possession of 
weapons of mass destruction spreads, so the danger of such weapons coming into the hands of 
terrorist groups will multiply. That is the ultimate nightmare which the world must take decisive 
and effective steps to prevent. Possession of chemical, biological or nuclear weapons by 
terrorists would constitute a direct, undeniable and lethal threat to Australia and its people. 
(Howard, 18 March 2003). 
It was curious to hear Shanahan argue that Rudd had got it wrong when he claimed that 
Iraq had WMD (a reference to Rudd’s keynote address, as shadow minister for foreign 
affairs, to the State Zionist Council Annual Assembly on 15 October 2002 (Howard, 2010)), 
while suggesting the Prime Minister had got it right by backing away from previous WMD 
claims about Iraq in his final speech to the House before Australia officially went to war.  In 
choosing his words carefully, Howard had actually stopped short of making the categorical 
claim that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction: rather this was inferred.  The argument 
was about “countries such as Iraq” and reference was to “the possession and pursuit of 
weapons of mass destruction” in defiance of UN Security Council resolutions.  Shanahan 
stopped short of noting the irony of the Prime Minister having to fudge the connection 
between WMD, Iraq and al Qaeda (because Australia’s intelligence agencies remained 
unconvinced) in the very speech committing Australian troops to war in Iraq, when most 
Australians believed that that was the reason for involvement. 
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Reflections on WMD, weapons inspectors and the public record 
The arguments about Iraq’s possession of WMD were presented in concert by the Bush, 
Blair and Howard governments, each asserting that Saddam had WMD while drawing on 
the same evidence from US and UK intelligence agencies.  Confident consistency can be 
a hallmark of a successful media campaign, and on this score all three leaders could not 
be faulted.  However, behind the scenes not everyone in US, UK and Australian 
intelligence agencies and policy departments accepted that Saddam had WMD, or if he did 
that this represented a threat of such significance as to justify war.  In particular, questions 
were raised about the reliability of evidence emerging as part of a surge in intelligence 
data, particularly from US-based Iraqi defectors, from September 2002 (former public 
servant, pers. comm, 24 April 2013).  These ranged from revelations about Saddam’s 
attempts to obtain “yellow cake” from Niger, suggesting that Saddam had resumed efforts 
to build a nuclear device, to accusations that he had resumed chemical and biological 
weapons development, and had used mobile biological weapons laboratories.  The paucity 
of western intelligence sources on the ground in Iraq made verifying almost impossible.  
Even judging the significance of UN weapons inspectors reports was a highly technical 
and specialised task - as it was to judge the threat posed, for example, by quantities of 
unaccounted for growth medium or years old botulinum toxin or a couple of hundred shells 
filled with mustard gas (UNSCOM Chairman’s report to UN Secretary General, 1998). 
As complicated as the task was for intelligence analysts, it was even more challenging for 
journalists.  Rod Barton, a retired Australian defence scientific intelligence officer, who had 
been a senior member of both Hans Blix’s weapons inspections team and the Iraq Survey 
Group, provided an insight into the complexity of the work for weapons inspectors and 
journalists. 
…The story's a lot more complex than any media outlet can actually say, because you'd lose 
your readership…You'd try and simplify things so that the man in the street can pick up the 
paper and see whether he's got weapons of mass destruction or not.  Not all these 
sophisticated arguments about old - and, what does that mean if he's got old - and a small 
number of WMD and so on.  You know, it's too complex a message.   
It's got to be more black and white for most media outlets, and of course I have to say that most 
media outlets don't have the understanding – or have the people to understand [the 
complexities]…and even if they did, they’d say they've got to sell [newspapers] - it's got to be a 
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simple message for the readership.  It can't be this sophisticated and complex with all these 
subtleties in the story.  So it tends to be black and white.  That's why the story [was] never 
accurately reflected, in any article I've ever seen in the US or here (Barton, pers. comm.,16 
November 2012). 
Political leaders use the media to communicate with their various constituencies and 
effective communicators have the ability to explain complex policy issues in simple terms.  
It may be that Bush, and perhaps Blair and Howard, simplified the case for war because 
the real reasons for going to war were complicated and too difficult to explain readily to the 
media and therefore to the general population.  Paul Wolfowitz, former US Deputy 
Secretary of Defense, suggested in an interview with Vanity Fair’s Sam Tannenhaus on 9 
May 2003 that, while there was broad agreement to an invasion, there were differences 
within the US bureaucracy when it came to justification. 
The truth is that for reasons that have a lot to do with the U.S. government bureaucracy we 
settled on the one issue that everyone could agree on which was weapons of mass destruction 
as the core reason…[However] there have always been three fundamental concerns. One is 
weapons of mass destruction, the second is support for terrorism, the third is the criminal 
treatment of the Iraqi people. Actually I guess you could say there's a fourth overriding one 
which is the connection between the first two (Wolfowitz cited in Tannenhaus, 2003). 
Barton suggested that the Australian Government’s simplification of the case for war 
effectively collapsed two arguments into one, with the result of greatly exaggerating the 
threat that Saddam represented.   
Governments simplify the case too…there's a different question about whether [Saddam] had 
weapons of mass destruction and whether invasion was justified. The question that should have 
been asked is not whether he had weapons of mass destruction, but whether Iraq was a threat, 
and I have to say that is a failing within government, and certainly within the public domain, 
because you can have weapons - some old weapons of mass destruction - I'm sure Iraq has, 
even today has some weapons of mass destruction...yeah, there'll be some - you can almost 
guarantee…but is Iraq a threat from WMD?  The answer is no, of course not. Was it a threat in 
2003? The answer would be no, but as I said, there are subtleties in the argument, and 
sophistication in the argument which I think the media didn't want to know, and probably was 
not really explained to the media properly in any case, and certainly the governments didn't 
want to know, because the invasion I think had nothing to do with WMD. That was an excuse 
(Barton, pers. comm., 16 Nov. 2012). 
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Another weapons inspector argued that there was sufficient information in the public 
domain to raise questions about the official government reason for going to war.  Richard 
Butler, a retired Australian diplomat and former Executive Chairman of UNSCOM (United 
Nations Special Commission created to oversee Iraq’s compliance with post-Gulf War UN 
resolutions requiring destruction of all chemical, biological and nuclear weapons), argued 
that, absent Security Council endorsement, the coalition invasion of Iraq was contrary to 
international law.  He suggested that in deciding to invade, the US and UK had effectively 
placed greater store in their own national intelligence sources than on Blix’s UNMOVIC 
findings and Butler’s UNSCOM findings of four years earlier.  (The US and UK national 
intelligence sources turned out to be false.)  
In my final report to the Security Council (1998-9) I reported that we had been able to account 
for almost all of Iraq's WMD and they had either been destroyed, removed or rendered 
harmless.  But there were a few possible weapons materials…‘unaccounted for’.  There was a 
small number of chemical shells that we thought had been produced that we couldn’t find.  
There was a very very small number of scud missile engines that we thought Iraq had 
possessed that we couldn't find.  But that we couldn't find them didn't necessarily mean that 
they continued to exist, but they were unaccounted for (Butler, pers. comm. 31 Jan 2013). 
Butler had been asked in the Security Council whether the materials that remained 
unaccounted for represented a “threat to international peace and security” (pers. comm. 31 
Jan. 2013).   
The answer I gave to the Security Council was that they were such a small quantity that in my 
opinion they were…not a threat to international peace and security.  I think, as an aside, I said, 
possibly if you were from Israel you might be concerned about these chemical shells that we 
couldn't seem to account for (Butler, pers. comm. 31 Jan 2013). 
Butler argued that, in comparison to the substantial quantities of WMD that Saddam’s 
regime had made and deployed (against the Kurds in Halabja and against Iran in the Iran 
Iraq war), “we had fundamentally dealt with the problem” (pers. comm. 31 Jan 2013). 
The second part of my report said ‘however in order to report to the Council that Iraq had fully 
discharged its responsibility under the Council's resolutions which are binding in international 
law pursuant to article 25 of the charter, Iraq still needed to allow us to conduct some further 
inspections or examination of materials that might close the gap on the things that were 
unaccounted for.  A few months before the report, six weeks or so before this final report, the 
Iraqi side had…refused permission for us to do that.  They promised that they would, but then 
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they resiled from that and said, ‘look we've had enough.  We want you out of the country’ and 
basically Saddam Hussein threw us out (Butler, pers. comm. 31 Jan 2013).  
In early 1999, amid claims in the US media that UNSCOM had been infiltrated by various 
national intelligence agencies and had “shared” intelligence information with the US and 
UK governments - accusations denied by Butler and his predecessor Rolf Ekeus - the 
Security Council disbanded UNSCOM and created UNMOVIC, naming Hans Blix, former 
head of the IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency), as the new Executive Chairman.  
(In the end), Hans Blix made a public statement which was virtually identical to mine four years 
earlier.  He actually said ‘Butler’s conclusion at the end of 1998 was correct.  We have gone 
through this with a fine tooth comb.  We've gone through every conceivable piece of information 
at our disposal.  We cannot say, we cannot demonstrate that Iraq continues to have WMD.  
There are a few things unaccounted for’.  And he said in public in New York outside the Security 
Council, ‘I emphasize that unaccounted for does not mean that they exist.  It means there's a 
discrepancy in records’ but he basically said ‘the Butler conclusions were right.  After four years 
we affirm them and there are some things inexplicable or unaccounted for’, but [he] could not 
find the WMD [or] an Iraqi WMD program (Butler, pers. comm. 31 Jan 2013). 
In his book Disarming Iraq: the Search for Weapons of Mass Destruction, Blix warned of 
the dangers posed by a ‘deficit in critical thinking’ and suggested that if indeed many 
intelligence services had judged that Iraq had chemical and biological weapons, (a claim 
frequently made), it was largely because they “assumed that anything ‘unaccounted for’ 
existed” (2004, p262).  It may have been that western intelligence agencies were haunted 
by the discovery during post-Gulf War inspections that the Iraqi nuclear program was far 
more advanced than anyone had anticipated, but whatever the reason, “categorical and 
key contentions about continued Iraqi nuclear efforts and attainments, made at the highest 
levels of the US and UK governments from 2002 on, were simply wrong and could have 
been avoided with a moderate dose of prudence” (Blix, 2004, p262).  
A rock-solid conviction at the government level in the US and UK that weapons existed, and the 
expectation at that level that they would be provided evidence proving this conviction correct 
probably had an influence on the intelligence communities, just as it did on other people and 
media.  A former director of the strategic, proliferation and military affairs office in the US 
Department of State, Greg Thielmann, said in July 2003 that “this administration [in the US] has 
had a faith-based intelligence attitude [in] its top-down use of intelligence: we know the 
answers, give us the intelligence to support those answers” (Blix, 2004, p262). 
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Many of the weapons inspectors believed that Saddam Hussein may have had residual 
chemical and biological weapons, and, while few believed that Saddam had given up 
entirely his desire to develop nuclear weapons, few believed that any viable nuclear 
weapons program continued to exist.   
Like most others, we at UNMOVIC certainly suspected that Iraq might still have hidden stocks of 
chemical and biological weapons.  However, we were not asked by the Security Council to 
submit suspicions or simply to convey testimony from defectors.  Assessments and judgements 
in our reports had to be based on evidence that would remain convincing even under critical 
international examination.  That is why, to the despair of some government officials, our reports 
did not lend themselves to the categorical conclusion these officials wanted to draw (Blix, 2004, 
p264). 
In the period leading up to the war, Scott Ritter, another former UNSCOM weapons 
inspector, publicly argued that Saddam no longer possessed significant quantities of WMD 
and became an outspoken critic of US Iraq policy.  On CNN on 12 September 2002, Ritter 
accused Butler and UNSCOM of spying in order to identify military targets for the US and 
UK, rather than for the purposes of disarmament (CNN transcript, 2002).  Both former 
weapons inspectors agreed that most of the weapons (Ritter said around 95% and in 
interview Butler said “almost all” (2013)) had been destroyed either under supervision or 
had been confirmed as destroyed – and both agreed that the rest was “unaccounted for”.  
In the CNN interview, Butler seemed to believe that those “unaccounted for” weapons 
existed, while Ritter did not. 
Despite the careful wording, US and UK officials drew on UNSCOM and UNMOVIC 
reports to argue that Saddam had WMD.  Paul Wolfowitz, former US Deputy Secretary of 
Defense, said in January 2003 “Despite eleven years of inspections and sanctions, 
containment and military response, Baghdad retains chemical and biological weapons and 
is producing more” (Blix, 2004, p262).  Stuart Cohen, acting Chairman of the US National 
Intelligence Council when the 2002 National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq’s WMD was 
published, stated that the estimate “judged with high confidence that Iraq had chemical 
and biological weapons…these were essentially the same conclusions reached by the 
United Nations and by a wide array of intelligence services – friendly and unfriendly alike” 
(Blix, 2004, p262). 
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In truth the Iraqis had mostly destroyed their WMD in the Summer of 1991 on the orders of 
Lt Gen Hussein Kamel al-Majid, Saddam’s son-in-law who headed the Military 
Industrialisation Commission and supervised Iraq's weapons development programs.  
After his defection to Syria in 1995, Kamel cooperated with UNSCOM and IAEA weapons 
inspectors and US and UK intelligence (Barton, 2006, p167, Blix, 2004, p29).  (He later 
returned to Iraq where he was “killed ‘in the most brutal manner possible’ and his body fed 
to dogs” (Barton, 2006, p169).)  Despite Kamel’s claim that he had ordered Iraq’s unilateral 
destruction of WMD, along with much of the relevant documentation, his testimony was 
cited by Bush, Blair and Howard as evidence of Iraq’s possession of WMD, rather than 
evidence of their destruction (Jull, 2003(2), p95).  At the time, UN officials and western 
intelligence agencies were unclear about Kamel’s motives and discounted his version of 
events (Barton, 2006, p168, Blix, 2004, p30).  The lack of documentation would 
subsequently make it difficult for Iraq to prove to inspectors that weapons had been 
destroyed rather than just squirreled away (Blix 2004, Barton, 2006). 
Other expert opinion 
As the invasion of Iraq grew closer, both the SMH and the Australian drew on experts to 
provide commentary on the war.  Professor Hugh White, of the School of International, 
Political and Strategic Studies at the Australian National University was one such expert.  
White wrote regularly for the SMH and appeared nightly on the ABC’s 7.30 report before 
and during the Iraq invasion.  At the time he wrote that he did not think the Americans 
would invade Iraq because “it was a dumb idea” (pers. comm. 23 Aug 2012).   
Looking back on the pre-war period, White argued that media preoccupation with WMD 
served to conflate, and therefore to confuse, two distinct issues - the American decision to 
go to war and the Australian decision to go to war - treating them as if they were one and 
the same decision.  This, according to White, had the effect of deflecting attention away 
from discussion of Australia’s reasons for joining the war; the nature of our obligations 
under ANZUS; and the kind of alliance Australians might want with our great and powerful 
friend.  Framed as it was, the debate suggested that if Saddam had WMD – and all of the 
Government’s earlier speeches involved the presentation of argument and evidence to that 
effect (Jull, 2004, p 87-98) - then joining the coalition of the willing was the appropriate 
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course of action.  The Alliance was often mentioned as a supporting reason rather than the 
primary reason for our involvement. 
White did not consider the invasion of Iraq in moral or legal terms, as many others 
opposed to the war had, but in straight strategic ‘realist’ terms.  At the time he did not 
believe the Americans were capable of governing a post-war Iraq.  
The army America was putting into Iraq was not big enough to govern Iraq.  I mean, this is just a 
troops disaster business.  You know, you just can't do it.  You can't do the week's shopping with 
$17.  You can't govern a country of 24 million people with 170,000 troops.  It just won't happen.  
It never has. I mean, this is military operations 101 (White, pers. comm. 23 Aug. 2012). 
White suggested that the focus of Australian media coverage had been overwhelmingly on 
the US decision – hence the preoccupation with WMD – and whether it was ethically and 
legally justified rather than whether it was “strategically wise”.  In his view the Australian 
media failed to identify what was really at stake. 
Actually in international affairs, success breeds legitimacy...what was wrong with the decision to 
invade Iraq was not that it didn't have Security Council approval; it's perfectly possible that it 
would have produced a good result, as Kosovo did [although]…it didn't [have Security Council 
approval]…But the fact that they ended up with a failure meant that we now go back and 
criticise it.  If it had been a success, we would have accepted it.  I actually think, from Australia's 
point of view, the failure of our debate was a failure to adequately analyse - to identify what was 
really at stake.  What was really at stake was not whether it was going to be legal, it was going 
to be whether or not it was going to work (White, pers. comm. 23 Aug. 2012). 
White argued that the second problem with pre-war coverage was the “systematic 
distortion” of the reasons for the invasion that, he argued, “continues to bedevil the 
analysis of the invasion to this day” (White, pers. comm.23 Aug. 2012).   
The peculiarity is that although George Bush and John Howard and Tony Blair and most 
Australian journalists genuinely believed that Iraq had WMD, that wasn't the reason they 
authorised the invasion.  WMD, they genuinely believed WMD but it was never the reason for 
their decision to invade.  It was a pretext.  This was absolutely obvious at the time….so in a 
sense the absence of WMD, when it occurred, didn't actually undermine the strategic rationale 
at the time.  It undermined the public pretext…Again, if the invasion had been a success - if 
Nelson Mandela (Iraqi version) had arisen on the banks of the Tigris and Iraq was today just a 
terrific little place where everybody wants to go for their holidays and buy a condominium - then 
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the fact that there were no WMDs would be a footnote in history.  The reason we focus on it is 
that the invasion was a failure (White, pers. comm. 23 Aug. 2012). 
Conclusion 
During the pre-war period the Government’s narrative and sources dominated print media, 
despite public opinion being sharply divided over the war (with a majority opposed to any 
invasion and a large majority opposed to intervention without UN endorsement (Goot and 
Goldsmith, 2012)).  Given the nature and circumstances of the debate, however, this 
dominance was perhaps understandable.  Firstly, the Government’s case for war was 
newsworthy as they sought to build public support for Australian intervention.  Secondly, 
the Opposition was divided and took time to arrive at a decision in a situation which was 
constantly evolving.  Twice (in September 2002 and February 2003) the Opposition voted 
against motions put by Independent Peter Andren calling for Australian forces not to be 
involved in any action against Iraq without UN support (Andren, 2003, p255-256) despite 
this being Labor’s own position on the war.  Thirdly, Howard minimised the differences 
between the major parties by favouring UN support for military action.  Only when the final 
UN position was known (the US and UK failed to secure a second Security Council 
resolution authorising military action against Iraq) did Howard make it clear that the 
Government intended to push ahead in any case.  Fourthly, the Government claimed not 
to have made a decision about Australian involvement until days prior to the actual 
invasion, despite Australian troops having deployed to the Middle East from January 2003.  
This made it difficult for those opposed to the war to engage the Government in debate 
about a decision they claimed had not yet been made.  Finally, Howard, in lock-step with 
Bush and Blair, based the case for war on intelligence information which remained 
confidential to Government, making it difficult for the media to source alternative expert 
opinion.  Framing the debate in purely intelligence terms also distracted the media from 
critical policy and strategic considerations – like Saddam’s capability and intent - that 
should have been (and perhaps was) part of the Government’s decision to go to war.   
On the media’s part, however, it appears to have been a case of circumscribed curiosity. 
Firstly, there were fewer than expected differences between the Fairfax and News Ltd 
papers’ coverage.  While the editorial position of the Australian was to support the war 
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(reflected in front page headlines and editorials) and the SMH’s editorial position was 
opposed, there were more similarities than differences, especially in straight news 
coverage.  Secondly, few journalists and media commentators had the time or the 
expertise to delve into documents in the public domain in order to test the Government’s 
assertions about WMD.  Few interrogated UN weapons inspectors’ reports which pointed 
to Saddam having possessed small quantities of WMD, which did not constitute a threat to 
international peace and security.  Nevertheless, there were some journalists whose 
expertise in defence and security matters and personal networks gave them an advantage 
in their reporting.  The Australian’s Patrick Walters was one example.  Thirdly, in 
Australian pre-war coverage there was very little written about the ideas and influence of 
the neoconservatives on the White House and US foreign policy, in particular their ideas 
about American exceptionalism, empire, scepticism about the UN and international law, 
transformation of the Middle East and regime change in Iraq.  More information about the 
neocons would have provided Australian readers with a context for interpreting US 
Administration decisions.  Fourthly, while many Fairfax and News Ltd journalists were very 
sceptical about both the US and Australian Governments’ reasons for going to war, they 
expressed the view that in the absence of hard evidence to the contrary, they felt obliged 
to take the Government at its word.  Almost all journalists interviewed for this research 
project expressed a commitment to objectivity or balanced reporting, which they saw as 
including hard news and facts.  Their personal views were irrelevant.   
Despite the widely claimed cynicism, most journalists accepted the Government’s framing 
of the war and failed to consider some of the deeper strategic questions about Saddam’s 
capability and intent; about Saddam’s purported links with al Qaeda; about whether the 
task (prosecuting the war in Iraq) was achievable with the military resources being 
deployed; about whether the neo-con dream of remaking the middle east was achievable; 
about the real reasons for Australia’s involvement and about the nature of the Australia/US 
Alliance.  Perhaps most telling of all was the media’s focus on intelligence rather than on 
policy – and its failure to push the Government on policy-related questions.  While an 
invasion might be achievable, was it strategically wise? 
In the lead-up to war, while the Government’s narrative framed the media debate, they 
were not totally successful in shaping the media agenda.  Each of the papers in the study 
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had their own editorial position, for example, and it could be argued that they arrived at 
their positions despite rather than because of Government influence.  This pre-war period 
seems to fit with both Bennett’s indexing model and Entman’s cascading network 
activation model.  The Opposition’s low share of voice during the three pre-war sample 
periods - 11% in the SMH and 14% in the Australian (see table 4.5) – appears to reflect 
the Opposition’s difficulties before the invasion in establishing a party position that 
differentiated it from the Government’s position.  Bennett’s model suggests that when 
there are clearly delineated positions held by political elites these are reflected (or 
indexed) in media content.  Right up until mid-February 2003, when US and UK attempts 
to secure a second UN resolution failed, the Opposition’s position on the war was not 
easily distinguishable from that of the Government.  Political science scholar, Murray Goot 
has suggested that the Prime Minister was seeking to “weaken Labor’s electoral position 
by adopting, what President Clinton’s pollster called, the strategy of ‘triangulation’…here, 
the act of embracing not only his own preferred means (the US) of disarming Iraq but also 
Labor’s preferred means (the UN)” (2003).  Howard’s claim that the Government had not 
yet decided about participating in the invading coalition, and his purported support for a 
second UN resolution, effectively limited the grounds on which both the Labor opposition 
and the media could attack.  It was only after the failure of the second resolution that 
differences became clearer, but even then, it was Labor that came under a lot of media 
criticism for its shifting position on the war, rather than Howard for supporting the war 
despite the failure of the second resolution.   
The Government’s success in framing the pre-war debate fits with part of Entman’s 
cascading network activation model, which describes a powerful role for government.  
However the model also suggests a feedback loop where public opinion in turn influences 
the media agenda, which in turn influences government decisions.  While Howard has 
spoken about his awareness of the strength of public opposition to the war (Howard, pers. 
comm, 20 Feb 2013), and decisions about the level and nature of Australian involvement 
may have reflected this, there is no evidence that public opinion or media content 
influenced the Government’s actual decision to participate in the coalition of the willing.  
Rather it appears that Howard’s mindfulness of the strength of public opposition to the war 
influenced the presentation of his argument for going to war.  According to a number of 
well-placed senior public servants, Cabinet’s first consideration of the strategic 
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considerations of going to war happened just days before troops were committed to battle, 
having been deployed to the middle-east months before to “acclimatise” to the harsh 
desert conditions. 
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Chapter 5 – Drawing the battle lines - wartime 
coverage 
Military action is always the agonising, last-resort option.  Those who think that democratically elected 
leaders enter military conflicts lightly have no idea of the emotional and other conflicting pressures 
involved (Howard, 2010, p.423-4). 
When you've got a shooting match, that's a pretty big thing (Stutchbury, former editor, the Australian 
2013, p.4). 
The decision to commit troops is always a significant decision for a government, carrying 
with it important potential risks if soldiers are wounded or killed, but also potential political 
benefits that go with a population “rallying around the flag” (Baum, 2003, Baum and 
Groeling, 2010).  In his memoir, John Howard wrote that: 
Supporting George Bush over Iraq made the Australian public quite uneasy.  If military action took 
place with Australians involved, and by then most Australians believed that that would be the case, 
and it was quick, with few casualties, then the public’s verdict would be accepting.  On the other hand, 
if the invasion were protracted, with greater-than-expected casualties, then the public reaction would 
be hostile (Howard, 2010, p.443).   
With the announcement of the invasion, media coverage shifted from debating the 
likelihood and reasons for an attack on Iraq to covering the invasion itself, with discussion 
of troop progress, images of hooded prisoners, Humvees and desert - and to a much 
lesser extent discussion of the longer term outcomes of the conflict.  According to Matthew 
Franklin, a former News Ltd editor at the Brisbane Courier Mail, covering the Iraq invasion 
was like covering a major event or political campaign with the pressure of rapidly changing 
events, long hours, hard work and difficult decisions (pers comm, 2013). The political and 
human stakes involved mean that war meets many of the standards of newsworthiness 
and therefore that covering war is good for the media business.   
Patterns of press attention 
This chapter examines the patterns of press attention during the first week of the invasion 
of Iraq, from 20 March 2003.  The chapter will consider the positive or negative context of 
the coverage of war-time themes, sources quoted (including their nationality and sector) 
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and compare the pattern of themes with those identified in the Tumber and Palmer study 
of the UK media (2006).  This chapter also draws on interviews with current and former 
journalists, editors, politicians and public servants who were directly involved in advising 
the Government on joining the war in Iraq or covering the Iraq conflict in Australia or 
abroad for the SMH or the Australian. 
Themes in Australian print media coverage of the invasion 
As the invasion was launched, press coverage moved its focus away from the pre-war 
themes of WMD, terrorism and the Alliance - themes used by the Government to build 
support for Australia’s joining the invading coalition - to hard, current news about the 
conduct of the war.  While there was still discussion of the longer-term political purposes or 
outcomes of the war, both papers were primarily focused on the conduct of the war.   
 
Table 5.1    Themes in media coverage of the Iraq invasion 
       Themes, as a percentage of all themes, in invasion coverage by media outlet 
 
Theme SMH Australian 
Conduct of the war 33 35 
Long-term political purposes 
or outcomes  25 21 
Aus domestic sentiment/pro & 
antiwar groups 
12 12 
Policy options 7 12 
WMD & Terrorism 9 10 
US/Australia Alliance & 
relations with other nations 
6 7 
O/S sentiment/pro & antiwar 
groups 
6 3 
Discussion of US motives 2 2 
n = 412 articles, 962 themes (351 in SMH and 611 in the Australian, Columns add to 100% 
  
Table 5.1 shows the breakdown of coverage by SMH and the Australian between themes 
related to the day-to-day ‘conduct of the war’, discussion of the ‘long-term political 
purposes or outcomes’ of the war and other themes.   A similar pattern was evident in both 
papers, where there was a significant focus on the day-to-day conduct of the war (33% of 
themes raised by the SMH and 35% of themes raised in the Australian’s coverage) in the 
first week of the invasion, when most of the population was watching nightly progress 
reports on their television sets and reading the detail in their daily paper the next day.  
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Only 25% of SMH themes and 21% of themes mentioned in the Australian during this 
period were related to the longer-term political purposes of the conflict or the likely 
outcomes of the war.  Public opinion was still of some concern, with 12% of themes 
covered by both papers about domestic support for or opposition to Australia’s 
involvement in the war. 
 
Table 5.2   Themes covered by press coverage of the Iraq invasion 
   Percentage of themes in invasion media coverage by media outlet each day from 20-26 March 2003 
[Note that Day 4 of the war was a Sunday and neither the SMH nor The Australian had Sunday editions.] 
 
n = 412 articles, 962 themes (351 in SMH and 611 in the Australian),  
Columns add to 100% for each publication 
 
Interest in the conduct of the war rose steadily from the day of the invasion, 20 March 
2003, from 2% to 82% of themes covered by SMH and from 0% to 63% of themes covered 
by the Australian by 26 March 2003, day seven of the war (see table 5.2).   Patrick Walters 
 Day of the Invasion (March 2003) 
SMH  
20th 
Day 1 
21st 
Day 2 
22nd 
Day 3 
24th 
Day 5 
25th 
Day 6 
26th 
Day 7 
Conduct of the war 2 36 19 30 54 82 
Long term political purposes or 
outcomes 
21 18 33 36 19 8 
Aus domestic sentiment/pro & 
antiwar groups 
14 16 13 8 7 8 
Policy options 14 8 5 12 7 0 
WMD & Terrorism 23 12 11 4 0 0 
US/Australia Alliance & relations 
with other nations 
18 0 8 6 5 0 
O/S sentiment/pro & antiwar 
groups 
7 9 6 4 9 3 
Discussion of US motives 2 2 6 0 0 0 
 
Australian  
20th 
Day 1 
21st 
Day 2 
22nd 
Day 3 
24th 
Day 5 
25th 
Day 6 
26th 
Day 7 
Conduct of the war 0 26 28 61 52 63 
Long term political purposes or 
outcomes 
32 20 25 11 16 17 
Aus domestic sentiment/pro & 
antiwar groups 
15 10 15 5 18 6 
Policy options 18 20 12 6 2 7 
WMD & Terrorism 27 12 7 5 3 0 
US/Australia Alliance & relations 
with other nations 
5 8 11 4 5 4 
O/S sentiment/pro & antiwar 
groups 
0 2 1 9 2 3 
Discussion of US motives 3 3 3 0 1 1 
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from the Australian reported that by day seven, coalition forces had made considerable 
progress and were within 100 km of Baghdad (2003(a)), despite their being hampered by a 
severe sandstorm.  He also reported that there were “close to 100,000 troops in the field 
and after five days of conflict, coalition casualties [were] less than 100” (Walters, 2003b).  
There were reports of around 200 Iraqi deaths and US General Tommy Franks announced 
that coalition forces had taken around 3,000 Iraqi prisoners (the Australian, 2003, SMH, 
2003(b)).  Newspapers in Australia carried front-page photographs of captured Iraqi 
soldiers. Baghdad-based SMH correspondent, Paul McGeough described the US-led 
advance to Baghdad as “remarkable” but warned that “the US policy of avoiding towns and 
cities leaves each one it passes as a virtual time bomb” (2003(b)).   McGeough quoted 
analysts as saying that the “Iraqi forces are better than the US makes them out to be, and 
they are proving that point”, adding that the “US has never captured a heavily defended 
city as big as Baghdad” before (2003(a)).  McGeough warned of a war that might be 
tougher and more protracted than expected, noting that “the Iraqis see death in battle as 
honourable: the Americans see it as a political crisis at home” (McGeough, 2003(a)).  An 
early claimed discovery of a chemical weapons site at Najaf was described as premature 
(SMH, 2003(a)).  By day five, mentions of WMDs and terrorism had dropped from 23% to 
4% of themes in the SMH and from 27% to 5% in the Australian.  By day seven there was 
no mention of WMD in either paper. 
While primarily focused on the day-to-day conduct of the war, both papers also considered 
the longer term political purposes or outcomes of the conflict.  In the SMH the percentage 
of articles examining the longer-term implications of the conflict rose from 21% of the 
themes covered on day one to 36% on day four, but dropped away to just 8% on day 
seven when there was a total pre-occupation with the invasion itself (see table 5.2).  In the 
Australian, concern about long term political purposes or outcomes of the conflict 
appeared to start high from 32% of themes covered on day one, then eased off to 11% by 
day five, ending the week on day seven at 17% (see table 5.2).  Articles about the longer-
term political purposes or outcomes of the war included concerns about the possible 
humanitarian consequences, including estimates of refugee numbers; the geo-political 
impact of the war within the region and the neo-conservative vision of establishing a 
democratic Iraq in a bid to remake the Middle East; and the economic impact of the war on 
the US and Australian economies.  There were warnings from the UN Secretary-General 
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Kofi-Annan of a possible “humanitarian disaster” in Basra (Dalton, 2003), while SMH’s Ed 
O’Loughlin, stationed in Amman, wrote that disruptions to the supply of electricity and 
clean drinking water meant that “hundreds of thousands of Iraqis are now at risk of 
contracting diseases such as diarrhoea, cholera and dysentery from contaminated ground 
and river water” (2003).  Allison Jackson of the SMH wrote about the possible impact on 
global sharemarkets of a drawn-out war in Iraq (2003), while Ross Gittens wrote that 
Australian involvement in the Iraq war would “barely dent federal coffers” because of the 
modest nature of our contribution and because of increased Government revenues as a 
result of higher world oil prices, but that involvement in the war “still diverts money from 
worthier causes” (2003).    
Commentators in both papers warned of the costs and consequences of the war.  In the 
Australian, Harlan Ullman invented a fictional letter from Iran’s Revolutionary Ruling 
Council to North Korea’s Kim Jung-Il to warn of the “destabilising consequences in the 
region and the world at large” of the US attack on Iraq and the consequent dangers posed 
by other members of the “axis of evil” responding to what they perceived as a US threat 
(2003).  Paul Kelly, also in the Australian, argued that the costs of the attack on Iraq far 
outweighed the benefits; that the doctrine of pre-emption had “severe limits – strategic, 
economic and political” and that America’s neoconservatives were “in denial about the 
costs of pre-emption.…Far from Iraq being the precedent that launches a new US global 
strategy this war will represent the best and the last demonstration of the pre-emptive faith 
that has guided America’s neo-conservatives” (2003).  Kelly wrote of the geo-political 
danger that pre-emption might prompt weak states to “develop new lethal capacities to 
save themselves” and the economic impact of the war, quoting Yale’s Professor Nordhaus, 
who said that the US President had “failed to prepare his country for this burden which 
includes post-war occupation” (2003).  Kelly wrote that “the true cost of Iraq, however, will 
defy arithmetic” (2003).  In the SMH, Alan Ramsey wrote about Nicholas Lehmann’s Letter 
from Washington that had appeared in The New Yorker the previous year.  Entitled “The 
Next World Order”, the Lehmann article had outlined “how the Bush Administration always 
intended invading Iraq, whatever the UN said or did, and the campaign of deception and 
deceit it would and did employ over the past year to manipulate and mould domestic and 
international opinion to cover its deeper motives” (2003). 
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As the invasion progressed, preoccupation with domestic public opinion and the politics of 
war faded, but did not disappear.  During the first three days of the invasion, 13-16% of 
SMH themes were related to domestic Australian sentiment about the Iraq war, but this 
dropped to 7-8% during days five, six and seven of the invasion, when stories were 
increasingly focused on the conduct of the war (see Table 5.2).  In the Australian, the 
percentage of themes related to public attitudes toward the war bounced between 5-18% 
(see table 5.2) across all six days of the sample period.  On day three of the war, Dennis 
Shanahan, in the Australian, argued that, “rather than being poll-driven, Howard has driven 
the polls” (2003).  At the end of week one, a Newspoll survey found 50 per cent public 
support for Australia’s involvement in the war (Lewis, Shanahan and Marris, 2003) – a 
marked change from a similar poll in late January 2003 which found that 76% of 
respondents opposed any military involvement by Australian troops in Iraq in the absence 
of UN support (Newspoll, 2003).  The party political implications of the war retained their 
news value. There were reports of a “new ALP split” over “Simon Crean’s latest policy 
“wobble” on the Iraq war” and a Newspoll survey showed “public dissatisfaction with Mr 
Crean’s performance had hit a new high of 58%” (Lewis et. al., 2003).   
WMD, terrorism and Australian wartime print media coverage 
WMD and terrorism themes had disappeared from press coverage by the end of week one 
of the invasion (see table 5.2).  With the passing of each day during the first week of the 
invasion, mentions of WMD lessened until finally on days 6 and 7 in the SMH, and day 7 of 
the Australian, there were no mentions.  The reason for war had faded in the face of 
images of battle.   
 
Table 5.3         WMD and terrorism: Invasion and pre-invasion coverage  
WMD and terrorism, expressed as a percentage of all themes, quoted by media outlet. 20-26 March 2003 
coverage compared with pre-invasion coverage. 
 
Media outlet Pre-war: 
Sept ‘02 – 
March ‘03 
20-26 
March 
2003 
SMH WMD and terrorism 26 9 
Other themes 74 91 
Australian WMD and terrorism 30 10 
Other themes 70 90 
n = 412 articles, 962 themes raised (351 in SMH, 611 in the Australian)  
                                             Columns add to 100% for each publication 
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Table 5.3 compares the occurrence of ‘WMD and terrorism’ as a theme during the first 
week of the invasion with coverage across pre-war sample periods.  In both publications, 
the WMD and terrorism theme’s occurrence dropped to around a third of pre-war levels 
during the first week of the invasion, dropping off to nothing by the end the invasion week. 
Positive and negative tone and context of themes 
Articles appearing during the first week of the invasion were categorised as being ‘pro-war’ 
if they presented arguments in favour of the war, portrayed coalition soldiers as heroic, as 
being highly trained, highly motivated and brave; ‘even-handed/balanced’ when the war 
was described in factual, balanced terms; or ‘sceptical or anti-war’ when the balance or 
argument was opposed to the war, when conduct of the war was criticized, the tone of the 
article was negative and concerns were expressed over likely outcomes of the invasion.   
 
Table 5.4  Direction of coverage during invasion of Iraq 
Direction/tone of war coverage – heroic/positive, objective/neutral or sceptical/negative - by media outlet 
 
               n = 412 articles (all articles), Rows add to 100% 
 
Table 5.4 shows that during the first week of the invasion, the Australian was twice as 
likely as the SMH to argue in favour of the war or present information about the invasion in 
heroic or positive terms (38% versus 19%); almost as likely as the SMH to publish 
balanced articles (39% versus 40%) and around half as likely as the SMH to publish 
articles which were anti-war or raised serious concerns about the longer-term political 
consequences of the war (23% versus 41%).   The Australian took a stronger pro-war 
position - and its pro-war editorial position was clear – with pro-war or ‘heroic’ articles 
outnumbering articles that were sceptical or opposed to the war in the ratio of 5:3.    
Media outlet Heroic/Positive/ 
pro-war/Pro-US 
Sceptical/Negative/ 
anti-war/anti-US 
Even-
handed/Balanced 
SMH 19 41 40 
Australian 38 23 39 
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Table 5.5  Direction of coverage of major themes during invasion 
Direction/tone of war coverage – heroic/positive, objective/neutral or sceptical/negative - by media outlets  
 
      n = 412 articles, 541 themes (56% of all themes during invasion), Rows add to 100% 
 
Table 5.5 presents the two major themes – ‘conduct of the war’ and ‘long-term political 
purposes or outcomes’ – in the context of the tone or direction of the articles in which they 
appeared.  The Australian was much more likely to write about day-to-day developments 
in the Iraq conflict in positive terms than was the SMH.  More than half of the times that the 
conduct of the war was covered in the Australian (53%), it was in the context of a pro-war 
article, while in the SMH this happened less than a third of the time (30%).  Around a third 
of each paper’s coverage of the conduct of the war (36% in the Australian and 39% in 
SMH), was in the context of an anti-war article.  However, the SMH was almost three times 
as likely as the Australian to write about the conduct of the war in the context of a 
balanced article (31% versus 11%).  When discussing the conduct of the war, the 
Australian was more likely than the SMH to take a position on the war. 
When it came to discussion of the longer-term political purposes or outcomes of the war, a 
different pattern emerged.   While the Australian was less likely than the SMH to raise the 
longer-term political purposes or outcomes of the war (21% of all themes in the Australian 
versus 25% in SMH – see table 5.1), when it did, the Australian was more likely than the 
SMH to do so in the context of an article that was critical of the war.  Almost half (48%) of 
the times when the longer-term political purposes or outcomes of the war were raised they 
were in the context of articles that were sceptical, anti-war or negative about the outcomes 
of the war.  This was surprising given the Australian’s editorial position of support for the 
war, but may have been indicative of their business model which prioritises the news value 
Media outlet Heroic/Positive/ 
pro-war/Pro-US 
Sceptical/Negative/ 
anti-war/anti-US 
Even-
handed/Balanced 
SMH    
Conduct of the war 30 39 31 
Long-term political 
purposes or outcomes 
15 34 51 
Australian    
Conduct of the war 53 36 11 
Long-term political 
purposes or outcomes 
23 48 29 
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of conflict.  It was also consistent with the views of the Australian’s opinions editor at the 
time, Tom Switzer, who was personally opposed to the war and who quite consciously 
sought to balance pro-war with anti-war articles (pers. comm, 19 March 2012).  
Discussions of the longer-term political purposes or outcomes of the Iraq invasion would 
have lent themselves to opinion rather than straight news reporting.  Less than a third 
(29%) of the Australian’s coverage of the longer-term political purposes or outcomes of the 
war was in the context of a balanced or neutral article, while more than a half (51%) of 
SMH coverage was in the context of a balanced or neutral article.   
 
Table 5.6 Direction of articles before and during the invasion 
Comparing the direction/tone of articles during the three pre-war periods with articles during the invasion. 
 
 n = 900 articles (326 in SMH, 574 in the Australian), Columns add to 100%for each publication 
 
Compared with their pre-war coverage (see table 5.6), the SMH invasion coverage was 
less likely to be negative or anti-war (41% compared with pre-war coverage that reached a 
maximum of 59% in February 2003), more likely to be even-handed or balanced (40% 
compared with 35% in March 2003) and only slightly more likely to present the war in 
heroic or pro-war terms (19% compared with 20% in September 2002, 17% in February 
2003 and 16% in March 2003).  The Australian’s coverage remained strongly pro-war 
(38%), but with more balanced or even-handed articles (39% compared with 19% in 
September 2002, 29% in February 2003 and 34% in March 2003) and significantly fewer 
sceptical or anti-war articles (23% compared with 37% in September 2002, 32% in 
February 2003 and 35% in March 2003).  Both papers appeared to moderate their 
positions (SMH became less anti-war and the Australian less pro-war) in the week prior to 
the invasion. 
Media outlet 12-18 
Sept 
2002 
5-11 
Feb 
2003 
13-19 
March 
2003 
20–26 
March 
2003 
SMH Heroic/Positive/pro-war/Pro-US  20 17 16 19 
Sceptical/Negative/anti-war/anti-US 49 59 49 41 
Even-handed /Balanced 31 24 35 40 
Australian Heroic/Positive/pro-war/Pro-US 44 39 31 38 
Sceptical/Negative/anti-war/anti-US 37 32 35 23 
Evenhanded /Balanced 19 29 34 39 
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Sources quoted during invasion period 
As the troops advanced toward Baghdad, the sources quoted by the media reflected their 
increased focus on the day-to-day progress of the war.  Table 5.7 shows the percentage of 
sources for each paper from government (elected representatives of any government), 
government officials (including members of the armed forces), members of the opposition, 
experts, community groups and non-government organisations, journalists, Iraqis (in Iraq 
or living abroad), other sources and opinion polls, and compares the data with the pre-war 
periods. 
 
Table 5.7  Who quoted: sources quoted during first week of invasion 
 Type of sources, as a percentage of the total quoted, by media outlet 20-26 March 2003 
 
n = 336 articles with sources quoted, 812 sources (327 in SMH, 485 in the Australian) 
                                                         Columns add to 100%for each publication 
 
The pattern of sources between the two papers is quite similar, although the SMH sourced 
a greater proportion of quotes from elected representatives of government (31% compared 
with 24% in the Australian), while the Australian tended to source more government 
Media outlet 12-18 
Sept 
2002 
5-11 
Feb 
2003 
13-19 
March 
2003 
20-26 
March 
2003* 
SMH Government  52 48 42 31 
Officials 12 8 17 17 
Opposition 12 18 7 6 
Expert 16 14 15 11 
Community groups & NGOs 0 4 4 8 
Journalists 1 2 7 10 
Iraqis 0 0 4 5 
Other 7 5 5 11 
Opinion polls 0 0 0 1 
 
Australian Government  52 47 39 24 
Officials 11 11 20 21 
Opposition 13 22 9 7 
Expert 11 4 13 14 
Community groups & NGOs 6 5 6 8 
Journalists 0 5 2 9 
Iraqis 4 1 4 6 
Other 3 4 6 11 
Opinion polls 0 0 0 0 
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officials (21% compared with 17% in the SMH), who included representatives of the armed 
forces (see table 5.7).    
Government sources continued to dominate media coverage of the invasion itself, but 
there was a greater diversity of voices, perhaps indicative of media concerns to capture 
the human impact of war.  The proportion of government sources (elected representatives 
plus officials, including Australian, US and UK defence personnel) in each newspaper 
dropped off by around 20% when compared with the week immediately preceding the 
invasion (see table 5.8).   There was greater representation of community groups, non-
government organisations (NGOs), Iraqis (both inside Iraq and abroad) and other sources 
amongst those quoted.  Both publications markedly increased the number of articles on 
the war during the invasion.  More than a third of coverage across the nine sample periods 
was published during the first week on the invasion.  Media embedded with US and UK 
invading forces were sending back volumes of stories and this was reflected in an increase 
in the number and proportion of other journalists being quoted.  Expert opinion remained 
important in both papers’ coverage (11% in SMH and 14% in the Australian, see table 5.8).   
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Table 5.8  Who quoted: sources quoted each day during first week of invasion 
  Type of source, as a percentage of total quoted, by media outlet 20-26 March 2003 
 
           n = 336 articles with sources quoted, 812 sources (327 in SMH, 485 in the Australian)  
                                                                                Columns add to 100%for each publication 
 
Elected government representatives and government officials remained the two most 
dominant sources of information throughout the first six days of the conflict, but there were 
days when experts and/or journalists rivalled them in importance (see table 5.8).  In both 
papers there was a sharp spike in expert sources quoted in the paper on Saturday 22 
March 2003, which appears to be linked to the Saturday formats of both papers’ longer 
weekend editions of the paper.  There was a spike in the number of journalists quoted in 
the SMH that same day, but the spike did not occur in the Australian until the Monday 
edition on 24 March 2003.  Quotes from the Opposition varied from 11% on Day 1 down to 
0% on Day 5 in the SMH, while in the Australian there was less variation with Opposition 
quotes representing between 5% and 9% of all sources quoted each day.  The invasion 
coverage included comparatively more officials (mostly US and Australian Defence 
personnel), community groups, NGOs, Iraqis, journalists and other sources.  At this time 
Media outlet: Sector 
Day of the invasion (20 – 26 March 2003)* 
20th 
Day 1 
21st 
Day 2 
22nd 
Day 3 
24th 
Day 5 
25th 
Day 6 
26th 
Day 7 
SMH       
Government member 40 34 24 27 39 32 
Government official 22 13 19 17 5 27 
Opposition 11 13 2 0 10 6 
Expert 7 10 16 8 15 9 
Community groups & NGOs 4 7 6 17 13 0 
Journalists 0 2 19 14 5 12 
Iraqis 2 10 6 4 3 0 
Other 9 12 8 1 10 15 
Opinion polls 4 0 0 0 0 0 
 
Australian       
Government member 16 28 27 31 16 24 
Government official 20 15 18 28 33 13 
Opposition 6 8 5 6 8 9 
Expert 21 12 20 8 8 15 
Community groups & NGOs 7 12 9 5 4 9 
Journalists 7 3 7 15 14 9 
Iraqis 15 2 8 0 6 6 
Other 7 20 8 8 11 16 
Opinion polls 1 0 0 0 0 0 
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the focus was very much on the progress of the advancing forces, the impact on the Iraqi 
people and reports from journalists embedded with US and UK forces.  
Nationality of sources 
This section looks at the nationality of sources quoted by each newspaper.  Where a 
person’s nationality was known, for example an Iraqi resident in Australia (Iraqi) or a US 
soldier in Iraq (US), that person was coded accordingly.  Where a source’s nationality was 
not known, the country in which the source was located at the time of quoting was coded 
as the source’s nationality.   
 
Table 5.9  Who quoted (nationality) during first week of the invasion 
Nationality of persons, as a percentage of those quoted during the first week of the invasion 
  
Nationality of source  SMH Australian 
Australia  43 45 
US 25 28 
UK  5 7 
Iraq  10 9 
International Organisations 4 3 
European Union 3 3 
Other Middle East (not Iraq) 5 3 
Other, incl Asia & Africa  5 1 
n = 336 cases, 816 persons/sources (327 (SMH), 489 (Australian) 
            Columns add to 100% 
 
The similarities between the two papers were striking. Australian sources dominated the 
coverage of both papers, with US sources constituting a quarter or more of all sources 
(see table 5.9).  The Australian had a slightly stronger representation of US and UK 
sources, which was at the expense of sources from international organisations, Iraq and 
other countries in the Middle East, Africa and Asia.   
 
  
150 
 
Table 5.10  Who quoted (nationality) on the two most important invasion themes  
Nationality of sources, as a percentage of all those quoted on the ‘conduct of the war’ and ‘long-term 
political purposes or outcomes’ - by media outlet – during the first week of the invasion  
 
                              n = 541 themes (56% of all themes during invasion), Rows add to 100% 
 
When it came to the conduct of the war, the Australian, was more likely than the SMH to 
quote US sources (40% in the Australian compared with 33% in the SMH), UK sources 
(10% in the Australian versus 7% in the SMH) and other middle eastern sources (4% 
compared with 2% in SMH, see table 5.10).  While this could be interpreted as a pro-US 
bias on the part of the Australian, consistent with its editorial position, it might also be a 
reflection of the Australian’s ability to source information from other News Ltd companies 
in the US and the UK.  When writing about the conduct of the war, the SMH sourced a 
greater proportion of sources from Iraq (17%) than did the Australian (13%), in part 
because of the presence of journalists like Paul McGeough in Iraq at the time (see table 
5.10).   
When it came to discussion of the longer-term political purposes or possible outcomes of 
the war, the Australian, was less inclined to quote Australian sources (45% compared with 
62% in the SMH), and instead was more inclined than the SMH to draw on overseas 
sources, including from the US, UK, Iraq, international organisations, the European Union 
and other middle eastern countries (see table 5.10).  The exception was when it came to 
Asia and Africa, where the SMH’s concern about Australia’s relations with countries in the 
Asian region outweighed interest on the part of the Australian.  
Media outlet Australia US UK Iraq International 
Organisations 
European 
Union 
Other Middle 
East (not Iraq) 
Other, incl 
Asia & 
Africa 
SMH         
Conduct of the war 30 33 7 17 8 3 2 0 
Long-term political 
purposes or outcomes 
62 28 3 0 1 1 1 5 
Australian         
Conduct of the war 29 40 10 13 1 3 4 1 
Long-term political 
purposes or outcomes 
45 29 7 7 5 2 5 0 
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Australian voices – who dominated? 
When only Australian sources were considered, the pattern of sources quoted by both 
papers during the invasion period was remarkably similar (see table 5.11).   
 
Table 5.11  Australians quoted in the first week of the invasion 
Type of source, as a percentage of all Australians quoted during the first week of the invasion, by media 
outlet – compared with the three pre-war periods. 
 
Media outlet 12-18 
Sept 
2002 
5-11 
Feb 
2003 
13-19 
March 
2003 
20-26 
March 
2003 
SMH Government  45 33 29 18 
Officials 6 0 9 6 
Opposition 19 38 16 11 
Expert 19 21 26 19 
Community 
groups & NGOs 
0 5 3 12 
Journalists 11 3 14 20 
Iraqis in 
Australia 
0 0 0 6 
Other 0 0 2 8 
Australian Government  44 36 30 18 
Officials 0 5 10 5 
Opposition 26 42 19 15 
Expert 8 5 17 20 
Community 
groups & NGOs 
5 6 10 15 
Journalists 3 6 9 17 
Iraqis in 
Australia 
10 0 1 4 
Other 5 1 4 6 
n = 360 Australian sources quoted (142 in SMH and 218 in the Australian), Columns add to 100% 
 
Once the war started, attention turned to the day-to-day progress of the invasion, with 
much of the commentary contributed by other journalists (some based in the middle-east), 
experts, representatives of community groups and NGOs, Iraqis and others.   In the lead-
up to war, all government sources (‘Government’ plus ‘Officials’) represented around 40% 
of Australians quoted in both newspapers, but this dropped to 24% in the SMH and 23% in 
the Australian during the invasion.  Before the war, the debate – focused on WMD and 
going to war - was dominated by elected representatives of government, the Opposition 
and experts.  During the invasion, Australian media – including those embedded with US 
and UK invading forces - were sending back stories and this was reflected in a 20% 
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increase in other Australian journalists being quoted in the SMH and an 80% increase in 
journalist sources quoted in the Australian.   
Quotes from Iraqis living in Australia quadrupled in the Australian and rose from close to 
zero to 6% in the SMH during the invasion period.  As the invading forces inched toward 
Baghdad, both papers were concerned with what our own troops were doing (much of it 
clouded in secrecy with the Australian Defence Department loath to release information 
about the whereabouts or mission of Australian special forces); about the progress of 
coalition troops; and the impact of the invasion on Iraqis themselves.  The invasion drove 
the media’s focus offshore, away from the cut and thrust of domestic politics.  The invasion 
prompted both papers to pay greater attention to non-Government sources – including 
experts, community groups and NGOs, other journalists and Iraqis in Australia – to 
balance official sources.   
Observations on press coverage 
The data collected in this study lend themselves to comparison with the Tumber and 
Palmer data (in Media at War: The Iraq Crisis, 2006), although their data cover the period 
20 March – 7 April 2003, when Baghdad fell to coalition forces. These data cover just the 
period 20 – 26 March 2003. 
Comparing themes in Australian and UK print media 
Tumber and Palmer (2004) compared the relative proportions of UK invasion coverage on 
the ‘conduct of the war’ with the ‘purposes or outcomes of the war’ in the Daily Mirror, 
Daily Telegraph, Guardian, the Murdoch-owned UK Sun, ITN and BBC.  Table 5.12 
compares the Tumber and Palmer data with the data for the two Australian papers. 
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Table 5.12      Comparing the themes in war-time coverage in Australia and UK 
        Themes in invasion coverage by Australian and UK media outlets 
 
            * Taken from results of Tumber and Palmer research (2004, P101), Rows add to 100% 
 
During the invasion, both Australian papers were focused primarily on the conduct of the 
war (the Australian, 63% and the SMH, 57%) rather than on the purposes or outcomes of 
the war.  However, the two Australian papers’ focus on the conduct of the war falls in the 
middle of the pack when compared with their UK counterparts, with News Ltd’s Sun (83%) 
and the Guardian (68%) more focused on the conduct of the war and the Daily Telegraph 
(56%) and the Daily Mirror (53%) both less focused on the conduct of the war – but with 
three of the four papers in the 50–70% range.  The Sun (83%) tended to be an outlier, 
perhaps reflective of the visual nature of this right-wing tabloid’s appeal to its readers.   
Only television, which also relies heavily on visual images, focused a higher proportion of 
its coverage on the conduct rather than the outcomes of the war.  The degree to which a 
publication demonstrated interest in the conduct of the war - as opposed to concern over 
the purposes or outcomes of the war - did not appear to be related to either format (tabloid 
versus broadsheet) or political/editorial position, as the right-wing tabloid Sun and left-wing 
broadsheet Guardian were more concerned with the conduct of the war than their 
Australian counterparts, who were themselves more concerned about the conduct of the 
war than the right-wing broadsheet Daily Telegraph and the left-wing tabloid Daily Mirror.  
It may be that factors not included in this study were at play, for example, the way they 
covered the war and the relative attention they gave to casualties; access to journalists on 
the ground in Iraq; or relationships with news services and other networks.  Clearly visual 
images of the conduct of the war – tanks rolling through the dessert, hooded prisoners, 
Title Conduct of the war Purposes/outcomes of the 
war 
Daily Mirror (UK) * (L,T) 53 47 
Daily Telegraph (UK) * (R,B) 56 45 
SMH 57 43 
Australian 63 37 
Guardian (UK) * (L,B) 68 32 
Sun (UK) * (R,T) 83 17 
ITN * 93 5 
BBC * 92 2 
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bomb devastated homes – would be more readily available than images of the more 
hypothetical discussion of the purposes or outcomes of war. 
Comparing pro-war and anti-war context of themes 
In this study, articles covering the first week of the invasion were categorised as being 
‘heroic’/pro-war (when US, UK and/or Australian troops were reported as being highly 
trained, highly motivated and brave); even-handed/balanced (when the war was described 
in factual, balanced terms) or sceptical/anti-war (when the conduct of the war was 
criticized and concerns were expressed over likely outcomes).   
 
Table 5.13  Comparing direction of coverage in Australian and UK media 
War coverage tone – heroic/positive, objective/neutral or sceptical/negative - by media outlets in Australia 
and UK. 
 
            *Tumber and Palmer 2004, p106, Rows add to 100%. 
 
Table 5.13 compares this study’s data with those quoted by Tumber and Palmer (2004).  
Some might argue that to compare the Tumber-Palmer data with the data from this 
research is to compare apples with oranges given that this research sample covers only 
the first week of the war, the period 20 – 26 March, while the Tumber-Palmer data cover a 
two and a half week period from 20 March – 7 April 2003.  However,  Tumber and Palmer 
state explicitly in their study that “the first five days of the war have not been analysed 
separately...as no important differences were found between the two periods in each of the 
titles’ reporting” (2004, p106).   
The UK Sun (52%) and the Australian (38%) were both much more positive about the war: 
much more likely to portray troops in a heroic and positive way than the SMH (19%), the 
Media outlet Heroic/Positive/ 
pro-war/Pro-US 
Sceptical/Negative/ 
anti-war/anti-US 
Even-
handed/Balanced 
UK Sun* 52 16 32 
Australian 38 23 39 
SMH 19 41 40 
UK Daily Telegraph* 17 17 66 
UK Daily Mirror* 14 32 54 
Guardian* 2 40 58 
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UK Daily Telegraph (17%) or the Guardian (2%) (see table 5.14).  The SMH (41%), along 
with the Guardian (40%) and the UK Daily Mirror (32%) - progressive anti-war papers - 
was the most anti-war of all the papers.  Least negative about the war were News Ltd’s UK 
Sun (16%), the UK Daily Telegraph (17%) and the Australian (23%).  The two News Ltd 
papers the Australian (39%) and the UK Sun (32%) along with the SMH (40%) were the 
least likely to adopt an even-handed or balanced tone in the presentation of information 
about the war, while the right-wing broadsheet the Daily Telegraph (66%) was the paper 
most likely to take an even-handed or balanced position (despite a pro-war editorial 
position) followed by the Guardian (58%), the UK Daily Mirror (54%) and the SMH (40%).  
In other words, the data suggest that the Australian publications were more likely than all 
but one of the UK publications (UK Sun) cited in the Tumber and Palmer study to signal a 
position one way or the other in their reporting on the war. 
Dynamics of agenda setting 
War embodies much that interests readers.  The action of battle and the human interest 
inherent in life and death situations, especially when Australian troops are involved, skews 
the usual media agenda setting processes.  During the coalition invasion of Iraq, while 
politicians, officials and experts still dominated media sources, there was an increase in 
the representation of affected Iraqi civilians, aid and community groups and journalists, 
some embedded with invading US troops, who become eye-witnesses to events (see table 
5.8).  Coverage was focused more on the conduct of the war and to a lesser extent the 
consequences of war with discussion of the reasons for going to war increasingly 
overwhelmed by daily news of the invasion (see table 5.2).  However, divided public 
opinion and ongoing questions about the reasons for going to war heightened public 
awareness and increased the political stakes, which, along with concern for the welfare of 
Australian troops and their families, led to increased demand and competition for 
information.  War also represents a commercial opportunity for newspapers: there was a 
surge in sales as readers sought information about the Iraq war (Lee, 2004).   Michael 
Stutchbury, editor at the Australian, was acutely aware of the importance of the Iraq war 
story at the time. 
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If Australia's going to be involved in a war then that's a big story.  So that's quite a big effort to 
cover that properly so you've got to get all your resources in line and work out how you're going 
to cover this thing and you don't go through too many wars so that's a big thing….Just what's 
happening and how you're going to cover it is a big thing.  Then how are you interpreting what's 
going on, what's the range of opinions you're going to have in the paper which will sometimes 
blur between comment and analysis… and then you'll have an editorial position on these things 
as well… (Stutchbury, pers. comm., 29 January 2013). 
At the SMH too there was an awareness of the magnitude of the project of reporting on the 
war.  Peter Fray, SMH’s UK correspondent during the Iraq war and former SMH editor, 
said:  
There is always a question ‘are wars good for sales?’  The general view is that the first Gulf war was 
good for sales because it was the first war of its type. It was a very tech war and I think the media got 
very engaged with the tech question. Whereas I think the second Gulf, with Iraq, was a different type 
of war. Yes, the tech question was there, remarkable drones and what have you in the war, that kind 
of stuff.  But it wasn't as exciting. So there was in the public, [this question] ‘what was the war about?’ 
(Fray, pers.comm., 31 October 2012) 
Fray spoke about an internal Fairfax debate focused on what sells papers or what ‘moves 
the dial’.   
The first Gulf War sold papers, the death of Princess Diana sold lots of newspapers and a few other 
kinds of royally celebratory things sell papers.  But not lots of things move the dial. There was always 
that issue - if it's not going to move the dial, how do we do it, such that it does positively - potentially 
move the dial. Anyway, I think this lead up to this war got bulked into the broad geo-political debate 
which wasn't quite as sexy as missiles that could find you in your bedroom and kill you. 
So it was a different sort of war.  It was obviously a vital issue but I don't recall much debate about the 
philosophical, ideological sort of positions of the paper around it. It was broadly that we had to be as 
comprehensive as we possibly could; as balanced as we possibly could. Get on the ground, get in the 
right places as quickly as we needed to do. Be ready for action. So that was the pre-conditions of 
having to go do the war (Fray, pers. comm., 31 October 2012) 
Covering the war 
The challenge for Australian journalists was to get information about where Australian 
special forces were operating and what they were doing (on this score the Defence 
Department was totally silent); what was happening at a strategic level with the invasion 
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itself; and what was happening on the ground to Iraqi citizens.  For many journalists, it was 
an exercise in frustration, with very little information coming out of the Australian Defence 
Department either in Australia or in Doha, where the US Central Command media centre 
was located.  An Australian journalist despatched to Doha at the time complained that the 
US Central Command’s (CENTCOM) media strategy relied more on embedded journalists’ 
somewhat personal experience than on a strategic view from CENTCOM (pers.com, 24 
Jan 2013).  He complained that it was three days after the invasion before there was a 
press conference. 
My job was really to do the report out of CENTCOM, as it was called, US Central Command, in Doha. 
That's what I was sent over to do. As it turned out, because of the media strategy that they employed, 
which was very much reliant on embedding, that was completely useless. There was barely - I think it 
was three days after the invasion that they actually held a press conference. So they were relying on 
all the micro stuff, the footage from the embedding, to drive the news from  the embeds basically. That 
was the sort of strategy they employed and quite successfully (pers. comm. 24 Jan 2013).  
Former Secretary of the Department of Defence, Ric Smith, acknowledged that the 
Department had received a number of complaints from the media about the lack of 
information provided by the ADF during the Iraq invasion, especially compared with the 
information being provided by British and American officials.  He argued that because of 
the nature of Australia’s contribution, in particular the Special Forces contingent, and the 
nature of their mission, the Department was not in a position to provide much information 
or access – but that this changed with the later deployment of the Al Muthanna Task 
Group in April 2005. 
Peter Cosgrove - who, you know, ran that pretty tightly - just said, well, this is what I've decided.  This 
is what we'll do. There were a couple of reasons for that. One is an historic one. I think we're 
traditionally more cautious on that, and had not moved into that sort of great embedding culture that 
the Americans have got; and secondly, the nature of our forces, particularly with the Special Forces, 
didn't allow it readily at the outset. They may have had some embedded people and more information 
out when we were in Al Muthanna, but certainly in the first deployment, that was very tightly held 
(Smith, pers. comm., 13 Feb 2013). 
Rather than a recent trend, others have pointed to a long-standing aversion to media 
attention on the part of the Australian military.  In the context of the Vietnam war, journalist 
Neil Davis called it the “feel free to fuck off” approach to public relations (Hyland, 2014) 
and in the context of the war in Afghanistan, Monash University media scholar, Kevin 
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Foster, argues that “the ADF’s determination to keep an iron grip on information, based on 
an entrenched cultural distain for journalists, a resistance to scrutiny, and an obsession 
with protecting its reputation, meant that what it was actually doing in Afghanistan 
remained a mystery” (Hyland, 2014).  Again in the context of Afghanistan, ABC journalist 
Michael Brissenden has written about the ADF’s  “culture of secrecy” and “uncooperative 
treatment of the media” as having “seriously limited our understanding of the complexities, 
failures and achievements of a war that has cost 40 Australian lives and billions from our 
budget” (2013).   Tom Hyland, a former foreign editor at the Age and Sunday Age spent 
six years trying to report on what the army was doing in Afghanistan.  He sees the army’s 
closed approach to providing information as indicative of a wider culture of defensiveness 
when it comes to information. 
I suspect it goes wider than that. Perhaps the army’s aversion to open communication and 
media freedom might simply reflect a wider national trait, deeply embedded in our political, 
government and bureaucratic culture. That culture is expressed in a closed, defensive 
officiousness, where all official information is assumed to be confidential except when someone 
in authority deigns to release it. In that sort of political environment, openness, engaging with 
the media and practices like embedding are impositions to be endured with gritted teeth and 
pinched nostrils (Hyland, 2014).   
The ADF applied a similar formula to the Iraq conflict, but it was not just the military or 
bureaucrats averse to media attention: it was an aversion shared at the political level as 
well, indicative perhaps of the “culture of defensiveness” suggested by Hyland.   Robert 
Hill, Minister for Defence at the time, was totally opposed to embedding and was not well 
disposed to members of the ADF briefing journalists – although he mentioned that there 
had been some in the Defence Department who thought differently. 
I didn't agree to embedding journalists.  There were differing views within our Defence 
Department.  The US did I think right from the beginning.  I just didn't think it was the right thing 
to do.  The troops have got enough things to worry about rather than having to worry about 
journalists.  So be it… It's not the job of the military to be briefing the journalists…. I'm the one 
that needs to be held to account not the soldier (Hill, pers. comm., 12 February 2013). 
Another indicator, perhaps, of an Australian political culture of aversion to sharing 
information is the dearth of memoirs written by former Australian politicians and public 
servants about the 2003 Iraq war.  There are numerous examples of memoirs having been 
written by key US figures in the decision to go to war in Iraq, while there are very few by 
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Australians.  Australian public servants, even in retirement, tend to keep up a tradition of 
keeping policy processes behind closed doors. 
Public opinion 
“The battle for information and the context over the winning of public opinion is a feature 
common to all conflicts” (Tumber, 2004).  For a number of reasons, however, the battle for 
public opinion over the Iraq war was more intense than most.  There were sharp divisions 
in international opinion, with Security Council members, including the French, German and 
Russian governments, deeply opposed to a US-led invasion of Iraq.  Domestically, 
Australia faced the prospect of committing troops abroad without bi-partisan political 
support for only the third time in our history (along with the Vietnam War and the sending 
of troops to Malaya in 1955 (O’Connor 2004, p211)).  There were strong divisions within 
the community on the question of Australian involvement.  “Public concern culminated in 
record-breaking protests on the weekend of 14–16 February when over 500,000 people 
took part in anti-Iraq War rallies across Australia, including Australia’s largest ever 
demonstration of around 250, 000 people in Sydney” (O’Connor 2004, p207).  Before the 
war, of the many polls conducted, not one showed majority support for Australian forces 
being part of a US-led attack. 
On average, more than half those interviewed (54 per cent) opposed ‘Australian armed forces 
participating in a United States led attack on Iraq’ (UMR), ‘Australian forces being part of any 
US led action against Iraq with the objective of deposing Saddam Hussein’ (Newspoll), or 
‘Australians being part of the American military force’ if ‘military force is used to depose Saddam 
Hussein’ (Morgan); little more than a third (36 per cent) supported Australian involvement.  From 
August to January, on Newspoll’s figures, those ‘strongly’ opposed consistently outnumbered 
those ‘strongly’ in favour by about two to one, 18:35 (Goot, 2007(2), p269). 
By the middle of the first week of the invasion, however, as Howard had predicted, public 
opinion had swung behind the war, with a Newspoll survey finding 50% of respondents 
“personally in favour of Australian troops being involved in military action against Iraq”, up 
from a low of 18% in early February 2003 and 45% on the first day of the invasion 
(Newspoll, 2003).   
Once the war commenced, opinion in all the polls shifted. Exactly how far is difficult to say: the 
polls are at odds. But shift they did – and in favour of Australia’s commitment. In a poll taken the 
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day after the Prime Minister’s March 18 announcement that Australian forces would fight, 
Morgan reported that almost as many respondents approved ‘Australia’s being part of the 
American military force’ (46.5 per cent) as disapproved (48.5 per cent); these figures were little 
different from the 45: 52 figure generated by the same question in December in a poll that 
included respondents aged 14-17. However, towards the end of the first week of the war signs 
of a shift seemed more certain: a smaller Morgan sample split 50.5:46 (Morgan, 2003b, 2003c) 
(Goot, 2003, p6).  
The reason for the shift in the polls was unclear.  As Goot pointed out, not all polls referred 
to the UN, but when they did, the question of UN endorsement appeared critical to support 
for Australian involvement.  Before the war, with UN Security Council endorsement, a 
majority favoured Australian involvement; without it a majority opposed Australian 
involvement (UMR research cited in Goot, 2007(2), p273).  However, once military action 
had taken place, while many would have preferred UN endorsement, the war was 
underway and the issue may have become one of loyalty to Australian troops serving 
abroad (Goot, 2003).  “The start of the war may have done more to change views about 
the UN’s position than the action, or inaction, of the UN did to change views of the war” 
(Goot, 2007(2)). 
Entman’s cascading activation model highlights the two-way influence of journalists on 
public opinion and of public opinion on journalists.  As the focus of this thesis is on the 
influences shaping the media agenda, journalists and editors were asked about the degree 
to which they were influenced by public opinion when they covered the war in Iraq?  As 
with public opinion polls, the answer to some extent depended on the way the question 
was asked.  When framed as a question about whether they as journalists were influenced 
in their reporting by public opinion, there tended to be a defensive reaction that drew on 
professional standards and journalistic values like independence.  When the question was 
framed around the sensitivities of reporting a war, responses acknowledged the need to be 
sensitive to families of Australian troops serving abroad and to a kind of patriotism that 
clicks in when a nation goes to war.  When the question was framed around whether there 
was a need to be aware of reader demographics and views when covering a story, many 
agreed that they wrote with an idea of their typical reader in mind and that they wrote to be 
read. 
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In interview some journalists insisted that their professionalism as journalists required 
them to ‘tell it as it is’ or to ‘write it straight’ when covering any issue, including the Iraq war 
and the political debate around it.  In ‘telling it as it is’, some described a conscious effort 
to keep personal views and an awareness of public opinion out of the process.  One 
journalist described it this way.   
You try and approach it [reporting the Iraq war] on the merits of the case. You try and be 
dispassionate about it….You don't run whatever your personal views are…you've got to be 
careful about letting that infect your copy too much. I suppose to the extent that we were, 
certainly in print, the only people running a critical coverage, we weren't a cheer squad for the 
war in a most insanely ridiculous way. At least it was heartening…[to] know that the public - 
there were people - who didn't like it and that we weren’t pissing in the wind (pers.comm.24 Jan, 
2013). 
This did not mean, however, that journalists were inured to public opinion. Another 
journalist said “well as a journalist you’re very aware of everything that’s sort of going on in 
your area that you’re covering…including public opinion and everything else. So it would 
be impossible not to be mindful of that” (pers. comm. 8 Jan 2013). In a similar vein, News 
Ltd’s Paul Kelly observed that being aware of public opinion is really part of the job. 
What you write is influenced by the current political conversation. That is, what are the issues of 
the day, what's happening in Canberra?  What might be the issues of the day in terms of public 
opinion as well?  So public opinion feeds into the broader democratic conversation.  So you are 
influenced by the broader conversation when it comes to what you write about. I mean you want 
to be pertinent. You want to be relevant. You want to be engaged in the issues. So yes, [public 
opinion] informs what you're writing (Kelly, pers. comm. 18 June 2012). 
While knowing about and being aware of public opinion is important to a journalist’s work, 
journalists themselves might not always be the best sources of information about the 
influence of public opinion on the formation of their own views or on the way they might 
choose to cover a story.  Such a question goes to the heart of a journalist’s professional 
pride.  Ego is involved and a truthful response requires self-awareness and a degree of 
open-ness not often found in any profession. Nonetheless, Kelly, argued that public 
opinion had greater influence than most journalists will admit. 
The next question is, does public opinion influence your own views? Well I think public opinion 
influences journalists a lot more than most of them concede. A lot of journalists are contrarians 
but a lot aren't. A lot like to be in the comfortable position of having the public or having public 
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opinion behind what they say, although of course as I said, never like to admit that or say that, 
but I think that's true. It's a characteristic of human nature. So I guess what I'd say is that in my 
approach I like to think that I've reached my own assessment independent of public opinion. But 
the truth is, of course you are influenced by public opinion and you'd be pretty silly if you didn't 
concede that. So I think it is a factor, yes (Kelly, pers. comm. 18 June 2012). 
Former Fairfax correspondent and editor, Peter Fray, suggested that being aware of public 
opinion was an essential part of writing in order to be read. 
…you can't write in a vacuum so you do need to be very aware of what the Zeitgeist is or what's 
out there in public opinion land. So I think it was - the fact that most of the people opposed the 
war and that there was this quite vibrant and healthy public debate going on was very much 
reflected in what I was thinking and I hope how I wrote….So was I aware of the public debate, 
yes? Did that - was that reflected in how I wrote? Yes. Would that change now? Yeah, I think 
probably. So there was always that sense that your job was to distil what was going on, inform 
people and to some extent be read. So what were the preconditions for being read? I guess you 
have to think about that. That's what every journalist has to think about that. So there's no point, 
again, you're not running in a vacuum. We're writing to be read. You're writing to have a 
response. So what's a good yarn, I suppose?  
…Just because the people, the mass of public opinion, was opposed to war would that 
necessarily mean that you wrote pieces that had a sort of similar kind of through-line. The 
answer to that is probably no. But you certainly would be conscious of it (Fray, pers. comm, 31 
Oct, 2012). 
Like Kelly, Fray observed that some journalists actively sought to differentiate themselves 
from what might have been seen as public opinion, but that that was not necessarily a bad 
thing as it added to the diversity of views.  Fray saw it as a journalist’s responsibility to be 
“endlessly curious and ask questions”. 
There are certain journalists who went out of their way to be different. I do think that's helpful. I 
think that's entirely healthy, provided it's not being different to the point where you're wrong. The 
thing with the war is that you could, in your own head, spin it multiple ways…You can spin it 
through pure politics, geo-politics, religion, clash of cultures, clash of civilisation, good versus 
evil, George Bush doing his dad's work, oil, suppression of minorities, some sort of echo with 
the First World War with chemical weapons.  I mean there were multiple tracks going on in your 
head around how you could approach that story.  So there's - as ever, with every story there 
should be multiple things going on in your head - so you do have to find your way through that. 
I think the job broadly is to be endlessly curious and ask questions. But ultimately to make a 
decision as to what part of that multiple-headed beast you're going to get, is a) most pertinent to 
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the people and b) is going to inform and or potentially, I suppose, antagonise but primarily to 
inform and to shed more light than heat on this issue (Fray, pers.comm, 31 Oct, 2012). 
When it came to awareness of one’s readership, Paul Kelly made it clear that an 
awareness of the Australian’s customer base influenced the quality of their coverage. 
For a national paper - and we essentially see ourselves as having a customer base which 
involves decision makers in the public, private and university sectors. That's the audience that 
we're geared to. So what we try to provide then is an intelligent, value-added coverage on a 
range of issues for those sorts of people. So that's the first point to make. That's the initial point 
to make... 
I think I'd make the general observation that the paper recognised that this [the Iraq war] was an 
extremely divisive issue, globally. An extremely divisive issue in Australia. It was an issue of 
great passion, great passion. So therefore any position you take, whether you're for the war or 
against the war, is going to be contentious by definition. I think that's an important point to 
make.The other important point to make is the story evolves, you know the Iraq stories evolves 
over a period of time as well. That's an important point. I guess the final point to make is there 
are perspectives to have about Bush and what the Americans are doing: that's one perspective. 
Then another perspective is what should we [Australia] be doing? (Kelly pers.comm. 18 June 
2012). 
Whatever editorial position each publication had taken before the war, both publications 
appeared to have been aware of some unwritten journalistic conventions around covering 
war in Australia.  One is a tendency for the media to present Australian troops and their 
mission in a broadly positive, even heroic light (see table 5.6).  For the Australian, this was 
perhaps easier as it was consistent with their pre-war editorial position.  For the SMH this 
required a more nuanced position which supported Australian troops in the field while 
remaining opposed to the war.  Whatever organisation a journalist was working for, these 
conventions were top of mind. 
Something that you have in mind when you’re reporting on defence is the way this country, 
politicians and public included, treat the military, soldiers, and that is with a real degree of 
veneration. It’s one thing that you do keep in mind when you’re reporting on defence stories.  
You might criticise - impliedly criticise a government policy - but you are careful not to be 
criticising the individual soldiers who are being sent to war by forces beyond their control. That’s 
just something that when you report on issues to do with war and military in this country in 
particular (I don’t know about other countries) but you’re aware of it here…[it has] to do with the 
whole ANZAC mythology that exists in this country (pers. comm., 8 Jan 2013). 
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Robert Whitehead, SMH editor at the time explained the Fairfax position at the time. 
Look, once the war had started, we'd passed that point where we're engaged in a [debate]…you 
don't actively campaign to undermine or threaten lives…you've said everything you possibly 
can, the war has now started.  You've got to move into a mode that faithfully covers that for your 
readership [who] were acutely aware we hadn’t supported Australian involvement with the war.  
Once [the war had] started we also had to go on and say ‘of course we support the Australian 
troops’.  There's a political question and there's also a social question…Families are committing 
people to an unthinkable agony during this war. You support troops once they're committed 
(Whitehead, pers. comm., 19 December 2012). 
This awareness of the need for a qualitative change in reporting once the invasion had 
started was evident in the content analysis data (see table 5.6).  Both the Australian and 
the SMH were less negative/sceptical/anti-war/anti-US in their coverage of the actual 
invasion than they had been in their pre-war coverage (despite differences in magnitude) 
and both papers were more even-handed/balanced. Both papers increased their 
percentage of heroic/positive/pro-war/pro-US content in their immediately pre-war levels.  
This suggests that there was a bandwagon or ‘rally round the flag’ (Baker and Oneal, 
2001, Baume, 2003) effect operating, where neither paper, regardless of their editorial 
differences over support for the war, was willing to be seen as somehow disloyal to 
Australian troops in the field. 
Former New Ltd journalist and editor, Matthew Franklin, who worked at the Brisbane 
Courier Mail during the Iraq conflict, was critical of much war-time journalism, especially 
from embeds, which he saw as akin to covering a horse-race or a sporting event, with the 
media clearly barracking for one side. 
I don't think newspapers and media in general are good at war…what I mean to say is, it's like 
race calling to the media. It's like - how many people died and how many bombs were dropped? 
Look at this fantastic great photo of the little girl running away from the napalm, or in the Iraq 
case, these sensational photos of things blowing up.  That's what papers are into. I don't think 
papers, or media much at all, sees itself as having a responsibility to, not just at the start explain 
both positions, but to keep covering both positions - to see it not as a race call or reporting on a 
car accident, but also putting the reasons why we're there and political context around it 
(Franklin, pers. comm., 4 December 2012). 
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Conclusion 
During the first week of the invasion three trends are evident in both the Australian’s and 
SMH’s coverage of the war.  Firstly, as soon as the invasion started, there was a 
significant increase in the overall volume of news reporting (see table 2.3) which tended to 
focus on the conduct of the war and to a lesser extent the long-term political purposes or 
outcomes of war (see table 5.1).  Coverage of policy options, WMD, terrorism, the US 
Alliance and the reasons for going to war dwindled to almost nothing by the end of the first 
week of the invasion (see table 5.2).   The Iraq war was a significant news event to which 
both papers devoted significant space and resources.  Both saw increases in their 
circulation in 2002-3 (Australian Press Council, 2007). 
Secondly, during the conflict both papers continued the trend that Australian and US 
sources accounted for the vast bulk (73% of all sources quoted in the Australian and 68% 
of sources quoted in the SMH) of all sources quoted about the war: a continuation of the 
pattern established in the pre-war period (see table 5.11).  In both papers, US sources 
tended to be quoted on the conduct of the war, while Australian sources tended to be 
quoted on the long-term political purposes or outcomes of the war (see table 5.13).  
Amongst the other sources quoted, community groups and NGOs, other journalists, Iraqis 
and ‘other’ sources were all represented in greater numbers during the conflict than in the 
sample periods leading to war (see table 5.8).  Even then their combined voice accounted 
for just a third (34%) of sources quoted in both papers (see table 5.8). 
Thirdly, during war-time there is intense competition to influence public opinion, but the 
relationship between journalists and public opinion is complex and difficult to describe let 
alone measure.  In interview, journalists spoke of a dynamic which comes into play when 
they are covering a war involving Australian troops.  While they are conscious of 
journalistic values which require balanced and objective reporting, they are at the same 
time aware of a kind of patriotism – even a reverence for the military - that clicks in when 
the nation goes to war.  This ‘rally-round-the-flag’ effect (Baker and Oneal, 2001, Baume, 
2003) is well documented in the literature, but manifests in Australia as public veneration 
of the Australian soldier and the ANZAC myth.   
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Despite deep divisions in Australian society over the merits of the Iraq invasion, public 
opinion shifted in support of the war, and Australia’s participation, a week into the invasion 
– as Prime Minister John Howard had predicted it would (Howard, pers. comm., 20 Feb 
2013, Kelly 2009) – although, even then the numbers were pretty evenly split (Goot, 
2007(2)).   For the Australian, whose editorial line had always been in favour of the war, 
portraying Australia’s war effort in a heroic light was consistent with its pre-war position.  
The SMH, however, was in a difficult position requiring some nuanced explanation of the 
reasons behind their opposition to the war, while supporting Australia’s troops in the field.  
During the conflict, while the Australian was twice as likely as the SMH to carry articles 
which portrayed the conflict or Australian and coalition troops in a positive light (38% of the 
Australian’s articles, compared with 19% of SMH articles), both papers were noticeably 
less sceptical or negative about the war (than their pre-war positions) and more even-
handed or positive in their coverage once the invasion had taken place (see table 5.6).  
Comparing the war-time coverage of the two Australian papers with the British papers 
cited by Tumber and Palmer (2004), both the Australian and the SMH were more likely 
than all but one of the British publications (the UK Sun) to signal a position one way or the 
other in their reporting and commentary on the war (see table 5.14). 
Christie’s agenda-public opinion congruence model suggests that the media agenda is 
never too far out of step with public opinion, especially when there is an evident trend one 
way or the other (2006).  During the Iraq war, the rally effect in Australia (Goot and 
Goldsmith, 2012, p57) was reflected in both public opinion and in press coverage, with 
cause and effect unclear – but with the result of greater congruence between the media 
agenda and public opinion during the invasion than prior to the war. Entman’s cascading 
network activation model describes a feedback system which includes the relationship 
between the media agenda and public opinion but which includes the role of government 
and other elites.  The journalists interviewed for this project believed that, during war-time, 
reporting required greater sensitivity, in part because of concerns for families of soldiers 
abroad, but also because of a kind of patriotism which comes into play when the country is 
at war.  This sensitivity, at a time of increased government control over information, may 
have resulted in fewer journalists covering opposition to the war or the more vivid 
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examples of the consequences of war.   Paradoxically, heightened awareness of public 
opinion may have enhanced the government’s ability to control the media agenda.   
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Chapter 6 – Uncertain Victory – collapsing rationales 
and continuing civil war 
Despite leading the US into a costly war against Iraq based on a non-existent WMD threat, 
George W Bush was not framed as scandalously incompetent or dishonest. How this potential 
presidential scandal was silenced, despite the war’s yielding few benefits to the US in exchange 
for death, destruction, and immense financial cost – over $3 trillion (Stiglitz and Bilmes 2010) – 
recapitulates and extends our model of scandal politics. (Entman, 2012) 
President Bush, in green flight suit and aviator glasses, flight helmet under his arm, was 
welcomed aboard the USS Abraham Lincoln on 1 May 2003.  He had just landed in the co-
pilot’s seat of a Navy fighter jet and, after a quick change of clothes, stood before a banner 
with the words “Mission Accomplished” to deliver his triumphant announcement that “major 
combat operations in Iraq have ended.  In the Battle of Iraq, the United States and our 
allies have prevailed” (Bush 2003).  At the time the event was seen as a public relations 
coup, with a Democrat congressional aide quoted as saying “We hoped he’d look foolish 
getting out of the airplane…[but]…no such luck. The top gun cut a striking figure in his Top 
Gun duds, surrounded by admiring men and women in uniform” (Cline, 2013). Not many 
months later the Mission Accomplished sign – and the speech - became objects of ridicule 
as violence in Iraq escalated and the US death toll by hostile fire exceeded the number 
who had died in combat before Bush’s speech (Murphy, 2003).   The invasion had been 
quick and successful, but the post-war period was characterised by looting, lawlessness 
and escalating sectarian violence, for which the coalition troops appeared ill-prepared.  
With the passage of time, there was mounting pressure to find the WMDs that were the 
pretext for war, and when there were none to be found, there were government inquiries in 
the US, UK and Australia into the “intelligence failures” that had led all three countries (and 
Poland) to war.  By virtue of framing the debate as one about “intelligence failures”, the 
inquiries served the valuable political purpose of deflecting attention away from policy and 
governance failures toward the content and quality of intelligence analysis. 
Patterns of press attention 
This chapter examines the patterns of press attention during five one-week sample periods 
after the invasion of Iraq, including after the presentation of two inquiry reports - the 
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Parliamentary Joint Committee on ASIO, ASIS and DSD reported on the Inquiry into 
Intelligence on Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) (Jull Committee report), and 
Philip Flood’s Report of the Inquiry into Australian Intelligence Agencies in the Federal 
Parliament.  (See Content analysis sample periods, p. xi, for details of dates and events of 
sample periods.)  The chapter considers the positive or negative direction of the coverage 
of post-war themes, sources quoted (including type and nationality) and compares the 
data with the Tumber and Palmer study of the UK media (2006).   
Themes in Australian post-invasion print media coverage 
In the post-invasion period, the focus of coverage moved away from the conduct and long-
term political purposes of the war, toward the Australian political consequences of the war.   
 
Table 6.1   Themes in post invasion coverage 
       Themes in post-invasion media coverage as a percentage for each media outlet 
 
                Columns total to 100% 
 
The impact of the war on domestic Australian politics dominated SMH post-invasion 
coverage (52% of all themes) and accounted for around a third of coverage in the 
Australian (31%, see table 6.1).  The strong focus on domestic Australian politics may 
have been a reflection, at least in part, of the selection of sample periods which coincided 
with important domestic events related to the Iraq conflict, including the release of the Jull 
and Flood reports.  Both papers considered the worsening situation in Iraq to be 
newsworthy, but the Australian was proportionately almost twice as likely to discuss the 
 Media outlet 
SMH Australian 
Themes covered in the 
post-invasion sample 
periods 
Australian domestic political fallout 52 31 
Situation in Iraq 12 22 
US political fallout 9 11 
Other nations’ policies 5 8 
War on terror, Islamic fundamentalism 6 8 
Relations with other nations 3 4 
Economic impact of the war 2 3 
What really happened? 2 5 
UK political fallout 4 7 
US motives 6 3 
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situation in Iraq (22%) than was the SMH (12%).  The US and UK political fallout, other 
nations’ policies, the war on terror, and US motives for going to war were third order 
themes in both papers (see table.6.1).  The Australian’s greater focus on international 
news in the post-war period may have been both a reflection of their business model 
(which includes extensive international news coverage) and their access to international 
news services through other News Ltd companies around the world. 
 
Table 6.2  Themes in coverage during each post-invasion sample period 
Themes in post-invasion periods as a percentage of all Iraq-war themes covered by each media outlet 
 
       Columns total to 100%, * SMH sample size atypically small 
 
The differences in the two papers’ priorities are more apparent when the post-invasion 
data are disaggregated for each sample period (see table 6.2).  By early March 2004, 
when the war was less than a year old, the connection between the war on terror and Iraq 
had faded almost completely in both papers’ reporting (see table 6.2).  Relations with other 
nations were a theme of Iraq post-invasion reporting in the SMH only in May 2003 and in 
SMH 
1 - 7 May 
2003 
2 - 8 October 
2003* 
1 - 7 March 
2004 
20 - 26 July 
2004 
20 - 26 March 
2008 
Australian domestic political 
fallout 
24 18 71 71 14 
Situation in Iraq 12 12 14 9 21 
US political fallout 3 6 8 6 57 
Other nation's policies 7 0 0 10 0 
War on terror, Islamic 
fundamentalism 
17 18 0 0 0 
Relations with other nations 10 0 0 0 0 
Economic impact of the war 5 6 0 0 7 
What really happened? 3 0 1 3 0 
UK political fallout 0 41 1 1 0 
US motives 19 0 4 0 0 
 
Australian 
Australian domestic political 
fallout 
15 7 66 34 0 
Situation in Iraq 15 16 19 25 56 
US political fallout 8 18 6 11 11 
Other nation's policies 5 6 0 19 0 
War on terror, Islamic 
fundamentalism 
19 11 1 5 7 
Relations with other nations 15 5 0 0 0 
Economic impact of the war 8 5 0 1 0 
What really happened? 2 7 3 3 22 
UK political fallout 1 22 5 2 0 
US motives 11 1 1 1 4 
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the Australian in May and October 2003 (table 6.4).  By 2004, relations with other nations 
had faded as a theme for both papers, perhaps because by that time the vast majority of 
Australian troops had returned home and Australia’s involvement had arguably diminished 
in importance. 
The October 2003 sample period stands out as atypical for a number of reasons, firstly 
because of an apparent lack of interest on the part of the SMH in the war in Iraq.  There 
were only seven substantive articles on the Iraq war during this period, compared with 42 
which appeared in the Australian (see table 2.3).  Secondly, both papers focused their 
attention on the UK domestic political situation, as Blair faced the British Labour Party’s 
conference at Bournemouth, surviving a leadership crisis brought on by divisions in the 
party over the Iraq war and the suicide of government weapons scientist David Kelly 
(Webster, 2003).  Blair was facing claims by former minister Robin Cook and others that 
he had “privately conceded two weeks before the Iraq war that Saddam Hussein did not 
have any usable weapons of mass destruction”; that he had “misled the House of 
Commons and asked MPs to vote for the war on a ‘false prospectus’” (Cracknell, 2003) 
However during this period, David Kay, head of the Iraq Survey Group, presented a 
somewhat ambiguous interim report to the US Congress.  Kay reported “no finds of actual 
weapons, but did show documentary evidence of a weapons development programme and 
one piece of physical evidence (a vial of botulinum)” (Tumber and Palmer, 2004, p145). 
That week, the FBI and the US Justice Department also announced an investigation into 
the White House’s leaking of the identity of Valerie Plame, a covert CIA operative, 
apparently in retaliation for an article her husband, Joseph Wilson, wrote for the New York 
Times, in which he challenged the Bush Administration’s claim that Saddam Hussein had 
tried to secure uranium yellow cake from Niger (suggestive of an active nuclear program) 
(Rich, 2006, p186, Woodward, 2006, p219).  The announcement of the investigation was 
significant because it was the first criminal probe of the Bush White House (Eccleston, 
2003).  Over a period of five days in October 2003, six articles about the Plame affair 
appeared in the Australian, but curiously none appeared in the SMH.   
The release of the report of the Jull Committee report (the Parliamentary Joint Committee 
on ASIO, ASIS and DSD’s report of its Inquiry into Intelligence on Iraq's Weapons of Mass 
Destruction (WMD)) in March 2004 prompted a surge in both papers of articles examining 
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the Australian domestic political fall-out from the war.  Between 1 and 7 March 2004, 71% 
of all Iraq-related themes in the SMH and 66% in the Australian were focused on the 
Australian domestic political implications of the war (see table 6.2).   Similarly, the tabling 
of Philip Flood’s Report of the Inquiry into Australian Intelligence Agencies on 20 July 2004 
prompted the same level of attention by the SMH as did the Jull report (71% of all themes 
were related to domestic political issues).  In the Australian, however, the Flood report 
received much less attention than the paper had given the Jull report (only 34% of themes 
focused on domestic political issues).  In the Australian, the situation in Iraq, other nation’s 
policies and the US political fallout from the war were also a focus of reporting at this time. 
 By March 2008, the fifth anniversary of the invasion, the overwhelming focus of SMH 
coverage was on the US domestic political implications of the war, followed by the 
situation on the ground in Iraq and then the Australian domestic political impact of the war.  
On the fifth anniversary of the invasion, the situation in Iraq still dominated the Australian’s 
coverage, followed by examination of what really happened and consideration of the 
impact of the Iraq war on US domestic politics (see table 6.4).  
WMD and Australian post-invasion coverage 
During the early post-invasion period, as the search for WMD continued in the 
background, the media tended to focus more on the situation in Iraq and domestic political 
issues.  As time progressed and the US Administration had to admit that WMD were not to 
be found, the WMD theme became central to inquiries in US, UK and Australia and the 
focus of media attention.  At the same time, there was a de-coupling of the WMD theme 
from the terrorism theme as claims of links between Iraq and al Qaeda (including a claim 
that 9/11 terrorist Mohamed Atta had visited Prague in 2001 to meet with Iraqi intelligence 
proved incorrect (Rich, 2006, p128, Woodward, 2006, p120).   
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Table 6.3  WMD as a percentage of themes in all nine sample periods  
WMD themes covered in all nine sample periods expressed as a percentage of all Iraq-war themes covered 
by each media outlet. 
            
                  n=4,816 themes (1,668 in SMH and 3,148 in the Australian) 
 
The invasion marked the low point in WMD reporting, in large part because of the 
preoccupation of both papers with day-to-day coverage of the coalition troop’s advance on 
Baghdad. Table 6.3 compares the proportion of themes focused on WMD, excluding 
references to terrorism, across all nine sample periods.   In May 2003, immediately after 
the invasion, WMD reporting constituted just 8% of themes covered by the SMH and 5% in 
the Australian.  At this stage, the US Administration was still expressing confidence that it 
was just a matter of time before WMD would be found.  By October 2003, however, there 
was relatively greater interest in WMD (with 14% of themes in the SMH and 25% of 
themes in the Australian WMD-related) largely because of events in the US, rather than 
Iraq.  David Kay, US head of the Iraq Survey Group, testified to the US Congress about 
the Group’s failure to find WMD (but discovery of some ambiguous evidence) and the FBI 
announced its investigation into the White House leaking of Valerie Plame’s identity.  [Kay 
ultimately resigned from the Iraq Survey Group on 23 January 2004 and five days later 
testified before the US Senate Armed Services Committee that “We were almost all wrong, 
and I certainly include myself” (Woodward, 2006, p278).  He said that, with 85 percent of 
the work done, he “had no reasons to believe they ever would find WMD stockpiles in Iraq” 
(Woodward, 2006, p278).] 
In both papers the surge in WMD references during the March 2004 sample period (56% 
in the SMH and 45% in the Australian) reflected the media’s interest in the release of the 
 
12 - 18 
September 
2002 
5 - 11 
February 
2003 
13 - 19 
March 
2003 
20 - 26 
March 
2003 
1 - 7 
May 
2003 
2 - 8 
October 
2003 
1 - 7 
March 
2004 
20 - 26 
July 
2004 
20 - 26 
March 
2008 
SMH          
WMD theme 18 21 17 4 8 14 56 42 5 
Other theme 82 79 83 96 92 86 44 58 95 
Australian          
WMD theme 22 21 16 6 5 25 45 21 4 
Other theme 78 79 84 94 95 75 55 79 96 
  
174 
 
Jull inquiry report into intelligence on Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction in March 2004.  
WMD references were also frequent in the SMH (42%) and less so in the Australian (21%) 
in the wake of the tabling of the Flood inquiry report in July 2004.  The Australian did not 
focus the same level of attention on the Flood report as it had on the Jull report.  By the 
fifth anniversary of the invasion, the March 2008 sample period, WMD – the reason for 
going to war – had dropped in importance to just 5% of themes in the SMH’s coverage of 
the Iraq conflict and just 4% of the Australian’s coverage.   
Direction of post-invasion coverage  
Aggregating the data across all five post-invasion sample periods, and all types and 
genres, provided a snap shot of the pro and anti-war direction of each paper’s post-
invasion coverage.   
 
Table 6.4    Direction of coverage after the Iraq invasion  
Direction – pro-war, balanced or anti-war – as a percentage of all post-invasion coverage, by media outlet  
 
n = 304 articles (91 articles in SMH and 213 in the Australian), Columns add to 100% for each paper 
 
Fifty percent of articles in the SMH were anti-war in their tone, compared with 30% in the 
Australian, while just 12% of SMH articles and 26% of articles in the Australian were pro-
war (see table 6.4).  Table 6.4 shows the percentage of times that Iraq-related themes 
were mentioned in the context of pro-war/pro-US, balanced/even-handed or anti-war/anti-
US articles.  In the post-invasion period it is interesting to note that the direction of 
coverage in the Australian was on balance more even handed or balanced, or anti-war 
than it was pro-war, even though it tended to be more pro-war than the SMH.  This was as 
much a reflection of the nature of the news that dominated these periods - namely news 
about the failure to find WMD and the flawed nature of the intelligence that led to war – as 
it was an indication of editorial policy.  Despite this, editorial comment in the Australian 
continued to be pro-war (see chapter 8). 
Media outlet Pro-war/Pro-US Anti-war/anti-US Even-
handed/Balanced 
SMH 12 50 39 
Australian 26 30 44 
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Table 6.5               Direction of coverage after the invasion of Iraq 
Direction – pro-war, balanced or anti-war – as a percentage of all post-invasion Iraq-related coverage, by 
media outlet across each of the five post-invasion sample periods. 
 
 
1 - 7 May 
2003 
2 - 8 
October 
2003 
1 - 7 
March 
2004 
20 - 26 
July 
2004 
20 - 26 
March 
2008 
SMH      
Pro-war 29 14 4 4 0 
Anti-war 29 86 67 52 20 
Balanced 43 0 29 44 80 
Australian      
Pro-war 35 19 16 28 33 
Anti-war 11 43 46 27 33 
Balanced 55 38 39 45 33 
     n = 304 articles (91 articles in SMH and 213 in the Australian) 
 
The SMH, always strongly anti-war or balanced, became steadily less pro-war over the 
five post-invasion sample periods, while the Australian bounced around, settling with a 
third of coverage pro-war, a third anti-war and a third balanced (see table 6.5).  Both 
papers were at their peak of pro-war coverage in May 2003, as the end of major combat 
operations was announced sooner than many expected, with fewer lives lost than 
expected, but by October 2003 the rationale for war, WMD, was starting to collapse and 
both papers’ anti-war coverage increased. Anti-war coverage remained high in March 
2004 when both papers were covering the findings of the Jull Committee report, easing a 
little, but remaining above 50% in the SMH, in July 2004 with the release of the Flood 
report.  By March 2008, on the fifth anniversary of the war, with an insurgency still raging, 
the SMH had no pro-war content, while the Australian steadfastly refused to give up its 
editorial support for the war, and continued to balance anti-war with pro-war content. 
Positive and negative direction of themes  
While the editorial positions of both papers in the study were clear, this did not necessarily 
mean that it was easy to predict how each paper would present or frame particular 
themes.   
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Table 6.6   Post invasion Iraq coverage – themes and direction  
Direction of themes in post-invasion media coverage by media outlet, expressed as a percentage of each 
theme and then as a percentage of all Iraq coverage in each outlet. 
 
*Three LH columns - rows total to 100% for each theme. **RH column totals to 100% for each publication 
 
In both papers, discussion of the Australian domestic political fallout from the war and the 
situation in Iraq was more likely to be in the context of an anti-war article than a pro-war or 
balanced article (see table 6.6).  Fifty per cent of SMH discussion of the Australian 
domestic political implications of the war was in articles that were judged to be negative, 
anti-war or critical of the US, compared with 43% of the Australian’s articles on the same 
theme (see table 6.6). The situation in Iraq was presented as a negative in both papers, 
with 68% of SMH coverage and 46% of the Australian’s coverage judged to be negative, 
anti-war or anti-US policy.  The US political fallout was the next theme on both papers’ 
agendas with 48% of SMH coverage and 49% of the Australian’s coverage negative (see 
table 6.6).  
Media outlet Themes Direction of article **% of all 
Iraq 
coverage in 
the paper 
*Positive/Pro-
war/Pro-US 
*Negative/ 
Anti-war/ 
Anti-US 
*Evenhanded/ 
Balanced 
SMH Australian domestic political fallout 11 50 39 52 
Situation in Iraq 7 68 25 12 
US political fallout 0 48 52 9 
Other nations’ policies 0 73 27 5 
War on terror, Islamic fundamentalism 23 39 39 6 
Relations with other nations 83 0 17 3 
Economic impact of the war 20 20 60 2 
What really happened? 0 80 20 2 
UK political fallout 0 100 0 4 
US motives 0 50 50 6 
 
Australian Australian domestic political fallout 27 43 29 31 
Situation in Iraq 16 46 38 22 
US political fallout 25 49 27 11 
Other nations’ policies 40 26 34 8 
War on terror, Islamic fundamentalism 46 17 37 8 
Relations with other nations 83 0 17 4 
Economic impact of the war 23 8 69 3 
What really happened? 32 32 36 5 
UK political fallout 10 29 61 7 
US motives 39 39 23 3 
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Sources quoted in post-invasion period 
After the invasion – during which government sources tended to be crowded out by those 
with more direct experience of the war (officials, community groups and NGOs, journalists, 
Iraqis and ‘others’) - the number of government sources increased, but did not reach pre-
war levels (see table 6.7).  In both papers, officials constituted a higher proportion of 
sources after the invasion than they had before the war, and ‘government’ and ‘official’ 
sources combined represented more than half of all sources (51% in the SMH and 57% in 
the Australian (see tables 6.7 and 6.8). 
 
Table 6.7                 Who quoted: before, during and after the invasion  
Sources quoted during the pre-war, invasion and post-invasion periods expressed as a percentage of all 
sources for each publication for each period. 
 
Media outlet Pre-war Invasion Post 
Invasion 
SMH Government 46 31 35 
Officials 14 17 16 
Opposition 11 6 16 
Expert 15 11 10 
Community groups & NGOs 3 8 6 
Journalists 5 10 11 
Iraqis 2 5 1 
Other 5 11 3 
Opinion polls 0 1 2 
 
Australian Government 44 24 34 
Officials 16 21 23 
Opposition 14 7 10 
Expert 10 14 10 
Community groups & NGOs 6 8 5 
Journalists 3 9 8 
Iraqis 3 6 9 
Other 5 11 2 
Opinion polls 0 0 1 
 n = 1,002 articles, 2,409 sources (927 in SMH, 1,482 in Australian), Columns total 100% each publication 
 
In post-invasion reporting, government sources (including the US President, prime 
ministers and other Cabinet ministers and other government members) outnumbered other 
sources and accounted for more than a third of both papers’ sources (see table 6.7).  
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Officials (including members of the Australian, UK or US bureaucracy and members of the 
Australian, UK or US Defence Forces) constituted the second largest source group in both 
papers (23% in the Australian, 16% in the SMH (see table 6.7).  Members of the 
opposition accounted for a higher proportion of SMH sources (16%) than they did in the 
Australian (10%).  Experts represented 10% of both papers’ sources, while journalists 
represented a larger share of SMH sources (11%) than in the Australian (8%).  Iraqi’s, 
both in Australia and abroad represented a higher proportion of sources in the Australian 
(9%) than they did in the SMH (1%). 
After the disruption of the invasion, post-invasion source patterns tended to return to pre-
invasion levels with a couple of exceptions.  While government and official sources 
combined returned to almost pre-invasion levels, some government sources appeared to 
have been replaced by official sources, who, having increased during the invasion 
remained higher in the post-invasion period (this trend was more evident in the Australian, 
see table 6.8).  After a lull during the invasion, the opposition was more likely to be quoted 
in the SMH in the post-invasion period than before the invasion, while in the Australian, the 
opposition was less likely to be quoted after the invasion than before (see table 6.7).  
Journalists too were quoted in the post-invasion period at around invasion levels.  Experts 
dropped off a little in both papers, while the number of Iraqis quoted in the Australian 
increased further on invasion levels.  The proportion of Iraqis quoted in the SMH dropped 
off after the invasion (see table 6.8).  Table 6.8 provides a more detailed breakdown on 
when particular sources were quoted. 
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Table 6.8  Who quoted: sources quoted during the post-invasion periods 
Occupation/Sector of persons quoted, as a percentage of all persons quoted, by media outlet during each of 
the five post-invasion periods. 
 
 n = 544 sources quoted (177 in SMH, 367 in the Australian), Columns total to 100% for each publication 
 
Australian Government sources still dominated in both papers in almost every period after 
the invasion.  When added to official sources, this meant that the government narrative on 
Iraq was represented by between 38% and 73% of sources quoted.  The pattern of 
domination by government sources in both papers persisted when the data were broken 
down by each post-invasion sample period, with one exception: 2-8 October 2003 (see 
table 6.8).  The October 2003 sample period in the SMH was atypical in that the coverage 
of Iraq was unusually light, with only seven articles looking at the Iraq war, at a time when 
the Australian carried 42 (a ratio of 1:6).  (Across all other sample periods, the ratio of 
SMH articles on Iraq to those carried in the Australian was between 1:1.5 and 1:2.4).  The 
smaller number of articles in the SMH also meant fewer sources quoted, so that the 
October 2003 sample period was the only one in which government sources were 
outnumbered by officials, experts, journalists and other sources.  Surprisingly, government 
sources peaked in the Australian, when they were at their minimum in the SMH (in 
October 2003), when the Australian’s coverage was focused on David Kay’s testimony to 
 
1 - 7 May 
2003 
2 - 8 October 
2003 
1 - 7 March 
2004 
20 - 26 July 
2004 
20 - 26 
March 2008 
SMH      
Government 58 11 29 25 50 
 Official 15 22 17 15 10 
Opposition 5 0 24 20 10 
Expert 3 22 15 10 0 
Community groups & NGOs 10 0 2 9 0 
Journalists 5 22 14 12 10 
Iraqis 3 0 0 2 0 
Other 3 22 0 2 20 
Opinion polls 0 0 0 5 0 
Australian 
1 - 7 May 
2003 
2 - 8 October 
2003 
1 - 7 March 
2004 
20 - 26 July 
2004 
20 - 26 
March 2008 
Government  31 44 34 33 19 
 Official 25 29 23 18 19 
Opposition 7 7 20 9 0 
Expert 7 14 9 9 14 
Community groups & NGOs 4 0 0 8 24 
Journalists 9 6 9 5 19 
Iraqis 14 0 4 16 5 
Other 3 1 2 2 0 
Opinion polls 1 0 0 1 0 
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the US Congress and the FBI investigation of the Valerie Plame Affair, and both papers 
considered the UK domestic political  impact of the war on Tony Blair’s career.   
After a lull in October 2003, coverage of Iraq increased in both papers when the Jull and 
Flood reports were tabled in March 2004 and July 2004 respectively.  During March and 
July 2004, government and official sources in the SMH were to some extent balanced by 
opposition and expert representation.  This balancing trend was less evident in the 
Australian overall, but to the extent this happened, it did so during March 2004.  The rest 
of the time opposition voices were under-represented in both papers.  The ratio of 
government to opposition quotes was 2:1 on average in the SMH and 3:1 in the Australian.  
When government and official sources are combined to provide a picture of the 
representation of the government narrative, this ratio grew to 3:1 in the SMH and almost 
6:1 in the Australian. 
Sources and pro-war/anti-war direction 
Whilst particular sources, eg government, had predictable views on the war, they were not 
always quoted in the expected context.  Table 6.9 sets out the direction of the articles in 
which particular source groups were quoted: pro-war, anti-war or balanced. Up to four 
sources were coded for each newspaper article.   
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Table 6.9                   Post-invasion sources and the context in which quoted   
Sources quoted during the post-invasion period and the pro-war/anti-war/balanced direction of the article in 
which the source is quoted. 
 
n = 245 articles, 544 sources quoted (177 in SMH, 367 in the Australian), Rows add to 100% for each source  
 
The SMH was more likely to quote government sources, officials, members of the 
opposition and experts in the context of anti-war articles, while the Australian was more 
likely to quote government sources, officials, experts, community groups, Iraqis and other 
sources in the context of balanced or even-handed articles (see table 6.9)). The editorial 
position of each paper appears to have had some influence on the context in which 
sources were quoted, but the pattern is mixed, with both papers quoting a large number of 
sources in balanced/even-handed articles.  This may be a reflection of both the sampling 
method which focused on significant events and coding which took into account both 
theme and tone when an article was classified as pro-war, anti-war or balanced.  
Journalists and the opposition were the only source groups that the Australian was more 
Media outlet Pro-war/ 
Pro-US 
Anti-war/ 
anti-US 
Even-handed/ 
Balanced 
SMH Government 13 56 31 
Officials 21 57 21 
Opposition 7 48 45 
Expert 0 89 11 
Community groups & NGOs 0 30 70 
Journalists 0 45 55 
Iraqis 0 50 50 
Other 0 50 50 
Opinion polls 0 0 100 
 
Australian Government 20 31 49 
Officials 20 37 43 
Opposition 14 47 39 
Expert 23 26 51 
Community groups & NGOs 6 18 77 
Journalists 18 46 36 
Iraqis 15 15 70 
Other 29 29 43 
Opinion polls 50 0 50 
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likely to quote in an anti-war context (46% of journalists and 47% of opposition sources 
quoted in the Australian appeared in anti-war articles).   
Nationality of sources 
The Australian was more likely to quote an American in connection with Iraq than an 
Australian, and the SMH was more likely to quote an Australian than all other nationalities 
put together.  Australian sources made up 51% of post-invasion sources quoted in the 
SMH (see table 6.10). This is in contrast to the Australian’s quoting of US sources (32%) 
more often than Australian sources (30%) during this period (see table 6.10).  US sources 
were the second most quoted group in the SMH, with a comparable spread in both papers 
of other sources from the UK, Iraq, international organisations, the European Union and 
other Middle Eastern, Asian and African countries.  Iraqi sources, however, represented 
17% of the Australian’s sources, but just 7% of SMH sources (see table 6.10).  The 
relatively high representation of Iraqi sources in the Australian may indicate that that paper 
has greater access to US news sources and perhaps Iraq-based journalists in contact with 
Iraqi official and civilian sources. 
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Table 6.10  Nationality of sources quoted before, during and after invasion  
Sources quoted during the pre-war, invasion and post-invasion periods expressed as a percentage of all 
sources for each publication for each period.  
 
Media outlet Pre-war Invasion Post 
Invasion 
SMH Australia 48 43 51 
US 23 25 21 
UK 6 5 5 
Iraq 5 10 7 
International Organisations 5 4 2 
European Union 6 3 2 
Other Middle East (not Iraq) 4 5 5 
Other, incl. Asia & Africa 2 5 6 
 
Australian Australia  46 45 30 
US 25 28 32 
UK 6 7 9 
Iraq 6 9 17 
International Organisations 6 3 1 
European Union 8 3 2 
Other Middle East (not Iraq) 4 3 3 
Other, incl. Asia & Africa 1 1 5 
 n = 998 articles, 2,426 sources (931 in SMH, 1,495 in the Australian), Columns total 100% each publication 
 
It would appear that the Australian’s strong US focus happened in the post-invasion period 
(see table 6.10) when all eyes were on the US and UK to see how the failure to find WMD 
would play out politically, and when questions were being asked about how the US would 
respond to the growing civil unrest in Iraq.  When the Australian was focusing more on US 
and perhaps Iraq and UK developments, the SMH was becoming more focused on the 
Australian domestic political implications of the war, with Australians representing 51% of 
all sources quoted on Iraq. 
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Table 6.11 Nationality of sources quoted in all nine sample periods 
Nationality of persons quoted as a percentage of all persons quoted by each media outlet during each of the 
nine sample periods. 
 
n = 2,426 sources quoted (931 in SMH, 1495 quoted in the Australian), 83% of articles contained quotes.      
Columns total to 100% for each publication  
 
A greater proportion of quotes were ascribed to Australian sources in the SMH than in the 
Australian, in eight out of nine sample periods (see table 6.11).  This may be a reflection of 
both the Australian’s pro-US position on the war and their ready access to more 
international sources, particularly in the US.  Both papers seemed to quote UK sources in 
similar proportions, with both papers’ UK-sourced quotes peaking during the October 2003 
sample period when Tony Blair was defending his leadership in front of his party at their 
Bournemoth conference.  The Australian’s pattern of quoting Iraqi sources roughly tracked 
that of the SMH until the tabling of the Jull Committee report in March 2004, when Iraqi 
sources started to be quoted more often than in the SMH.  In the July 2004 sample period, 
when the Flood report was tabled, 29% of quotes in the Australian were from Iraqis: the 
highest proportion of Iraqi quotes of any sampling period.  Quotes from Asian government 
 12 - 18 
September 
2002 
5 - 11 
February 
2003 
13 - 19 
March 2003 
20 - 26 
March 
2003 
1 - 7 May 
2003 
2 - 8 
October 
2003 
1 - 7 March 
2004 
20 - 26 
July 2004 
20 - 26 
March 2008 
SMH  
Australia 62 48 43 43 36 36 71 50 20 
US 12 29 25 25 32 27 12 13 70 
UK 2 2 10 5 2 36 3 4 0 
Iraq 5 2 8 10 16 0 2 7 0 
International 
Organisations 
5 5 5 4 2 0 0 4 10 
European Union 5 8 6 3 7 0 2 0 0 
Other Middle East 
(not Iraq) 
8 0 4 5 5 0 10 2 0 
Other, incl Asia & 
Africa 
1 6 0 5 0 0 0 20 0 
 
Australian  
Australia 41 51 44 45 23 15 55 28 26 
US 34 21 24 28 46 48 18 19 41 
UK 3 5 7 7 4 19 15 4 0 
Iraq 3 5 7 9 19 3 11 29 22 
International 
Organisations 
8 6 5 3 2 4 0 0 0 
European Union 10 7 8 3 2 7 0 0 4 
Other Middle East 
(not Iraq) 
0 3 6 3 4 1 1 6 4 
Other, incl Asia & 
Africa 
1 3 0 1 0 3 0 15 4 
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ministers peaked in both papers in July 2004, when the Philippine Government announced 
withdrawal of its troops as part of a deal to secure the release of kidnapped Philippine 
contractors. 
Australian voices – who dominated? 
When Australian sources were identified separately, the patterns between the two papers 
looked remarkably similar (see table 6.12).  While the SMH drew more of its sources from 
the Government (36% compared with 30% in the Australian), the Australian made up for 
that shortfall by quoting more official sources (25% compared with 18% in the SMH).  
Together with official sources, the government narrative was being put by 54% of sources 
in the SMH and 55% in the Australian (see table 6.12).   In both papers, the Government 
narrative was balanced by Opposition sources in a ratio of 2:1 (25% Opposition sources in 
the SMH and 21% in the Australian (see table 6.12)).  It may be that many of the expert 
sources were also used to balance the Government narrative, in which case, the ratio of 
Government to ‘Opposition’ plus ‘expert opinion’ was 1.5:1 in the SMH and 1.7:1 in the 
Australian.  Not all Government sources were quoted in the context of a pro-war article,  
but the Opposition’s voice appeared to have been drowned out in the post-invasion period. 
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Table 6.12  Australian sources quoted during the three major stages of the war  
Occupation/Sector of Australians or Australian residents as a percentage of all persons quoted by media 
outlet during the three stages of the Iraq war. 
 Pre-invasion Invasion Post-invasion 
SMH 
Government  35 18 36 
Officials 5 6 18 
Opposition 23 11 25 
Expert 23 19 10 
Community groups & NGOs 3 12 2 
Journalists 10 20 6 
Iraqis 0 6 0 
Other 1 8 3 
 
Australian 
Government member 34 18 30 
Government official 7 5 25 
Opposition 29 15 21 
Expert 11 20 12 
Community groups & NGOs 8 15 8 
Journalists 7 17 4 
Iraqis 2 4 0 
Other 3 6 2 
       n = 998 articles, 1,078 Australians quoted (445 in SMH, 633 in the Australian)                                            
Columns total to 100% for each publication 
 
For many Australian sources, the invasion disrupted the pattern of coverage.  Government 
and Opposition categories dropped off during the invasion, but returned to pre-invasion 
levels, post-invasion.  Other categories, such as community groups and NGOs, journalists, 
Iraqis and others, temporarily increased their share of voice during the invasion, but 
reverted back to pre-war levels in the post-invasion period.  For officials, however, their 
share of voice increased somewhat during the invasion, but increased markedly in the 
post-invasion period.  The marked increase in Australian official sources after the invasion 
suggests that they may have been quoted in the context of the two government inquiries 
into Iraqi intelligence.  Table 6.13 provides greater detail of share of voice for each sample 
period. 
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Table 6.13 Australian sources quoted across all nine sample periods 
Occupation/Sector of Australians or Australian residents quoted as a percentage of all persons quoted by 
media outlet during each of the nine sample periods. 
 
n = 1,078 Australians quoted (445 in SMH, 633 in the Australian), * Small number in sample for both papers. 
** Small numbers in SMH sample, Columns total to 100% for each publication 
 
The most significant change in the post invasion period was the degree to which officials 
were quoted by both papers, largely in the context of the release of the two intelligence 
inquiries in March and July 2004.  Prior to and during the invasion, officials (who included 
members of the ADF and the APS) represented just 6-9% of Australians quoted in the 
SMH and 5-10% in the Australian.  In the post-invasion periods, officials accounted for 
between 14-35% in the SMH and 11-31% of those quoted in the Australian.  Government 
sources remained the largest single source group quoted in both papers in six of the nine 
sample periods.  This comparable treatment of Australian Government representatives 
and officials quoted in each paper suggested that both papers were covering similar 
events in similar ways, for example through their respective offices in the Canberra press 
gallery.  The Opposition were the single most quoted group in both papers in February 
2003, when the Parliament debated sending troops to Iraq.  During four of the five post-
Media outlet 12-18 
Sept 
2002 
5-11 
Feb 
2003 
13-19 
March 
2003 
20-26 
March 
2003* 
1 - 7 
May 
2003 
**2 - 8 
Oct 
2003 
1 - 7 
March 
2004 
20 - 26 
July 2004 
*20 - 26 
March 
2008 
SMH  
Government  45 33 29 18 41 0 41 31 50 
Officials 6 0 9 6 35 0 14 16 0 
Opposition 19 38 16 11 12 0 29 31 0 
Expert 19 21 26 19 0 25 14 9 0 
Community 
groups & NGOs 
0 5 3 12 0 0 2 3 0 
Journalists 11 3 14 20 12 75 0 0 50 
Iraqi-Australians 0 0 0 6 0 0 0 0 0 
Other 0 0 2 8 0 0 0 9 0 
 
Australian  
Government  44 36 30 18 32 36 36 26 0 
Officials 0 5 10 5 11 27 31 26 13 
Opposition 26 42 19 15 21 9 27 21 0 
Expert 8 5 17 20 11 18 4 18 13 
Community 
groups & NGOs 
5 6 10 15 11 0 0 8 63 
Journalists 3 6 9 17 11 9 2 0 13 
Iraqi-Australians 10 0 1 4 0 0 0 0 0 
Other 5 1 4 6 5 0 0 3 0 
  
188 
 
invasion sample periods, the Australian quoted a higher proportion of officials than did the 
SMH.  This may be a reflection of the Australian’s marketing strategy and desire to 
influence the Canberra bureaucracy, as well as perhaps the personal networks of 
individual journalists, especially specialist reporters.  For example, News Ltd journalist 
Patrick Walters was mentioned on a number of occasions by interviewees as a respected 
defence expert with whom they often spoke during this period. 
Australian sources and pro-war/anti-war direction 
Given that particular source categories, eg Government or Opposition, had predictable 
views on the war, of interest was the extent to which Australian sources were more or less 
pro-war than all sources quoted (see table 6.14).  Up to four sources were coded for each 
newspaper article, and direction was a judgement based on both theme and tone.   
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Table 6.14     Australian post-invasion sources and the context in which quoted   
Sources quoted during the post-invasion period and the pro-war/anti-war/balanced direction of the article in 
which the source is quoted.  Australian sources in bold, all sources in grey. 
 n = 245 articles, 544 sources quoted (177 in SMH, 367 in the Australian), Rows add to 100% each source 
  
Both papers were more likely to quote Australian Government sources, officials and the 
Opposition in the context of pro-war articles than all government, official or opposition 
sources (see table 6.14).  When it came to Australian sources (not including government), 
the SMH was more likely to quote them in the context of an article that took a position on 
the war (pro-war or anti-war) than one that was balanced or even-handed. The Australian, 
on the other hand, was more likely to signal a position in articles which quoted government 
and official sources.   
Observations on press coverage 
In May 2003, Tumber and Palmer sampled UK press titles – the UK Daily Mail, Daily 
Telegraph, the Guardian and the Daily Mirror – to identify the percentage of reports 
devoted to WMDs.  These data are reproduced below (see table 6.15). 
Media outlet All sources 
Pro-war/ 
Pro-US 
AustralianP
ro-war/ 
Pro-US 
All sources 
Anti-war/ 
anti-US 
Australian 
Anti-war/ 
anti-US 
All sources 
Even-handed/ 
Balanced 
Australian 
Even-handed/ 
Balanced 
SMH Government 13 17 56 49 31 34 
Officials 21 35 57 53 21 12 
Opposition 7 8 48 50 45 42 
Expert 0 0 89 90 11 10 
Community groups & NGOs 0 0 30 50 70 50 
Journalists 0 0 45 50 55 50 
Iraqis 0 0 50 0 50 0 
Other 0 0 50 0 50 100 
 
Australian Government 20 22 31 36 49 42 
Officials 20 30 37 30 43 40 
Opposition 14 16 47 40 39 44 
Expert 23 21 26 14 51 64 
Community groups & NGOs 6 0 18 10 77 90 
Journalists 18 20 46 20 36 60 
Iraqis 15 0 15 0 70 0 
Other 29 0 29 0 43 100 
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Table 6.15  Percentage of reports devoted to WMDs*  
 
Daily Mail Daily Telegraph Guardian Daily Mirror 
8% (n=9) 7% (n=14) 10% (n=26) 12% (n=19) 
*(Tumber and Palmer 2004, P 143) 
 
This study found that, in May 2003 around 8% of Iraq-related themes in the SMH and 5% 
of Iraq-related themes in the Australian were related to WMDs (see table 6.3).  These 
findings are of the same order of magnitude as the UK data, but it should be noted that this 
study identified up to four themes per article, while the study cited by Tumber and Palmer 
identified the percentage of reports (or articles) devoted to WMDs.  It would appear from 
the Tumber and Palmer data that the editorial position of a UK paper was more likely to 
influence the number of articles on WMDs than, for example, the format of the paper.  The 
two left-leaning, anti-war papers - the Guardian (a broadsheet) and the Daily Mirror (a 
tabloid) – were more likely to be writing about WMDs in May 2003 than were the two right-
leaning, pro-war papers – the Daily Telegraph (a broadsheet) and the Daily Mail (a 
tabloid).  This would also appear to be the case with the Australian papers, with the SMH 
more likely to touch on the theme of WMDs (8%) than the Australian (5%) (see table 6.3).   
The degree to which papers referred to WMD may also have been a reflection of the 
sensitivity of the issue at the time of the sample period, rather than a persistent pattern 
across the different stages of the conflict.  By May 2003, President Bush had declared that 
“in the battle of Iraq, the United States and our allies have prevailed” (2003), but there 
were still no signs of the WMD that had prompted the invasion.  Many of the President’s 
critics used the failure to locate WMD as an opportunity to challenge the President over 
having taken the nation to war.  This might explain the tendency for left-leaning papers at 
the time to make more frequent references to WMD.   
Alongside these developments was a subtle change in the narrative.  Prior to the invasion, 
whenever government officials mentioned WMD, it tended to be in the context of a 
narrative that suggested Saddam Hussein might pass WMD to al Qaeda terrorists and it 
was the spectre of WMD-armed terrorists (rather than just a WMD-armed Saddam 
Hussein) that the official narrative suggested constituted the real risk to the national 
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security of the US, UK, Australia and the rest of the western world.  Accordingly, the pre-
invasion data collected in this study grouped “WMD and terrorism” into a single theme 
category.  After the invasion, however, as the narrative around links between Saddam 
Hussein and al Qaeda proved difficult to sustain, references to WMD tended to be in one 
of three contexts: 1) the success or otherwise of the search for WMD; 2) speculation about 
Saddam’s reasons for giving the impression that he had WMD when he did not; and 3) 
how it was that the US, UK and Australia could have got the pre-war intelligence so wrong.   
While senior government figures continued to refer to Saddam’s links with terrorist groups 
(not including al Qaeda), there were fewer media reports about links between WMD and 
terrorist groups.  Parallel inquiries in the US, UK and Australia focused attention on the 
intelligence advice used by the President and two prime ministers to justify war. 
Dynamics of agenda setting 
After the war, the failure to find WMD added to existing scepticism.  Some were surprised 
that even the expected residual weapons from the Iran Iraq war had not been found.  
It was very gradual. It wasn't like a kind of moment where we all thought ‘they haven't got them’, 
because the search kept on going and other things started vying with the WMD narrative.  There 
was a story about the looting and the search for Saddam….I think there was a level of surprise 
but by that stage I think journalists had regained their general cynicism…by that stage…I think 
people thought well the WMD's are a pretext, the war is essentially about ousting Saddam, 
that's the main reason….Journalists started thinking the main motivation to go to war was to get 
rid of Hussein, not to root out his WMD….people weren't surprised that there wasn't the big 
discovery, the nuclear capability.   [But] I think they were surprised they didn't find anything. Just 
old stockpiles from the Iran-Iraq war you'd have thought they would have found some mustard 
gas somewhere or other (Nick Bryant, pers. comm, 3 Dec. 2012). 
The failure to find any WMD left many commentators and experts confused about how the 
three leaders, and their intelligence agencies could have got it so wrong.  Ironically, the 
magnitude of the intelligence failure lent weight to the argument that taking the US, UK 
and Australia to war had been a huge mistake rather than some kind of grand conspiracy 
over oil.  The preoccupation of both papers after the invasion with the domestic political 
implications of the war (on average 52% of SMH and 31% of the Australian’s themes, see 
table 6.3), suggest that the Prime Minister faced considerable media scrutiny after the 
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invasion.  Despite the scrutiny, however, Howard seemed to be a master at ensuring that it 
was his message, his framing and his narrative that were reflected in the media. 
The 2004 Australian general election, held in October of that year, returned Howard with a 
Senate majority and was viewed by many as the  “first test of voters’ reactions to the 
failure to find weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in Iraq and the difficulties of 
establishing democratic institutions there” (McAllister and Bean, 2006, p 604).  Past public 
opposition appeared to have had little impact on the election outcome, with just 4% of 
those polled by the Australian Electoral Survey mentioning it as an issue in the October 
2004 election (McAllister and Bean, 2006, p 608).  While Bush’s credibility was deeply 
damaged and Blair was battling a backlash in party and public opinion, Howard appeared 
to survive the Iraq war with very little political damage. Not long after the election – and 
contrary to his previously stated position that Australia’s “involvement of combat troops 
would be limited to the initial invasion phase” (Howard, 2010, p458) - Howard accepted an 
invitation from the Japanese to deploy an Australian army battle group to Al Muthanna 
province to provide force protection to Japanese engineers doing construction work 
(Howard, 2010, p458).   
Inquiries into pre-war intelligence 
In the wake of the Iraq invasion, and the subsequent failure to locate WMD, each of the 
US, UK and Australia held parliamentary (UK and Australia), congressional (US) and 
government inquiries (US, UK and Australia) into the intelligence failures which contributed 
to the decision to go to war.  Table 6.17 lists the release dates of the reports of the five UK 
investigations (the fifth, the Chilcot Iraq Inquiry is yet to report), the two US investigating 
bodies (which together produced six reports) and the two Australian reports.  The timing of 
the UK government’s “Review of Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction” (Butler 
Review, released on 14 July 2004) and the Australian government’s “Report of the Inquiry 
into Australian Intelligence Agencies” (Flood Inquiry, released on 20 July 2004) enabled 
the authors of both reports to have the advantage of knowing the content of the US 
Senate’s "Report of the Select Committee on Intelligence on the U.S. Intelligence 
Community's Prewar Intelligence Assessments on Iraq", which was tabled in the US 
Congress on 9 July 2004 (Cotton, 2007, p333).  The timing and content of all of the reports 
  
193 
 
suggested that, as with pre-war intelligence sharing, there continued to be a high level of 
cooperation and coordination between UK, US and Australian governments and agencies 
after the invasion, and in explaining the decision to go to war. 
 
Table 6.17 Timeline for Iraq war inquiries in the US, UK and Australia  
 Dates of reports from five UK inquiries, two US inquiries and two Australian inquiries into the Iraq war  
 
3 July 2003 UK House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee reported on “The 
Decision to go to War in Iraq”  
Sept 2003 UK Intelligence and Security Committee reported on “Iraqi Weapons of 
Mass Destruction – Intelligence and Assessments”.   
28 Jan 2004 UK Hutton “Report of the Inquiry into the Circumstances Surrounding the 
Death of Dr David Kelly C.M.G.” 
1 March 2004 Australia’s Parliamentary Joint Committee on ASIO, ASIS and DSD 
report on “Intelligence on Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction” (Jull 
Committee report)  
9 July 2004  US Senate "Report of the Select Committee on Intelligence on the U.S. 
Intelligence Community's Prewar Intelligence Assessments on Iraq"   
14 July 2004 UK “Review of Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction” (Butler 
Review ) 
20 July 2004 Philip Flood’s “Report of the Inquiry into Australian Intelligence Agencies”  
31 March 
2005 
US Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States 
Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction (Robb-Silberman Report) 
8 Sept 2006 US Senate Select Committee on Intelligence released two reports: 
"Postwar Findings about Iraq's WMD Programs and Links to Terrorism 
and How they Compare with Prewar Assessments" and "The Use by the 
Intelligence Community of Information Provided by the Iraqi National 
Congress." 
25 May 2007 US Senate Select Committee on Intelligence released "Prewar 
Intelligence Assessments About Postwar Iraq".  
5 June 2008 US Senate Select Committee on Intelligence released a report which 
"details inappropriate, sensitive intelligence activities conducted by the 
DoD’s Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, without the 
knowledge of the Intelligence Community or the State Department." 
Ongoing 
(announced 
15 June 
2009) 
UK Iraq Inquiry, (Chilcot Inquiry) a public inquiry into the nation's role in 
the Iraq War.  
 
  
194 
 
Similar strategies were employed by all three leaders. The terms of reference of inquiries 
in all three countries focused attention on the quality and accuracy of the intelligence 
advice provided to governments, rather than on the quality of policy decisions or decision-
making processes which drew on the advice provided.  The Jull Committee (the Joint 
Parliamentary Committee on ASIO, ASIS and DSD) was asked to “consider the nature, 
accuracy and independence of the intelligence used by the Australian government and the 
accuracy and completeness of the presentation of that intelligence by the Australian 
government to the Parliament and people of Australia” (Senate Hansard 18 June 2003, 
Jull 2003).  Attention was thus focused on the intelligence advice and those who had 
provided it, rather than on those who had made the decision to go to war.   While Blair and 
Bush came in for criticism over the way in which they had both managed their decision-
making processes (Cook, 2004, Short, 2005, Woodward, 2006), Howard came in for very 
little, despite reports that the only submission to Cabinet which canvassed the merits of 
going to war was considered just days before the invasion (Kelly, 2009).  Former heads of 
the Prime Minister’s department, the Defence Department and ASIO confirmed in interview 
that this was the case.  According to Kelly there was an “astonishing and complete unity of 
opinion in Canberra…Ministers [had] made clear they did not want contesting advice and 
the public service offered no advice on the merits of the war or Australia’s commitment” – 
suggestive of a compliant public service, unable or unwilling to provide the “‘frank and 
fearless’ advice much romanticised by the media” (2009, p 260). 
All three leaders focused post-invasion discussion on whether or not they had made the 
decision to go to war in good faith: that is that they had had good reason, based on the 
intelligence advice they had received, to believe that Saddam had weapons of mass 
destruction.  They tended to avoid discussion of Saddam’s military capability (judged by 
many as having diminished since the first Gulf War (Jull, 2003, pp. 82-85), his intent or his 
links with al Qaeda.  Just as the arguments in favour of invading, consistent across all 
three leaders, had focused on the existence of WMD, the leaders’ defence in the war’s 
aftermath was to argue that they had been mistaken, but that it had been a genuine 
mistake: a reasonable decision taken at the time on the basis of the intelligence advice 
they had received (Howard, pers. comm., 20 Feb 2013).  All three leaders have also 
argued that despite the mistake - and acknowledging that Iraq had its problems in 
establishing democracy - Iraq was a better place without Saddam (a brutal dictator 
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(Howard, 2010, Bush, 2010, Blair, 2010)).   In the UK, Blair had to contend with two former 
ministers, Cook and Short, documenting in their memoirs that Blair had confided some 
weeks prior to the invasion that Saddam’s WMD did not constitute a threat (Cook, 2004, 
Short, 2005).  Both ministers testified to the UK House of Commons Foreign Affairs Select 
Committee that “they had each been separately briefed by MI6 in the period before the 
military conflict in Iraq to the effect that Saddam Hussein’s weapons of mass destruction 
did not pose any immediate threat” (Evans, 2003).  
In Australia, no-one in Howard’s highly disciplined party and Cabinet broke ranks to make 
such a statement.  Nor does it seem likely that Howard, with his history of carefulness, 
would ever have said such a thing – but the Jull committee found that Howard had been 
briefed along these lines by his own intelligence agencies (2003(2), p83).  The Jull Inquiry 
suggested that: 
4.79 …The AIC assessments are more moderate and cautious than those of their partner 
agencies, particularly those in the United States. However, even within their caution, it is 
arguable that they overstated the degree to which WMD existed. Nevertheless, the pre-war 
assessments that now appear to be most accurate are those that were most sceptical.  
4.80 These were, after September 2002, largely the assessments provided by DIO. In summary, 
DIO said: ‘We thought it likely that they [Iraq] still retained some of the weapons of mass 
destruction that had been produced prior to the Gulf War. But we did cast some doubts about 
the likely state, fragility and reliability of those weapons of mass destruction from that period. 
Iraq had the capability to produce chemical and biological weapons … at relatively short 
notice… but we could not say that they had done so.’ (Jull 2003(2), p 82) 
In their advice to government, DIO questioned whether Saddam had a viable WMD 
program and queried any links with al Qaeda.  Frank Lewincamp, head of the Defence 
Intelligence Organisation (DIO) at the time, said in interview that the agency had told the 
Government directly that there was “no substance” to the claimed links between Saddam 
and al Qaeda and that DIO were “doubtful about the extent to which he's actually got a 
program…Yes, he could reconstitute it, but he doesn't have one at the moment” 
(Lewincamp, pers. comm. 18 Sept, 2012). 
Margaret Swieringa, Secretary to the Jull Committee, summarised the intelligence advice 
provided to the government by the Defence Intelligence Organisation (DIO) and the Office 
of National Assessments (ONA) in an article in the Sydney Morning Herald on 12 April 
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2013.  (The date and agency which provided the advice has been added (Jull, 2003, pp 
82-83).) 
The inquiry found:  
1. The scale of threat from Iraq's weapons of mass destruction was less than it had been a 
decade earlier [ONA 1 March 2001]. 
2. Under sanctions that prevailed at the time, Iraq's military capability remained limited and the 
country's infrastructure was still in decline [ONA 8 February 2002].  
3. The nuclear program was unlikely to be far advanced. Iraq was unlikely to have obtained 
fissile material [DIO/ONA 19 July 2002]. 
4. Iraq had no ballistic missiles that could reach the US. Most if not all of the few SCUDS that 
were hidden away were likely to be in poor condition [DIO/ONA 19 July 2002]. 
5. There was no known chemical weapons production [DIO 31 December 2002]. 
6. There was no specific evidence of resumed biological weapons production [DIO 10 October 
2002]. 
7. There was no known biological weapons testing or evaluation since 1991 [DIO 31 December 
2002]. 
8. There was no known Iraq offensive research since 1991 [DIO 31 December 2002]. 
9. Iraq did not have nuclear weapons [DIO 31 December 2002]. 
10. There was no evidence that chemical weapon warheads for Al Samoud or other ballistic 
missiles had been developed [DIO 31 December 2002]. 
11. No intelligence had accurately pointed to the location of weapons of mass destruction [ONA 
31 January 2003]. 
The report found that the “case made by the government was that Iraq possessed WMD in 
large quantities and posed a grave and unacceptable threat to the region and the world, 
particularly as there was a danger that Iraq's WMD might be passed to terrorist 
organisations…This is not the picture that emerges from an examination of all the 
assessments provided to the committee by Australia's two analytical agencies'' (Jull, 
2003(2), p94).   “Statements by the Prime Minister and Ministers were more strongly 
worded than most of the Australian intelligence community judgements” (Jull 2003(2), 
p94), leading to Australian reports that the Prime Minister had, like the UK Government, 
“sexed up” intelligence to justify Australia’s participation in the invasion (Barker, 2003, 
Walters, 2004). 
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WMD and the Australian Intelligence Community (AIC) 
The Government’s justification for war subtly morphed over time, from a strong pre-war 
emphasis on Iraq’s possession of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) (and the danger 
that Saddam Hussein would pass these weapons to terrorists) towards a greater emphasis 
on the US/Australia alliance after the invasion.   While former Defence Minister, Robert 
Hill, stated in interview that “the debate within the media and within the government was 
about WMD and the potential risk associated with Saddam Hussein having it and 
potentially using WMD” (pers. comm. 12 Feb 2013), he acknowledged that the US Alliance 
had some influence on Australia’s decision to go to Iraq. 
Well in this instance ANZUS I think really is short hand for saying shared interests and 
development of a shared capacity to respond to threats and a certain element of joint 
responsibility to protect each other's interests.  So not in terms of a technically invoking ANZUS 
but the existence of that very close working relationship on defence matters was certainly 
relevant.  Again you'd know from what you've read that in the months that actually led up to the 
final decision we went to great pains to understand exactly how the US thinking was developing 
on it and what they might ask of us because it was in our best interests to know that (Hill, pers. 
comm., 12 Feb 2013). 
Some people interviewed for this project questioned the media’s pre-war emphasis on 
WMD, suggesting that the Government’s publicly-stated reasons for war differed from their 
actual reasons.  In interview, Lewincamp (formerly head of DIO) questioned whether the 
debate over the existence or non-existence of WMD was as critical to the Government’s 
consideration of Australia’s involvement as appeared to be suggested by media coverage 
at the time (pers. comm. 18 Sept. 2012).  The media’s focus on the existence or non-
existence of WMD served to distract them from examining the more strategic questions 
about whether Saddam constituted a security threat in terms of his military capability and 
intent – and from the ‘real’ reasons for Australia’s involvement.   
Well, the question to ask there…is how much that [WMD] was an issue inside Government 
versus how much that was an issue in the media, because I think there is a distinction.  It was 
more a media issue, I think, than it was an issue inside Government.  [This] goes to all of the 
discussion that has occurred since about the real motivations or the reasons for Australia 
participating in the conflict in Iraq….My own view, looking back, is the Government didn't go into 
the conflict in Iraq because of the weapons of mass destruction.  It was one of the justifications 
used publicly as to why the Saddam regime was a threat; but it wasn't a reason.  The reason we 
  
198 
 
went in was because of the relationship with the United States. So I think the focus on weapons 
of mass destruction was much stronger in the media than it was inside Government 
(Lewincamp, pers. comm. 18 Sept. 2012).   
Lewincamp was critical of journalists who, with the benefit of hindsight criticised the 
intelligence community for having got it wrong. 
It's also worth noting that nobody in the media, before the invasion of Iraq - nobody, nobody to a 
person said they had no weapons of mass destruction. Journalists are all very good, after the 
event, of saying ‘oh yes you guys got it all wrong’.  Hang on.  Show me the journalist, in the lead 
up to the invasion that said they had none.  Show me.  You can't.  You cannot find, I'm sure, a 
single journalist that said that (Lewincamp, pers. comm. 18 Sept. 2012).   
Weapons of mass destruction, according to Lewincamp, had been used as a justification 
for the invasion as a means of demonstrating that Saddam could not be trusted.  Saddam 
had used WMD against his own people and could use them again against a neighbouring 
country and might pass them on to terrorist groups.  However, he pointed out that DIO at 
the time had not been convinced of the claimed links between Saddam and al Qaeda and 
said so in their reports to Government.  
Some opponents of the Government accused Howard of taking the nation to war on the 
basis of a lie.  Andrew Wilkie, former ONA analyst and author of Axis of Deceit, argued 
that Howard had misled the Australian public, but not about WMD: rather, about Australia’s 
reasons for going to war and about the nature of the intelligence advice the Government 
was getting (pers. comm. 23 Jan 2013).  Wilkie argued that the Government’s motives for 
entering the war had less to do with WMD and more to do with the US Alliance and 
Australia being a “good Alliance partner”.  He said that the Government had taken very 
“ambiguous” intelligence from the Australian intelligence community and presented it 
publicly in a much less ambiguous way. 
It was patently obvious that the Government's interest in the war was all about the US alliance 
and us being a good alliance partner…It was self-evident that the official case for war was not 
something that was believed within the intelligence community and it couldn't be something that 
the Government was believing. The intelligence advice that the Government was getting was 
painting a very, very ambiguous picture….The intelligence advice about the WMD threat and 
links to terrorists was never as unambiguous as what the Government was using publically. The 
Government was clearly taking ambiguous advice, filtering it, knocking out the qualifications, 
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hardening it up and using it publically, because they wanted to go to war. They wanted to join in 
the war (Wilkie, pers. comm. 23 Jan 2013). 
When it came to the Government inquiries set up to investigate the intelligence on WMD 
and Iraq, Wilkie argued that they missed a critical part of the picture.  What was missing 
were the Australian intelligence assessments of the US, including information about US 
motives for going to war and the reliability of US intelligence assessments. 
Because the organisation that was writing assessments about the US was the Office of National 
Assessments, among the things I was reading were ONA's assessments on the US. Among the 
things I was seeing were the classified emails and cables coming from the Embassy in 
Washington through to the Australian Government and from the ONA Liaison Officer in 
Washington. These cables, these emails being reflected in the ONA assessments, were 
describing in some detail what was going on in Washington, why in fact the US was so 
interested in the war (Wilkie, pers. comm. 23 Jan 2013)..  
According to Wilkie, Australian intelligence assessments of the US were all about the US 
agenda and why the US wanted to go to war.  WMD and terrorism were rarely mentioned. 
It was all about the US agenda: why the US wanted to go to war. You see, this is one of the 
unfortunate things about the inquiries. The inquiries that were set up into the war - which looked 
at intelligence - only looked at the intelligence advice about Iraq. They were never asked - or 
never directed - to look at the intelligence advice the Australian Government was getting about 
the US and UK. That would have blown the lid on the whole thing, because, when you see this 
advice the Government is getting, you see that the Government knew this had precious little to 
do with WMD and terrorism.  It had something to do with WMD and nothing to do with terrorism 
(Wilkie, pers. comm. 23 Jan 2013). 
Dennis Richardson, Director-General of the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation 
(ASIO) at the time, suggested that the rationale for war (WMD) had been overstated. 
No…the rationale was not nearly as strong and unambiguously accurate and dogmatic as what 
was being claimed.  It wasn't made up.  I mean I defy anyone to go back and read the literature 
at the time, including out of the UN, and say it was made up.  Everyone believed, as far as I can 
see, there were weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. It's a question of whether that justified a 
war (Richardson, pers. comm. 16 November 2012). 
After Powell’s presentation to the UN in February 2003, DIO prepared a “limited 
distribution piece” that went to senior members of government, questioning many aspects 
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of the Secretary of State’s presentation and suggesting that the US had drawn firmer 
conclusions than DIO thought warranted (Lewincamp, pers. comm. 18 Sept. 2012).   
I can remember drafting it with my analysts.  We said we have heard the Secretary of State’s 
speech to the United Nations.  We do not have the intelligence to support the judgements that 
he made.  That is for either one of two reasons.  Either the US has intelligence that does 
support the judgements, but that we haven’t seen.  We think that's unlikely.  Secondly, the US 
has drawn firmer conclusions and judgements on the evidence than we think is warranted.  We 
think that's what's happened.  So we said that directly to Government in the front page of our 
assessment of it (Lewincamp, pers. comm. 18 Sept. 2012).   
None of Powell’s evidence was used by Howard in his address to the Press Club on 13 
March 2013 or by Howard or his ministers in the parliamentary debate on 18 March 2013.  
Neither did Howard use again any of the subsequently discredited evidence that he and 
Downer had used in speeches in September 2002 and February 2003.  Hill and others 
claimed that the Government was always conservative in what was said.  Asked about 
what prompted the need for conservatism, and on what basis the Government might act 
conservatively, Hill replied: 
Oh well because I constantly read the intelligence - ours and others - and constantly tried to 
best understand exactly what the situation was.  The difficulty in these things is it's not an open 
book.  You have to draw conclusions from evidence and a lot of that evidence has been 
deliberately withheld….I listened to our intelligence people.  I went to Britain and talked with 
their intelligence people.  I went to the US and talked to their intelligence people.  I had to be on 
the balance, confident of what I was saying…[Powell] relied on material that had been given to 
him and some of it turned out to be flawed.  But we didn't ever say that. [We] must have [had 
some level of doubt about it.]  As I said you make a judgment on everything you see and hear 
(Hill, pers.comm. 12 Feb 2013). 
It is clear that the Government was aware of question marks over some of the US and UK 
intelligence.  The need for conservatism was perhaps explained by a “surge of new 
intelligence on Iraq [that] came in from the beginning of September 2002”, which the 
Committee believed might have prompted many of ONA’s “firmer assessments…despite 
doubts expressed at the time about its trustworthiness” (Jull, 2003(2), p70).  Much of this 
intelligence came from Iraqi defectors through the Iraqi National Congress and the US 
Defense Department’s Office of Special Plans (OSP), headed by Douglas Feith.  OSP had 
direct links with the White House and passed on information which other agencies, 
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including the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the State Department’s Bureau of 
Intelligence and Research (INR), had previously rejected as unreliable or found to have 
been incorrect.  Australian intelligence agencies were well aware of the resulting tensions 
between the US agencies, in particular OSP, CIA and INR, leading to a perception of 
“policy running strong”, that is that some US intelligence had been politicised (Jull, 
2003(2), p72).   
This awareness appears to have resulted in concern at DIO that assessments provided to 
government would take account of any institutional bias in foreign sourced material they 
received.  In addition, however, it is unclear whether the greater resources in Washington of the 
Australia’s Defence intelligence agencies gave them this greater awareness. The continuing 
scepticism in the DIO assessments, compared to those of ONA, might be a reflection of this 
appreciation (Jull, 2003(2), p72).   
Despite pre-war DIO reports to government about the tensions between US intelligence 
agencies, at interview, Howard denied having been aware before the war of the possible 
politicisation of US intelligence.  He used a straw man argument in which he questioned 
whether George Tenet, head of the CIA, had been suborned (induced to act illegally) – 
which both overstated the suggestion and ignored the US agency - the Office of Special 
Plans in the US Defense Department - considered to have been most at fault. 
Well I don't accept that.  There's no evidence that people in the CIA altered intelligence analysis 
as a result of political pressure.  I mean that was not even found in America…..Cheney's office 
had a view and they had some intelligence gathering capacity.  They had sort of an Intelligence 
Unit itself.  But I don't think there was any evidence that - I mean the definitive American 
document on this was the National Intelligence Assessment which is a distillation of all the 
views.  There was an assessment produced in November 2002 and I quote from it in my book.  
There's no serious evidence that that was corrupted by political pressure.   
I mean in order to sustain [the view that some of the intelligence was politicised] you really have 
to accept that George Tenet and all the people immediately under him were suborned.  Well 
having met George Tenet, he was appointed by Clinton, he was the last person who was 
suborned.  He was just not the sort of person to be suborned (Howard, pers. comm. 20 Feb 
2013). 
There is also evidence that, many months before the invasion, the UK intelligence 
community had doubts about some of the US intelligence.  The leaked “Downing Street 
memo” – minutes of a meeting held on 23 July 2002 between Blair and senior officials at 
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Downing Street – reveal that Sir Richard Dearlove, head of MI6, had recently returned 
from Washington and believed that US intelligence was being “fixed around the policy”.   
There was a perceptible shift in attitude. Military action was now seen as inevitable. Bush 
wanted to remove Saddam, through military action, justified by the conjunction of terrorism and 
WMD [Weapons of mass destruction]. But the intelligence and facts were being fixed around the 
policy. The NSC had no patience with the UN route, and no enthusiasm for publishing material 
on the Iraqi regime's record. There was little discussion in Washington of the aftermath after 
military action (Danner, 2006, p88-89). 
In interview, Howard said that he had not been aware of the “Downing Street memo”, but 
(again using a straw man argument) that he did not believe that Sir Richard Dearlove had 
thought the intelligence was faked (pers. comm. 20 Feb 2013).  [‘Fixing the intelligence 
and facts around the policy’ suggests ‘politicised intelligence’ and describes a lack of 
objectivity or a bias in the collection of data.  It does not necessarily imply faking data 
(Lowenthal, 2009, pp3-4).]   
I saw Sir Richard Dearlove when he was Head of MI6 when I was Prime Minister.  I've quoted 
all of this in my autobiography.  I've seen Sir Richard Dearlove subsequently and there's no way 
that Sir Richard Dearlove thought the intelligence was being faked.   
…if you are using that [the leaked Downing Street memo]  to base a claim that Sir Richard 
Dearlove thought the intelligence was suspect, then that does not accord with anything he told 
me…No, definitely not.  Quite the reverse.  Quite the reverse (Howard, pers. comm. 20 Feb 
2013). 
The Jull Committee made public the tenor and timing of the Australian intelligence 
community’s advice to government, which was sceptical about the existence of Saddam’s 
WMD programs.  DIO had also disputed the claimed links between Saddam and al Qaeda 
(Lewincamp, pers. comm., 18 September, 2012).  If the intelligence advice provided by 
Australian intelligence agencies had not provided a compelling case for war, this raises the 
question about the real reason for going to war. DIO’s Frank Lewincamp expressed 
frustration that, despite the findings of the Jull report, neither the media nor the public took 
up the debate about the real reasons for Australia’s going to war.   
If you come to a conclusion from that that there wasn't a compelling case based on the 
intelligence to go to war, that leaves open the question for somebody to then say why did we 
go? So it comes back to this question of why the Jull report did not lead to a stronger public 
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debate about the real reasons. Perhaps there's no appetite, either in the media or in the public, 
for that debate (Lewincamp, pers. comm. 18 Sept. 2012).   
Some in the intelligence community might have felt put out that Howard’s decision to go to 
war in Iraq should result in the glare of public attention questioning the adequacy of their 
own intelligence advice.  Both the Jull and Flood reports pointed to a divergence in advice 
provided by DIO and ONA (around September 2002 (Jull) or late January 2003 (Flood)) 
which raised questions about the possible politicisation of the advice ONA had provided 
the Government during this period.  It was this so-called politicisation narrative that the 
media ran with at the time and which became an effective means for deflecting media and 
political attention away from the critical implication of the Jull report’s findings: that, on the 
basis of advice received by its own intelligence agencies, the Australian Government did 
not have a compelling case for war.  Instead, the intelligence agencies became the focus 
and the Government quickly moved to announce a further inquiry to be headed by former 
senior public servant, Philip Flood. 
Flood, reporting in July 2004, found that there had been “a failure of intelligence on Iraq 
WMD”; that “intelligence was thin, ambiguous and incomplete” and that “Australia had 
shared in the allied intelligence failure on the key question of WMD stockpiles, with ONA 
more exposed and DIO more cautious on the subject. But many of the agencies’ other 
judgments have proved correct” (Flood, 2004, p34).  Contrary to Jull’s suggestion, Flood 
found “no indication that either agency’s reporting was subject to any political influence” 
and that “their reporting on Iraq also demonstrated their capacity to remain independent of 
allied assessments, despite heavy reliance on allied intelligence collection” (2004, p168).  
However, Flood did recommend increased resources and a strengthening of ONA’s role, 
along with a “more deliberate management of the overlap between ONA and DIO, and 
conscious identification of substantive points of agreement and difference between 
analysts and agencies” (2004, p170).  He also suggested a narrowing of DIO’s focus and 
that DIO be headed by a military person rather than a civilian: ironic given that DIO’s 
advice had proven to be closest to the actual situation than any other western intelligence 
agency.  For the head of DIO at the time, this amounted to a “clipping of DIO’s wings” 
(Lewincamp, pers. comm., 18 Sept. 2012).  
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The Flood Review was different because it was a formally appointed review - an evaluation, if 
you like - of the Australian Intelligence Community.  It was done by a government and, frankly in 
my view, it was a very ordinary piece of work. It had a set agenda, a pre-established agenda, if 
you like, which was to re-establish ONA as the head of the intelligence community. That's fine. I 
had no difficulty with that.   
But you might remember, it clipped DIO's wings. It said that DIO had to narrow its focus of 
reporting, and I thought on very spurious grounds. This is partly because people were upset by 
the fact that we had adopted a consistent mind - a different mind - in our reports to that of ONA. 
So, as a number of media commentators said at the time, hang on a minute; DIO got it more 
right than ONA, but you've told DIO to stop doing this? How sensible is that? The Government 
accepted it. So you sit back and you look at that and you think well, somebody's asleep 
(Lewincamp, pers. comm. 18 Sept. 2012).  
While the inquiries had some critics within the intelligence community, Richardson, 
explained why, in his view, the Australian intelligence community did not feel it had been 
used in an exercise to deflect attention away from Howard and the Government.  He 
described how Howard had answered a question in Parliament around September 2003 
when he acknowledged that the intelligence had been inaccurate, but had accepted 
responsibility for taking the nation to war.  Richardson said that Howard had been quite 
explicit in saying that “it is governments that make decisions about war and peace, not 
intelligence agencies” (Richardson, pers. comm. 16 November 2012). 
He [Howard] took the responsibility for the decision. He did not try to dump it off onto the 
intelligence agencies. He simply didn't. He was quite different. What happened here was quite 
different to what unfolded in the UK and in the US, where in both cases, to varying degrees 
there was a temptation to want to blame the intelligence community, which was totally spurious. 
Totally, because, if the mere existence of weapons of mass destruction had been a basis for 
war…they could have gone to war a year or two years before. 
I mean…no one really went after the intelligence community here in Australia. I mean there was 
the Flood report, which led to changes. But that was not a report that went after the intelligence 
agencies. It led to some tightening up and some changes in governance arrangements, 
but…Howard did not set up the Flood inquiry to go after the intelligence community [or] to 
deflect responsibility onto them from him (Richardson, pers. comm. 16 November 2012). 
Despite what Richardson said, in the clamour to find explanations for the collapse of the 
reasons for going to war, the media effect of both the Jull and Flood reports was to move 
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the focus of attention away from Howard and the Government’s decision toward the 
intelligence advice and those proffering it. 
Conclusion 
A number of factors contributed to the media’s coverage of the political fall-out from the 
Iraq war and to Howard’s faring better than his fellow coalition leaders Bush and Blair.  
Howard’s decision to commit to only the major combat operations (invasion phase) 
reduced the chances of Australian military deaths and removed Australians from the 
dangers and responsibility of rebuilding Iraq or responding to the rising insurgency.  It also 
distanced Australia from unpopular decisions like de-Baathification and the dissolution of 
the Iraqi army, that L. Paul Bremmer III made in his role as Administrator of the Coalition 
Provisional Authority (CPA), and from disputes within the US military about the adequacy 
of troop levels in Iraq.   
The post-war inquiries were carefully choreographed and Bush, Blair and Howard 
responded along similar lines at similar times.  Howard was a disciplined politician who 
chose his words carefully.  On Iraq he never varied from the ‘script’ which one can only 
assume was agreed between the three leaders.  In the post-invasion period, neither he nor 
either of the other leaders backed down or expressed any regret for what had happened.  
Each leader continued to argue that the invasion had been worth the cost: that the 
world/middle east/Iraq was now a better place with Saddam gone.  On Iraq, there would be 
no regrets or mea culpas of the kind expressed by former US Secretary of Defense, 
Robert McNamara, over Vietnam. 
Time was on Howard’s side.  It took some months for it to be established definitively that 
there were no WMDs.  This meant that, by the time the rationale for war had collapsed, the 
bulk of Australian troops had been withdrawn and were no longer in harm’s way.  The 
inquiries in Australia were timed to take advantage of the US and UK inquiries and the 
insurgency in Iraq still seemed a manageable problem when the October 2004 elections 
were held. 
The time when Howard was most vulnerable was after the release of the Jull report, which 
found that the “case made by the government that Iraq possessed WMD in large quantities 
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and posed a grave and unacceptable threat to the region and the world” (p94), was not the 
picture that emerged from an examination of assessments by ONA and DIO.  Despite 
headlines on page one of the Australian – “PM’s spin sexed-up Iraq threat” (Walters, 2004) 
– the issue dropped away very quickly.  Two factors contributed toward this.  Firstly, the 
leaking of segments of the report some weeks prior to its official release framed the issue 
for some journalists as being about politicisation of the intelligence bodies, rather than 
about the Howard government’s exaggeration of the case for war.  Secondly, Senator 
Robert Ray, one of the Labor Party’s representatives on the Jull Committee, made 
statements at the time that would have made it impossible for the Labor Party to pursue 
the Government over the report (see chapter 7). Howard’s immediate announcement of a 
further inquiry, to be headed up by Philip Flood, also took heat out of the debate. 
Howard’s skill as a politician meant that he did not have to contend with party dissent of 
the kind that Blair had had to deal with in the UK, where divisions within his own party 
meant that Blair had had to rely on the support of the opposition to go to war (Howard, 
pers. comm. 20 Feb 2013).   Howard’s cups of tea with potentially dissenting 
backbenchers won him the support of his entire party on Iraq, when this was not possible 
on issues such as the treatment of refugees (Howard, pers. comm. 20 Feb 2013).  He was 
barely challenged by an opposition “that failed to clearly define a position on the Iraq War” 
(Latham, 2005, p208). 
In the lead-up to the invasion, the candid advice of his own intelligence agencies enabled 
Howard to modify his rhetoric, previously based on US and UK intelligence sources, which 
were later discredited (Jull, 2003(2)).  By the time it came to the invasion, Howard avoided 
categorical claims that later hounded his colleagues abroad.  The Australian intelligence 
community proved “on the whole more moderate, more measured and more sceptical” 
than their partner agencies in the US and UK (Jull, 2003(2), p50).  No doubt there was a 
spectrum of views in those organisations, but their more measured advice protected 
Howard from the political consequences of overstatement.  With the notable exception of 
Andrew Wilkie, they did not leak against him in the media.  While there may have been 
differences of view, Howard was spared the embarrassment of public revelations from 
serving intelligence analysts.   
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Finally, Howard was a master at managing the message.  He knew how to get his 
message out.  He knew how to persuade and to argue his position.  He was a master at 
black-letter law and, while some people believed he misrepresented the reasons for going 
to war, many people interviewed testified to the pains he went to in choosing his words 
carefully, presumably in order to avoid saying things that he might later regret.  Despite 
public opinion being firmly against the war, Howard won the 2004 election at least in part 
on a “stay-the-course” message, appealing to the sentiment that Australia was not the kind 
of country to “cut and run”: this in the context of Australia having already withdrawn its 
invasion troops.  Perhaps Howard knew that the public and the media had short memories 
and that simple messages tend to trump complex messages when it comes to media 
coverage. 
Of the three models being considered in this project, Entman’s cascading network 
activation model appears to best describe the powerful influence of government over the 
media agenda during the post-invasion period.  This was in part the result of deliberate 
Government action (for example the leaking of the Jull report and announcement of a 
further inquiry), but also the absence of further revelations which might have served to fan 
the flames of a crisis.  Despite overwhelming public opinion that the war had been a 
mistake, public statements by a senior Labor figure made it difficult for the Opposition to 
pursue Howard over Iraq.   Despite the efforts of some sections of the media, the Howard 
Government was spared a political crisis.  Howard’s management of the media and the 
impact of the war on Australian politics will be considered in greater detail in the following 
chapter. 
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Chapter 7 – The Iraq war and Australian politics 
What failed was statecraft, what failed was the policy decisions of the key leadership individuals 
in the three countries….There were intelligence failures…and good lessons I think have been 
learnt from that.  There were greater failures in the use by policymakers or misuse by 
policymakers of intelligence than there were in the intelligence communities in any of the three 
places.  But the greater failure - if, like me, you think it was wrong to go in - was in the decision-
making by the key policymakers and that's a failure of statecraft rather than anything else 
(Gyngell, pers.comm. 10 Oct 2012). 
The Iraq war was an issue which sharply divided Australian society and left many 
unanswered questions.  In the face of widespread public opposition, reflected in opinion 
polls and large demonstrations at the time, Australian troops were committed to war on 
grounds which were later proven to be false.  Two inquiries failed to shed light on the “real 
reason” Australia went to war and, having taken the country to war on a false premise, the 
Government faced little by way of sanction afterward (Goot, 2007).  Issues were raised in 
the media, but quickly faded from view, lacking credible champions who might have kept 
them alive.  Labor called for a royal commission but failed to take political advantage of the 
damaging findings of the Jull report (Price, 2004, Kelly, 2004).  The efforts of a small group 
of former senior defence force personnel and public servants, who called for an Iraq 
Inquiry, appear to have foundered without sufficient political or media sponsorship 
(Broinowski, 2012, Barratt, 2014).  Some people interviewed for this project explained the 
political response to the Iraq war in terms of Howard’s power and skill as a politician 
(Shanahan, pers. comm., 4 Dec 2012, Whitehead, pers. comm., 19 Dec 2012, Shergold, 
pers. comm., 19 Feb 2013).  Some suggested that the media did not do their job properly: 
that they failed to act as a watchdog holding the Government to account (Manne, 2004, 
Jakubowicz and Jacka, 2005, Tanner, pers. comm., 30 Jan 2012).  Some pointed to a 
bureaucracy, cowed and intimidated by a Government determined to keep them in check 
(Kelly, 2009, p260).  Some blamed an Opposition divided by leadership tensions and in 
fear of looking weak on security (Latham, 2005, McLeay, pers. comm., 2 May 2013).  
Finally, others pointed to a passive Australian political culture in which the rights that other 
countries have had to fight for, are taken for granted (McLeay, pers. comm., 2 May 2013).   
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Shaping the pre-war agenda 
This chapter considers the impact of the Iraq war on Australian politics, in particular the 
way in which John Howard’s skill as a politician enabled him to achieve a remarkable level 
of influence within his party, in the Parliament, over the bureaucracy and in shaping the 
media agenda on the issue of Iraq.  Drawing on interviews with key participants, this 
chapter examines how and why Howard was so influential and the degree to which he 
shaped the media agenda before the war and minimised the adverse political 
consequences after the war.      
Howard: Selling the war  
Before the war, Australian public opinion was sharply divided with “those strongly opposed 
at least twice as numerous as those strongly in favour; constituency soundings made by 
the parties’ backbench that indicated considerable public opposition to the US-Australian 
position; and large demonstrations against going to war in most of the Australian capital 
cities” (Goot and Goldsmith, 2012, p.48).  Prime Minister Howard developed a 
communication strategy designed to explain to the Australian people the link between 
Saddam, WMD and terrorists.   
I wanted to get out the key messages of the potential of dangerous weapons being handed to 
terrorists.  I wanted to get out the message that Iraq had had years to comply with Security 
Council resolutions.  I also wanted to get out the message that maintaining the strength of the 
alliance with the United States was very important.  They were the main messages that I wished 
to get out.  People have now forgotten that 10 years ago, 11 years ago after the attack in 
September 2001, the main worry Americans had was when and where the next attack on 
America would take place (Howard, pers. comm. 20 Feb 2013). 
Howard denied in interview that he had ever said that Saddam had been involved in the 
9/11 attacks on New York and Washington.  He argued instead that the 9/11 attacks had 
changed the Americans’ perception of the risk of terrorist groups getting hold of WMD. 
Saddam was not involved in the attack on New York and Washington.  I’ve never argued that he 
was.  But I certainly believed, and the evidence available to us pointed in that direction, he did 
have weapons of mass destruction and there was a concern that they might be handed to 
terrorist groups (Howard, pers. comm., 20 Feb 2013). 
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As Prime Minister, Howard earned himself a reputation as a skilled politician, effective in 
getting his message across (MacCallum, 2012, Fitzgerald, 2008, Kelly, 1992).  He was 
rarely caught out by a question, staying on message and avoiding answers to complex 
questions he would rather avoid.  Howard was “a very good parliamentary performer and a 
more than competent media communicator” (Fitzgerald, 2008, p101).  Despite his skills, 
there was a cool distance in his relationship with the Parliamentary Press Gallery.  Howard 
deliberately bypassed press conferences with the Gallery in favour of situations, like door-
stops and radio and television interviews, where he had greater control over the message 
(Fitzgerald, 2008).  Victorian radio personality, Jon Faine observed that Howard could 
reach massive numbers of voters in a short time through the strategic use of talk radio. 
John Howard has been more prepared to harness talk radio than any of his predecessors.  In an 
hour and a half in the morning, whenever the situation requires immediate action, the Prime 
Minister will blitz the nation with as few as two or three or perhaps as many as half a dozen 
carefully placed radio interviews.  Typically, the ABC’s AM or Radio National Breakfast (now 
with Fran Kelly, a press gallery veteran) and Alan Jones in Sydney will get a call offering up the 
Prime Minister for a chat.  The equivalent in TV would require a day of trekking from studio to 
studio.  Using a telephone and the radio it can be all done before nine o’clock in the morning.  
Even sequential newspaper interviews would chew into the prime ministerial diary and make for 
a less efficient use of time….John Howard’s style has been to tackle major issues, to engage 
and – if required – to speak with as many cities and as many stations as possible.  His office 
has cultivated relationships with presenters in each major market to try to contain and confront 
problems.  He has used this approach for the Iraq war, the Tampa and Timor, to name just a 
few (Faine cited in Manne (ed), 2005, pp171-2). 
After such radio interviews Howard’s press office would circulate the transcripts to the 
Gallery, ensuring that the key messages of the day were received by the print media in the 
context of Howard’s choosing.  If the print media wanted a Howard quote, the radio 
transcript was the only available source that day.   
I used radio very extensively because I found it a medium that allowed you to explain things in a 
fashion that you couldn't always do in a television interview or in a news conference.  They are 
deficient as mediums of relaxed explanatory communication… Radio is in some respects the 
best way of communicating a message: that is that people can actually hear your story - those 
who listen.  Whereas you can give your story at a news conference and the only people who 
might hear it are the journalists present because nobody chooses to report it.  Unless the news 
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conference is directly telecast and that doesn't happen very often (Howard, pers. comm., 20 
Feb 2013). 
Critical also to Howard’s efforts to control the media message was his maintenance of 
strict discipline in his Cabinet and in the party room.  On the issue of Iraq there was no 
exception.  That discipline held to every man and woman in the party in the lead-up to and 
for the duration of the war. 
The Prime Minister’s office controls the media agenda by controlling the Cabinet and the 
backbenchers as well.  The entire Liberal and National party staff stayed year after year 
consistently “on message”.  Very few leaks came directly from the Howard inner circle and 
those that did were contrived for media purposes and never investigated by the Australian 
Federal Police (Fitzgerald, 2008, p97). 
The former head of the Prime Minister’s department, Peter Shergold, credited Howard’s 
human relations skills and his paying attention to potential dissenters as having played a 
significant role in party unity on the question of Iraq.   
I think the Prime Minister worked hugely, both through Cabinet, through meetings with his 
colleagues.  He would often - particularly on issues where he thought there was concern - he 
would go out of his way to have people come round to his office, have cups of tea.  He was very 
strong, if you will, on his human relations skills, particularly with those who were most likely to 
be dissenters, to make sure… they could see that their views were being heard and they were 
being taken account of (Shergold, pers. comm. 19 Feb 2013). 
Howard himself acknowledged that there had been those in the Liberal and National 
parties with reservations and that he had spent time with them, but that the American 
Alliance, September 11 and the Bali bombings had contributed to a strong ‘instinct’ within 
the Coalition to support going in to Iraq. 
Well there were some people who had reservations and those people who had reservations I 
talked to, I spent time with them to explain it.  In the end they went along with it.  There weren't 
many...But the instinct to support the sort of thing we did in Iraq was very strong in the Liberal 
and National parties. The American Alliance is part of it.  Once again you've got to go back 10 
years.  You've got to understand it.  This was in the shadow of what happened in America in 
September 2001 and in the shadow of what happened in Bali in October 2002.  There's a 
different - I mean we're now 10 years beyond those events and look back and say, oh why did 
we do this, why did we do that.  You've got to take yourself back to the atmosphere at that time 
(Howard, pers. comm. 20 Feb 2013). 
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Howard’s formidable political skills enabled him to think on his feet while staying on 
message (MacCallum, 2012); listen to mainstream Australia and use their language to 
address their concerns (Fitzgerald, 2008); and win over potential opposition within the 
Liberal and National parties by paying attention to potential dissenters (Shergold, pers. 
comm. 19 Feb 2013).  While keeping to message, Howard’s apparent lack of scripting 
meant that he came across as modest and a good listener (Whitehead, pers. comm., 19 
Dec. 2012).   
The Opposition and the lead-up to Iraq  
In the long lead-up to the war, the Leader of the Opposition had the fraught task of 
negotiating Labor’s position in a situation which was continually changing and where there 
was no clear consensus among Labor Caucus members about what should be done 
(Tanner pers. comm., 30 Jan 2013).  Former Labor Finance Minister, Lindsay Tanner, 
spoke about the “slow build-up” to war, with the “to-ing and fro-ing between Bush and 
Blair” making it a prolonged and difficult process for Labor, especially around the question 
of United Nations support.   
So we had this diabolical problem, where there were sections of the Labor Party, who - possibly 
including me…- who basically just would have opposed participation full stop.  There were 
others for whom the position of the United Nations was quite critical, and who had the view if, as 
in 1991, there was a formal UN-endorsed process, we should treat that pretty seriously and 
probably accept it… 
…So there's an extended period, which made us very politically vulnerable. Because it meant 
that on the one hand we had the government going all the way with George W and rattling the 
sabre, and accusing us of being in bed with Saddam Hussein.  On the other hand, you had the 
Greens and various other characters able to take the fundamentalist ‘no blood for oil’ kind of 
stuff, and carry no responsibility for any serious decision-making.  So that meant that the Labor 
Party was in a very difficult position for an extended period of time (Tanner, pers. comm., 30 
Jan. 2013). 
Most in Labor did not dispute the existence of WMD, but there were differences about the 
level of threat they represented and how this should be managed (Tanner pers. comm., 30 
Jan 2013).  The Labor Party ultimately took a position that it would support military action 
against Iraq only if it had the support of the UN, but there were subtle changes in the 
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Party’s position over time.  On 21 September 2002, Labor’s Shadow Foreign Affairs 
spokesman, Kevin Rudd, in an interview with Lateline’s Tony Jones, suggested that, if UN 
Security Council processes were to be exhausted, then Labor would support unilateral US 
military action subject to either of two conditions: “evidence of a link between Iraq and 
events of September 11 or evidence of a significant expansion in Iraq's weapons of mass 
destruction capability and threat”.  While Rudd was personally convinced that Saddam had 
WMD, he was unclear about Iraq’s nuclear status.  
Iraq’s Foreign Minister is a liar.  Iraq plainly possesses chemical and biological weapons agents, 
and there is some evidence that those agents have been weaponised.  The nuclear question is 
a much more open one.  But that ball-faced statement that he put to the UN [that his country 
was totally clear of all nuclear, chemical and biological weapons] is simply untrue.  The 
question for the international community is - what do we do about it and through what legal and 
political process? (Rudd, 2002(a)). 
In another interview with Lateline’s Tony Jones, three days later on 24 September 2002, 
Rudd again asserted that Saddam possessed WMD. 
There is no debate or dispute as to whether Saddam Hussein possesses weapons of mass 
destruction.  He does.  There's no dispute as to whether he's in violation of UN Security Council 
resolutions.  He is.  The argument before us is what sort of action should be taken (Rudd, 
2002(b)). 
Labor’s position was complicated by Howard’s stated commitment to a second UN 
resolution (which Labor also supported) and his refusal to admit that any decision about 
Australian troop involvement had been made - until just days before the invasion, when 
Cabinet authorised “our defence forces, which were pre-deployed to the gulf to acclimatise 
and contribute to the campaign to persuade Saddam Hussein into compliance, to take part 
in coalition operations” (Howard, 18 March 2003).  Tanner suggested that, had there been 
a second UN resolution, it might have put Left members of Caucus in a difficult situation.  
Oh look, it was all pretty fluid…there were lots of very tricky discussions in the Shadow Cabinet.  
But I think a lot of people in the Right would have been tempted to support a United Nations 
backed military intervention.  It's not clear what the outcome would have been for Labor's 
position had that been the choice facing us.  There would have been a fair proportion of the 
Caucus - predominantly in the Left - that I think would have opposed anyway.  But a lot would 
have depended on the detail and how things unfolded (Tanner, pers. comm. 30 Jan. 2013). 
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Labor’s withholding of support for the Government’s position meant that for the third time 
in its history Australia faced the prospect of the commitment of troops abroad without bi-
partisan political support (O’Connor 2004, p211).  [At the time, Labor claimed that it was 
the first time in Australia’s history (Crean, 2003)].  Asked why there had not been a 
backlash against Howard when no WMD were found, Richardson suggested that the 
political debate in Australia during that pre-war period had “moved around”, and that the 
view that Saddam Hussein had possessed WMD had been shared by many across the 
political spectrum.   
Look at the political debate in Australia, and how it all moved around. You pick out any 
individual across the political spectrum. So apart from those at either end, you look at what your 
major politicians at the time were saying…everyone was persuaded that there were weapons of 
mass destruction in Iraq, and I suppose the view was, well if they went in there and were able to 
hold up a weapon of mass destruction at the end of it and say look what I got, then at least that 
would be some sort of legitimate rationalisation. But that did not happen. They found a few old 
things, but the thing is they did not find anything that you could legitimately argue were weapons 
of mass destruction.  Getting the odd old rusty shell here and there isn't going to help you. But 
they did uncover a clandestine network and intention on the part of Saddam Hussein to resume 
once sanctions were lifted. But you can understand why that war remains controversial, and will 
for a long time. It just will (Richardson, pers. comm., 16 November 2012). 
Rudd’s categorical pre-war statements about Saddam having WMD reduced Labor’s 
capacity to attack, and gave the Government ammunition, which it has used on countless 
occasions since.  In Latham’s words “the party failed to clearly define a position on the Iraq 
War.  We failed to vigorously oppose the Howard Government’s misguided policy of 
searching for weapons of mass destruction that didn’t exist, and of making Australia a 
bigger target in the war on terror” (2005, p208). 
Controlling the post-war agenda 
Just as Howard proved to be a master at framing the pre-war debate, such that Australian 
involvement appeared to have hinged on the question of the existence of WMD, he proved 
adept at focusing the post-war debate on pre-war intelligence and those who provided it, 
rather than on the policy process which informed the decision itself (White, 2004).   
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Howard: managing the consequences of war 
Howard has acknowledged that going to war in Iraq was the most controversial thing he 
did in his time as Prime Minister (pers. com., 20 Feb 2013).   He had expected a backlash, 
but admitted that Blair had had a harder time than he, Howard, had domestically (pers. 
comm., 20 Feb 2013).  Interviewees in this study identified a number of factors - some 
outside Howard’s control, but others related to his considerable skill as a politician – as 
having contributed to his political wellbeing in the aftermath of the invasion.   Howard 
acknowledged that luck had been on his side when it came to casualties, while pointing 
out that Australia’s Special Forces had been well trained and had had an opportunity to 
acclimatise to the conditions in the Middle East beforehand (pers.com. 20 Feb 2013).  
Howard had expected casualties when troops were committed, but was pleasantly 
surprised when there were no deaths in battle. (He acknowledged the deaths in Iraq of 
Private Kovco, and Flight Lieutenant Pardoel who died in a plane crash while serving with 
the British Armed Forces (pers.com. 20 Feb 2013).)  
The lack of Australian casualties was identified by a number of interviewees as being the 
critical issue in minimising any political backlash for Howard.  Nick Bryant, former BBC 
correspondent in Washington during the Iraq invasion (pers.com., 3 Dec 2013) and Roy 
Eccleston, former News Ltd Washington correspondent (pers.com. 21 Jan 2013), both 
identified the absence of ADF casualties as having had a significant impact on the public’s 
response to Howard after the war.  Eccleston also pointed to the fact that Australia did not 
get drawn into scandals like Abu Ghraib. 
The Australians didn't lose soldiers there.  I don't think they lost a single soldier in Iraq…You 
had a lot of Brits dying and certainly the Americans, a lot of Americans were killed, but also had 
that whole scandal with Abu Ghraib, that really tarnished the Americans…. my view is it would 
have been first of all deaths and we had a minimal - minimal, that's not fair to Australia - but we 
didn't have the amount of troops on the ground essentially that the Americans and the British 
did and so he didn't have to cope with all that.  Then perhaps we weren't really drawn into the 
scandals.  (Eccleston, pers. comm., 21 Jan 2013) 
Some commentators suggested that many Australians did not see Iraq as Australia’s war 
and that this perception contributed to the lack of a backlash against Howard when no 
WMD were found.  Former Fairfax editor, Peter Fray, argued that, compared with Bush 
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and Blair, Howard had not been seen as sufficiently ‘in the tent’ to have had to pay a price 
when the reasons for war collapsed. 
Howard was smart enough - or was not so much in the tent enough - that he had to do the 
massive selling job.  The Americans and the British did nearly all of it. The war wouldn't have 
happened without Blair and Bush - obviously wouldn't have happened without Bush. But I'm 
pretty sure it wouldn't have happened without Bair… [Bush] needed a really big friend [Blair] 
next to him and I think in terms of public opinion here - not wishing to diminish the Office of 
Prime Minster of Australia - but I really do think it was seen as something that we went along 
with rather than we instigated. I think that's probably the crucial difference isn't it? That we didn't 
instigate it. We were asked by our longstanding friends to come along for the ride and we said 
yes. No one died - well, when I say no one, not many people died. We didn't have a lot of blood 
on our hands in terms of killing civilians or those sorts of horrible things that happen in war 
(Fray, pers. comm., 31 Oct 2012). 
This view accords with that expressed by Paul Kelly of the Australian, who suggested that 
the Government had deliberately not played much of a role in selling the war. 
[The Government] wasn’t encouraging a big debate about this.  When you look at Howard’s 
statement justifying war – and I made this point at the time – the really interesting thing is that 
he’s not supporting regime change.  He’s not saying Iraq is a direct threat to Australia.  His 
actual justification for the war is very meagre and very general.  He’s very careful about what he 
says.  Very careful.  That’s why I kept saying he did not make a persuasive case for war (Kelly, 
pers. comm., 18 June 2012). 
Many of those interviewed pointed to the discipline of Howard, his office, his party and the 
defence department and their ability to control the media debate.  Fray spoke about the 
control that Howard’s office had over the entire Government, including the bureaucracy. 
I thought, that the media debate was all going through Howard's office in terms of the 
government's side of it. I mean it was very disciplined within the party certainly, but also there 
wasn't an outbreak of like the defence department saying anything. Never does really. But do 
you know what I mean? They really towed the line, which made the stuff about children 
overboard even more remarkable. That was another story (Fray, pers. comm., 31 Oct 2012). 
According to Shergold, Howard was effective in using the Cabinet process to win over his 
colleagues and enforce party discipline (pers. comm. 19 Feb 2013). 
It is certainly true that the Prime Minister was always a very good user of Cabinet, a bit like Bob 
Hawke and like I think Paul Keating…He used Cabinet to have quite long discussions about the 
war in Iraq and particularly before going, so that essentially nobody - it made it harder for 
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anybody to pull out.  I mean the most extraordinary thing, I believe, if you look at that period, is 
through all of the controversy about going to war in Iraq, I don't think any member of the 
Coalition ever crossed the floor...including all - if you like - the Petro Georgiou soft left.  
Whereas they did cross it occasionally on detention or refugees - not on Iraq - which is just 
extraordinary when you consider the controversy that surrounded the war (Shergold, pers. 
comm. 19 Feb 2013).   
A number of interviewees pointed to Howard’s carefulness in his use of language and his 
avoidance of overblown statements that might otherwise have come back to haunt him.  A 
former Australian embassy official based in Washington before the invasion observed that 
Howard had avoided Manichean Bush-like statements about good and evil or “you're either 
for us or against us” which worked to Howard’s advantage when the reasons for war 
collapsed. 
Howard played a much more careful game in his statements, and I think that Bush standing on 
that aircraft carrier, and saying the war was won…the overblown statements, and - I'm obviously 
more familiar with the Bush statements because I was there for some of them, but – ‘you're 
either for us or against us’; ‘the axis of evil’, and all of these kinds of [statements] - simplifying to 
the point of absurdity the complexities of issues like this. Inevitably, I think those kinds of things 
bite you…when you can't deliver on them. A simple statement – even Hawke and ‘no child 
would live in poverty’ - those sorts of things, they get you in the end, if you make an ill-advised 
statement (former Australian embassy official based in Washington, pers. comm., 24 March 
2013). 
Former Defence Minister, Robert Hill, agreed that Howard had avoided over-blown 
statements and pointed out that Howard had never gone as far as Blair in his arguments in 
support of war. 
I do think that they copped more criticism, particularly Blair, because he did go further in some 
of his statements than we did.  Brits seemed to draw conclusions that we didn't draw.  We didn't 
see sufficient evidence to draw those conclusions and when those conclusions were shown to 
be wrong then he copped a lot of flak.  He also copped quite a bit of flak over the internal 
processes within the UK both in decision-making but also in communication of the government’s 
position (Hill, pers. comm., 12 Feb 2013).   
Allan Gyngell, former Executive Director of the Lowy Institute, was another observer who 
believed that Howard’s rhetoric, in particular his avoidance of values-laden statements and 
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his careful references to the Alliance, minimised irritation and reduced a possible public 
backlash in Australia. 
Howard never couched his rhetoric in the values-laden way that Blair and Bush did.  What he 
said was always pretty careful, heavily weighted on the alliance relationship to mentions of the 
engagement.  Howard didn't drive people crazy in the way that Blair did with his tone of moral 
righteousness. The British have still got this commission of inquiry going into the Iraq War.  It's 
very hard to imagine any deep seated wave of support for such a thing here in Australia 
(Gyngell, pers. comm. 10 Oct, 2012). 
Shergold agreed that, when it came to the war, Howard chose his words carefully and that, 
as a result people did not believe they had been misled. 
The speeches he gave to Parliament - and there would probably only have been three major 
ones, I think, during the war - they were the only speeches that I saw the Prime Minister ever 
have very detailed drafts written for him, because he tended to speak off the cuff or his 
speechwriters would give him the thrust of the speech and he would use it.  But on those 
speeches to Parliament he knew how important it was that every word was to the best of our 
knowledge correct and very careful about what he said.  Again I think, although people were 
obviously able to attack him very severely on the fact that no weapons of mass destruction were 
ever found - I think that the speeches he gave to Parliament on the issue were never found 
wanting.  Nobody actually believed that he had misled in any way, because he was so careful.  
It was the only speeches I can remember where he read from the first word to the last word, 
what was written in front of him (Shergold, pers. comm., 19 Feb 2013). 
Another reason for the comparative lack of a backlash against Howard and his 
government lay in his popularity and the perception of a unified government.  One 
journalist pointed to a combination of political and cultural factors that contributed to 
Howard’s relatively gentle post-Iraq treatment compared with Blair’s in the UK, where 
Blair’s own party was accusing him of being a sycophant to the US. 
Britain had ideas about power that Australia doesn’t have. Australia looks to the US as its sort of 
protector whereas the UK looks to the US more as an equal, if not in power terms, then at least 
possibly - not economic terms - but in terms of its position on the world stage.   [The UK is] also 
a more self-confident nation I think, where people aren’t as scared…of upsetting America in the 
same way that they are here. You’ve got few strategic factors which translate to political, cultural 
factors and you also have the fact that in other respects, Howard was just very popular and had 
a very disciplined government. The public saw that. They saw this sort of united government 
and they thought, well America is our important ally. We need them. They were more willing to 
go along with that than those in Britain were (pers. comm., 8 Jan 2013). 
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Howard’s crowded domestic agenda may also have protected him in the post-Iraq 
environment.  According to Whitehead, the war had little impact on his popularity. 
Howard was not strengthened by our involvement in the war and, therefore, was not weakened 
by the war when it turned out to be unsuccessful. He had a very full political agenda that 
dominated. As important as war is, John Howard was completely in command of the domestic 
agenda. During this time he was, possibly, at the peak of his listening powers….His popularity 
was, virtually, untouched by what happened in Iraq (Whitehead, pers. comm. 19 Dec, 2012). 
Blair rather than Howard, Fray suggested, had the personal qualities that made him the 
obvious choice to “sell” the war and this meant that Iraq was more Blair’s and Bush’s war 
than it was Howard’s.    
 [Howard] is a smart, wily politician…and so he was able to steer a slightly more middle path 
than the other two.  But if you wanted to sell war - I mean a popular war - to a world you 
wouldn't ask John Howard to do it.  But you would ask Tony Blair to do it. Tony Blair came to 
Australia a couple of years ago…and he was asked…why was it that he always seemed - 
despite all the terrible things that went on and the pressure he must have been under - why he 
always seemed so happy.  He said, well no one wants to get on a plane with an unhappy 
depressed pilot. That's why, Blair was incredibly good at just being upbeat.  Some of his [Blair’s] 
public performances during the lead-up to the war were remarkable and I couldn't imagine John 
Howard doing that. It's different people (Fray, pers. comm. 31 Oct 2012).  
Fray questioned whether Iraq had been a ‘hot button’ issue for Australians.  Howard was 
“too busy insulting the blacks to worry about selling the war” with the result that “we 
[Australia] didn’t get our fingerprints on anything” (Fray, pers. comm., 31 Oct 2012).   
John Howard at the time was too busy insulting the blacks to worry about selling the war. He 
was too busy not saying sorry… Even though public opinion was opposed to [the war], I don't 
think it was a hot button - a really hot button issue.  On the left, the ‘sorry’ thing for instance is 
far more important - far more of a hot issue. If you had an agenda to get rid of John Howard, 
you can see that you were going to get much more traction exposing his incapacity to say sorry 
for something that clearly needed to be said sorry about, than a war where it wasn't really our 
war (Fray, pers. comm. 31 Oct 2012). 
Former Prime Minister Malcolm Fraser doubted that John Howard paid any political price 
at all for having gone to war in Iraq on grounds that later proved false.  He argued that 
“there were votes in doing what America wants” (Fraser, pers. comm. 30 Jan 2012). 
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Australians - if you like - if you read the history from Federation or from before Federation, we've 
been a fearful nation. We've always wanted the protection of a major power. We thought Britain 
would protect us - we didn't ratify the Statute of Westminster till 11 years after the British passed 
that act. Because we thought it would weaken Britain's obligation to defend us. It was Curtin 
who ratified the treaty for Australia. Canada and South Africa applied it immediately, as did 
Ireland. But we didn't because we wanted protection of the Empire, wanted protection of Britain.  
We were quite incapable of reading the signs that the British did not have a navy big enough to 
fight a war in home waters and in the Pacific.  We didn't recognise how grievously weakened 
Britain was by the first war. Britain didn't herself. People still were living in the past, believing 
that where the map was pink, you'd be safe (Fraser, pers. comm. 30 Jan 2012). 
Whitehead suggested that Howard survived the political aftermath of the Iraq war because 
the Australian people felt that he should not have been held responsible for flaws in the 
intelligence of our allies, the US and UK. 
Our intelligence was one removed from the intelligence that the Australian Government was 
relying on. We were relying on the US and the UK, and it was the flaws in those secret services 
that put the pressure back on the political masters in those cities. There were no deep 
intelligence flaws that originated with Australian intelligence sources that directly led to any of 
these decisions. So I think there was a disconnect there; that the Government here was not 
seen to be responsible for the deep flaws in intelligence that came from the UK or the US. I 
don’t think there's anything in our system of Government that requires the Australian Prime 
Minister to be responsible for something in another country's intelligence services. I think that 
was a bridge too far for the Australian public. It certainly was not prosecuted politically that way 
therefore Howard was responsible. You simply couldn't extend that argument (Whitehead, pers. 
comm. 19 Dec, 2012). 
As early as November 2003 (just eight months after the invasion), Howard told David Frost 
in an interview at the BBC that “by and large Australia had moved on” from Iraq.  Hugh 
White, Head of the Strategic & Defence Studies Centre at ANU, pointed to the interview as 
an example of Howard’s confidence that he had read the mood of the Australian people 
and had their support. 
Howard was in London and he was asked by a BBC interviewer why Australia's involvement in 
Iraq hadn't been as contentious in Australia, or wasn't then as contentious in Australia as 
Britain's involvement in Iraq had been in Britain.  Howard said, oh, I think Australians have 
moved on from Iraq (White, pers. comm., 23 August, 2012). 
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Former Labor Minister, Lindsay Tanner, put the view that Howard escaped a backlash 
after the Iraq invasion because he always had the ready excuse that he believed Saddam 
had WMD because of the intelligence briefings he received before the invasion – and also 
because, by 2004, the war was “all over” and people were not interested in debating 
history (pers. comm. 30 Jan 2012). 
The real answer is nobody cares, because it's ancient history. It's - I'm exaggerating for effect 
here - but by the time you get to that point [the 2004 inquiries into Iraq intelligence] Iraq has 
been invaded. It's over.  Saddam Hussein is dead.  And so this is a debate about history. 
Politics is prospective, always prospective. People are not interested in debating history. 
Keep in mind that the UK involvement was much more high profile and substantial and centre 
stage than ours. [They were] not really influenced by that ‘Americans right or wrong’ kind of 
thing that's deeply embedded in the Australian psyche. So it's not comparable.  But I would say 
that outside the people who'd read The Guardian and The Independent, the political impact of 
all those enquiries and stuff in the UK is minimal (Tanner, pers. comm. 30 Jan 2012). 
Howard’s formidable political skills, according to Whitehead, had enabled him to maintain 
strict party unity when it came to Iraq, while dominating the political debate with domestic 
issues of concern to “middle Australia”.  Iraq was treated as an issue of concern only to the 
left intelligencia – the people who Howard believed would never have voted for him in any 
case – and shared responsibility for the collapse of the war’s rationale with the Australian 
intelligence community.  According to Whitehead, his framing of the war was rarely 
challenged by the media. 
He spent a lot of time listening to middle Australia. A politician so good at doing that...He had a 
very good feel for research polling that reinforced what he was hearing. He was not a Prime 
Minister who spent an awful lot of time in the parliamentary triangle in Canberra. He was much 
more comfortable being out in the suburbs, much more comfortable. He listened successfully to 
changing popular opinion. He remained popular. His popularity was, virtually, untouched by 
what happened in Iraq. (Whitehead, pers. comm. 19 Dec, 2012) 
Whitehead spoke of Howard’s ability to show remorse at the same time as showing 
strength which enabled him to connect with Australians at a personal level. 
Look, John Howard, I think, is an extraordinary man and an extraordinary politician, the likes of 
which we don't often see. His ability to show remorse at the same time as showing strength of - 
the courage of his convictions - I think is unmatched. Any time, post-Iraq and Afghanistan, that 
he has spoken he has talked about being deeply affected by committing - deeply personally 
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affected by committing troops to war. It is spoken with a sincerity that is not questioned - nor 
should it be questioned - but it's a strength of his character as a politician that he can, at once, 
be strong about his political decisions and, at the same time as being genuinely affected and, 
therefore, able to connect with Australians at a personal level…He will go down as one of 
Australia's most extraordinary politicians. His connection with middle Australia is unmatched 
(Whitehead, pers. comm. 19 Dec, 2012). 
Howard’s long career in politics was marked by “wildly fluctuating political fortunes” which 
meant that he was much more successful in government than in opposition (Tiffen, 2006). 
Part of his success as Prime Minister has been attributed to “his skilful agenda 
management and his defensive skills in news management” (Tiffen, 2006). 
The leaking of the Jull report 
The Howard Government has been “a master of defusing bad news by shaping 
expectations and then having a simple line of defense, whether or not it matches the 
evidence” (Tiffen, 2006).  An example of this was the government’s handling of the release 
of the report of the Parliamentary Joint Committee on ASIO, ASIS and DSD’s Inquiry into 
Intelligence on Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), the Jull Committee report.  
Just a couple of weeks after the Hutton inquiry report was leaked prior to its official release 
in the UK, segments of the Jull report were leaked in Australia.  While in the UK the Hutton 
report was leaked to the Sun (a Murdoch-owned pro-government paper), in Australia the 
Jull report – apparently without the sections which criticised the Government – were 
leaked to a journalist known to be critical of the Government’s Iraq agenda, Tom Allard, 
who worked for the only major newspaper opposed to Australia’s participation in the Iraq 
war, the SMH.  [Fairfax’s Melbourne-based paper, the Age, supported Australia’s 
involvement in the war.]  On 17 February 2004, Allard’s front page article, based on the 
leaked information, ran with the headline “Case for war not sexed up, MPs find”, with the 
following opening lines: 
There appeared to be no systematic doctoring of intelligence by Australia's political leaders 
before the Iraq war but there was not enough information to be definitive, a parliamentary report 
is expected to find.  It is understood Australia's intelligence services do not get off so lightly the 
bipartisan report finding they did not provide advice of the highest standards before the decision 
was taken to send troops to war (Allard, 2004(a)). 
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As happened with the leaked Hutton report in the UK, in the absence of the full Jull report 
(not released until 1 March 2003), subsequent news coverage drew on the leaked material 
which appeared in Allard’s article.  One example was an Australian Associated Press 
(AAP) report out the same day which carried the headline “Iraq report expected to clear 
Gov’t” (2004(a)).  The following day Allard ran a further article drawing on the leaked 
material, titled “Agencies targeted in Iraq fallout” (Allard, 2004 (b)).  
Australia's premier intelligence analysis agency, the Office of National Assessments, applied 
insufficient rigour to its work and was too accepting of the claims of foreign spy services about 
Iraq's illicit weapons, a parliamentary report is expected to find.  And while its compatriot spy 
agency, the Defence Intelligence Organisation, was more careful, both surmised that Iraq had 
weapons of mass destruction, including in a joint submission to the Federal Government in the 
weeks before the war.   
The developments came after the Herald yesterday revealed that the intelligence committee 
report due for public release on March 1 is expected to absolve the Government of charges it 
doctored intelligence on Iraq's weapons of mass destruction.  The article also said that while the 
Government did not get a "clean bill of health", the strongest criticism was reserved for the 
intelligence agencies for not providing advice of the highest standard (Allard, 2004 (b)).   
The leak had effectively framed the key issue arising from the Jull report as being the 
divergence in advice between the two intelligence agencies.  The suggestion was that 
ONA had “tended to produce material to fit with government policy objectives” (Allard, 
2004(b)), in other words the intelligence had been politicised. [Howard denied he had 
either leaked, or authorized the leaking of the report (18 Feb 2004).]  This frame persisted 
for almost two weeks without contradiction and clearly influenced the public view and other 
journalists’ reading of the report when it was finally released.   
When the official report was released, several media organisations suggested that the 
report had cleared the Government – which it had not (Tiffen, 2006).  AAP reported that 
“The committee cleared the government of sexing up the intelligence report to justify war 
against Iraq, saying it was more moderate and measured than its alliance partners” 
(2004(a)). Alexander Downer, Minister for Foreign Affairs, claimed that the report 
“vindicate[d] the Government’s use of intelligence in making the case for action against 
Iraq” (Ramsey, 2004), while Howard argued the report had found “there was no 
interference in the work of the intelligence agencies” and that the “statements I and my 
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colleagues had made were very moderate, particularly compared with the statements of 
others” (Ramsey, 2004, Tiffen, 2006, Browne, 2004 ).   
Many journalists, primed to focus on the politicisation of ONA, missed the significance of 
the most critical finding in the report: namely that, on the basis of Australia’s own 
intelligence advice, there was no compelling case for war.  Tiffen suggested that “it is 
unlikely that many members of the press gallery read the key conclusion” (2006, p9):    
…the case made by the government was that Iraq possessed WMD in large quantities and 
posed a grave and unacceptable threat to the region and the world, particularly as there was a 
danger that Iraq’s WMD might be passed to terrorist organisations. This is not the picture that 
emerges from an examination of all the assessments provided to the Committee by Australia’s 
two analytical agencies (Jull, 2003(2), p93).   
The report said that “statements made by the Prime Minister and Ministers are more 
strongly worded than most of the Australian intelligence community (AIC) judgements…in 
part because they quote directly from British and American intelligence agencies” (Jull, 
2003(2), p94) 
In particular, in the 4 February 2003 speech to the House of Representatives, the Prime Minister 
quoted the findings of Joint Intelligence Committee of the UK and the key judgements of the 
National Intelligence Estimate of the CIA.  In both of these documents the uncertainties had 
been removed and they relied heavily on the surge of new and largely untested intelligence, 
coming, in the US at least, from Iraqi defectors (Jull, 2003(2), p94) 
Howard was also found to have selectively quoted from UN information in order to make a 
more compelling case for war.   On 4 February 2003, in the House of Representatives, 
Howard quoted from a UN transcript of their debriefing of Saddam’s son-in-law, Kamel 
Hussein (former head of Iraq’s WMD development programs who defected in 1995), that 
“Iraq had ‘a massive program for developing offensive biological weapons – one of the 
largest and most advanced in the world’” (Jull, 2003(2), p95).  Howard failed to mention 
that Kamel also said in that interview that, at the end of the First Gulf War, “I ordered 
destruction of all chemical weapons. All weapons - biological, chemical, missile, nuclear 
were destroyed" (UNSCOM/IAEA, 1995, p13).  Jull found that: 
..this description [Howard’s] of [Kamel] Hussein’s admission was true, but the program he 
described related to a much earlier period, and the bulk of the Kamal (sic) Hussein’s debriefing 
made repeated statements about the failures of nuclear programs, the destruction of weapons 
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and agents associated with the chemical and biological programs and the overall success of the 
UNSCOM weapons inspections (Jull, 2003(2), p95). 
The Jull report also found that Howard had selectively quoted UNMOVIC’s Dr Hans Blix as 
having believed that “Iraq was ‘cooperative on process, but not on substance’” (2003(2), 
p95).  This too was accurate but failed to take account of UNMOVIC’s also having noted 
“increasing cooperation and ‘numerous initiatives’ from the Iraqi side, even though 
cooperation was not immediate” (Jull, 2003(2), p95).  
They [UNMOVIC] reported that the results of inspections were consistent with Iraqi declarations 
and that no weapons of mass destruction had been found.  Their findings were most emphatic in 
relation to nuclear weapons.  The overall view, the balance of the view, from UNMOVIC 
appeared to be one of progress rather than a ‘damning indictment’ [Howard, 6 Feb 2003] or that 
‘the weapons inspectors were wasting their time’ [Howard, 4 Feb 2003] (Jull, p95-96). 
With the release of the full Jull report, Allard would have realised that the earlier leak had 
omitted those sections critical of the Government: that he had been manipulated into mis-
representing the report.  Instead of revealing this to SMH readers, the usually critical SMH 
ran with the innocuous first page lead: “Foreign reports used to sell war” (Allard, 2003).  
The article argued against any “sexing up” on the part of the Government and again 
focused on the politicisation of ONA.   
The Federal Government selectively used intelligence to bolster its case for war against Iraq but 
did not doctor or "sex up" reports on the threat posed by Saddam Hussein's weapons of mass 
destruction.   
The findings were in Parliament's intelligence committee report into prewar reports, which also 
said that the Government went beyond Australian assessments in major addresses to the public 
on the threats.  At the same time, the committee strongly criticised Australia's intelligence 
services for providing flawed advice about Saddam's WMD capability.  The report, released 
yesterday, also poses serious questions about the possible politicisation, and effectiveness, of 
Australia's premier intelligence agency, the Office of National Assessments (ONA) (Allard, 
2003). 
The usually pro-war Australian was the only paper to go with the front page headline, 
“PM’s spin sexed-up Iraq threat” (Walters, 2004).  Walters, the Australian’s national 
security editor, was well connected with the defence and intelligence communities, having 
served as senior adviser to Kim Beazley when he was the Labor Defence Minister in the 
Hawke Government.  [Beazley was a member of the Jull Committee, as was another 
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former Labor Defence Minister, Senator Robert Ray.]  Rather than focus on the 
intelligence and the intelligence community, Walters instead focused on the Government’s 
rationale and decision to go to war.   
As Peter Browne pointed out in an article in the New Matilda, “the Government's handling 
of the release of the parliamentary report...[was] a prime example of Mr Howard's spin 
technique at its boldest.  No outright 'lies' were uttered, but the most politically dangerous 
of the committee's findings were effectively neutralised” (Browne, 2004).  Aware of the 
leak, and the potentially damaging (for the Government) content of the Jull report, a key 
Labor figure in the inquiry inexplicably excused the Government of any wrong-doing. 
The Opposition and post-invasion politics 
The tabling of the Jull Committee report might have been expected to provide ammunition 
for a Labor attack on the Government over Iraq.  Public opinion was divided over the war 
(Goot, 2007(2)) and the Jull finding - that Australian intelligence reports did not make the 
case “that Iraq possessed WMD in large quantities (or) posed a grave and unacceptable 
threat to the region and the world” (Jull, 2003(2), p93) - might have prompted a sustained 
Labor attack over the lack of a compelling case for war.  But apart from some questions 
during Question Time, and statements made on the tabling of the Jull report, the issue 
quickly dropped from view.  The Government’s announcement of a further inquiry (a 
private inquiry rather than the royal commission Labor was pushing for) may have 
temporarily silenced some critics, but the Labor Party appeared to acquiesce and did little 
to take the matter further.  Some pointed to a lack of unity within the party, but there was 
also a suggestion that Howard’s political and rhetorical skills made the issue of Iraq a 
difficult debate to engage in without Labor being wedged or framed as anti-American, 
hostile to the Alliance, anti the Australian forces, pro-Saddam or soft on terrorism.  Implied 
also was a belief that a complex or nuanced narrative could not sustain public or media 
attention. 
The whole report [Jull] was terribly damning, but got a bit of publicity for a little while, and then it 
just died away…the opposition didn't take it up, and why didn't they do that?  I don't know. The 
people who were leading the opposition at the time were pretty inept (McLeay, pers. comm. 2, 
May 2013). 
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 McLeay suggested that neither Robert Ray nor Kim Beazley would ever go after the 
military or the intelligence people because "they were too much part of it to ever give them 
a very hard time" (McLeay, pers. comm. 2, May 2013).   For Crean, it was not an issue on 
which he believed Labor could make ground and there were mixed feelings within the 
party about going to war (McLeay, pers. comm. 2, May 2013).     
 [Crean] just didn’t see it [Iraq] as an issue that he could make big run on.  Plus…there were 
very few people in the Labor Party who weren’t in favour of it…It wasn’t as big a cause celebre 
in the Labor Party as it should have been….the big problem for us was getting jammed in this 
argument ‘well, if you’re against the war, you’re against the troops’. Howard was trying very hard 
to make that argument that you were unpatriotic and at the time all the speeches would have 
been littered with these weasel words about how, yes we’re all against the war but we’re not 
against the troops, they’re just doing the job the Government sent them to do. No one even 
talked about mindless slaughter or that sort of thing, everyone was being really careful that you 
didn’t let Howard jam you as being anti the troops.  I think that probably circumscribed the way a 
lot of people approached it and then it just became too hard - it became a bit of a hard issue to 
manage (McLeay, pers. comm. 2 May 2013). 
This view was supported by another journalist who believed that Labor had backed away 
from Iraq because they did not see it as a vote winner. 
I think they didn't see it [Iraq] as a vote winner for them, a bit like in the sense of that the people 
who were already anti-war were voting for them anyway and the people, the swinging voters, it 
wasn't an issue and it could be used by Howard to make them look weak on national security 
(pers. comm., 24 Jan 2013). 
Tanner did not accept that Labor had backed off from applying political heat to Howard 
over Iraq.   Instead he argued that the media were not that interested when Labor sought 
to press the matter. 
No, it's not [because Labor failed to pursue the matter], because Labor did, but the media 
weren't that interested.  So we did plenty of that kind of stuff, but it was yesterday's story.  That's 
kind of - like nobody outside the political class is interested.  Nobody's interested in a ‘you were 
wrong’; ‘no, we weren't’.  So there was plenty of stuff done on that, but people aren't interested.  
It was over…keep in mind that we [Labor] don't decide when we go in the media.  They decide.  
So it's an old story; it's ancient history.  By the time all that unfolds, the world has moved on.  
There are other issues in play.  The electorate is not interested.  Most of the media is not really 
interested.  Unless there is some smoking gun - dah, dah, ‘Howard did lie’ revelation. So the 
political behaviour is yes, there was a certain amount of political pressure on Howard and 
  
228 
 
whatever, but the only people interested are in the political class (Tanner, pers .comm., 30 Jan 
2013). 
Tanner acknowledged, however, that Iraq was not an issue on which polling suggested 
that Labor had any ‘natural advantages’, that is where the public instinctively believed one 
party was better suited to manage it.  If this perception were also held by the media, this 
might explain media skepticism and Labor’s own lack of enthusiasm in pushing Iraq as an 
issue. 
So there are certain issues, where they've got natural advantages…you look at any polling that 
says who is best to handle…industrial relations, health, education, the environment [and] we 
[Labor] invariably win.  ‘Who is best to handle the economy, national security, defence?’  They 
[Liberal/National Coalition] invariably win. 
So in other words, Howard's got a debate and a set of issues on his turf, which by definition 
crowds out the stuff he's vulnerable on - GST, petrol prices, whatever.  Secondly, he's got a 
mining boom starting; he's got money coming into the coffers…Thirdly, he's got a Labor leader 
that's in a weak position, that ultimately doesn't see the distance, and who is replaced by 
somebody who is green, inexperienced and volatile.  So throughout all of this, Howard 
objectively is in a very strong political position, in spite of superficial challenges.  He's in a very 
strong position (Tanner, pers. comm., 30 Jan 2013). 
On the day the Jull report was tabled in the House of Representatives, Beazley, as a 
member of the Jull Committee, made direct reference to the report’s finding that Howard’s 
case for war was not supported by the advice of Australian intelligence agencies, but 
stopped short of accusing the Government of deceit.  Beazley suggested that Howard had 
decided around mid-2002 to support the Americans, before any advice from the 
intelligence agencies.  He was critical of Howard’s rhetorical strategy of portraying critics 
as anti-American and a danger to the Alliance.   
Australia did not go to war because intelligence made available to the Australian government 
through its agencies suggested a clear and immediate danger was posed by Iraqi WMD either 
directly or through passage to terrorist organisations.  However, Australians were entitled to 
think that those were the reasons we went to war, given the cases presented by the Prime 
Minister and his ministers.  Well before such intelligence hardened up in the latter part of 
2002—and even then it did not harden sufficiently to present a clear and compelling case—the 
Prime Minister had declared his support for American action if it occurred.  By the middle of 
2002 the Prime Minister had gone clearly to a domestic political pitch that sought to box any 
critical comments by his domestic political opponents to a war course as anti-American and a 
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danger to the alliance.  Having thus positioned himself he placed his government and his 
country on the coat-tails of any actions our allies undertook (Beazley, Hansard, 1 March 2004, 
p24944-5). 
Beazley went on to suggest the Government had attempted to shift blame to intelligence 
agencies, when going to war was a decision of the Government. 
Though our intelligence community may well have got some judgments wrong…it is innocent of 
any responsibility for a determination to go to war.  That responsibility lies with politicians.  
Another more important responsibility lies with politicians: they must not shift blame to agencies 
which are vital to the struggle with international terrorism. That struggle is an intelligence and 
police struggle. To discredit them where they do not deserve it is to weaken us in that struggle 
(Beazley, Hansard, 1 March 2004, p24944-5). 
In McLeay’s statement to the House of Representatives he argued that, “the evidence 
given to the [Jull] Committee by the intelligence agencies…shows that the Government’s 
presentation [of intelligence information to Parliament and the Australian public] was 
neither complete nor accurate” (McLeay, Hansard, 1 March 2004, p24947).   
The analysis undertaken by Australian agencies provided inconclusive intelligence to support 
the proposition that Saddam Hussein was a ‘grave and unacceptable threat’; so, on the 
government’s part, there was a careful process of selection that avoided, in the most part, the 
agencies’ assessments.  It was not so much that the Australian intelligence agencies got it 
wrong but that they were largely ignored by the government except where they could bolster the 
case for war.  Where they could not, other sources were found - for example, the infamous 
British document and a reliance on gung-ho US documents.  
The Committee says in chapter 5 that the government based its argument for going to war not 
just on intelligence but also on ‘historical experience, first principle hypotheses, deductive logic, 
assumption and assertion, as well as specific intelligence’. The government’s arguments were 
carefully crafted - and were faulty. They were based on false historical analysis, false logic, false 
assumptions and assertions without tested evidence. Senator Hill’s reported concern that 
Australian intelligence agencies were not gung-ho enough suggests that this was a conscious 
government position (McLeay, Hansard, 1 March 2004, p24947). 
Despite the damaging nature of the Jull findings, statements by Labor’s Senator Ray, to 
the Senate on 1 March 2004, and later that evening on the ABC’s Lateline program, would 
have made it impossible for Labor mount a campaign.  Ray argued against any suggestion 
that ministers had deliberately distorted the issue. 
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When I sum up the role of ministers, my answer to the question, ‘Did ministers deliberately go 
out of their way to distort this issue?’ is no. Did they rely on the intelligence agencies’ analysis? 
My answer to that is yes. Did they apply enough critical analysis to that? My answer is no. Are 
they guilty of anything? In my view, the Prime Minister, Senator Hill and Mr Downer are guilty of 
culpable gullibility in these instances. They heard what they wanted to hear. That is not a very 
good approach to these matters. You have got to go outside the square when it comes to 
intelligence matters. All the information coming to them backed up their preexisting prejudices. 
We are all vulnerable to that—I concede that—but, in this case, it could have fatal 
consequences (Senator Ray, Hansard, 1 March, 2004, p20333-20334). 
Ray then suggested – seemingly totally excusing the Government - that it is in the nature 
of politics for politicians to simplify things. 
Finally, we have to say fairly frankly that the government spokesmen, in presenting the case for 
pre-emptive intervention in Iraq, failed to include the necessary qualifiers and caution reflected 
in some of the intelligence agency reports. That is in part the nature of politics—politicians tend 
to simplify things and put them more directly—but, if you are going to rely on your public 
justification of intelligence analysis, you should quote it fairly directly and not leave the qualifiers 
out (Senator Ray, Hansard, 1 March 2004, p20332). 
On the Lateline program that evening, in response to a question from Tony Jones, Ray 
said that there had been no deliberate misleading of the Australian public. Nor was there 
any attempt on the part of the Government to apply pressure on the agencies, despite the 
reported divergence of ONA views from September 2002.   
TONY JONES: Robert Ray, what do you think about that? Were the Australian people 
effectively misled by the Government's reliance on flawed intelligence to justify the war? 
ROBERT RAY: Well, the key question is were they deliberately misled? I believe not.  
But there's no doubt that the intelligence was flawed at the time.  I mean, we have had David 
Kay and 1,400 inspectors search Iraq from top to bottom.  They haven't found any weapons of 
mass destruction nor are they ever likely to. 
TONY JONES: Your report, though, concludes that the Government itself is innocent of applying 
pressure to the intelligence agencies to get the information that it wanted or the intelligence 
spin, if you like, that it wanted. You stand by that I take it? 
ROBERT RAY: There's not the slightest evidence that the Government put any pressure on the 
agencies to produce particular advice.  My criticism goes more to the fact that I don't think the 
ministers, and the PM for that matter, actually put enough effort to checking the agencies' 
advice.  By that, I mean they should have cross-examined them more rigorously, and what's 
more worrying to me is they haven't done much since.  They've been more interested in putting 
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a political spin on the inadequacies of the advice rather than getting to the bottom of where the 
flaws emanated from (Ray, 2004). 
The Australian’s Matt Price described Ray as having been “very, very kind to Howard and 
Downer” (2004), reminding his readers that Ray was “a Labor hawk who wouldn’t have lost 
a minute’s sleep about Australia joining the war in Iraq” (2004).  Price was critical of the 
Government’s use of spin to sell the war. 
John Howard and Alexander Downer reckon the bipartisan report completely exonerates the 
Government from charges of exaggerating, cherry-picking or selectively ignoring advice during 
their avid prosecution of the war case.  This is an unblushing exaggeration that deliberately 
cherry-picks and selectively ignores the report’s contents.  Whatever you think of the war, only a 
dolt believes the arguments for signing up were transparent and spin-free (Price, 2004). 
Ray too was critical of the Government’s use of “spin” and its changing rationale for war - 
suggesting it was “too clever by half” for the Government to suggest that, left to Labor, 
Saddam would still be in power.  Despite his obvious frustration, Ray did not see “spin” 
and “a dubious claim about Iraq’s connection to terrorist groups” as grounds for arguing 
that the Australian public had been deliberately misled. 
Subsequent to the end of the conflict in Iraq, what we have seen mostly has been a political 
reaction. The old spin is out. The government does not seem to really want to know where the 
agencies got it wrong. We see this subtle slide, from their having WMD to having programs 
about WMD to having the potential and the capability of maybe instituting programs. That slide 
is not satisfactory. In recent weeks, the main reason for intervening in Iraq—regime change—
has been put up retrospectively. I do not mind regime change in Iraq, but the government 
specifically ruled it out prior to intervention. Now we are being taunted with: ‘Well, if it were up to 
you in the Labor Party, Saddam would still be in Baghdad.’ That is too clever by half, and it is 
being said to distract people away from the original reasons for going in, which were twofold—
WMD and a very dubious claim about Iraq’s connection to terrorist groups. If our intelligence is 
wrong now and it is wrong in the future, how many people will die because of it? That is why this 
is a crucial issue. It is not that we are trying to rectify the past. We do not want a situation where 
governments act on flawed intelligence in the future at the cost of Australian lives (Senator Ray, 
Hansard, 1 March 2004, p20333). 
Certainly it would appear that Howard’s ability to frame the debate - and to use sensitive 
topics to wedge Labor - may have contributed to Labor’s apparent failure to push the 
Government on Iraq at the time.  In interview, McLeay spoke about how clever Howard 
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was and how difficult it had been to counter his rhetoric, as well as his ability to know what 
Australian people were thinking. 
Howard was probably the most clever politician of his generation - no he wasn’t, Keating was 
the most clever politician of that whole generation - but Howard was the next best. Howard 
knew the thinking of the Australian people and he knew how to play on that violin and he always 
did it very well (McLeay, pers. comm., 2 May 2013). 
Instability over leadership within the ALP was another factor suggested by some as having 
contributed to Labor’s failure to use the Jull report to put pressure on the Government over 
Iraq.  This suggestion is worth considering, but the timing does not appear to support this 
notion.  Leader of the Opposition, Simon Crean called for a leadership ballot on 16 June 
2003 in an apparent bid to end the constant leadership speculation.  He won that ballot, 
defeating Beazley by a vote of 58 to 34 (Guardian, 2003).    Two days later, Senator 
Faulkner, Leader of the Opposition in the Senate, moved a successful motion to ask the 
Joint Parliamentary Committee on ASIO, ASIS and DSD to “consider the nature, accuracy 
and independence of the intelligence used by the Australian government and the accuracy 
and completeness of the presentation of that intelligence by the Australian government to 
the Parliament and people of Australia” (Senate Hansard 18 June 2003, Jull 2003).   This 
Committee (chaired by Liberal MP, David Jull) concluded a draft report before the end of 
the Parliamentary year in 2003, around the time of the second leadership ballot 
(November 2003), which Crean did not contest.  At this ballot, Latham defeated Beazley, 
who as a member of the Jull Committee would have been aware of the potentially 
damaging nature of the Committee’s report.  McLeay made it plain that he thought no 
Labor member of the Jull Committee would have leaked the selected, pro-Government 
parts of the report to SMH journalist Tom Allard around mid-February: it had to have been 
someone from the Government (McLeay, pers. comm., 2 May 2013).  Clearly there had 
been sufficient concern about the potential for political damage posed by the Jull report 
that the Government was willing to risk leaking selected sections to the media (a breach of 
Parliamentary privilege that might have resulted in a Parliamentary Privileges Committee 
inquiry). The significance of the leak would not have been lost on Ray, who nevertheless 
proceeded to remove the Jull report as a potential issue over which Labor might have 
criticised the Government.   
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This did not mean that Iraq was removed as a political issue.  Australia’s involvement in 
Iraq became an issue in the 2004 election with Mark Latham’s “troops home by Christmas” 
undertaking, given during an interview with Radio 2UE on 23 March 2004.   
I am hoping that by the end of the year the Australian troops will be back here for the defence of 
Australia, having discharged their international responsibilities and (be) back on Australian soil 
for the good protection of our country…our intention is to ensure that once the responsibility is 
discharged, and that is at the time of the handover to the new sovereign government in Iraq, 
then Australian troops will come back under a Labor government.  Say the (Australian) election 
was in September and there was a change of government, we would be hoping to have them 
back by Christmas certainly (Latham, cited in AAP, 2004(b)). 
The statement was widely condemned as “policy on the run” (Downer, 2004) and “political 
tokenism” (Grattan, 2004) and saw a marked drop in Latham’s popularity.  Latham slipped 
from being one percentage point behind Howard, as preferred Prime Minister, to eleven 
percentage points behind (Newspoll, 2004).   Latham’s failure to consult beforehand with 
his Shadow Foreign Affairs spokesman, Kevin Rudd, soon became obvious.  A couple of 
days later in the House of Representatives, an amused Howard quoted from a letter that 
Rudd had written to him the previous November (2003), after a visit to Iraq, in which – far 
from urging Australia’s withdrawal – Rudd had been critical of the government for not 
playing a greater role in rebuilding Iraq.  Howard referred to a “very well-written and 
carefully crafted letter…by somebody who obviously had some first-hand knowledge of the 
situation - urging the government to strengthen our presence in Iraq” (Howard 2004(a)).  
I received this letter and I replied promptly. The letter writer had in fact just come back from 
Baghdad. He had actually been on the ground. He spoke very warmly of what had been done. I 
am pleased to inform the House that this letter, dated 17 November 2003, came from none 
other than the shadow minister for foreign affairs, the member for Griffith. It is a very good letter, 
but let me share with the House a couple of the points that were made in the letter.  
He said, inter alia: “You will be aware that the federal opposition opposed the war, but now that 
regime change has occurred in Baghdad it is the opposition’s view that it is now the 
responsibility of all people of goodwill, both in this country and beyond, to put their shoulder to 
the wheel in an effort to build a new Iraq”. He then went on to say: “It is our view that this is 
particularly incumbent on Australia, given our role as an occupying power—a role which you 
confirmed in your statement of 17 April” (Howard, Hansard, 25 March 2004, pp27279-80). 
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Latham, in his diaries, admitted that he had overruled Rudd, who had wanted Labor’s 
policy on the troops to be “a review when we get into government” (2005, p276).  Latham 
saw this as “a wishy-washy stance” (2005, p276).  “I’ve had a firm position on every other 
issue and it’s worked for me; why not this one?” (Latham, 2005, p276).  Unfortunately in 
this instance, not only did Latham’s statement lead to headlines such as the Australian’s 
“Labor split over Iraq troop exit” (Lewis, Kerin and Walters, 2004, Latham, 2005, p278), but 
provided an opportunity for Howard to present himself as not the kind of leader who would 
“cut and run” (Howard, 2004(a)). 
…The Leader of the Opposition talks about an exit strategy. I say on behalf of the government: 
we do not have a cut and run strategy. It is not the Australian way to cut and run. It is the 
Australian way to stay and do the job and see it through, and that is what we intend to do. 
(Howard, Hansard, 25 March 2004, p27280). 
The irony of Latham’s “troops home by Christmas” statement was that it gave Howard the 
opportunity to appear resolute, loyal and determined, at a time when the Government was 
vulnerable to criticism that Australia was not pulling its weight in the re-building of Iraq.  
Out of a contingent of 135,000 foreign troops in Iraq at the time, only around 280 were 
Australian (part of a wider Gulf commitment of 850, (Walters, 2004(b), Department of 
Defence (2004(a))).  The Australian invasion forces had been withdrawn in May and June, 
2003.  Before Latham's statement, the Prime Minister had not put a timeline on when the 
remaining Australian troops would come home, “but the Government's own signals [had] 
been less than clear…with Defence Minister Robert Hill indicating on Tuesday [23 March 
2004] that Australian troops were committed only until July 1 [2004], when there [was] 
expected to be a handover of power from US-led coalition forces to an Iraqi government” 
(Lewis and Kerin, 2004).  There were also signs that some allies felt Australia could have 
done more. 
Our military contribution is tiny compared with our two major coalition partners, the US (around 
115,000 troops) and Britain (9000).  In fact, there is a perception among our closest military 
friends that we have not pulled our weight in the post-war, nation-building phase in Iraq, or in 
Afghanistan where we have a sole defence force representative compared with 100 New 
Zealanders.  More than a dozen countries have a larger military presence in Iraq than Australia -
- one of the original three occupying powers. They include Poland, Italy, Ukraine, Spain, The 
Netherlands, Japan, Romania, Hungary and Portugal. But Australia's influence and standing 
inside the US-led coalition is out of all proportion to our modest deployment (Walters, 2004(b)). 
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While many Australians had been opposed to intervention in the Iraq war, they also had 
the view that Australia should play a role in fixing what it had broken, and this may have 
been reflected in Latham’s sudden drop in popularity (Newspoll, 2004).  Tanner 
acknowledged that “a lot of people in the opinion-making elite, who were perhaps 
predisposed to be very sceptical about our involvement, saw [Latham’s troops home by 
Christmas statement] as a pretty shallow, populist kind of gesture that undermined his 
credentials to lead the country” (Tanner, pers. comm., 30 Jan 2013). 
The reason why Mark probably suffered some political damage as a result of that was because I 
think people sensed that this was basically a bit of cheap populism…[policy] totally on the 
run...Once you're there, it's a different question. The question is no longer should we be part of 
the invasion of Iraq? The question is where to from here? How do we extricate ourselves from 
this, without doing additional damage to the Iraqi people? Protecting our soldiers, protecting our 
interests, without upsetting the Americans too much? That's a very different question.  Mark's 
position was...appropriate in the preliminary phase of saying no, we're not doing this. Simple. 
Clear. Once you're actually there – and, given that there were some months to go before an 
election, that more facts on the ground would evolve over that period - you're dealing with a 
different and more complicated question (Tanner, pers. comm., 30 Jan 2013). 
One journalist suggested that the Labor party’s leadership problems had left them weak, 
disunited and timid, afraid of being characterised as soft on national security: in short “all 
over the place”. 
Generally speaking, the opposition during that time was a weak opposition….The political 
climate of terrorism I think made them quite timid. They didn’t want to be portrayed as being soft 
on national security and so that very much coloured what they would be willing to say and speak 
out against. They …had a lot of disunity. They had a lot of changes. They had a lot of 
leadership problems. They were a bit…all over the place (pers. comm., 8 Jan 2013). 
Tanner did not believe that Labor’s preoccupation with its own leadership battles had 
influenced decisions about pursuing the Government over Iraq, but he made an interesting 
link between Iraq and a subsequent Labor leadership contest. 
The other interesting aside to all of this, is that the great beneficiary of all of this is Kevin Rudd. 
Because what you've got is a period, where there's a whole lot of us - there's half a dozen of us, 
myself included - who are all the kind of next generation, jockeying for advancement. He's 
Shadow Foreign Affairs, and normally, most times, foreign affairs is not quite a backwater in 
Opposition, but it's usually not troubling the scorers that much.  Suddenly, for a couple of crucial 
years, his stuff is dominating the front page all the time, and so he gets the ability to massively 
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expand his public profile. He's helped by the fact that he's got a leader who looks a bit wobbly, 
and so the real political beneficiary of all this stuff is Kevin Rudd. Because it enabled him to 
basically take the lead as the next leader candidate, because it put him in the spotlight. So had 
it been another set of dominant issues over that period, the result could have been different. So 
that's a really significant thing in his emergence (Tanner, pers. comm., 30 Jan 2013). 
Finally, a couple of people interviewed suggested that there was a kind of laziness or 
passivity embedded in Australia’s political culture, that lets governments off the hook and 
is reluctant to examine the mistakes of the past.  McLeay referred to the “laziness of the 
Australian Parliament” (pers. comm. 2 May 2013). 
There's no tradition in the Australian Parliament of members of parliament waging war against 
governments…Whoever is the government, you don't have these independent-minded people 
who decide to take on their own government and the press probably wouldn't help them 
anyway. So you don't have that tradition like they have in the UK, of ginger groups and 
governments being held to account. The political system of Australia is one that is very much 
biased towards the government of the day having all the cards, and the way that parliament is 
made up helps that.  
…you've got a duopoly in the media here, or I suppose in the print media you've got a duopoly. 
The ABC sometimes gets fearless, but other times drags its coat. I think the population just 
weren't interested in it [Iraq] anymore. Australians don't seem to be the sort of people who like 
to know that something's gone wrong, and you ought to do something about it. The past is 
another country (Mcleay, pers. comm. 2 May 2013). 
One journalist suggested that Australia had a “less organised civil society” than the UK for 
example where there had been a strong push for a further inquiry (Chilcott Inquiry).  In 
Australia, the Campaign for an Iraq War Inquiry has not enjoyed wide-spread support and 
nor was the cause taken up by Labor. 
In Australia we have a rather less organised civil society than what you have on these kinds of 
issues in the UK.  If you want to know why that is, you’re really getting deep into stuff about 
what our political culture is and it’s very different to the UK.  So if you understand that question, I 
think you would need to look at the factors that contributed to the inquiries over there and then 
say, well where were they here? What were the similar bodies here doing?  Were journalists 
pushing for it in the UK?  If they were pushing, why were they pushing for it?  Who was lobbying 
them?  Where were their counterparts in Australia?  It's not a simple answer (pers. comm. 8 Jan 
2013). 
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Despite public opinion polls suggesting that increasing numbers in the Australian 
electorate believed they had been misled over Iraq (Newspoll 2004), Labor believed 
themselves unable to counter Howard’s wedge politics and framing that portrayed them as 
weak on security.   As Kelly pointed out in the Australian at the time, “Howard and Downer 
know that Labor is rolling over on Iraq.  They merely have to say that if Labor had its way, 
then Saddam would still be in power in Baghdad – and for Labor there is no effective reply” 
(2004).  The captions to Kelly’s article said it all: “Caught by the facts, but PM wins the 
politics: On Iraq Intelligence, the Howard Government misled Australians – and it will get 
away with it” (2004).  While Latham’s popularity picked up again after the prisoner abuse 
scandal at Abu Ghraib, Labor was defeated in the October 2004 election. 
Conclusion 
Howard was hugely influential in framing the terms of the debate on Iraq, ensuring they 
were favourable to the Government, but he could not be said to have dictated the media 
agenda.  The SMH remained critical of the war throughout and the Australian’s support for 
the war owed more to the views of New Ltd’s proprietor than to Howard.  Before the war, 
the WMD argument based on inaccessible intelligence advice, gave Howard enormous 
influence over the Iraq narrative.  After the invasion, when the WMD rationale had 
collapsed, the two intelligence inquiries served Howard’s purpose of deflecting attention 
away from the Government (and the policy processes that led to the decision) onto the 
intelligence community, despite the fact that the Australian intelligence advice had largely 
been ignored (Jull, 2003, Cotton, 2007, p338, McLeay, 2004, White, 2004, Wilkie, pers. 
comm. 23 Jan 2013).  Politically, the Government’s strategy of portraying criticism as 
evidence that the Opposition was pro-Saddam, anti-American, anti-ADF and/or soft on 
terrorism proved to be highly effective.  It both curtailed criticism and influenced the way in 
which criticism was covered in the media.  The Opposition, and a number of journalists 
interviewed for this project, were convinced that the Government had not been transparent 
in its public argument for war, and that a flawed policy process was being obscured by the 
focus on intelligence advice.  However, in the absence of a compelling and sustainable 
counter-narrative about the Government’s lack of transparency (even deceit), the issue 
lacked the critical mass required to create a political crisis.   
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Entman’s cascading network activation model suggests that for an issue to become a 
scandal it is not just a matter of media attention: that the media cannot simply “beat up” a 
story over time to create a scandal or political crisis.  For an issue to be sustained as a 
crisis, in addition to media interest, there need to be other credible parties sponsoring the 
crisis narrative.  As Entman points out, “scandal magnitude is determined more by the 
manipulative skills of sponsors and their opponents than by substantive judgements about 
the facts of malfeasance and their effect on society” (2012, p204).  While the Opposition 
had the findings of the Jull Committee report to back up their claims about lack of 
transparency and exaggeration – or misrepresentation – there was an almost universal 
reluctance to stop short of accusing the Prime Minister of lying (a very serious accusation 
in Parliament).  Senator Ray’s categorical statements that he believed that no minister had 
deliberately mis-represented or sought to distort the issue, represented a white flag for 
Labor.  It signaled to the rest of Labor that this was not an issue they could make any 
political mileage out of.  There were other people in the community with serious questions 
about the war.  Some called for an inquiry – former weapons inspectors challenged the 
evidence on WMD (Barton, pers. comm., 16 Nov. 2012), former heads of the armed forces 
challenged the principle of preventive war (Gration, pers. comm., 17 Nov. 2012), former 
diplomats challenged the wisdom of an attack on an ethnically diverse nation (Woolcott, 
pers. comm., 3 Oct. 2012), experts questioned the notion that Iraq could be turned into a 
pro-western democracy and the middle-east remade (White, pers. comm., 23 Aug. 2012) 
and a former senior defence bureaucrat questioned the process for taking the nation to 
war  (Barratt, 2014) – but in the absence of an active and ongoing Opposition campaign, 
their arguments tended to be reported and then drop out of sight.  Labor appeared to have 
shared Howard’s view that the Australian people had moved on (Howard, 2003(2)). In the 
absence of a scandal sponsor, and a clear and consistent narrative, the media could not 
generate a political crisis on their own. 
 
  
239 
 
Conclusion 
We should spend less time studying Simpson’s donkey and more time looking at why we were 
fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan for so long. All this is not in order to criticise past decision 
makers, but in remembrance of the dead, to help us avoid doing it again in some other place, 
simply because we failed to examine all the alternative means of resolving conflict. 
                                             Hon Peter Underwood, AC, Governor of Tasmania, 25 April 2014 
The 2003 Iraq war provides a complex and multi-faceted case study through which to 
investigate the influences on media agenda formation at two quality Australian 
newspapers, the SMH and the Australian, and to explore what gave rise to commonalities 
and differences in reporting and analysis.   The Iraq war was a highly newsworthy event: 
increased demand for news led to higher newspaper circulation (Lee, 2004).   Public 
opinion was sharply divided (Goot, 2007(2)) and the Murdoch media were accused of bias 
in their coverage (Manne, 2011(a), Hobbs, 2010).   Robert Manne suggested that Murdoch 
sought to use “the 70 per cent of the national and state-wide press he owns to ensure that 
the values drawn from his right-wing political philosophy remain dominant within the 
political mainstream” (Manne, 2011, p2).  Manne went on to suggest that it would have 
been unthinkable for the Australian to take other than a pro-war position. 
The Australian is Murdoch’s most important vehicle for influencing Australian politics. It is 
unthinkable that it could have been anti-war. Given all this, even if an enthusiastic 
neoconservative like Chris Mitchell had not been appointed editor-in-chief during the build-up to 
war, the Australian would have supported the Iraq invasion. On this question, Murdoch’s 
newspapers did not exercise autonomy (Manne, 2011, p17). 
This research compared the Australian’s and the SMH’s coverage of the war using a 
content analysis of 1,204 articles drawn from both papers during nine critical periods 
before, during and after the invasion.  Interviews with Fairfax and News Ltd journalists, 
politicians, experts and public servants explored the politics of what happened as well as 
possible reasons for differences in the ways both papers reported on the war.  The 
analytical aim of the project was to determine which of three US media models - W. Lance 
Bennett’s indexing model, Thomas Christie’s agenda-public opinion congruence model 
and Robert Entman’s cascading network activation model - might best describe what 
occurred in the Australian print media’s coverage of the war.  The research findings 
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confirmed some hypotheses (see chapter 2), challenged some, and enabled a more 
nuanced understanding of others. 
Australian media: ‘lapdogs’ or ‘watch-dogs’?  
Overseas critiques have concluded that the media frequently played the role of ‘lap-dog’ 
rather than ‘watch-dog’ when they reported on going to war in Iraq.  In many instances the 
media had allowed themselves to become echo-chambers for government arguments for 
war (Bennett et al., 2007, Doig et al., 2007).  This research suggests a more complex and 
uneven picture for Australia, with different roles being played by media at each of the 
stages of the conflict.  During the pre-war period, it appeared to have been a case of 
circumscribed curiosity. When it came to themes (see table 4.1) and sources (see table 
4.5), there were remarkably similar patterns in the coverage by both the SMH and the 
Australian, despite each paper having its own editorial position.  WMD and terrorism, 
policy options and Australian domestic attitudes toward the war were the three most 
frequently covered themes, accounting for 61% of Iraq-related themes covered by the 
SMH, and 64% of themes covered by the Australian (see table 4.1).  The US alliance 
came fourth representing 15% of Iraq-related themes in the SMH and 13% in the 
Australian (see table 4.1).  At the time, the US alliance was not being presented by the 
Government or the media as the principal reason for Australian involvement.  The 
similarities between the coverage of both papers may have been a reflection of their 
shared sense of news values (figures 2.1 and 2.2 show very similar media activity in 
response to critical Iraq-related events) and the fact that much of the newsworthy activity 
was taking place in Canberra, Washington or London, where both papers tended to cover 
the same events and quote the same people.   
As cynical as many later said they were, few journalists and media commentators delved 
into documents in the public domain or identified expert opinion that would have tested the 
Government’s assertions about WMDs and Saddam’s purported links to terrorist groups. 
There were UN weapons inspectors’ reports (Blix, 2005, Butler, pers. comm., 31 Jan 
2013), Australians who had served as weapons inspectors (Barton, pers. comm., 16 Nov 
2012), and former chiefs of defence forces (Gration, pers. comm., 16 Nov, 2012), for 
example, who questioned the degree to which Saddam posed a threat to international 
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peace and security, but the story was complex, technical and difficult to explain in the 
context of a binary narrative where WMD equalled grounds for invasion (Barton, pers. 
comm., 16 Nov 2012).  There were articles in the US media highlighting tensions between 
the US intelligence agencies, but stories about politicised US intelligence were a low 
priority in Australia.  There was very little written in Australia during this pre-war period 
about the ideas and influence of the neoconservatives on the White House and US foreign 
policy, in particular their ideas about American exceptionalism, empire, scepticism about 
the UN and international law, transformation of the Middle East and regime change in Iraq.  
The 10 March 2003 Four Corners program, “American Dreamers” was one of the few 
times the media provided a detailed account of the neo-cons and their political influence 
on the Bush Administration (ABC, 2003(a)).    
During the invasion, with the nation at war, press coverage moved its focus away from the 
Government’s narrative about WMD and terrorism to hard, current news about the conduct 
of the war (see table 5.2).  While there was still discussion of the longer-term political 
purposes or outcomes of the war, both papers were primarily focused on the conduct of 
the war.  By day seven of the invasion, WMD and terrorism themes had disappeared 
altogether from coverage.    
In post-war coverage, however, when there were recriminations over the failure to find 
WMD, the focus of coverage moved away from the conduct and long-term political 
purposes of the war, toward the Australian political consequences of the war.  Fifty-two per 
cent of SMH and 31% of the Australian’s post-war coverage was focused on the Australian 
domestic political fallout (see table 6.3), suggesting a return to the horse-race frame.  
However, the two post-invasion inquiries – Jull and Flood – found some in the media 
taking a stronger position than the Labor Opposition, leading others to suggest that Labor 
had “rolled over” on the issue (Kelly, 2004). 
On balance the data do not paint a picture of a ‘lap-dog’ media (US); but nor one of an 
active watch-dog media (UK).  The picture varies at different stages of the war, with mixed 
(perhaps muted) efforts to challenge pre-war Government narratives; war-time coverage 
mindful of the ANZAC myth; and a more active watch-dog role played by both papers in 
the post-invasion environment (see table 8.1). 
  
242 
 
Did Government dictate the terms of the Iraq debate?  
A common theme in discussion of the Australian media and the Iraq war has been that the 
Government dictated the media agenda.  This research has enabled a more nuanced 
understanding of the ways in which the Howard Government sought to influence the 
debate and the degree to which they were successful before, during and after the invasion.  
Despite its flaws, the Government’s narrative on the Iraq war was never seriously 
challenged before the invasion.  For both papers, ‘governments’ were by far the most 
important sources on Iraq – quoted almost five times as often as the next most quoted 
groups (the opposition, experts). The pattern was strikingly similar for both papers (see 
table 4.5).  There was a slightly stronger representation of US sources in the Australian, 
which, when compared with the SMH, was almost entirely at the expense of Australian 
sources (see table 4.6).  When Australian sources were separated out, the similarities 
between the two papers were even more marked.  For the whole pre-war period, 
Australian Government sources dominated both papers: 40% of Australians quoted in the 
SMH were government sources (35% elected and 5% unelected officials), and 41% 
quoted in the Australian were government sources (34% elected and 7% unelected 
officials) (see table 4.7).  The Australian was almost three times as likely to balance 
Government sources with a quote from an Opposition source as from an expert, while the 
SMH appeared to be equally likely to balance Government sources with either an 
Opposition source or an expert opinion (see table 4.7).  
The Australian media were much more pre-occupied with the US relationship than were 
their UK counter-parts (see table 4.9, Tumber and Palmer, 2006). While the Australian 
media gave greater consideration to the US relationship, they did not perceive it in the 
same negative terms as did their counterparts in the UK – perhaps because of the strong 
traditional, cross-party and community support in Australia for the ANZUS alliance (Goot, 
2007).  It is an irony that while Howard is said to have ignored the advice of his own 
intelligence agencies in his decision to go to war (McLeay, 2004), their advice appears to 
have encouraged him to modify his rhetoric (previously based on US and UK intelligence 
sources (Jull, 2003)), so that by the time it came to the invasion, Howard had avoided 
categorical claims about WMD that later hounded his counterparts abroad (Howard, 
2003(3)). 
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During the invasion, elected government representatives remained the predominant 
source of information.  This was despite a shift in focus toward the conduct of the war and 
away from domestic politics. While the proportion of government sources (elected 
representatives plus officials, including Australian, US and UK defence personnel) in each 
newspaper dropped off by around 20% when compared with the week immediately 
preceding the invasion (see table 5.8), they remained the main source of information about 
the war.  The pattern of sources between the two papers was quite similar, although the 
SMH sourced a greater percentage of quotes from elected representatives of government 
(31% compared with 24% in the Australian), while the Australian tended to source more 
government officials (21% compared with 17% in the SMH), which included 
representatives of the armed forces (see table 5.7).  There was an increase in the 
representation of community groups, NGOs, journalists, Iraqis and experts (see table 5.8), 
suggesting a concern for the human impact of the invasion.  At this time, Australians 
accounted for more than 40% of both papers’ sources (45% in the Australian and 43% in 
the SMH) and, together with US sources, they accounted for 73% of sources in the 
Australian and 68% of all sources quoted in the SMH (see table 5.11).  When only 
Australian sources were considered, the patterns between the two papers became 
strikingly similar – with Government sources likely to be balanced by an Opposition 
source, an expert, a representative of an NGO or a journalist (see table 5.14).  This 
suggests a press which shares similar news values (including a desire to put a human face 
on the war) and is reactive to the same influences, particularly in the Federal 
Parliamentary Press Gallery. 
Howard continued to dictate the terms of the debate on Iraq in the post-invasion period.  
He was barely challenged by a politically cautious Opposition (Garran, 2004, p124), and, 
in the absence of a crisis sponsor, limited media challenges faded away.  Lindsay Tanner 
suggested that Howard escaped a backlash after the Iraq invasion because he always had 
the ready excuse that he believed Saddam had WMD because of the intelligence briefings 
he received before the invasion – and also because, by 2004, the war was “all over” and 
people were not interested in debating history (pers. comm. 30 Jan 2012).  According to 
Whitehead, Howard’s framing of the war was rarely challenged by the media (pers. comm., 
19 Dec. 2012).  In the post-invasion period, Howard fared better than his fellow coalition 
leaders Bush and Blair (Howard, pers. comm., 20 Feb 2013) for a number of reasons. 
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Firstly, Howard had not advocated the war in the same values-laden way that Bush and 
Blair had - choosing his words more carefully - and as a result did not suffer the same 
political damage when WMD were not found (Kelly, pers. comm., 18 June 2012, Gyngell, 
pers. comm., 10 Oct 2012, Shergold, pers. comm., 19 Feb 2013).  Secondly, Australia’s 
limited commitment to the invasion phase reduced the chances of Australian military 
deaths and distanced Australia from responsibility for rebuilding Iraq, as well as unpopular 
decisions like de-Baathification and the dissolution of the Iraqi army (Fray, pers. comm., 31 
Oct, 2012).  Thirdly, the post-war inquiries, carefully choreographed across the three 
countries, served to focus attention on the intelligence and intelligence agencies, rather 
than on the policy advice or the quality of decision-making by Bush, Blair and Howard 
(Cotton, 2007).  Howard’s discipline meant that, on Iraq, he never varied from the three 
leaders’ ‘script’.  In the post-invasion period, no leader backed down or expressed regret.  
Each continued to argue that the invasion had been worth the cost.  Fourthly, Howard did 
not have to contend with party dissention of the kind that Blair had had to deal with in the 
UK (Howard, pers. comm. 20 Feb 2013).    
This study found that, while the Government dictated the terms of the debate on Iraq 
(WMD and terrorism before the war, and flawed intelligence advice afterward), they did not 
succeed in totally dominating the media agenda.  The SMH maintained its opposition to 
the war throughout, and, along with some journalists in the Australian in the wake of the 
Jull Committee report, sought to challenge the Government’s narrative on the war (see 
table 8.1).  However, in the absence of Opposition or other support, the media were 
unable to sustain a compelling counter-narrative. 
Did Labor go silent on Iraq? 
The Iraq war presented the Labor opposition with acute problems at a time of leadership 
instability.  Howard’s formidable skills as a politician won him the support of his entire party 
on Iraq, when such unity eluded him on issues like refugees (Shergold, pers. comm., 19 
Feb 2013, Garran, 2004).  He was barely challenged by an opposition “that failed to clearly 
define a position on the Iraq War” (Latham, 2005, p208).  A divided Opposition vacillated 
and found itself powerless to counter the Government’s narrative or to harness public 
opinion.  Neither the media nor the Opposition successfully sustained any challenge to the 
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gaps and problems in the Government’s rhetoric (Whitehead, pers. comm., 19 Dec 2102).  
Howard used UN resolutions on Iraq to legitimate preventive military action, in 
contravention of the UN Charter (Blix, 2011) and to justify, for the first time in Australia’s 
history, participation in “unprovoked aggression against a foreign country” (Gration, pers. 
comm. 16 Nov. 2012).  Howard supported a second UN resolution, but decided to go to 
war even when a second resolution did not transpire.  Howard professed to having had 
“contempt for Labor’s position” and suggested that, in making their support for intervention 
conditional on a second UN resolution, Labor had effectively outsourced its decision on 
Iraq to Russia and France (Howard, 2010, p443).  Yet the Government justified its actions 
under international law by drawing on resolutions from the same body, the UN Security 
Council, whose support the Government had sought, unsuccessfully (Howard, 2010, p 
445).  Blix observed recently that it was “puzzling that while Mr Howard considered that the 
‘principle at stake’ was ‘the failure of Iraq to fully comply with the United Nations 
requirements regarding WMDs’, he was furious about the Labor Party’s relying on a 
decision by the Security Council” (2011).  The Opposition seemed unable to exploit the 
contradictions in Howard’s pre-war position and appeared instead to be silenced by 
Howard’s use of wedge politics, fearing that he would paint Labor’s position as dupes or 
supporters of Saddam, anti-US, anti-Alliance or a lack of support for Australian troops 
(McLeay, pers. comm., 2 May 2013).   
In the post-invasion period, the leaking of selected pro-Government segments of the Jull 
report [Howard denied having any knowledge or involvement in the leak] proved critical in 
framing the key media issue as that of the divergence in advice between the two 
intelligence agencies – rather than the policy process or the Government’s decision to go 
to war (see chapter 7).  The suggestion was that ONA had “tended to produce material to 
fit with government policy objectives” (Allard, 2004(b)) or had been politicised.  The usually 
pro-war Australian was the only paper to go with the front page headline, “PM’s spin 
sexed-up Iraq threat” (Walters, 2004), focusing on the policy decision rather than the 
intelligence agencies.  Aware of the leak, and the potentially damaging (for the 
Government) content of the Jull report, Robert Ray, a key Labor figure in the inquiry, 
inexplicably excused the Government of any wrong-doing (see chapter 7).  The 
Government’s announcement of a further inquiry (a private inquiry rather than the royal 
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commission Labor was pushing for) may have temporarily silenced some critics, but the 
Labor Party appeared to acquiesce and did little to take the matter further.   
Some pointed to a lack of unity within Labor, but there was also a suggestion that 
Howard’s political and rhetorical skills made the issue of Iraq a difficult debate to engage in 
without Labor being framed as anti-American or soft on terrorism.  One journalist believed 
that Labor had backed away from Iraq because they did not see it as a vote winner.  
Tanner did not accept that Labor had backed off from applying political heat to Howard 
over Iraq (pers. comm., 30 Jan 2012).   Instead he argued that the media had not been 
that interested when Labor sought to press the matter.  Tanner did, however, acknowledge 
that Iraq was not an issue on which polling suggested that Labor had any ‘natural 
advantages’, that is where the public instinctively believed one party was better suited to 
manage it (pers. comm., 30 Jan 2012).  Howard’s ability to frame the debate contributed to 
Labor’s failure to push the Government on Iraq.  In interview, McLeay spoke about how 
clever Howard was and how difficult it had been to counter Howard’s rhetoric, as well as 
his ability to know what Australian people were thinking.  One journalist suggested that the 
Labor party’s leadership problems had left them weak, disunited and timid, afraid of being 
characterised as soft on national security: in short “all over the place” (pers. comm., 8 Jan 
2013).  S/he suggested that Australia had a “less organised civil society” than the UK for 
example where there had been a strong push for a further inquiry (Chilcott Inquiry).  In 
Australia, the Campaign for an Iraq War Inquiry has not enjoyed wide-spread support and 
nor was the cause taken up by Labor.  The captions to Kelly’s article said it all: “Caught by 
the facts, but PM wins the politics: On Iraq Intelligence, the Howard Government misled 
Australians – and it will get away with it” (2004).  
The evidence suggests that Labor went silent on the issue of Iraq during the post-war 
debate, with key leaders, like Robert Ray, signalling that they were not going to pursue the 
Government over Iraq (see chapter 7).  There were several journalists in both papers 
(including Allard, McGeough and Seccombe at the SMH, and Walters, Price and Kelly at 
the Australian) who challenged the Government narrative, but without support, the media 
alone could not sustain a counter-narrative. 
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Was the Australian consistently more pro-war than the SMH? 
Rupert Murdoch was a strong advocate of intervention in Iraq, as indeed were his papers 
worldwide (Greenslade, 2003, Manne, 2005, McKnight, 2012).  It is rare, however, that 
readers take notice of editorials.  Of interest is the degree to which a paper’s editorial 
position influences other editorial decisions, including opinion and analysis, news content 
and front page treatment – and how the Australian compared with the SMH.   
To begin, the different news priorities of each paper (the Australian placed a greater 
emphasis on international news) meant that readers of the Australian had access to 
almost twice as many articles on Iraq as did readers of the SMH (see table 2.3).  In both 
papers it was clear that Iraq was seen as an important issue: many of those articles were 
published on the front page (11% in SMH and 10% in the Australian, see table 2.6).  While 
the Australian was pro-war and the SMH anti-war, in both papers the balance of opinion 
varied according to the article genre – editorial, opinion/analysis or news (see table 3.7).  
Leader writers at the Australian took a strong pro-war position throughout the conflict (94% 
of editorials were pro-war), while those at the SMH took a less strong anti-war position 
(63% were anti-war, see table 3.1).  In both papers there was a more balanced approach 
to the presentation of views in analysis and opinion articles than in editorials (see table 
3.3).  The SMH’s strong anti-war position remained evident, but the Australian’s analysis 
and opinion articles, while slightly pro-war, were more balanced than expected (see tables 
3.3 and 3.4).   
When it came to straight news coverage, some pre-conceptions were challenged.  Both 
papers were found to have been more likely to publish balanced articles than articles 
which only conveyed a dominant position on the war, and, when papers conveyed a 
position in their news coverage, they were more likely to be anti-war than pro-war in most 
sample periods (see table 3.6).  It is worth noting again that articles were coded as being 
pro-war, balanced or anti-war according to the way they treated particular themes.  For 
example, a pre-war article questioning the existence of WMD was coded as anti-war, as 
was a post-invasion article reporting the failure to find WMD.  As expected, anti-war 
articles increased in the post-invasion periods when the news was dominated by stories 
about the failure to find WMD. 
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It was a surprise to find that both papers were more likely to be balanced or anti-war in 
their straight news coverage, given a wide-spread perception of pro-war bias on the part of 
the Australian.  David Williamson’s comment about Rupert’s ideological line “whack[ing] 
you in the face every time you open the Australian” (Taylor, 2014) is a case in point.  The 
apparent contradiction, however, is explained by understanding the nature of content 
analysis (which treats every piece of information as equal) as opposed to the way people 
actually read newspapers (which is all about prioritising information to be read over 
information to be ignored).  Editors use the front page, for example, to engage the reader:  
to frame the issue of the day in a way which conveys the paper’s views on an issue; to 
attract attention; and/or to engender outrage.  In the print world, the front page invites a 
potential buyer to reach for their purse.  Consistent with the Australian’s editorial position 
on the war, page 1 coverage of Iraq was most likely to be a pro-war article (46%); less 
likely be a neutral article (36%) and even less likely be an anti-war article (18%) (See table 
3.10).  Often there would be a pro-war lead article, balanced by a smaller anti-war opinion 
piece.  In the SMH, page 1 coverage was most likely to carry balanced articles on Iraq 
(53%); around half as likely to run anti-war articles (28%); and even less likely to run pro-
war articles (19%, see table 3.10).   The Australian’s campaigning approach to the Iraq 
war translated into strong pro-war front page articles and headlines, and overwhelming 
support in its editorials (94% of editorials were pro-war, see table 3.7), but news reporting 
tended to be more balanced and the opinion pages, while slightly pro-war (40% pro-war, 
36% anti-war and 24% balanced, see table 3.7), reflected both sides of the debate.  With 
balanced and anti-war articles, headlines sometimes - in both papers - made the content 
appear to be more pro-war than it was.   
This research found that, in broad terms, the Australian was consistently more pro-war 
than the SMH, and that the SMH was consistently more anti-war than the Australian.  
However, comparing different genres and time periods presents a more interesting and 
nuanced picture.  Editorials in both papers and the Australian’s page one conformed to the 
trend, as did analysis and opinion articles in the SMH.  However, analysis and opinion 
articles tended to be more balanced than expected in the Australian, reflecting the 
commitment of the opinions editor, Tom Switzer, to more balanced coverage of the war.  
Perhaps the biggest surprise, however, was the finding that news items in both papers 
were more likely to be balanced than indicate a position, and more anti-war than pro-war 
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when a position was signalled.  This may in part be a reflection of the approach to coding 
(articles were coded according to their balance of themes) and/or sampling (around major 
events, for example inquiries into the failure of pre-war intelligence), but it may also be an 
indication that both the SMH and the Australian employ some excellent journalists who are 
committed to fair and balanced reporting. 
Were the media mindful of public opinion? 
Despite their differing positions on the war, both papers reduced their anti-war coverage by 
more than ten percentage points during the invasion (see table 3.8).  Editors of both 
papers acknowledged the sensitivities around war reporting, while seeking to remain true 
to their editorial positions.  The Australian was twice as likely as the SMH to argue in 
favour of the war or present information about the invasion in heroic or positive terms (38% 
versus 19%); almost as likely as the SMH to publish balanced articles (39% versus 40%) 
and around half as likely as the SMH to publish articles which were anti-war or raised 
serious concerns about the longer-term political consequences of the war (23% versus 
41%, see table 5.4).    
Both papers were clearly conscious of public opinion (see chapter 5).  Journalists spoke 
about a complex dynamic which comes into play when they are covering a war involving 
Australian troops.  While conscious of the need for balanced and objective reporting, 
journalists are also aware of a kind of patriotism - even a reverence for the military - that 
clicks in when the nation goes to war.  This ‘rally-round-the-flag’ effect (Baume, 2003) is 
well documented in the literature, but manifests itself in Australia most obviously as public 
veneration of the Australian soldier and the ANZAC myth.  A week into the invasion, 
despite deep divisions in Australian society over the merits of going to Iraq, public opinion 
had shifted in support of the war, as Howard had predicted it would (Howard, pers. comm., 
20 Feb 2013, Kelly 2009).  Even then the numbers were pretty evenly split (Goot, 
2007(2)).   For the Australian, whose editorial line had always been in favour of the war, 
portraying Australia’s war effort in a heroic light was consistent with its pre-war position.  
The SMH, however, was in a difficult position requiring some nuanced explanation of the 
reasons behind their opposition to the war, while supporting Australia’s troops in the field 
(Whitehead, pers. comm., 19 Dec 2012). 
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This research has enabled a more nuanced appreciation of the dynamics involved when 
the media report on a nation going to war.  It would appear that during times of uncertainty 
and complexity, like war, the media are especially mindful of public sentiment, and make 
sure they are not too far out of step with what they believe to be their readers’ views.  
However, public opinion is just one of several factors taken into account at such times, 
including events as they unfold. 
Could journalists have sustained a political controversy/crisis 
over Iraq?  
There was concern, amongst experts and former public servants interviewed, at what they 
saw as a failure on the part of the bureaucracy to provide advice which critically examined 
the merits of going to war (White, pers. comm., 23 August 2014, 12 Dec 2012, Gration, 
pers. comm., 16 Nov, 2012, Woolcott, pers. comm., 3 Oct. 2012, Fraser, pers. comm., 30 
Jan 2012).  Kelly was the only journalist interviewed for this project who saw the nature of 
the bureaucracy’s pre-war advice to government as an issue (Kelly, pers. comm., 18 June 
2012, Kelly, 2009, p261) which suggests perhaps that many in the media do not have a 
good understanding of the way the APS works – or they do not consider policy advice 
important.  While the Government decided to make some of its intelligence advice public, 
policy advice was excluded from the terms of reference of both the Jull and Flood 
inquiries.  This meant that officials from the key policy departments of PM&C, Defence, 
and Foreign Affairs were not called to give evidence (Jull, 2003(2), pp107-108).  Had they 
been called, they would have had to explain why not one of the three critical policy 
departments – PM&C, DFAT or Defence – had offered advice which questioned the 
wisdom of going to war (see chapter 6).  It is not clear the degree to which policy 
departments differed over the issue of WMD.  Gyngell, was convinced that, like him, his 
former colleagues in the bureaucracy believed that Saddam had WMD; that they were 
more likely to be residual chemical and biological weapons rather than nuclear weapons; 
and that they were unlikely to pose a significant threat.  He suggested that some in the 
bureaucracy believed that differing assessments might have been explained by the 
Americans having access to evidence that had not been shared with the Australians 
(Gyngell, pers. comm., 10 Oct 2012).   
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It may be that strong public support for the US Alliance encouraged both the media and 
the bureaucracy to acquiesce and accept a flawed Government narrative, in the belief that 
war was inevitable.  The Alliance enjoys bipartisan political support, overwhelming public 
support and strong support within the federal bureaucracy - and the Defence Department 
is no exception (Curran, pers. comm., 14 Nov 2012).  Former head of the defence 
department, Ric Smith explained that there were two overriding objectives in Australia’s 
joining the coalition of the willing: “one was about weapons of mass destruction and 
ensuring compliance with the Security Council, et cetera, and the second was about 
serving the US alliance…I mean, the US objectives were ours, and the second one follows 
from that” (Smith pers. comm., 13 Feb. 2013).  He said that the debate in the media about 
the different agendas in Washington was irrelevant to the question of Australian 
involvement.  Questioned about the claimed link between Saddam and al-Qaeda, Smith 
agreed that there had been doubts within the Defence community, but that the whole 
question hinged on the American agenda and Howard’s loyalty to Bush rather than on a 
testing of the claimed connection.   
Evidence suggests that policy advisers within the federal bureaucracy [as distinct from the 
intelligence agencies] raised few, if any, concerns about the Government’s plan to be part 
of the Coalition of the Willing (Shergold pers. comm., 19 Feb 2013; Smith pers. comm., 13 
Feb 2013; Kelly, 2009, p262), despite Australian policy advisers having good reason to 
believe in advance that it wouldn’t work (White, pers. comm., 23 August 2012).  This raises 
the spectre of Australian policy advisers supporting Australia’s participation in a project 
which they believed in advance had limited chances of success: a “dumb idea” as White 
(pers. comm., 23 August 2012) and Gration (pers. comm., 16 Nov 2012) suggested.  
Howard wanted to give the Americans the political support they needed, while maintaining 
time and resource limits on Australia’s contribution – indicative of our (niche) capability, but 
arguably reflecting Australian reservations about phase four, the post-invasion phase 
(Smith, pers. comm., 13 Feb 2013).  The bureaucracy complied.  
Those journalists who saw a policy failure wrote about it, but in the absence of concerted 
Opposition sponsorship, there was not sufficient momentum or critical mass for a counter 
narrative to build into a political crisis.  There was little media support for the Campaign for 
an Iraq War Inquiry which might have included an examination of APS advice to 
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Government. While there was often critical or questioning coverage of the war’s principal 
themes and issues, journalists on their own could not sustain a counter narrative or 
generate the intensity required to create a crisis for the Government (see chapter 7). 
The media agenda 
The media agenda is fluid, responding not just to external influences, but in accordance 
with an organisation’s “own take on the world and its own culture…tied into its own 
commercial and marketing strategy” (Kelly, pers. comm., 18 June 2012).   
Every media organisation has its own unique brand and its own unique culture and it will stand 
or fall according to that…[this is] exemplified in the way the media organisation frames issues.  
The way it frames issues determines what it thinks is news.  Of course stories have got to be 
treated on merit but the fact of the matter is that assessments of merit are going to differ 
according to one’s view of the world as well.  So while we strive all the time, I think, to be fair 
and operate in terms of assessing news on merit, we also have our own view of the world… 
reflected in op-ed pages…in editorials…that is the opportunity to outline in detail the thinking 
and philosophy of the media organisation or the paper (Kelly, pers. comm, 18 June 2012).  
Table 8.1 provides an overview of the findings of the content analysis.  It would appear 
from the table that, while the Government was able to exert a great deal of influence over 
the media agenda (it was the most quoted source before and after the invasion), the 
degree and manifestation of the influence varied across the three stages of the war and 
between newspapers.  For example, while the Government was successful in dictating and 
framing the pre-war discussion around WMD and terrorism (see table 4.1), it was not 
successful in winning editorial support from the SMH (see table 3.1) or in winning public 
opinion until at least a week into the invasion (Goot, 2007(2)).  During the invasion, the 
focus was on the conduct of the war and day-to-day developments in the conflict (see 
table 5.1).  Much of this coverage was of US troops, and US and UK battle plans, given 
the almost total silence on the part of Australian Defence officials about what Australian 
forces were doing at this time (see chapter 4).  The most quoted Australian sources during 
the invasion were other journalists in the SMH (often embedded with the US or UK forces), 
and experts in the Australian (see table 5.14).  The war, rather than the Government, took 
centre stage (see table 5.1).  As Howard had expected, public opinion swung toward a 
balanced position (slightly in favour of the war (Goot 2007(2)), and both papers were, 
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according to their own account, very aware of the sensitivities involved in war-time 
reporting (see chapter 5).  In the post-invasion period, Australian domestic political fallout 
from the war was the most quoted theme in both papers (see table 6.3).  While 
government returned to being the most quoted source (see table 6.7), the failure to find 
WMD and deteriorating security made the ‘situation in Iraq’ the second most covered 
theme in both papers (see table 6.3).  The Australian’s front page coverage moved from 
being strongly pro-war to balanced (see table 3.13), while opinion and analysis articles 
moved from being pro-war to anti-war as the search for WMD proved fruitless (table 3.3).  
 
Table 8.1  The media agenda: an over view of trends and influences  
Themes, sources, direction and public opinion across each paper at each stage of the war 
 
 Pre-invasion Invasion Post-invasion 
SMH 
Most quoted theme 
WMD and 
terrorism 
Conduct of the 
war 
Aus. domestic political 
fallout 
Most quoted sources Government Government Government 
Nationality most quoted Australian Australian Australian 
Most quoted Australian source Government Journalists Government 
Direction: front page Balanced Balanced Balanced 
Direction: editorials 
Anti-war Anti-war/ 
Balanced 
Anti-war 
Direction: opinion/analysis Anti-war Anti-war Anti-war 
Direction: news Balanced Balanced Balanced 
Overall direction Anti-war Anti-war Anti-war 
Public opinion Anti-war Balanced Anti-war 
Australian 
Most quoted theme 
WMD and 
terrorism 
Conduct of the 
war 
Aus. domestic political 
fallout 
Most quoted sources Government Government Government 
Nationality most quoted Australian Australian Australian 
Most quoted Australian source Government Experts Government 
Direction: front page Pro-war Pro-war Balanced 
Direction: editorials Pro-war Pro-war Pro-war 
Direction: opinion/analysis Pro-war Pro-war Anti-war 
Direction: news Balanced Balanced Balanced 
Overall direction Pro-war Balanced Balanced 
Public opinion Anti-war Balanced Anti-war 
 
While the Government appeared to have less influence over the media agenda in the post-
invasion period a couple of observations need to be made.  A content analysis, by its 
nature, measures what is in the papers, rather than what is not.   What it did show was that 
in the post-invasion period, when the first intelligence inquiry (Jull, 2003(2)) reported in a 
way that was potentially damaging to the Government, the media sought to create an 
issue out of it, but the matter died in the absence of either a scandal sponsor or a 
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Government response that would have fed perceptions of impropriety.  Headlines that in 
the UK sparked government inquiries and the death of a British scientist, were largely 
ignored in Australia.  Silence proved to be an effective strategy on the part of the 
Government, and the absence of an organised or determined Opposition meant that the 
Government simply moved on to other business.   
Howard’s contriteness about intelligence failures and his announcement of a further inquiry 
(the Flood inquiry) suggested a sincere desire on his part to get to the bottom of the 
problem, while regretting having done what any reasonable Prime Minister would have 
done, which was to act on advice.   Howard used deflection to great effect, for example, 
his use of US and UK intelligence (later discredited) to justify the invasion did not prevent 
the Government commissioning two inquiries into advice provided by Australian 
intelligence agencies (later found to be “more moderate and cautious” than their US and 
UK counterparts, and that the “most sceptical” assessments proved the most accurate 
(Jull, 2003, p113)).   
Howard was also adept at stonewalling.  For many months after David Kay, head of the 
Iraq Survey Group, had admitted that ‘we were nearly all wrong’ and that he was satisfied 
there were no WMD in Iraq, Howard maintained that it was too early to say that there were 
no WMD to be found (Tiffen, 2006, Blix, 2005).  Almost a year after the invasion, Howard 
was still saying it was too soon to judge whether WMD would be found.  In February 2004 
he responded to questions about whether he would have supported war knowing Iraq’s 
capability in WMD was negligible with the response that it was “an absurdly hypothetical 
question” (Garran 2005, p5, Tiffen, 2006): a position belied by his pre-war caution to avoid 
making categorical claims about Saddam’s WMD capability.  Howard’s stonewalling 
bought him time as he was rarely challenged by the media or the Opposition.  It also 
limited political damage and, in the lead-up to the 2004 election, Howard’s election theme 
was one of trust: “Who do you trust to lead the fight on Australia's behalf against 
international terrorism?"  Howard’s influence prevented what, under slightly different 
circumstances, might have been a major political controversy.  Once again he had proved 
a master at “skilful agenda management” and “defensive spin control” (Tiffen, 2006). 
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Models of agenda formation and their limitations 
The Government’s influence over the media agenda during the pre-war period seems to fit 
with both W. Lance Bennett’s indexing model and Robert Entman’s cascading network 
activation model, and both models provide valuable insights.  The Opposition’s low share 
of voice during the three pre-war sample periods appears to reflect the Opposition’s 
difficulties before the invasion in establishing a clear position on Iraq that differentiated it 
from the Government.  Bennett’s model suggests that when there are clearly delineated 
positions held by political elites these are reflected (or indexed) in media content.  Right up 
until mid-February 2003 when US and UK attempts to secure a second UN resolution 
failed, the Opposition’s position on the war was not easily distinguishable from that of the 
Government.  Howard’s claim that the Government had not yet decided about participating 
in the invading coalition, and his purported support for a second UN resolution, effectively 
limited the grounds on which both the Labor opposition and the media could attack.  It was 
only after the failure of the second resolution that differences became clearer.  Even then, 
it was Labor that came under a lot of media criticism for their shifting position on the war, 
rather than Howard for his apparent reversal in supporting war despite the failure to secure 
a UN mandate.   Entman’s cascading network activation model is consistent with a pre-war 
media agenda initiated and largely controlled by Government - and Entman’s model 
suggests a feedback loop where public opinion in turn influences the media agenda, which 
in turn influences government decisions.  While it is true that Howard was mindful of the 
strength of public opposition to the war, and decisions about the level and nature of 
Australian involvement may have reflected this, there is no evidence that public opinion or 
media content influenced the Government’s actual decision to participate in the coalition of 
the willing.  Rather it appears that Howard’s mindfulness of the strength of public 
opposition to the war influenced the presentation and timing of his arguments rather than 
the decision to go to war.   
During the Iraq invasion, the rally-round-the-flag effect was reflected in both public opinion 
and in press coverage, with cause and effect unclear – but with the end result of 
congruence in the direction of changes in media coverage and public opinion.  During the 
invasion both papers were less anti-war, more balanced and more pro-war than their pre-
war coverage, though SMH remained more anti-war than pro-war (see table 5.6).  This 
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accords with Christie’s agenda-public opinion congruence model, which suggests that the 
media agenda is never too far out of step with public opinion, especially when there is an 
evident trend one way or the other (2006).  Politicians and the media are acutely aware of 
the ‘rally-round the flag’ effect, which might contribute to its being a self-fulfilling prophesy.   
However, the effect can be short lived if the war drags on; if there are many casualties 
(fortunately few in Australia’s case); or if the public feel they are being lied to.  Entman’s 
cascading network activation model describes the influence of government, other elites 
and media and public opinion over the media agenda.  During war-time, while the 
government holds tight to the flow of information, they are also vulnerable to factors 
beyond their control, for example, the day-to-day progress of the war effort – which is 
absent from the model.  Public opinion is also arguably a more powerful influence on the 
media agenda during war-time because of community sensitivities about the fate of 
Australian soldiers serving abroad.    
During the post-invasion period, Entman’s cascading network activation model appears to 
be the best of the three models at describing the influence of government over the media 
agenda, but in the post-invasion context the Government was operating with less political 
latitude than it had before the war.  The Government’s influence at this stage was in part 
the result of deliberate action (for example the leaking of the Jull report and announcement 
of a further inquiry), but also the absence of further revelations which might have served to 
fan the flames of crisis.  Despite overwhelming public opinion that the war had been a 
mistake, public statements by senior Labor figures ruled out any opposition campaign to 
pursue Howard over Iraq.   As a result, the efforts of some sections of the media quickly 
faded and the Howard Government was spared a political crisis.  
Each of the three models provides some insight into the dynamics which may have been 
operating at different stages of the war, but fails to capture the full complexity of the 
dynamics in play.  Bennett’s indexing model describes a tendency on the part of the media 
to index the opinions of the elites in their coverage of issues.  This may be a reflection of 
the value journalists place on balance, fairness and authoritative sources, which often 
manifests as following a quote from one party with a quote from a critic or devoting 
equivalent column centimetres to each side of a debate.  The indexing model, however, 
does not take account of the interplay between the media agenda and public opinion, or 
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the feedback that occurs when elites moderate their positions in response to media 
coverage or public opinion polling.  Nor does the indexing model take account of the self-
censorship that takes place on the part of the media during war-time, when coverage is 
enormously sensitive to public concern about the fate of Australian soldiers serving 
abroad.  
Christie’s congruence model, which suggests that the media agenda is never too far out of 
line with public opinion, appeared more apt during the invasion period when there was 
intense attention and concern focused on Australian troops abroad.  During the pre-
invasion and post-invasion phases, however, the terms of the media debate were being 
framed by the Government, in the face of public opposition to the war.  Christie’s model 
fitted the SMH more than the Australian, because the Herald’s decision to oppose the war 
was in accord with public opinion before and after the invasion.  During the invasion, 
however, the SMH found itself out of step with a majority (albeit small) who supported the 
war effort.  On this point, Whitehead, SMH editor at the time, was vehement in his 
assertion that the SMH’s editorial position had been made without consideration for public 
opinion.   Useful as it is, the Christie model does not consider the role played by elites in 
setting the agenda, nor the influence, for example, of organisational culture or an activist 
proprietor. 
Entman’s cascading network activation model captures the multifaceted and dynamic 
nature of the complex relationship between the elites, the media and public opinion and 
provides a useful framework within which to study the influences on the media agenda and 
news frames.   This model perhaps best describes the nature of the power of governments 
to shape the media agenda, while also taking into account the influence of other 
politicians, public servants, other experts and public opinion.  However, while there are 
shared news values between journalists (and this study found more similarities than 
expected), the media agenda is not homogenous or fixed: it is constantly being 
renegotiated within and between publications, news organisations, editors and journalists.  
It can be contradictory, as exampled by the challenging headline “PM’s spin sexed-up Iraq 
threat” on the front page of the usually anti-war Australian on 2 March 2004 (Walters, 
2004).  There can be many media agendas operating at the same time.  While editors at 
the Australian claimed never to have been directed by Murdoch to take a particular 
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position on the war, Murdoch has been frank in his admission of having used his papers to 
promote the war.  An activist proprietor is perhaps another influence which might be 
included in the model. 
What is missing from the original cascading network activation model, Entman expanded 
on in Scandal and Silence: Media responses to presidential misconduct (2012) – and that 
is the power to keep something out of the media agenda.  Public relations practitioners 
have long focused attention on what Tiffen calls “defensive spin control” or “agenda 
management” (Tiffen, 2006).  A critical finding of the research was that, while the media 
were important in keeping the government honest, they did not have the power to elevate 
an issue into a crisis without the involvement of a crisis sponsor, such as the Opposition or 
the courts or another authoritative body.   Entman suggests that for an issue to become a 
crisis it is not just a matter of media attention: that the media cannot simply “beat up” a 
story over time to create a crisis (2012).  For an issue to be sustained as a crisis, in 
addition to media interest, there need to be other credible parties sponsoring the crisis 
narrative.  Entman points out, “scandal magnitude is determined more by the manipulative 
skills of sponsors and their opponents than by substantive judgements about the facts of 
malfeasance and their effect on society” (2012, p204).   
Conclusion 
Taking the nation to war is probably the gravest decision a government makes.  To do so 
on a false premise and escape with minimal political retribution is extraordinary.  It is not 
that the press were incompetent: rather that at times they appeared to lack the contacts or 
curiosity to interrogate the government narrative more than they did.  Before the war, the 
focus was on intelligence material which was inaccessible to the media.  But after the 
invasion, when it came to reporting on the findings of the Inquiry into Intelligence on Iraq's 
weapons of mass destruction (Jull, 2004(b)), many in the media behaved as a pack, 
primed to cover the report through the “politicised intelligence” frame prompted by the 
leaking of parts of the report (see chapter 7).  Almost en masse the media failed to 
understand the implication of the full report when it was released: that is that the advice 
being provided to the Government by Australia’s intelligence agencies did not provide a 
compelling case for war.  It is an irony that despite Murdoch’s support for the war, the 
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Australian appeared to be more critical of the Government over the Jull report than was 
the SMH.   
There was considerable anti-war coverage in both papers and public opinion turned 
against the war after the invasion, having only temporarily supported the war during the 
active phase of the invasion.  These factors might have presented a problem for the 
Government as Iraq descended into civil war.  But the Opposition inexplicably failed to use 
the damaging findings of the Jull report to create a political crisis for the Government.  
Labor seemed strangely powerless to mount an effective attack, with Senator Ray cutting 
much of the ground from under a possible Labor campaign.  In the absence of a sponsor 
for a crisis narrative, the media kept the story going for a while, but it petered out when 
there was no new material to feed it.  
 ‘Truth will out in the end’ is a common adage, but sometimes the media are so blinded by 
a particular way of looking at an issue that they fail to see the truth, or the significance of 
the truth, when it is in front of them.  The tendency of the media to follow the prevailing 
interpretation of an issue sometimes makes it difficult for another reading to emerge after 
an issue has been framed in a particular way.  As Entman has observed, “contrary to 
some writing on scandals, then, fact may not eventually dominate over falsehood, nor 
must the preponderance of evidence necessarily trump a clever defence strategy” (2012, 
p126).  The Iraq case study has shown how Howard’s political skills, in particular his 
“skilful agenda management and his defensive skills in news management” (Tiffen, 2006) 
enabled him to survive what, for Bush and Blair, proved much more difficult times.  It is 
also a demonstration of how traditional mainstream journalism “remains susceptible to 
skilled manipulation and distraction that allow cover-ups to succeed” (Entman, 2012, 
p127). 
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Appendix: People interviewed  
 Date interviewed 
Journalists and editors 
Nick Bryant – BBC journalist in Washington during the Iraq invasion 3 December 2012 
Roy Eccleston – Australian’s correspondent in Washington  21 January 2013 
Matthew Franklin – formerly editor, Brisbane Courier Mail 4 December 2012 
Peter Fray – SMH London correspondent during the war 31 October 2012 
Paul Kelly – Editor-at-large, the Australian. 18 June 2012 
Steve Lewis – journalist at the Australian during the Iraq invasion 4 February 2013 
Paul McGeough – SMH middle east correspondent during the Iraq war 29 November 2012 
Alan Ramsey – SMH journalist and opinions writer 4 December 2012 
Mike Seccombe – SMH journalist during the invasion 6 December 2012 
Dennis Shanahan – Political Editor, the Australian  4 December 2012 
Michael Stutchbury – Editor, the Australian, during the Iraq invasion, 
currently editor-in-chief of the Australian Financial Review 
29 January 2013 
Tom Switzer – Opinions editor, the Australian, during the invasion 19 March 2012 
Linsday Tuffin – Former sub-editor, Hobart Mercury 30 June 2013 
Robert Whitehead – Fairfax editor, SMH, during the Iraq war 19 December 2012 
Journalist - non-attributable  8 January 2013 
Journalist - non-attributable  24 January 2013 
 
Current and former politicians 
Hon John Howard, OM, AC – 25th Prime Minister of Australia 20 February 2013 
Hon R.J.L. Hawke, AC, GCL – 23rd Prime Minister of Australia 21 February 2013 
Hon Malcolm Fraser, AC, CH, GCL – 22nd Prime Minister of Australia  30 January 2013 
Robert Hill, AC – former Senator and Minister for Defence 12 February 2013 
Lindsey Tanner – former Labor Minister for Finance 30 January 2013 
Leo McLeay – former Speaker of the House of Representatives, member 
of Parliamentary Joint Committee on ASIO, ASIS and DSD 
2 May 2013 
Andrew Wilkie – Independent MP, former ONA whistleblower 23 January 2013 
 
Experts  
Rod Barton – former UN weapons inspector 16 November 2012 
James Curran – Assoc. Prof., History Department, University of Sydney 14 November 2012 
Cavan Hogue – former diplomat, Adjunct Prof.  Department of 
Communication, Macquarie University, and member of the Group of 43 
12 December 2012 
Hugh White, AO – Professor of Strategic Studies, School of International, 
Political & Strategic Studies, ANU 
23 August 2012 
Richard Butler, AC – Professor of International Affairs, Penn State 
University, former Australian diplomat and UN weapons inspector  
31 January 2013 
Gen Peter Gration – former Chief of the Australian Defence Forces  16 November 2012 
Dr Klaus-Peter Klaiber KCMG – German Ambassador to Australia during 
Iraq war, Visiting Fellow, ANU Centre for European Studies 
17 September 2012 
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 Date interviewed 
Current and former public servants 
Philip Flood, AO – former Secretary of the Department of Foreign Affairs 
and Trade (DFAT) and Head of the Inquiry into Australia’s Intelligence 
Agencies 
4 December 2012 
Allan Gyngell, AO – former Executive Director, Lowy Institute, former 
Director-General, ONA,  Visiting Fellow, Crawford School of Public 
Policy, ANU 
10 October 2012 
Frank Lewincamp – former Director, Defence Intelligence Organisation 
(DIO), Visiting Fellow, Crawford School of Public Policy, ANU  
18 September 2012 
Dennis Richardson, AO – Secretary of Defence, former Secretary of 
Foreign Affairs and Trade, and former Director-General, Australian 
Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) 
16 November 2012 
Michael Thawley, AO – Secretary of the Department of the Prime 
Minister and Cabinet, former Australian Ambassador to Washington, 
international adviser to the former Australian Prime Minister, John 
Howard 
20 November 2013 
Dr Peter Shergold, AC – former Secretary, Department of Prime Minister 
and Cabinet (PM&C), Chancellor, Western Sydney University 
19 February 2013 
Richard Smith, AO, PSM – former Secretary, Department of Defence 13 February 2013 
Richard Woolcott, AC – former Secretary, Department of Foreign Affairs 
and Trade 
3 October 2012 
Un-named former Australian Embassy official, Washington (off the 
record) 
7 March 2013 
Margaret Swieringa – former Secretary, Parliamentary Joint Committee 
on ASIO, ASIS and DSD (Jull Committee) 
24 April 2013 
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